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PREFACE
The writer's interest in sociocultural integration began with one of the

first works he reported on in his graduate studies in sooiologyJ Sorokin· s
Soc1al

~

Cultural D,ynamics" volume I.

'When an acquaintance pointed out some

si."1lilarit1es between Sorok1n's sociology and the ph1.losopby of science worked
out by Bernard Lonergan, S.J. 1n Insiibt, the writer read Insight in order to
make the comparison more expUcit. l'inalq, the writer'. interest in Redfield
Callie .!'.rom a specific interest in small vlllag& canmun1t1ea, wh10b in turn

steDned tram an 1u1iel"e8t in the miaaione ot India and lfepal.
concerned bimaelt

wrr muoh

For Redfield

with the integrat.ion ot small communities, with

studying them &I wholes.

The present thesis is an attesupt to bring together

80M

ot the results of

what might be ce.lled a discwJaion between three thinkers who have played a

great role in molding the writer's thinking about society and culture.

Other

men enter the d1acus8ion, especially prominent 18 Michael Polany1, who b.u made

a 8ip:ttioant contribution to the wr1ter' s understanding ot society and
culture.

-

The thesis 1s not a systematiC presentation

ot the theories ot

the men in the dialogue, nor is it primarily a criticism

any one ot

ot their ideas. It ie

rather a selection of those ideas and concepts which the writer judges will be
useful in carrying out research in small comnnmit1es.
11

------------

Richard W. Moodey, S.J. wu born on July 31, 1933
in Painesville, Ohio.

He attended Mentor High School, :Hentor, Ohio where
he graduated in l~.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
THE PROBIEM

A.
1.

Redfield's toraulation.

Robert Redfield..,.. that he first sees a

village or COIlII1nity that he atud1.s .s an "intuited whole .. It in much the same
fashion u he first saw the Mcma Lisa or P1caeao' s "Guernica U as wholes.. or as

he apprehends the tace ot a living person. H:u lIOi.nt.1t1c training as an
anthropologist, however, prevents him froM going out 1mmedlate17 to wite a

book baaed upon his first impression. For he beoo:mea critical. of his first
impression.

'1'be problem becomes one of analys1a ot the or1g1na1 whole, and re-

synthesis of the analyzed parts into a sy8tam.
intuited whole.

"I ..e a col'llml.nity first as an

I then begin to understand part1cular things about it. From

connections nov discovered among these parts I conceive of systems. We shall
become interested here in cona1dering the poaalbillty that very much, perhaps
all,

ot the lite ot a comma.n1ty Jnq

be conoelwd as jut a rev qetems,

possibly 88 one all-encompaas1ng .,.ta.
study proceeds,

2.

Can an lnt1l1ted whole gift vay, as
1

to one equal.l1' comprehenalw analyzed qst.am?"

Soroldn t s tormulat1oa.

logist, Pit1r1m SorOJdnI

A 81111lar queetlon baa been put by a socio-

"Is e'YfJr'T culture an integrated whole, Where no

1rhe L1ttle COBII'lun1tl (Chioago, 195,), pp. 17-19.
1

2

essential part i. incidental but each is orpnioall¥ connected with the rest?
Or i.e it a mere spatial oongeries ot CNltural objects, values, traita, vb1ch

bave drifted tortuitoual;r together and are united on17 by their spatial
adjacency, just b;r the tact that they are thrO'iID together. and by nothing
more?,,2 Sorold.n's "int.crated whole" lIOUld seem to correspond rather close17
to Redfield'. idea ot an "8D.8l.yaed

J.

~

heuristic

~.2!

.,..tem.

integration.

what might be called a "heuristic theor;r"
cOCIDlWlit1GS

ot the type mentioned

keeping diff'erent theories or

tt

This thesis will be devoted to

or the

by Redfield.

~theses

)
to Joseph Bensman and Arthur V1d10h,

integra.tion

or

small village

A heuristic theory in'l;'Olves

reacv tor use in research.
.

According

heuristic theorj' d1£f'ers .t.rom "cod.1f'1ca-

tion of theoretical perspectives," tor such codU'icatlon is a logical synthesis
in terms

ot the

p:.t~opositions

in the theories, and t.be camposite perspective

thua./ach1evad is applied as a unit to research problema.

however, "allOHB past theory to remain as a residua

or

Heuristic theory,

latent possibilities

'Which the research worker can bring to bear on his specific field problem."
But it "cannot 'WOrk 11' the reseazoch worker on

! P£!.ori grounds 18 unwilling

to

entertain the pos.ibility of' using or seriously eonaidering all or a variety ot

the available theories. ,,4 The toClle ot th1e the.is on a heuristic theory of'

28ooi&1 and Cultural DzD!!1cs (New York, 1937-1941), I, 3.

'l'hia work will

be re.terred to as pjii!!1cs.

-

)"300iolog10al Theory in Field Research," AJS, LXV (May, 1960), p. 58).

4Ibid •

-

3
integration in small communities is a result or an anticipation on the part of
the writer of research in small cOl!mlt1U1ties in Northern India and Nepal.

It is

likely, however, that the results or the thesis lIOuld be applicable tow.rda
the study of larger areas, or even towards a syatematic theory of social and
cultural integration.

The work ot Redtield and Sorokin will be Qed in this

thesis because the writer judges their work to be particularly relevant to the
problem.

Redt1eld himaeU tocuses b1s work on small communities.

Soroldn

works in the area ot general tbeOI'7, but his ·grand scale It tbeOl7 as presented
in his I?z'n!t!4os centers on the problem. of integration.
theee volumes are an investigation of the
integrated culture.
rhythms, tempos.

na~

"Considered objeotively

and change, the

~os

ot

its types, its processes, its trends, fluctuatiOns,

The m&1n material with which this inftstigation deals is that

provided b7 the Oraeco-Roman and We8terft civilizations during the more than

5

twenty-five hundred ,ears ot their histo17. 1f

B.
1. Sl!tem 2!:. oopprtes.

THE PROCEDURE

Knowledge of the little conmmn1ty as an intuited

whole depends upon a pereonal experience ot that cOIllllWlity.

This knowledge

depends upon how the cODmUDity &treats the observer; it is mare akin to an
aesthetic experience than to a scient1tic explanation.

From such personal

experiences, the scientist viabes to proceed to more precise statements which
can be subjected to ver1tication. And he laya down rules ot procedure which
specU'7 the means to be taken to reach the desired end.

5Dynamics, I, x.

Redfield spec1tied the

end as knowlfJdce ot the lit.tle oommunit.y aa an anal7Sed
a step turther and specitied alternat.ive

.,..tea.

~t.heses--~

Sorok1n 'lent

culture might be

either an integrated whole, a syst.em in Redfield's term8, or a congeries,
whioh lacks S78tematio relationships.
2.

Smitioation!!!!,!!~.

SiDae it is neoessar;y to have some

methodical wq ot workiD& towarda one' s goal in research, one lIlU8t somehow
specify the goal. ot hia researoh at the outset. Bernard 14nerpn.· S.J. s..,..
that this speoitication 18 the tunotlon
achieve understanding, but theY' do

80

or

the heur1atio structure.

"Scientist

only at the end ot an inquiry. Moreover,

their iDf:lU1r1' 18 methodical, and method

co~ts

in ordering means to achieve

an end. But how can _ana be ordered to an end wben the end 18 knowledge and
the knowledge is not ,.t acquired? The anllWfJr 18 the heuristic structure.
Name the unkno1m..

Work out ita properties. Use the properties to direct,
6
order, guide tbe inqu1r7. If
). Alterutive hypotheses.

Two auch heuristic structures worked out bY'

IDnergan are cl.aical and atatistioal heuristic stru.otures.

Arrr range ot

obserYatioDa can be subewned under either one ot the heur1atic struotur.s-01ass1oal or statistioal.

"On the torarr lvPothesis it will be possible to

discover some orderlY' s81"ies, progression, or grouping.

On the latter

hypothesis no suoh series, proll"ession, or lVouping exists.

Both hypothese.

can be tormulated, their implications are to be wrked out J and the tacts are
to decide which h1Pothesu is, if' not ultimate truth, at least the beat

6

wight, 2nd ed. (New York, 1958), p.

4U.

--available op1n1on at the given stage ot scientific developnent."
"orderly series, pt"Ogr'esa1on, or groUpinglf

S881118

to soroldn's "integrated whole,· and the lack

7

The

to correspond to aome extent

ot such an orderly series,

progression" or grouping seems to COlT_pond to a "congeries. 1f
". Redtield' 8 torma

2! t~.

Instead ot speak1ng ot "heur1atic

structures, If Redtield speaka ot the "tonu ot thought It that help towards
knowledge ot the little community as an anal)'zed s1St..

"What shall be the

torma ot thought that vill help us toward this mre strictly controlled
knowledge, a knowledge that will pre.ern some of the holistic qualities ot the

8

things compared?"

Again, he asksl

the parts ot the conception to

OM

"What is, the torm ot the arrangements ot
another? Or, to what model" present to

experience from some other source than the human oommUD1ty" does tb.1a chos.
holistic cOQOept tend to conform?" As exaplu ot models he

giftS

ft. k1nd. ot

machine,· • "ft8t orgaD1_,· a "textbook on tormal 10gic,1f and "drama or other
torms ot literary art.,,9 Altogether, Redtield gives five DlXiels.

the causal

model, the f\mctional model, the logical model, the aesthetic model, and the
The caual. and the functional model correspond to the machine
10
and t.he O1"ganiam, and are the mdels that are predom1Dant in nat.ural science.
symbolic model.

-

7Ibid ., p. 67.

~e Little C01n1IIWl1t.l, p. 2.

-

9Ibid., pp. 1,-16.
l°"The Relation ot Ant.hropology to the Social Sciences and t.he Humanit.ies,,1f
Ant.bropoloSl T~, ed. A.L. Kroeber (Chicago, 19,2), pp. 733-73,.

---6
Each ot these models is a way ot wrk1ng out. the properties ot the unknown in
order to use theae propert.1es to "d1reot, order, guide the inquiry. It Thq can
be regarded as alternative ~the8e. which require a controntation nth the

tacts in order that the best mieht be chosen.

Speaking

thought that "when at least two named things are

80

ot these forma ot

ident1t1ed in the pre-

arrangement, and when fUrther lome cormection between tbe two is supposed, then
I have posed a question of a relationship.

then the prearrangement.. the

initial. mental torm, includes l!JOIleth1ng often called a 'bypothesis'--a toresc3D
connection or relationship stated in such a
11
disproof. "

5. Sorokin' I torme

~

Wtq'

aa to tacilitate ita proof or

1nteFat10n. Soroldn attirJu the necelsity ot

working out the propert.ies ot the unknown in order to pide the 1nqu1rT when he
sharplT critioizes inveatigators ot culture

_0

"taU to elucidate exaot17

what 1ihey zr.ean by integration or unity or interdependence of parts or organic
character as applied to a culture." He theretore proposel to work out more
specit1c "u1n forma ot relationship between the varioua culture traits,
characteristiol, and oomplexes tram the standpoint ot 1ntepoation.,,12 The torm

ot relationship in a culture can
ot

S1Btemel

u80c1ation due to

loaico-meaninatul.

1)

be that

atl external

-

l)Ibid., p. 10.

7.

factor, oausal-tunctional, or

Sorokin later distinguish.s bet'tftlfm two tqpe8 ot

ll.rbe Little CcInDam1tl. pp. 152-153.
12~., I,

ot a congeries, or one of three types

7
congeries I

(1) those that are lfapat1allT aontipoua aDd peroeptionally

a1m1lar," and (2) thol. that are lfapat1alq contiguous and mecbanical'l1' cohesive. 1t And he apeaka of tour types ot 878temar

(3) indirect cauaal-tunational

which 18 the same .. a unitT due to "lOc1ation with an external tactor, (4)
direct causal-functional, (5) 10gico-mean1qtul, and (6) a synth.sis ot log1.aomeaD1ngtul and causal-tunctional.. 14 Lik. Redfi.ld' a forms

ot thought or

models, the•• aix ditter_t kinds ot un1tiea can serve as alternative
hypothe••s collC8l"ldng the vq a little co-.mity 18 integrated.

6. ...Pr...oc
......edtare
............. g!

~

thena. The procedure in this ttl••iI will be to

name the unk:no1m or UIllaIo1ms wh1ch mwst

bec~

known i t one 1s

to understand

the integration ot a little ocamm1tYJ to work out the properti88 ot the un-

known,

and to 1Ddioate how thue propert1e. can guide empirical 1nqu1ry.

The

propert1es, ot course, will be different. accord.1.Dl to d1tterent. po.a1ble

'WIq8

that. the ooJlDlllJll1ty can be integrated. ADd Redfield ad Soroldn can be used
to point out V. different h1Potb.elea concerning intesration.

Redt1eld

pro'lides more apecit1c 1II&ter1al dealing with small OOJIIIl11Il1ties, but Sorokin

providea a w1der theoret.ical context in which to locate the problem ot
intep'ation.

P1u.117, Lonergan provides a .tillmore general context, tor he

deal. with the nature

or

heu.:r18tio .tNotun. in general.

And a tfJfI more

1ntroductory wrda oOReaming the nature ot hev1at10 .truoture lII1at be siven.

14. S001.t.T, Culture, !!!! Per.onal1tl (New York, 1947), p.

14,.

8
C.

1.

!h! conc!p!

~

nature.

HEURISTIC STRUCTURE

In Redtield' 8 statement of the problem of

integration, the investigator must proceed from an "intuited whole" to "one
equally compreben81ve analyzed system. It

Th18 involves going tram a personal

experience qu1te sim11ar to the appreciation of a work of art auch as the Mona

Lisa--an experience which can be delcribed--to a scientific explanation.
Redf'1eld brinp out the contrast between such an aesthet1c description aDd a

8cientU1c explanation, but sees "a continuum ot effort and

ways

ot work

between tbe novel1st and the stat1atioal experimenter. II One should be aware ot
where one is on that continuum, but should no~ stop work

tor

tear ot not being

scientitic enough to sat1817 everyone. for "be oonaun1oatioft of the nature ot
a culture, a community, or a wrk ot art, il part of the business and the joy
of human linne, and neede to be carried on whether or not there is a strictly
behavioral 8Cience. ttl5

Talking about "the nature ot a culture" is using a kind

of heur1atio concept, for it points out that there is an unknown to be kao1m,
whether it 18 tA> be known by art1lt1c or soientllia means.

Talking about

natures is not restricrtred to 8C1ent1at.a J philosophers 11lce to do it too. For a

scientist, however, a nature is not knowD, even approx:1m.&tel3', Wltil a
l:\Ypothesis baa been fomulated about it and has been verified.

In scient1t1c

research, it 11 uuallT not 8Utticient to name the unknown "tbe nature of
culture," but 11 lWO.laary to spec1ty the concept by how it 11 to be lmo1m.
But it, for example, one specifies that culture is a system to be known. by'

establ18hing precise correlations between variables, oae 1s on a more

15!h!, ;Little Cormawdtl, pp. 166-167.

9
~otheticaJ.

level than if he merelY' aska about the nature of culture.

For

the nature ot ou.lture, or ot this particular culture, ma;y' not be By'steroatic;
it might be a co'ngeries.
2.

!

mathematical !!!5?le.

The function ot naming the unknown "the

nature ot culture" oan be illustrated by a mat.....ematical exa1J1ple.
it is common to nUle the unknown number "x. 1f

In algebra,

Then if one has a problem, sucb

as determining the first time af'ter three o'clock that the l1dnute hand will

exact.l.y cover the hour hand, one can write dowl
minutes atter three o'clock."

'·Lat x be the number ot

Then, one can inter that 'while the minute hand

moves over x minutes, the hour hand move8 over x/12 minutes.
observes that at three o'clock the hour hand haa a

15

ibird1y, one

minute start.- There

tollow the equations
X.

There were tour stepI"

-

x
12

"(1) giving the unknown a name or symbol (2) inferring

the properties and relatione of the unknown, (3) grasping the p08sibUity' ot
combining these properties and relations to torm an equation, and (4) solv:ing

the equation. II Lonergan generalizes front the example, appl.ying the mathematical example to empirical inquiry I
In every empirical inquiry there are known8 and unknowns. But
the knowns are apprehended whet.~er or not one understands J th.,- are
the data of' sense. The unknowns, on the other hand, are what one
will grasp by insight and formulate in concer>tions and suppositions.

Accordingly, let us bestow a name upon the unknown. Rather
let us advert to the fact that alread7 1 t has been named. Jor
what is to b. known by understanding these data is called their
nature. Just as in algebra the unknown number is x, until one
tIndi out what the number i8, so too in empirical inquiry', the

10

bT ina1ght is named •the nature ot • • • • t
Once Gal1lee discovered bis law, be knew that the nature ot a tree
tall was a conatant aoceleratiLon. But before be dUcovered the
law, !'rom the _" tact that he inquired, be knew that a tree tall
possessed a aature, tb.ouib be did not know what that nature waa. 16

unknOwn to be reached

). MetuocioloV.
gathered in the 11ttle

To attinn that there 115 some

~lligib11iV

in data

OOIrllItUlitT i8 to ma.ke a metuooiological, not a 80cio-

logical judpent. Aa Fr. Paul Hanly Furter says. metaaociology Eurniehed "t1.o
methodological presuppositions neceaaar;y tor carl')'inl out sociological research

const.ruct1nc sociological systems, and cr1ticiz1ne; ncb syatema

att,8l" they haw

been completed.,,17 AJld the soclo10C1at or anthropologist, like Galilee,

b7

the

mere tact ot hi8 1nqu.1.r.y, att1rma that the ob3ects ot hie study pos.ess some

intelligibility, a aatore to be cruped by 1na1cht.

4. Galilee' • •c1eut.1t1c advance. When Galilee aft1rmed that a tree tall
had a nature to be d18covered, he did not yet haw an explanation.

an explanation he mean.redl
the deter.1nate amount

or

To obtain

el) the determinate distaDoe ot a tall, and. (2)

time a bodl' takes to cOYer that diatance. Atter a

serie. ot measurements, he diacovered in them a pt'l8ral rule.
traversed 111 proportional. to the time squared. 1I18 ThWI Galilee

"the distance
went, beyond

his

Pl"e-scientilio Aristotelean opponent.a, who ....e content to talk about the
nature of U.ght. the nature of beat, etc. Galilee 1nau&urated modern science
by lnaut1nc that the nature

ot weight wu not enough, from sensible s1Jrdlarity

l6tonergara, pp. )6-37.

17'l'be Scope
York, lm-), p.

am

8:-

Method of Soc101oq.

18Lonergan, pp. )3-34.

-

! Metaaociological treatise (New

11
which resides in the relations ot things to our senses, one must proceed to
relations that hold directly between things tb8mselves."l9

5. Unity throuih heuristic concel?!.!.

There is an advantage to the tact

that the concept of nature is not an explanation, it can unite seyeral
difterent explaations. Man's understanding ot thinp can develop, and a
change ot understanding invo1 ves a change ot explanatory concepts I "tor the
explanatory concept may be defined as an expression of the content ot the
understanding."

Thus, Aristotle coDOeived tire as an element, the predecessors

ot Lavoisier as a manitestation ot phlogiston,

and later chemists

as a type ot

oxidation. Yet the heur1atic concept ot "the, nature ot t1re" unites these

different explanations, aud "without this unU'orndty it 'MOUld be incorrect to
aq that Aristotle bad an incorreot explanation

or what

he meant and we mean

by ttre.,,20

Difterent explanations ot SOCietY' can also be linked by a common heuristic
structure.

otis Dudley Durlcan and Leo P. Schnore I tor example, speak

oontlict1ng perspectives in contemporary sociology'

ot three

"the behaY10ral scientist

studies society as a s78tem ot social interaction and interpersonal relations,
the culture theorist approaches it as a culture pattern or value a18tem, and
the human ecologist examinu society u the functional. organization ot a population in process ot achieving and maintaining an adaptation to its environment
If our experience is t7Pical., these perspectifts are not only ditterent. they

are so d1tterent that it 18 difficult to explain and juatity one

19~., p. )8.

-

2OIbld., p. 737.

or them

to a

•
12
sooiologist committed to auother."2'-

What is ot speoial importance here, how-

ever, is not the dittaren.ces between battling perspectives, but the

W&y'

that

they are united, for Duncan and Scbnore say that they are "tooueing on the
nature 0.1' society as the !;5?lanandum ot sociological. theory.... 22 The "nature 0.1'
sooiety" is a general heuristic concept uniting the three different perspeotives.

6. Hypothetical heuristic concms. 7be concept. ot a "sy'lStem of social
interaction and interpersonal relatiOns," of a "culture pattern. or value 8)'s
and ot ".functional crganization of a population in prooess ot acbievin& and
maintaining an adaptation to its enrlronment,·
, like the conoept
of sooiety," are heuristic concepts.

or

"the nature

But unlike the concept of "the nature of

sooioty," thsse ooncepts are hypothetical..

they assart much more than the

simple anticipation that society baa an intelligibility that can be grasped by
insight.

The antagonism that Duncan and Scbnore sq exists among these

difterent viewpoints 1s a tine example of tailure to tu.l.t"ill the conditione
laid down. by :Bensman and Vidich for the heuristic use of theory, vh10b "oannot
work it the rasearch lIOrker on..a priori grounds is unwilling to entertain the
possibility of using or seriously considering all or a variety ot the available
23
theories. II
FBilureto realize that such lover-level heuristic concepts are
hypothetical. leada to inter-tribal warfare in soaiolog)".

Znanieoki says that

2lUCultural, Behavioral, and Ecological Perspectives in the Study" ot
Social Organization," AJS, I:I..V, (September, 1959), pp. l44-145.

22~41' p. 132.

-

2.3aensman and Vidich, p. 583.

1.3
JID1Ch ccntrO....sy steIns from ignoring the tact that either the hypothesis that
society is a "natural .,.temll or the hypothesis that it is a "cultural syatem."
is scientifically legitimate nit used heur1etically to search tor facts which
agree witb it, but not dogmatically to prevent tbe diaooY'ery ot tacts which
disagree with it. n24

1. Experience, ina1Et, !!!!! judgaent. When the scientist seeks to

know

the nature ot some phel1OM1'lOl'l, be antiCipates an intelligibility in that

phenomenon whiob can be grasped by human UD<ierst.andil'll, by an inaight.

This

nature to be grasped is an UDknown, but caa be known 1rl ita general characteristic 01 beiDg 1Dtellig1ble. What the

scient~t

knows before be understands

are his data, vbich he can apecUy in terms ot the acta ot knowledge by vh1ch
be will laJ.ov them, even though these acts are not the same as the act by which
he grasps the nature

ot tbe data. Finally, he is not satisfied with merely

getting 1nsights into the data, but insists on verification.

And the wa;y tbat

be lmo.. that a theory is Y'er1tied is not the . .e as the way that he lmo1fs the

data, or the way that he tirat

p"up8

a possible explamat1on. Data are known

by experience, their nature is grasped by insight, aad the Y'8l.1dity of what has

thus been grasped 1s aftirmed or denied in judpent.

Lonergan represents these

three lIDIlents of cognitional. process sohe.tioall.y.
Free Images.

Utterances.

Questiona tor Intelligence.

Insights.

Formulations.

Questiona tor renection.

Reflection.

Judpent. 1I25

ItI.

Data.

II.

m.

Perceptual Images.

~lor1an Znan1ecld, "Controversies

1945), p • .$19.

25Lonergan, p. 214.

in Doctrine and Method,"

~, L (May,

Experience, wight, and judp!ent make up a heuristic structure, tor a
heuristio concept is "the notlon ot an unlmovn content and it is determined by
anticipating

too

type

or

act through which the unknown would become

a heUristic structure "is an ordered set ot heuristic notions."

known,"

and

26

8. Lower-level heuristic st-ruotures. The heuristic structure which
ant1c1pates the experiences by which data are known, the insights whioh lead to
the formulation

ot hypotheses,

and the judgments which result

is cOllll1On to 8'D1' empirical scienoe.

tram verification

For the investigation ot integration,

hoWever, tbere haYe been proposed less general heuristic stl"'.1Ctur'es.

antioipate wights that result in the

tOl"1lUl~t,1on

One can

of 818tems, but ODe can alao

anticipate tl,e general characteristics of the S)"lltem that will be formulated.
These turther spec1t1catLODa are b1potbetia.l. Redtieldfs causal, tuDotlonal,
logical, &eathetic, and Q1Ilbol1c modela coutitute h7P0thetical apecilicatioDa

ot what the formulated

8)'8tem will resable.

Soroldn' s indirect aud direct

cauaal ..tun.otional Q"IItems and his logico-maaingtul 818tema are .imilar
.pecitications.

hrthermore, be.ide. the insights that grasp ayet_tic

relatiouh1pa, th.... are ..in......e wl&bta' by wbich one realise. that the
antiCipated qatematic relationahipe do not exist.

graaps the point, or sees the solution, or
insight aPP'!ehenda that 1D.

SOll\8

or tnat the solution is to

derv a

COtIH

"While direct insight

to lmov the reuon., illY8rse

tashion the point is tbat there is no po1nt,
aolut1on, or that the reuon is that the

rat1ona1.1t;r ot the real adDd.t. d1et1nct1ona and. qualiticatlona. u27 SometbiDg

26Ibld., p. 392.

-

27Ibid., p. 19.

-
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11ke an inverse ill8ight. i. needed to knoll' that. a s.t. ot cultural traits and
elements oonatitut..a a congeries. 'l'bus, Redfi.ld and Soroldn provide a aeries

ot hypothetical heuriatic struotures whoae implications must

be further

elaborated in reterence to the study ot the lit.tle community' as an integrated
whole. But 111

eYery

case, whether one ant10ipatea a congeri.. or one ot the

several var1eties of systems, the huic structure of experience, insight, and
judgment vill be emplo;red.
D. RELATIONS BETWEEN SYSTEMS
1.

SUbordination, Ooordination,

~

ooyeries. It will not onlT be

necessary to work out the general properties pt dUterent t.7P8s ot '1St. ., but
it vill alao be necesS&r7 to treat ot the relationshipa between system.
Soroldn says that there are

80 many'

empirioally giftrl sooial and cultural

systems that "amidst auob. an 1ntin1tude we are as helpless as amidst a jungle

ot oongeri••• 1t Be says that

m&n1' ot the attempts ot social sc1ent1ats to

olassify th.se IIlUltitudes ot systems into a tn.aIlq8able number ha.... been
realiatic.

UD-

"The class•• they gift are not real 871t... , but just nomiul

pigeOl'lholtDg that sometimes diTides the real syatea into two or more parts and
unites into one olus the parts of dUter_t 871t.B and congeries. It
on to AT that the

w.n

ft)"

28

Be goes

to arriV'e at a correct reduction of t.he multitude

of s,.neau and congeries to a reuonable m.unber "is baaed upon the fortunate
fact ot the subordination or the .ystems to one another, c1v1ng us a vast
continent of a moet embracing system COlIlpoaed ot subsY8tema, and each ot theae
of their sub-sub-sub • • • 8)'11tems." Examples of subordinated qsteJu ot

28Pm!!!ics , IV, 107.

»
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systems given by Sorokin are mathematics, each ot the sciences and the whole
systan of scientific knowllldge, .)"Stems of religion, law" and art.

Besides

subordination, there is also coordination, as ot state and church in count.r1es
with separation of church and state, and of the judicial, executive, and

legislative branches of govemmenta. And finally, 81Btems can be non.ystanatically related to one another, toming a congaries of systems. 29
Qeneti9

2.

~

d1alectioal relatione between

mteu.

'.l'be aboVe i. in

structural, rather tbarl in d7namic, t..... Concentration on structural
relatlonehipe leads to a oonception ot sooiety and culture that i. static. But
besdies a F!!p

ot

ay'IteJU in an area whioh ~.es. either systetr.atic or non-

systematic relations to

OM

another, tbere are alao s!llence. of systems that

are neither sy-staatically' or non-Q1Itamaticall.y related.

Thus" besides

classical method, which 18 baaed upon the antioipation ot a constant

.,..tern,

and statistical method, whioh is baaed upon the anticipation that data will not

contona to

~,

Lonergan. apealca

ot genetic

and dialectioal methocta.

Genetic

method i. grOUBded by the anticipation of an intelligibly related sequence of

ayatans, and dialectical method 18 srounded in the anticipation that the
relationsb1ps betwen noce8sift qate_ vJ.ll be non-systematic. Lonergan
claims that the abovo tour methoda--cluaical, statistical, genetiC, and
dialectical--"are relevant to
muat

arrr field ot

be, they are able to cope with
29 Ibid., pp. 107-110.

-

,30

Lonergan, p.

48~.

data; thq do not dictate what data

data no matter what they wq prove to be."

17
F.

1. Indiv1dualit l

PROPERTIES OF mINas

2!~.

Although the tour methods enumerated by'

lonergan are supposed to be applicable to &IV' data, their use depends upon a
basic condition.

General syatema and structures towards which these methods

bead IllU8t be "d1acoTered, ver1tied, and applied in data that are all

individual." Theretore, "to link intelligibly the individual data with the
general structures, there 18 needed a tartber and diat1not type ot understanding that fP'upa oonerete unities, identities, 1Iboles."

SiDee a concrete unity,

identity, whole is a thing, "1t tollows that the aenera1 structures are
conoerned with the properties

ot things,

wher~

properties and things are what

18 to be known by understa:Bd1ng the aaae data by different but complementary

31 'l'hus, besides

procedures.-

the insight. that grasp syet. . , there are alao

insights that grasp a concrete Wlity in data to give knowledge ot a thing.

2. Apt.,

lJ!!!!ine,

vehicles.

The d1at1Dction between properties and

things can be applied to Sorold.n'. breakdown of the "generio phenoJllel1.On"

studied b7 100101017. He aaye that -the moat generic model of' &'ftT soc1ooultura
phenomenon" is "_antnstu1 interaction of two or more bumart 1ndividual•• .32 He
analyzes mearWIgtul interaction iato the oomponents

ot "(1) thinking, acting,

and reacting human beings as subjeots ot iateraotionJ (2) _anuws, values,
and norma tor the sake ot which the ind1v1duals interact, realizing and

exchanging them in the course ot the interaction.

en evert actions and

material phenomena as the vehicles or oondv.ctore through which immaterial

32Societ" Culture, ~ Personalitl, p. 39...40.

•
18
yalues, and norms are objeot,1t1ed and sooialised."

33

Human beings are things

which have propert.ies that enable t.bam to tld.r:ak, act., and react. Meanings,
yalues, and noms are the prodUct.. ot human th1nld.ng and derd.ring, and
constitute the "ideological culture" ot an 1nd.1v1dual or ot a croup •.14 Overt
act.ions are the external, visible aspect of a human being'. aoting and react.ing
and constit.ute t.he "behavioral culture" of an 1nd1v1dual or a group.

Mater1al

phenomena as fthicles or oonductors are first the mater1ala upon whioh humans
act., and alter being tr.atormed by human activity, ar8 the EO<iuota of human
activity. These matedal

pheD.Qn8D&

constitute the -'terial culture"

ot an

individual or p-oup.,,35

3. Propertles

2! agents.

Sorolcin sap that although the socl010gist

leaft. the .tudT ot the biological lad PQObologioal properties ot INman beinge

to the biolog1at
(1)

aDd the pa;ycholog18t, the tollov1.rag ahould be kept 1n

Po•••••ion of a wll-developed

D8I"fOU8

.,..t-,

with

iu

mind.

reoeptors, oonductors, and ettector., 1Ih1oh enablu man to react.
to the 8timuli exerted by other humIa beines. (2) abillt7 to
pertorm a wide variety ot OV'ert actiou.
Poe.easlon ot
miDd, with ita el_ts of a. .ationa, pereept.iou, ideas, imagination, meJIOl"7, aaot1ol'Ul, teelinga, and volitlona. Man 18 a thinklng,
8lIOtioD&l, aftecti.... , '9011tlcmal arpnl., able to act aDd r.act in
the superorpn1c world of mears1.Jtca, value 8 , and 1\Ol'I1l8. (Why and
how he has beoome suoh a creatur. does not ooacern 118 at thie point..)
(4) Biologioal and ,,,,,,bologioal heteropne1t7 in reapeot to race,
aex, ace and other pb;raical cblracter18t1ca, . . well as meatal makeup--int.81ligeace, emotionality, will power, and 80 on.36

en

J4Ibid., p. 31).
3SIb1d.
.36Ibid., p. 42.
-

33Ibld., pp_ 41-42.

$
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IDgiCally, these propositions from biology and paycholoQ' are postulates ot

gorokin's sociology.

Furtey distinguishes between empirical postulates and

supra-empirioal postulates.

He says that postulates on the mind and on the

11111 are supra-empirical)7 Therefore, the properties of the subjects of

interaction listed above include supra-enp1rical poetulatea.

Furthermore, it

i8 difficult, i t not impossible, not to make statements about mind and will

in their progress whioh is

w tate the physical scienoes
oomparatiftlly unrurned by disputes, but in practice

this has been impossible.

"The data of empirical sociology have such an

when studying society.

Sociologists may want to

intimate connection with hurnan1.t,. that hardly. anyone can resist the t..ptat1on
to interpret them in the light

ot Rpra-emp1r1oal principles in one wa:y or

another. Therefore JII8D3' sociologists haft frankly introduced aupra-empirical
postulates into their works--an a great

4. Properties!! vehicles.

many'

haft introduced them taclt17 • .)8

Soroktn _phaa1s.. that material things as

fthicles ot mean1ngs acquire propertiee over and abo'f'e their Jlh7alcal, chemical
and biological properties.

"When a stick becomes a churinga (the most sacred

reUgiows objeot ot the Austr'allan buabman), a riDS becomes an 'enpgement
r1Di,' the sun becomes the SUn God or' aymbol of 1f'1.adoa, joy, and lite--tbeae
cultural mea:d.ngs are imposed upon the buic meaninc that aign1t1ea theae
material objects .. nch, with all the1r chem1.oal, pbJ1r1oal, biological

37Furtey, pp. 218-225.

38Ibid., p. 50.

-
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properties. It39

5.

Bebav1.ol' •

'l'b.e generic phenomenon to be studied is mean1ngtu.l int.er-

action. Now interaction
is itself neither a tb1na nor a property. bu.t a
,
process consisting at actions and reactions. S1m1lar17, th1nldng, desiring,
willing. acting, react.1ng are not prope:l"t.iea, but covert and overt behavior ot
butnan beings with properties Wb1ch enable tbea to act in theae

ware.

AnT

proces., wbether it is the prooess at solving a problem, ot cho.1ng a meal in

a restaurant, ot cazT7ing on a oonver.atioll, ot writing a book, of building a
house, or of d1geatiDg a meal, consiat. in a aerie. ot eveta.

Thus &n1' inter-

.

action proce.. will consist ot a aerie. ot actio_ and reactions of the
indirtdual. tmolved, and each action and reaction it.elf constitutes an event.

Therefore, the .tudT ot interaction i . not. mere17 a atudy ot t.hing. and
propert,ie., it i. alao a atud;r of prooes.e. and the event. that make up these
procesaes •
6.

Soc1ety, culture,

!!2 pe!"801UIlitl.

Attar breaking meaningfU.l inter-

action dcnm into it. component. ot agents, meaning., and vehicles. Sorokin
gives a sliahtlT different. aoal.ylli..

"(1) personality as the aubjeot

or

inter-

action; (2) 800ietl as the totalit70t interacting peraonalit1u, with their
sociocultural relationships and proo..... , and (3) culture as the totalit.y of
the meanings, value., and nol'Wl posse.sed b7 the interacting perso_ and the
totality ot the vehioles which objeot1ty, sooialise, and 00llV87 theae
mean1Dp."

40

Wh.n speakinl ot the intesratlon ot the little caammity as a

39~c!l' IV, 14, lootnote 12.

4°8ooiet1, Culture, ~ Personality, pp. 63-64.
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whole it will be neceSAl"T to look tor the int.egrat,lon of personality, ot
society, and ot culture, aad tor the intecratlon ot all three with one another.
"Any theory," sa,.. Soroldn, "that

str.....

only one of them in a etudy' ot the

sociocultural world, or that seeke to keep the three aspecta separate, is
inadequate. For pedagogical

purpo... they

JIl8l' be .tudied separatelYJ but when

the anal78i. of eaah member of the tr1n1ty 18 concluded, th1a eleDl8D.t mat be

referred to the tr1ad1o man1told, or matrix, in which it ex1ata ...41
Q.

1.

l!!! Foblem.

and Nepal.

StlMKARy

The writer expecte to st.u<:\Y small oOllllUDities in India

'J.bel"e be will uk the question ot Whether
eu.oh communities oan be
,

knoWn as analyzed

~,

'Whether they are integrated wholes or mere spatial

oongeries. Be will ask queetiona co11Cem1Dg the integration ot the society be
tinda in these Tillaps, the culture of tbeY11l.age., aDd the per.onalities of

the people U'Ylq there. He will obllene a collection ot things, properties,
and events, aDd try to disco.,... whether or not they are all .yatematloallT

related.
2.

_'l'be Procedure.
. . . . . . . . . .-=-..

The prooedure will be to work out a heuristic

structure or a heuri.tic theory ot the integration ot amall communities. The
steps in working out a heuristic structure &reI
its properties.

"Name the unknoWll.

Work out

Use the properties to direct, order, gu1de the inquiry." The

UDkno1lll hu been named "the integration

ot the Uttle community. If Following

Sorokints anal7a1a, three 1nte:rmed1at. unknowns have been named:

(1) "the

integration ot SOCiety,· (2) "the integration ot culture," (3) "the integration

41 Ibid., p. 64.

-
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or

personality."

The jrOperties

ot the un1c.nollD have been suggested

by' Soroldn,

with his congeries, causal-functional integration, and logico-meaningful

integration, by Redfield, with his causal, f'unctional, logical, aesthetic, and
symbolic models, and by Lonerpn, with hi. claes1cal, statistical, genetic, and
dialectical heuristic structures.

Th1a thesis is ooncerned primarily with

further elaboration ot these properties of the unknovn.

Tb.e last step, that of

using the properties to direct, order. guide the inqu.1r;y. will not be taken 10
the tbes1e t but in the research that is antioipated in India and Nepal.

»

CHAPTER II
THE LITTIE C<I-!Mt1Nrl'Y III REIATION TO SCitOKDl'S

THEDaY

or SOOIEn

"Name the unknown. Work out its properties. Use the propertiea to direct
order, guide the 1Dqu.1ry.1t !he unlmoWn haa been named the "integration of the
little cOlIl11l\JDity." In tb1e ohapter, there will be a brief presentation

or the

properties that Redt1eld ues to make explioit the way he is ua1n& the term
"little CCII\1IUl11ty." But the greater part ot the ohapter will be devoted to
trying to see what :pE"Opel"tiea Sorokin attributes to the little community, in

the light of his theory

det1n1tion

or

or society.

'l'h1a expos1t1OD will oonstitute a nominal

the little C01'IltIRU&it7J it will, in other words, tell how the words

are being ued in the present thes18.

'l'b.e question ot a real or explanatory

definition will be ra1.aed, but will DDt be able to be settled in the present
chapter.

For it rwe. SOIlle YeI'7 basic and difficult m.etuociolog1cal iseue8

dealing with the relativity of judp.eDta.
In d.1aculing the looation

or

the little oClmllUllity in Sorokin' 8 theory,

there wlll be opportun1ty to elaborate somewhat on the six main tonu of unity
he preaenta--tvo types

ot conceries and tour types ot s;rat... In the

application ot theae type. of unitT to lOOi8t7, it will be seen that tor
Soroldn the litt18 cGm'IIIUDit7 11

!?z det1n1tlon

lOgioo-mean1ngtu.l unity.

23

a oauaal-tunotlon.al. u well as a

A.

lEFINITION OF THE LlT'l'IE C<HmNITY

DUterent explaDationa ot the senaible phenomenon called "tire" were
united by the common identification of the known unknown as "the nature
tire."

ot

L1kew1se, d1f'terent pet'spectivea in tIOoiology are able to argue with

each other beoaue

ot a

comJII)ll

identification

or

the known unlmovn as "the

nature of _oiety." '!'be apeoit1catlon of the UDlmoVD 111 this thena i.e not in
terms of "nature" but in terms of "the integration of the little oommunity."

And 8ince 111 the little oollllUl1ity can be found the aspects ot SOCiety, wlture,
and personalit)", the pNbl_

or

the theais can be 'Viewed as concerning the

integration at each ot theae three.

Because

i~

is the little ocmnun1ty--and

the particular types of SOciety, culture, aM personality that lUke up the
little COUlIIBIIl1ty--tbat i.e to 'be invastipted, it seems necessary to make clear
just. what is me&l'lt by' tbe term, "little 00DI'I1Unity • It

1.

lkmd-aal. definition.

At the beginning ot an inquiry, one bas to name

the th1np be is ta1J.d:na about, and dove det1nit101'l8 of his most importarrt.

tenaa. BieNtedt poiDts out that at the begimdng of an

inquiry, bove1"el", one

cannot give the exact det1n1tlon of what be i8 st'u.d11ng, since one at the major
goals ot the 1raquiry 18 to
definition ot tire untU

dieOOYel'

ODe

that det1nitlon.

One cannot give an exact

has bad an wight into the nature

ot tire. Bier-

sted,t·. solution to this dilemma 1s the distinction between nominal and real
definitions.
apply a name

In nominal de1'1nition, one 'begina with obaenatton

and seek.

to

to "objecta, phenomena, or properties that have something in

common." In real detinition, one begins with the observed thing alreacq named
and 8.U

to define the

term b;y a dJ.aoovery and artioulatlon ot the properties

of the thing to which it refera--"ve begin with a concept and want to discover

pi

1

and to articulate the properties associated v1th ita referent. If

Nominal.

det1n1tion, for e.x:aDJple, tel18 how one is U81ng the term "fire" or "societYJ"

real definition detiDes "tire lf or "soo1ety" in terms
diaOO't'el"ed

or

wbat 1Dquiry baa

about "the nature ot tire" or "the nature of sooiety. fl

Lonergan

says that although aominal de1"inition does not demand. insight into the thing to

1Ib10h the term reters, it does raquire an insight into the use of words.

Ua

languap 18 an

For

enormoualy comp11oated tool v1th an almost endless variety of

parts that admit a tar greater number ot signif'1cant oQmb1nations. It insicht
is needed to see bow other tools are to be used ptOperl1" and etteotively,
insight is s1:m.ilarly needed to use a laDauase. prooperly and effectively.·2

2.

NOIIl1Dal definition

!! little

coJ8JA1U1ty.

Redfield's designation ot tbe

little comPlUn1tyas an "intuited vbole h iD11catea \bat he is ident:U'y1.ng what

be means by a little oommunity by appeal1ng to the content of 8Ol'n8 lnunan

experienoe, namely, ot intuiting the little OO1'IImDUty as a whole. Be sifts a
olearer explanation ot bcnr he 18 ua1na the t8l"lll by giving tour qualities ot the
little

OORmID:1t.yt

(1) d1atinot1vene88, (2) smallnes8, (3) hamoPD8it7, and (4)

all-providing seU'-autticieac;r.
inside aDd outside

The distinctiveness 18 evident to thoae both

the oolll'1\Ulit7, wh1ch is emal.l 8l'JGUgh to be either the lUd.t

0

personal observation or to provide the observer v1th a unit of personal
observation tully represatrtative ot the whole.

It 18 ".1011'- ohanging" or

homogeneous, 80 that "acti'91ties and states ot mind are mtlOh alike tor all
persona in oorreapondinc sex and age positiona J and the career ot one ganeratiol

laobert Bieratedt, uNOIdnal and Real Detinitional" ~sium on Sooio1ogic4l
Theorz, ed. Llewell.3'ft OroBS (Evanston, n11DOia, 1959), p.
7. -

2Lonergan, p. 11.

~---------------------------------.
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repeat.. t.bat of t.he preced1ng • .J Th.8e four cbaracterletl0' will probabl,. be
.,..uled in fev of t.be oonmmitles to be studied by' the writer in India.
bOV8Y8r , 18 not a source

or

This,

d1.tttcu1tyas long as they are taken merely as a

nGlldnal definition, telling one bow the term 18 uaed.

).

~lanato17

definition. Explanator,., or real, definitions require Ita

tlJ,rtb8l" insight into the objects to whicb language refers ...4 It one defines a
airol., for example, as rta perfeotly round plane curve ,It he baa g1van a nominal

det1n1tion, telling bow the name ·oircle" i8 used. But an explanator,.
definition demands a fu.1-tber ins1abt. And 1na1gb.t 18 a1...,.. a grasp of
iatelUgibilit,. in experience.

ot

&

Sere, the

~iential

aapect can be the image

cart wheel. On. then uk, the question, "Why 18 it round? n Is it beO&WJe

itl spokes are equal?

Its spow could be equal, but sunk into the bub and the

riM unequallyJ or the rim could be fiat between the spokes.

But i t the hub

decreases to a point, the ria and the spokes to 11Ms, and i t an 1nt1nitJ' of
equal. spokes radiate from the hub, the rim would be perfectil" round, and

ucessaril,.

80.

Nov points and line. are not imaps, but concepts, tor as 800n

.. the bub i. made into an imaginable dot, the spoke. could be sunk into it
uraequalll", and there wuld be no nec•••ity of rOUDdnes8.

To obtain the concept

it is necessary to suppo.e that the dot, po•••••ing magnitude and position, has
ollly position.

And the euppoa1ng, thi.nk1ng, considering, formulating, and

det1nine that produc. the conoept oocur only in COnjunction with an inSight.

3!l!! Little Commun1tl, pp. 3-4.

4umergan,

p. 11 •

..
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this insight occurs, and only i f it oocurs, can one intelligently uttar the
definition:

"a. circle is a locus of co-planar points equid.istant from the

~

center. w'

4. Pr1rrd.tive terms. Even explanatory definitions, however, must be
defined by other terms, which tbemael ves presuppose other terms.

It might seem

that any definition is based, u1. tirnately', on either undefined t'3l'm8 or upon
definition in a circle.

This would be true 1f' definition was merely' a matter

of I(l3.nipulating tel:'rr.I8, which it is not.

For definitions "emerge in solidarity

with experiences, images, questions, and insights. II No insight can be express
by a single term, and

.

sane insights are basic in that they do not premppoae

other insights on the same topic:
Latus say, then, that tor every basic insight there is a cirole
and relatioa, 8UCh that the terms fix the relations, the
relations fix the terms, and the ins1ght fixes both. It one graapa
the necea88r)" and sutticient condit1ou tor the perfect roundness ot
the 1m.ag1Ded plane curve J then one grasps not on.l.y the circle but &lao
the point, the line, the c1rcumterence, the radii, the plane, and
equality. All the concepts tumble out toptber, because all are
needed to expJ:"es. adequately' a Single insight. All are coherent,
tor cober~e basioally' means that all bang together !rom. a single
1naigb.t.6

ot terms

When terms are defined by their place in a "circle

ot terms

and relations, 8\lOh

that the terms fix the relations, the relations fix the tame, and the insight
fixes both," they are said to be defined implioitly.

5.

Implioit definition.

Implicit detinitlon consiat. in "explanatory

definition without nom1na1 ciet1n1tion. ft

-

5Ib1d •• pp. 7-8.
6Ibid., pp. 11-12.

-

'lb.e 8tatmr ;ent that "tv.> and only two

»
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points determine a straight line" :La an i.mplic1t definition of both point and
straight line.

1'be UOJId.na1 def'initiona ·polition without magnitude" and

"length without width or breadth," ve omitted, tor the det1n1tion ot point is

sat1st1ed by an ordered pa1r at numbers, since tw such pairs detemine a
straight line, and the det1n1tion of line 18 satisfied by a tirst dell""
equation.

"'!'be signit1canoe ot 1mpiioit de1'in1tion is its complete pnerality.

The omission

or

nominal definitions is the om1esion ot a restriction to the

objects which, in the first instance, one happens
axclusiva use

1;0

The

be thinking about.

ot explanatory or postulat,ioD8l elanenta concentrates attertt10n

upon the set ot relationahipa in which the

wh~le

scientifio significance is

contained ••1

6. Explanato!7 definition

!! 1ittle

~t.l.

Explanatory definitions

come at the end at an inquiry. But the prescmt work, although it 18 the
beginning of

inquirY' tor t.he writer, is to

make use

ot the previous 1nquiriu

of others, particular17 ot Redfield and Sorold.n. FolloWi.ng Sorokin'. general
IIOciolog1cal t.he017, it 18 possible to approach 010.", at leut, to an
explanatory det:Ln1tlon ot the litt.le o01lllllUn11iy.

The acmmt.ap of worldng from

a larger scale 800101ogio&1 theory 18 that it awakeDB one to the po8sibiUty

that the little COII'1IUl1ty dDea not ditter, in ita explanatory relatioubtpa,
from other aoo1al

IZ"~.

desoriptive level.

7Ibid., pp. 12-13.

-

Its ditterences, in other words, might be

OD

a mere

ps
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B.

THE LITTIE COf1MUNITY AS AN nmRACTION SYSTEM

The little community 18 a sooiety, which is, aooord1ng to Sorokin, "the

totality of interacting personalities, with their sociocultural relationships
and processes."

8

In the little COll".mun1ty, the number of interacting

personalities in that totality is determined

~J

residence within the community,

an area small eaough to be illveatipted by one man. t·Jba.t i. more important
hoWever, is the investigation.

ot the sooiocu1tural relationships

and pr'Oces••••

These can be investigated under the title ot ditterent types of interaction.

1.. 'llP!s

2! !!ttera.c!-ion.

Soroldn d1stlngu.ishes between Itsuperficia1 and

shortliYed interactions" and "the durable,

t~

recurring, etfective, and '.fUll

grown' interaction process.s that generate important sooiocultural structur.s
(social groupe, cultural. 8)'1Iteme) and sociocultural persons, in contradistinction from purelY' biological organisms."

It is, ot course, the second kind ot

interaction processes that are ot the most interest to sociologists. He
that these are the processes that are:

8~

"(l) orpntzed, in contrast to the

unorganized and disorganized, (2) solidary, in diat1nction from arl:ta.g~)ftistio

and neutral) and (,3) integrated, in contrast to the uninteS!:ated.,,9

-

2. Det1n1tion ot interaction. Soroldn defines interaction as "any event
by which one partly /Jie.:!tangibly intluences the overt actions or the state

10

mind ot the other."

8

Soci~,

An interaction process that i8 durable, recurring, and

Culture,

10
-Ibid., p. 40.

9Ib1d., pp. 69-70.

ot

!!!S Per8OlUllitl, p. 6).
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effective wlll, then, be a series of events.

Since sociocultural interaction

is meaningful Sorokin gives a definition of meaning'
some!dnd, stands as a. Algn of someth.ing 81se.

"anything which, for

The generio significance of

meaninc is tha.t in whioh A mean." B if A operates as representing B, U' it
stands far :S, or oalls it to :llind. nll It is this meaningful aspeot of
interaction that figures largely in the disoussion of ideologioal ou!ture,
but it is important also in differentiating the different t;ypes of interaction

processes.

That this should be so follOlls from the faot that the actions and

interactions ot men oonstitute their behavioral. oulture, a large part of which
is an expression of t:le meanings, values and, noms of their ideolOSical
culV...1re.12

3. 2!:ianlzed interaotion.
ty

If

A social group, It Slqs Soroldn, "as a totali-

ot interacting individuals, ls.rganized when its central set of meanings

and values. as the reason tor their interaction, is sOOlewhat consistent within
itself and assumes the form of the law-norma precisely defining all the
relevant actions-reaotions of the interacting individuals in their relationship toward one another, the outsiders, and the world at large, and when these

norms are effective, obllgator.r, and, if need be, enforced in the oonduct of
the interacting persons."l)

Here it is the oharacteristics of the ideological

culture of the group--the meanings, values, and norms-that distinguishes
organized:fran unorganized or disorganized interaction.

The ideologioal

llIb1d., quoting C. I. Lewis, "The l>lodes ot Meani~,ft PhUoso2& and
Phenome'iiO!?Jieal Research, IV (1943), 236.
12~., p. 313.

-

13Ibld., p. 10, original in italios.

..
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culture of the group Il'lUst (a) be Ifsomewhut consistent within itself," and (b)
assume "the fom

or law norms

• • • • It

The first characteristic, that of

internal consistency, concerns the integration of eul ture.

4. Inmrat10n !!!1 orsaniution. Although the three olassifioations

of

interaction that Sorokin gave were (1) organ.1zed, (2) solidary, and (3)
integrated, along with the nega.tion ot these as three opposite types, Soroldn

is not entirely oonsistent in applying t.'is distirction.

For

he

consistently'

uses "integration" to rder to the relationship of cultural elements, and
"organization" to reter to the relationships of bwnan beings to

OM

another.

An organized group is oonceived as the social oounterpart of an integrated

qstem. ot eul ture, as Sorokin shows by the toJ.;'lowil¥! analyses I
Human beings in their relationship with one anot,her give:

3.

Isolated human beings
Unorganized human groups
Organised groupe

A)

Solidaryt

1.

2.

Subordinated to
Coordinated witil
Antagonistic to
Neutral wi t.h

B)
C)

one another

Meanings, values, and Norms in their relationships with one another give.

1. Isolated meanings, values, and norma
2. Congeries ot meanings, etc.
3. Integrated systems of meanings, etc.
A)

Conaistentz
Subordinated to

S)
C)

Contradictory to
Unrelated congeries
neutral to

-

14Ib1d.,

Coordinated with

p. 316.

one anothe;.h
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But this parallelism does not imply that the culture ot an organised
group is in aDT V&7 identical with that group. An organised group and an
integroated cultural .yatel1l oyerlap or coincide only "insotar as any organised
group bas a set of meaniDgs, valu•• , and norms as the raison

!!'!!£! ot

it.

existence J and th1s set tmBt be and usual17 is integrated in the bulk ot its
meanings L!deological culturi/, especially in its law-norma, and in the

respective actions L.&tbav1oral cultureJ and 'fthicles L}iaterial culturi{ ot the
group ent..ced by it ••15 Tbe cmtrlapping can onl.7 be partial becausea

(1)

any organized group bas otbar 8)'8tema of cultve besides the main one J (2)

cultural syatema generallY' do not localize

~d

111nit themselves to one group,

but are shared by m&Il7 different groups; and (3) even with referenoe to the
set ot lIleaninp, valuel, aad norma that
possible that the

S8118

&l"8

norms, and n.l.U8S of

it ie

16

The IIOlt sipitioaat part of the
aft

main set of meaainga,

organised group are its law-nora. Sorokin distinguish

es law-norms from purely moral norms, tecatcal

tashion,

!!'~,

set could generate mother organized group completely

isolated trCll'l and independent ot the first.

S. !!!-noru.

a group's raisoll

llOl'!IUI,

norms ot etiquette and

of reli&1on, mores, tollaf'aya, and customs. Relig1oll, more.,
17
tolkw'ay'a, and customs are collections ot several different kinds ot 1lO1"IIIII.
DOrMS

Law norms are "&113" norma ot conduct (of do1Dg, nondoing, toleration) that

lSIbid.,

- p. 33S, original
1~1d., p. 3)6.
-

17Ibid., pp. 83-85.

-

»

in italics.
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attribute a certain right (the object of right) to one party (the subject of
right) and a certain duty (the object of duty) to another party (the subject ot
18
Besides the "official law-norms" of a group, which are
duty) are law norms."
embodied in constitutions, written law, etc., there are also "unotticial lawnorms" which supplement, or sometimes contradict, the official law-norms .19
The psychological characteristics ot law-DOrms include not only an intellectual
grasp ot the pattern ot action demanded, but also a grasp ot strong reasons tor
20
conforming to the norm, along with torcetu.l emotional and volitional backing.

6. Distributive

~ organizational tunctions

2.! !!!-~.

Law-norms (1)

distribute rights and duties to the members ot, the group, and (2) organize
activity connected with these rights and duties by enforcing obedience to the
norms.

Law-norms distribute not only tuuctiou and roles to be pertormed, but

also values ad burdens.

.A. right uaually entails title to a va1ue--property,

services, obedience ot others; a duty usually sDtails a social burden--payment

ot taxes, ob$dience, rendering ot service. 21 Law-norms organize group members
under authority, whioh "oonsists not in the physical force of the members of
the government (sometimes they are very teeble persons pnyaically), nor in the
power ot various gadgets which they have (these are operated by many human
agents subordinated to them), but in the law-convictiol18 ot the members ot the

18 Ibid ., p.

72.

19~., p.

79.

-

20 Ibid ., p.

75.
21 Ibid ., p. 77.
-
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group (or of their "ll&.jori ty) which attribute to the government the right to
govern, to legislate, to judge (alt-18\YS u.nder apacified conditions), asoribing

at the same time to the members of the group the duty to obey ita orders. 22

7. Solid.::rz interaction. A prison i8 an organized system ot interaction.
Yet it is unlikely that the interaction 1s largely solidary in the pri8on, tor

"interaction is solls!!!I when the aspirations (meanings-val ue8) and overt
actions ot the interacting parties concur and are mutually helpful tor the
realization of their ob.1ectlvee. fI

The interaction in the prison ie more likely

to be either ant.yoq1etic interaction, in which -the desires (meanings-mues)
and overt actiON! of the parties are opposite ,and lnutuall.y hinder one another,"
or mixed. 23 In almost all organized groups, there are elements of antagonilal,

"purely solidary organised groups are rare, limited ma1n1T to small groups 11ke
the 'perfect tailyf or to the interaction or devoted friends.

• • • '!'he

decisive evidence tor this in practical1,y all organized groups is the existenee
of ...c.-oe;;;,;;rc
.......i;,;;;o;,;;n!!!J! sanctiODf in their official law. 1t

all

r~1f3mber.

In a purely solidar,r group

would freely do their duty without coercive sanctions.

And the

greater the ant&goniem_ present, the greater the sanctions normal17 must be. 24
Solida.ry' or antagonistic interaction can be direct or indirect, can vary in
intensity, "extens!ty," and motivation. 2; Sorokin speaks also of familistic,

25

24Ibid., p.

-

94.

Ibid., pp. 9;-98.
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mixed or contractual .. and compulsory t;ypes ot interaction, which are respective

lY.. mostly solidary.. both solidary and antagord.etic, and mostly antagon1at1c.

2(.

It i.e interesting to note that the pt'1JIuIry criteria of solidarity is the
conourrence of the interacting parties in their aspirations (mean1ngs-ftlues)
and their overt actions.

Lack of tbts COl\CUrl'8UCe can be from perllOna.l

antagon1ama within a group, tram factions within a grouP .. and from. personal or

group derlationa from the law-norma, or other norma .. of a group, whether this
deviation is throuah overt action or through unw111iog but forced conformity.
It the ideological, bebanoral, 8Dd material culture of the whole croup is

vell 1ntearated.. there will still be room

le~

t.. • lack ot solidarity. For

the ideological culture of all the member. ot the group JUq be such that it

leads them to oClllllpetition, to a ruthle•• eftort to get the upper-hand over

other.. All the p-oup can have the same nol'lll8, which lead to 8Qtagonist.1o
interaction by their ""'1' nature. 27

8.

Sut!aarz'.

The little commun1t;y

waa nominalq defined in terms of di.-

tinctivene.... smallnes., homogeneity, and all p.rtov1ding selt-sufficiency. An
elaboration of Sorold.n t • concept of meaninctul interaction baa bean given in
order to proceed towards an explaaatory det1nition of the little comam1.t;y.

Interaction 18 orprdzed i t the culture of tbe interacting individuals i.
integrated in ita NiD
~

rneam.np,

that diatribate rights and duties IIlld organize the intvact1ng

personalities under an authority_

26 Ibid ... p. 99.

27Ibid., pp. 121-122.
h

-

values .. and norru .. so as to ruult in law-

The total culture

ot an organized group

is

)6
not necessarily integrated just because it po....se. an integrated set of lawnorms.

For there are 1IlA1l7 other areas ot culture beside. the central meanings,
L1kew1se, an organized group need

norms, and values that generate the &roup.

not be characterised y.r1marily by solidary iDteraction, tor a group may be
organ.ized eftl'l though its melbera have con.fiict1ng aapiratiou. ADd solidarity
is not identical with 1n.tegration

or culture,

'becaus. t.be aame aspiration can

lead to contliot of individuals pos_.ing that upirat.1on. as when two men
want to bold th. . . . job _ Organisation aDd 1Btep-ation are not identical, but
parallel, orPAisat1on reter. directly to tile relatl.onebipa between human
being., but integration ret... directly to
value., and

DOl'IU.

~

relatio_hip. between meanings,

The parallelt_ will be f\utther elaborated, in order to

explain more de.t1n1tely what 18 _ant b;r a littl. commun1ty in terms ot
Soroldn'. Sl'8tem, and what is MAnt by the integration
C.

or tbl little community_

THE LI'r'l'IE CCl4Mt1ffrrY AS A COLLECTIVE UNITY

In the i.ntroduetory obapber, Soroldn wu said to have

11'Yell

six type. ot

unitie.) two of the.e were oonpri•• and .tour ..... 878t-. '!'he•• types of
unities O&m be applied both to organizat.ion aDd to integration. Her., the
concentration .f attention 11111 b. on the orpaillational. aspects, with
oceasioDal. reference to the integration ot culture.
1.

Co!e!'ie.,

sp!t1a1!l ooratipt!!

!!! p!!:"~1ona11z

.imilar. '1'h1s is

not an i:m.portaDt type ot unity in Soro1d.n'. theory, but is given tor logical
completeness _ An example of this would be a pile of sand or bricks. 28
2. COtlg!!1.esl

spat1altl oontipus

~

28
Sooietz, Culture, ~ Personalit:, p.

mechan10allz cohesive.

116.
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Another less important unity tor Sorokin, exempl1t1ed by

ft. piece ot rock, •

stick, • box containing all the unassembled parts ot • car ...29
).

Indirect causal-tpActional system.

This type ot unity is had when a.

set ot objects are related to one another indirectly by a common relationship
to some agency axtemal to all of them.

collection of objects in his studT:
the tire-place,

Soroldn gives as an example the

"books, manuscripts, typewriter, lop 1n

tiBh1.nc tools, olock, pictures, various boxes, furniture." To

these he adds it.eme in his pocketsl

"money, pen and watch, handkerchiet,

SGlle

letters, automobile license and registration, comb, etc." '!'be.s objects need
not be spatially adjacent, they have no

~

cauaal-tunctioaal relationship,

and .yet somehow they all happeD. to be united through a common

agent, the

individual and his needll. Each ot thea is in oaual-tunotional relationship
w.l tb the indi:r.Ldul and his needs, and through this ccrrm¥)n apnt, the:y are

indireetly eormected by causal-functional tiea,

4. Direct cau.aal-tunctional mtem.

Olle

with another.,.)O

"An . .sembled automobil., a solar

system., the Columbia Broadcaeting Sy'atem, and an organism are also unities,
though sane

ot them, like a solar

ayatem or the radio network, cannot be

perceived as .etlI017 unitt•• , their parts are separated by distant apace and

are not T1a1ble at ou Ilano....ll There 11 at, tbe baste ot their unit.y&

(1)

a causal depm.d!nce, Vb:1ch 1s Ita ona-aided dependence ot the ettect A upon the

-

29 Ib1d •

-

31lbld., pp.

145-146.

--cause B, so that when B 1& given A is give., when B is cbaDging A 18 changing,
but the reverse ma.y not be true.
ing,

••• W1r1d 1& the oauae of the !lower bend-

wbile the !lower is not the cawse of the w1nd blowilllJ" and (2) a

.f'unCt.lonal 1ntel"d!p!t!dence, wh1ch 18 "a JIIl1tu1 1nterdepencienoe of two

01'

variables where A 18 the cause and e.ttect. of B and vice versa. • ••

When t1lO

more

irOn st1cks, one bot, the other cold, touch one another tbe reaulting process
18 an equalizatiOn of their temperatures.

In this equalizattoll ne1ther of the

sti.okais tbe ca11M or the effect J both 1ntlU8QCe each other and are tunctional17 interdependent.,,)2 A buic characteristic of oausal-twtctioD8l unit1es
ia that "each part, depend.a upon the whole and ,the whole depends UPOIl the

parts • .,))

5.

~l

sm--

At the buis of such unitle. "U the logical or

aesthetic coneuteocy of their mean1ncs-norma-ruues. All 818tau of mean1ngsnorma-'f'&l.ues that show such a oouistenoy' are meaningful, 10g1co-aestbetic

unities, begSmd.ng vJ.th a s1mple propo.ltlO1'1I A 1a S, 2+2-4, and ending v1th
all the cons1ateDt se1en.tltic, phUosophical, rel1g1ous, eth1cal, artlstlc
S)'8tema of mean1qs-'nOl'Jfl8-Yalues. 1t

The el_nta related in this 'type of unity

are not the . . .thle, ecmcrete parts of the caual-tunottonal unity, but
"1mmater1al and ftOn-s_01'7," and "tI:.lerefore apaeel... and. tilel.... " Oaly When
they are objectified in actions and vehicles are tbey "spat1ally concrete and

)2Ibtd ., p. 146, footnote 2.

33Ihid., p. 146.
-

....
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sensor1ly' perceptiouJ. like a statue, a P1otve, a building or a book.".34 The
d1.t'terence between causal-functional
formulation

or

am mean1ngf'ul.

un1ties 18 brought out in •

the criteria tor each 11'1 parallel terms I

causal-fwlctiODal. unity 18

the criterion

ot •

ft. tangible causal or tunetlonal interdependence of

its parts upon one &I'lOther, of the Whole upon its parts, and ot the parts upon
the whole • • • pro'f'1ded thia interdependence 18 vieWed. as due to the phyeioo-

chemical or biological. properties of the whole and of its parts; ,,3S the
criterioa ot a logioo-m.eaniaghl unity 18 Ita 10g1cal

[Or

aeathetiy

compatab111ty md apecit1c dependence or interdependence of each meauing-

element upon other meanings-elements, of the

~eanings ..elam.eat8

upon the whole

system, ad of the sy'IIt.ea upon the elements. ,,)6

6.

~l-oausal-tuDct1onal

SZ!tem.

sTstem 1l'1 vh1ch t.he interdependence is

1'h1a is a causal-tuuctloul

!!!! due "to the

physicocheJn1cal or

biolog1cal properties of the whole and of 1ts parts. It U there were two
!.,.ndepend.eQt lrlveatlons ot atom1c bombs, tor example, there wuld be a meaningtul tie between the two bomb..

lIt, however, an inventlon of atomic bombs 11'1

the United states factually 1nf'luenoed their invention somewhere elae, then tba

with each othel'.

!b1s example illustrates msaniDg1'u.l-cauaal (f\motlonal

unity. ",7

-

34Ibid.

J5~C8, IV, 4.

36Ib1d ., p. 21.

-

37Socletz., Culture.

!!!! Peraonalltl.

pp. 147-149.
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~p£lica.tlon

7.

2! !.!-! t-~s !:2.

society

~

culture.

Sorokin applies

these types to the organized group,J8 and to cultural lntegr:-ation)9 'l'he
difference is priJoar11y one of

~J

in viewing the organized group one's

attention ill primarily upon the relationships

or

people, but these relation-

ships are founded u}lOft meanings-norms-values, which are cultural; in viewing

the integration ot eu.lture one'a attention i. concentrated upon the meanings-

norms-value., but th.a.

U".

only grasped 1naotar as one discovers the meanings

objectU'1ed 1r1 the behavioral and material culture ot the people one is studying.

It 18 intePesting to note that Whereas one ot the examples given tor a

direct cauaal-tunotional unity in the tirst

~a1tio1'l

was an assembled

autonobile J Sorok1n later olusUied this as a oaual-mean1ngfUl unit,., because
the parts are "all causal'J¥ oormeoted with one another ani all created by the

purposive activit1es of the groupa • o In this respect, it 1s s1m11ar to an

..u

oren1sed

F2!P'

~

8.

wh10h 18 a oauaal and meaningtulwdty.

or,an13ed I!!'!P !! ! causal

!!!! 1,!\ea&U.PR'!!1 unit:.

Soroldn would not make 1t h)rpothetioal that
i'unotlonal unitT'

aD

Firat ot all,

organ1sed group is a

0&8&1-

"The "ffIIt'1' det1n1tion ot sooial interaction points out at

once tbat any Il'OUP ot 1nteraot.1nIind1ri.duals 18 first ot all a cauaal-

tunoticm.af unitl in which all oom.ponents are mutually and tangibly interdependent.

In any interaction ayatem there is a triple interdependence ot one

38 Ibid., pp.

-

)))-))5.

J9Ibid., p. 3)4.

-

40Ibtd., p. 147.
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part upon the other important parts, ot the whole upon these parts, and ot the

parts upon the whole interaC...iOll syst,am.. For such. a unity there i8 no need

tor either spatial adjacency or mecbaa1cal cohes1on.
Second, Wan organized interaoting group is a

me!!!!S~

!!ttl-If Sorokin

gives five reaeons tor th1s usertiolU
(1) The 1DIIIlbers interact becau8e ot or tor the sake ot oertain
meanirlga-norms-values. By defin.1tion only meaningful interactio. aa.kes a lrOoiocult\U'al 11'OUP.
(2) • • • a ~p's oausal-tunotional unity 18 determined, to a
gl"eat extent, by ita component of meanings J they create indirect
or direct cawaal.-tunctional dependence ..mere otherwise, by virtue
of the bioplv81cal propertie8 or the objects 1Inolved, tbare 1IOUl.d
be 110 oauaal-tunctlonal dependcmceJ and vice versa, the component
ot ..ald. ott_ eliminates the cauaal-tunctlonal tie8 between
the phenowana.
~
(J) A:trr orpa:d.sed II"O\lP 18 a fP'OUP 11'lYgrat.ed or 1oliOallT COBs1atent to some extent at least in ita ethical and. law-norma,
meaa1rap, and 'I'&1ue8 • • • • in ep1te ot the presence ot contradictions in t.he otf1oial and unottic1al law ot the croup, 1llOst
ot ita DOI'm8 are log1cally cona1stellt, aad, 10 tar aa they are
enforced, the bulk ot the overt actiorut ot ita MlIbera md ot
the fth1el.s used are cOIl81atent alao with"'" DOl'lIl8 &ad with
one another. This logical consistency ot the 1aw-DOI'm8 and 1awact10ruJ ot the member8 is Dever pel"teot, but its minimum 18 touDd
in arJT group as long as it rerna1u an organised group. • • •
(4) ltft1l outside ot lav-DOl"II8, tbe ren of the meaninp-nOl'Uvalues of the group, because ot which or tor the sake ot wbich
the ind1:f'1clu.ala interact, are 1nt.ep-ated to some extent into
..sthe...ically or lolically aona1atent ayatem.s.
(5) Af:q' 1081 ex1ating orpntHd prollP baa to haft a minimum or
solidarity among it. moat powerful members. Solidarity in all
it. ra1t1oatiou 18 ap1n a ••10 of OOIl81et.eftt meanil'1ls. So t ..
as it i. one ot the ties binding the members ot the group into
a solidary 1l1l1ty. it 18 a IMI.111nIM tie. Oausal-1\mct1onal tie.
are "oolorles.", neither Cltagon1atic nor solidary: PC' ee; they
are mere17 ties of depeDdenoe an::! iDt.erdeper1dence .hl

9. Detild.tiou

-

~

met.uoc101oll_

4lIbid., pp. 147-148.

Tbe above section sbows how 1mportaat

42
for Soroldn's theory is his statement that the generic phenomenon tor sociolog-

ical investigation is meaningful interaction. For by the VC'y detin1tion of
uinteractior"

If

it turns out that

causal-functional EQ'Stem.

&rq"

group of' interacting 1nd1v1duals 18 a

And by the very f'act that interaction 18 meaningful,

it turns out that anT interacting group is a

un1ty,

"The n1Smbers interact beoauae

nie~ful...causal-tunct.1onal

ot or for -the sake of' certain mean1ngs-

nonna-values.. f..t<.r definition only meaningful interaction makes a sociocultural
grouP." The writer believes that it would he di.t:tieult to find any major
!'la.ws in Sorokirl t s reaaoDiDg, once the generic pbenomerson 18 conceded to be
meaningful interaction, and h18 det1n1tlon

accepted.

int..aetlon 1s

Therefore, it 1a at this po1at tbat critic1am., apart tr_

eorrecUoM

ot

an:r minor

1nooD818te11cies that. miaht. be

round,

1IIOUld bave to be

But th1a ar1t.1c1am will then concern. the very definition of' sociology

aimed.
and

or, mearr1.ngtul

ot ita scope.. And as rurtey says, ".ooiololiats differ a

good deal among

themselves about the aut area ot reality which their science disoua.8S.

'J.'hia

folloW'll claarly :trom the detinit10u ot sociology which they have given •• • •

Disputes .. to the exact area to be COftred by the science have bedeviled
100101087 from 1ta early period down to the present.

in other langu.aaea {.8to;/, so010log1st.s have
Pl"OptJr

lle1'8r

1'0 exprus the _e tact

agreed very well on the

criteria ot rel81'aDC8 tor their solenoe.,,42 And it 18 a task ot

metaaociololl to det1ne SOc1010&7, to work out the criteria ot rel4!mU'lCe.
10.

---

..

Criteria ot relevance. Furt.,- goes on to SII.7 that "1t 18 impossible

to argue t.hat one set ot relew.nce criteria 18 true and anot.her talse, that

4!Paul Banl.7 FUrte;r, "The Problem of Values," §ptposi1lJ!1 2!! Soc1010110al

Theo!Z, p. ;11.
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one is right and another wrong. All one can do is to argue that one set 111
preferable because it 111 more practical or mare illuminating or possessed in a
greater degree of some other desirable quaU.ty.
among alternative sets

ot criteria is determined

In other words, the choice
b)" meataociolog1cal value

judgments. II The choice of the criteria of relevance is, within broad limits,
arbitr!l7.

43

This seems to the writer to have rather important consequences,

if it is correct.

For i t the writer'.s interpretation ot Furtey's assertion.

about the arbitrary character of criteria ot relevance is correct, it would
seem to follow that the dispute, mentioned 1a the first chapter, over the

behavioral, cultural, ad ecological

perspeot~ves

be settled, even in regards to one's

OWD

arbitrary dacuio..

in sociological theory cannot

800iological researcb, except b7 _

'or tbese three perspectives represent three dUferent

definitions ot sooiology.

The writer baa stated a buic agreement v:Ltb

Zoaniecki, 'Mho asserted that aucb perspectiY'Ss should be regarded as
!VetheUcal, and thus should be used beuri8tioal..!l to search for tacts which
agree with them, rather

tbaQ

dopatica11l to PZ'e'ftl1t the discovery ot tact

'thicb disagree with it.44 But an;r arbitrary decision in favor ot one
perapectiva rather than another reaovu the perspeotift, with its definition o£
society, fraa the hypothetical stage. For a b7P0thesis is a propoSition that

can be carefully formulated, whose implications can be deduced, and whose truth
or falsity

08Il

be judged by a controntat1oD of' these implications v:Lth the data

Ultimately, it seems to the writer that the criteria of relevance depend upon.,

43Ibid., pp. 511-512.

-

44Znan1eck1, p. 519.

not so much the det1n1tlon of sociology, but upon the definition of societl
which is the baais for the definition ot 1001010gy. And it the definition ot
society carmot be stated aa a hypothesis and then ver1tied as certainly or more
or lees probably true or false, it seems to the writer that most ot the
propositions in the field are baaed ult1mate13 on an arbitrary decision and
cannot be made subject to

aD)"

other criticism than that ot logical consistency

with the basic, arbitrarily chosen, premise.

-------

11. Criteria ot relevance and n0lldrla1 definition. Another w.y of stating
this would be to _1' that it is impossible to giVEt a real or explanatory
definition ot sooietT, but only a nominal one,_

You could, in Bierstedt's

formulation, apply "soo1et,.. aa a a.ame to "objeota, phellOllen&, or properties
that haft something in common," but could not beg1n with a concept and go on to
"discover and to articulate the properties associated with its reterent.,,45
Or, in Lonergan's term8, one could formulate a definition baaed upon an insight

into the w.y the word -soeietT" is uaed, but could not formulate a definition
baaed upon an ina1cbt into the objects to which the lIOrd reters. 46
Sorokin' s statement that 8Oc1010gy studi_ meaningful interaotion 18 a

statement of a criterion of re1ennee. It auch statement. must be regarded as
arbitrary, then the statements conoerning the nature of an orpnised grou.p,
801idar1ty, and integration all are permeated by this arbitrary value judgment.
Empirioal verllication is useless either as oonfirmation or disproof; the

4SBierstedt, p. 137.

46u,oerpn, p. 11.

-4,
statements are made on tbe baa18 ot an arbitrary juc.ipent. Sorokin has made
the logical blunder ot introducing nom1na1. definitions, and then treating them
as real.

"The word we have introduced by stipulation and to which we have

arbitrarily given a meaning COIne, through use and repetition, to be regarded as
necessarily haTing that meaning ...47 And it WIlld follow that the att8llpt to
use Sorokin I s theoretical appl"oach as a means ot approaching an explanatory
detinition ot the little COWIIl11'1ity is based upon a talse uaumption, namely,
that Soro)dn's detiDition

or mean:1.nl1\1l

interaction is more than an arbitrary

stipulation or boY be is using the worda.
12. Criteria ot. relevance -and relati'ri.em. 1'be question at iS8\18 is
(

whether or not basic propoaitiou about the nature ot 8oo1ety, and ultimately
about the nature ot man, can be regarded u hypotheses capable
or disproof, or merely u arbitrary u8\IlIlptiou.

or

ver1t1oation

i'h1a is a question about what

might be called the buic iD'!!'Fetative trame'NOrk for one's research.

It it i

impossible to ftrity' 8.lV propolitiou ot such a tramewOl."k, the tramework and
the theor,y it generates are relative to the personal whims or the cOllIcious or
unconscious biases ot tbe dUterent SOCiologists.

~e

would be forced to apply

to sociological theor,- itself the principle ot cultural relativ18m as
formulated by'Melville HerlkoTit..

"judgments are baaed on experience, and

experience is 1aterpreted by each indi'ridual in term. or his own enculturation."

48

47Biersted.t, p. 128.

4~ and Hi. Works (New York, 1948), p. 6), quoted by Redfield, The
Primitive Wi.;.;.or;.;;;.,,;;l;,;;d!.!!!!!! 'l'ranstomat1ons (Ithioa, lew York, 19,,3), pp. DiTi-14'.
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13.

Conclusions.

The i.sue

ot relatinan CaDnot be met here. The point

in bringing it up was to indicate what seems to the writer to be the logical
iJnplicati0118 ot ny1rlg that one's criteria ot relevance are arbitrary.

It

criteria ot relevance are arbitrary, it 18 still in the realm ot nom1nal
definit10n ot the little cotmm1l1ity to say that 1t 1s a meaningfUl-C&Usalfunctional s78tem.

For su.oh a statement 18 only a logical coIl8equence ot the

detinitions ot meaningful interaction, organized group, and caueal.-tunction and
logico-mea.nillcfUl unities. At this point, sinoe relativism cannot be discussed
here, it will be impossible to say whether or not Sorokin's detinitiol18 are
nominal or explaDatory.

It will be necesAlT, however, to go further with the

exposition ot his qatem in order to locate the little COl!ImUrl.ty within it,
leartng to a further chapter the question ot whether tbia results in an
approach to an explanatory dstin1tion, or is merely a nominal detinition that
is more elaborate thaD Redfield'e.

D.

1.

SCROKm t S CLASSIFICATION OF ORGANIZED GROUPS

!!!! bu•• !!! _ol.....a.........Bit
___i....o_at.....i......o_n.

Sorokin gives two bues.

"'l'he first

scientit10 ba.18 ot the olueitioation ot the grou.pa is • • • the !.nteusity
olesen•••

!! oausal-ttmctloul.

components."

interdepend_o~

among its member. and

Thus,

It "'111 1000 individual. DOt united by causal interdependenoe, 200
are united, the.e 200 make a real collective unity or group. It
amol'1l the.e 200 m8lbers ot the group, $0 ind1viduals are, say, twioe

or thrice more olosely interdepmd.ent, this ditterence 1n the degree
ot oauaal. interdependence (int8D81t7 ot interaction) makes ot the.e
$0 individual. a group within the group ot 200. It among these 50
members, 10 are still more tang1bly interdependent, they make a group
in a group ot $0 within a group ot 200. Thus a tangible d1tterence in
closeness or intensity ot cauaal-tunctioul interdependence i. the

~

47

first objective basis for distinguishing the existence at groups
and tor their cl..s1t1cation.49

But it is the component of rnemings-norma-values that gives to any group

its opecitio ind1v1dual.it)"t
Thus the seoond objective basis or the unity and individuality of a
group is the character of it. com~ent ot meani!s.When the
mean 1nge-values-nora bi'"'caUii ot ~oh
lor t "sake of which the
individuals interact and establish their causal interdependence are
different in two sets or interactin, individuals, these indiv1duals
(with their actions and vehicles) make difterent groups. It they
now int,aract around. the values of Protestantism, DOW about the values
ot General Motors, now around the values of the democratic party,
they compose not one but three d1tf'erent groups ItOOlllPOUlldedtt of the

ana

same 1nd1viduals. • • •
Thus the maiD bases or group classification quite logically tollow
from the very nature ot the causal ..n1Oan~l unity at the groups.5 0

2.

Unibonded

~

mu.ltibonded groups.

It a group interacts for the sake

of one set ot reeanings-norJns-values, it i8 uni'bonded.

It, however, it

intera.ct.a tor tho salce ot two or more sets ot r;ceanings-norma-values, it is
nmltibonded.

51

Soroldn warns ap1ut an a priori clusification of groups on

the basis ot some nt ot basic needs or on the basis of a logical classification at meanings-norras-valU8s.

Sorokin Bays that the danger here is a

classification that does not oorrespond to the way the human population is
actually divided into groupe.

SO he chooaef,l to "drop the speculative way ot

tentative hypotheses and take iutead the wq ot observation. What groupe in
human. population have actually been the powerful and perunent grou'P8?

in the position

or

We are

a geographer trying to chart a little known region with its

plains and hills, streams and lakes, woods and deserts.

L92.,ocietl, Oulture, ~ Personality, p. 170.
,OIbid., pp. 110-171_
'lIbid., pp. 171-172.

His first task is to

48
map these as they are given to his observation.-52 at course Soroldn's
observations are not a simple taking in ot some (lII1tbical) "pure" data; just
as the map-maker bas a system ot symbolic notations,

80

also Sorokin reads the

topography ot the soolal universe with the aid ot the whole sohema ot
definitions which has been briefly outlined aboye.

3. Sorold.n

giftS

a !!!J!!!7 clua1.t1oatioD

"observations" on the main
I.

Unorpn!.zed!!!

t7J)e8

~

Foupe, wb10h includes his

ot UD.1bonded and multiboDded

~-Organi..d

Qrou2!

1. Extern.all1' united, "as it" orguized
2. Publl0
3. Crowd, mob

4.
S.
II.

Sem1-nomiDal p1val
Purely DaIJdul plurel

~

A.

Orprdsed GrOUE!

Unibonded

1.

F!Uf!

Bioaocia1 groupings I

a. Race,
b.

Sex, and

c. Age groups.
2.

Sociocultural groupingsl

a.

K1Dah1p,

b.

Territorial,

c. Langu.ap I
d.
e.

state,
Occupational ..

t. Eooncm1o,

C. ael.icioua,
h. Political,
i. Ideological, and educational groups
j. NomiDal group. ot the elite
B.

Multlbonded P'OUps

1. The family
2.

Cl.aruJ

).

Tribes

gl"OUpSI

4.

,.

Natlou

Castes
6. Feudal .states
7. Cluaea

C•

structural Varieties

1.
2.

3.

4.

,.
6.
7.

8.
9.
10.

Large or small in size
Well-organisftd or sem1-organ1zed
Cent1"alised or decentralized
With mourcb1cal, ar1atocratic, oligarchic, democratio,
republican, tyrann1.oal, and ot,ber {"onu ot government
Strat1t1ed in va:ri.ou vap
LoDe and sbort-lived
SoUdary, antagonist10, mixed
Intepoated, unintell"ated, mi.xed culture
R10h ad poor in the campollMlt. ot meaninp and ".hioles,
in the qual1ty ot m8llbers
With mutual iftter,roup relationships I
a. SoUdary (u nbcroup to: IN'lp, or as coordinated
group')
b. Antqonistic
c. Neutral
d. UlINlated,3
e. strat1t1ed·

4. !!!!. little oommu.n1tl !! ! territorial EouE. Although a territorial
group comes under unibonded ~ in the above soheme, (II. A. 2. b.),
Soroldn distinguishes between unibonded groups which have territory as their

only bond, aDd mulUbonded groups ot wh1ch the territory is one ot the main
bonds.

rr_ the langu.ace we speak, OD up to our beliets, tastes, opinions,
mores, aad mazmers J eV8l'7'OD8 who resides in the nm.e locality tor a
lone t1Jne is impl'egnated by its pographic, social, and cultural
patterns. An. emergence or -the looal type of personality," ot local
patriotism and local culture becomes inevitable in such conditions.
With 1noreas~ mobilit~t the P2Jllation and with ~t change
!l re.tden.oe~~~r~e and eotlvenm 2l! ~ri;U-
neijhbOrh#i 1!'.2i:~~ deCt1ni.. • • •

e

The decreaa1ng role ot the locality P"OUp, in the coftditlons ot

53Ibid., p. 118 •

_

-

....
,0
intense mobilit1', is due also to the dissooiation ot the Eevious9'
multibonded lOcali~ into a series ot untiiinaidlt;up!o Among
the poiiilations 1t i"Wti.iretheY were 'tiOm, the local l' group vas
in fact a multibonded group in 1Ib.1oh the locality tie wu one ot
many. Whether in a preliterate tribe or in a Hindu, Chinese, or
other village, or in a medieval cit1' with non-migratory and nonmobile populations the locality group vu otten tied by the bond ot
kinship, conmaon languace, common culture, OOlIIIlOn religion, common
citizenship, e'Nll by C01RIIIOD occupatioa 8I'1d econt.lldo interesta.
Persons who lived all their 11"... in the same locality composed a
multibcmded pG\\p that _lded their personalitY' in all its essential
blosooial characteristic.. SUch a multibollded group, located in a
limited area, is what ~ sociologists stll1 oall a "CODlml111t;y8 in
contrast to a uniboD.ded asllOciation.
With the increase ot population mobility tb1a multibonded group
began to dissociate. • •• rile locality gro\tp has progressi't'8ly
became a UDibond.ed terri. tonal group instead ot & multibonded group,
hence a decl1fte of ita importaDce. Bence alao the notable mistake ot
!!!.!!l SOc10l0~. who continue to treat this UDibonW \errttorti! -

grOUP as !!

~F"rtant

usoo1ii1Ois:;Ii

ficcmaiii1tli

!!"COntrast !! UnlbindGd

The little COl'IIII1W11ty, thera, 1r1 terms ot Soroldn's theory, 18 a multibonded
territorial group.

The people who li" 1n it vill be characterized by lII&DlY

tbe same traits, because
cultural patterns.-

ot being ttimpregnated

ot

by its geographio, social, and

The "local t7Ptt ot personality" that Sorold.n s8.11l

inevitably emerges wuld seem to oorrespolld to Redfield's trait ot homogeneitr

that he saya is cbarecter1stlo ot a small comnmity. The ...
ter
.........
r1...to
.......
r1_&_l
also

C01YII1OD

~

is

to the two difterent detinitions. rbia bond seems to lead to the

oharacteristio ot distinctness g1"..n by Redfield.

Soroldn does not seem to

mention anyth1.ns that could be direotly pa1.red ott

nth Redfield's tourth

oharacteristic of -all-providing selt-sufficienc1"

R

perhaps the number and type

ot the further bonds 'be7ond the territorial WOllld determine the degree to whioh
a community could be said to be selt-amtticient.

54Ibid., pp. 198-199; Sorokin'a italics.

...
E.

CONCLUSIONS

The attempt to apjroach more closely

to an explanatory definition of the

little community' baa raised an iaportant iane, which issue baa not been met,

namely, whether or not one can give an explanatory definition of society that.
18 not. relative to the particular enculturat.ion process that hu molded the

ideas ot the soc1ologist do1Dg the defining.
would have to be baaed on an

SUoh an explanatory detinition

wicht into the phenomenon

"society" reter., and would have to bG veritiable.

to which the

~d

Bu.t whether or not

Sorokin' s theOl7 is baaed upon explanatory detin1t1ons, the present chapter has
served to locate the little community within

~s

theory, and to sbow that the

characteristics be ..signa to a mult1bonded territorial group are similar to
the characteristics aaa1grled to the little oomrmm1ty by Redfield.

In addition,

a set or t . . . that will be used throughout the wrk bas been defined, at least
tlOldnally.

Such notions as nominal and explanatory and iJnplioit de.t1n1tions,

primitive t.eras, meaningful interaction, organized group, law-norms,

solidar1tT. causal-tunctional. and log1co-meaniftgtu.l ayatema, criteria ot
relevance, relat1rlam, and. multibonded and uniboD.ied groups have been
introduced.

It hu in addition been leen that i t one accepts Sorokin's

definit10u ot interaction, organized fP'O\lp, caaal-tunct1onal unity, and
logico-meaningtul unity, be muat in logic concede that it i8
that any orgardzed group is a meaningtul-causal. unity.

~

!!lJX!thetioal

•

CHAPTER UI
MODELS AID LlWS
In this chapter, the distinction between concrete descriptions and
abstract formulations will be emphasized.

Deacript.1ve techniques are be

definition relative to the one doing the describing, tor description is a

statement of the way thinp look to that describing person.

Laws in physics,

it will be .een, are beyond 100kingJ they are invariant becauee they are

Because law are abstract, they sr. not the same as models, which

abstract.

are concrete. Models can be constructed only by concrete Warence. trom laws.
But it 18 possible not only to conatruct sywtematio models, or schemas of

reourrance which obey classical law, but aleo non-818tematic prooesses as
well.

'ft).e

po8sibUlvof non-systematio proce.ses, which correspond to

Sorok1n.· s congeries, g1ves ri.e to the pos.ibility

distinct

t1J)e

ot statistical

metbod as a

of approach, which results 1n a type of intelUgibilit;y dif'terent

from that had 111 c1anical laws.

Stat1stical law have their heuristic

anticipation in probabilit71 rather than in the nature of things, or the
determinate correlations between abstract corre1atiYG8.

Admission of

statistical law &wids both a determinism that would attempt an imaginative
mechanical model ot a community, and an indeterminism which regards laws as
essentia117 unverit1able.

1. Mathalatioal

A.

CLASSICAL HEURISTIC smUCTURES

~

"ietitic Wights.

52
»

Insight into the image ot a

53
cart wheel came as an answer to the question

"Why is it l"OUDd? J1 and reaulted in

the forroulatiOl1 of the explanatory definition. Ita oi.rcle 18 a lOOU8 ot coplanar po1Dts equid.1stant trom the center ••1 Qalileo vent beyond his presclentU'io Aristotelean opponents by h1a insisht into the r-elationship between
distance and time, he discovered that 1n a tree fall -the d1stance traversed is

proportional to the ti!lle squared.·2 The explanatory definition of a circle
puts one in the realm of the non-imagill&ble, tor points and line., unlike dots
ed threads, cannot be 1macined.
ODS

·Strangely, sometblng similar happena when

formulates the law ot talling bodies.

a pertect vacuum 18 impossible. What

the more 010le17

ODe

oaJl

It holds in •
be

~lilhed

approxtmat.. to the cond.1tiona ot a

vaOU'Ulll,

and to realize

experimentally' 18 that
ftC\1Url1,

the more

&CCUl"ate the law ot oo~ &Gceler.tien is toartd to be."l
1'ba mathematical aDd tbe ac1entit1o wights are difterent.

Galilee could

DOt .imply imag1ne tree talla, as tba mathematician can. imagine oart wheels, or
in hlgher

_~tios,

more INbtle Q'Ilboll0 imaps ot operat1eu oarried out in

lower-level proceduru. he bad to do field work, perform experiments. And no

matter how many experiments he completed, his data would alwaya remain

dUcroete, represented by a serie. of separate points on a diartaace-tiM gl"aph,
unlike the ccmtimloua smooth
1Dalght tate the uture

lLcmerpn, pp. 7-8.

-

2Ibld., pp. 13-.34.

-

)Ibid., p. )4.

0UJ'Ye

of the oart 1fbeel.

ot the oirole

theretore, while

pouped the neoessi ty ot roundne.s,
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inSight into the nature oE a Eree Eall em give onl.7 possiblllty, Eor ..,
number ot difterent curves could pass

throuch all the

known points on the

graph. Furthermore, in mathematica, the 1raaginatlon can chanae as JIUOh as
necess&1"7 in its ettort to approximate the concepts, but ln emp1rloal science
the data up their own

way'

with their uunal:vsed multiplicity aDd their

re.tractor1nns to meuurameu.ta that

U'e

more than app.rox1mate .,,4

F1nall¥, the circuit oE ..thematioal thought is 'l.mlllment.
images

throuch 1DS1ahts

Uit IIOveS tram

aDd coDCeptlons to the production ot .,mbollc ilnages

whence higher ins1gbta arue.· But the cireu1.t ot scientific developcent is

-

not immaDent. it "1Dalud.es action upon extern.al th1np1 it
,

BIOW8

from

ob88l"'t'&tion and expeM.aent to tabulations and graphs, from these to wicht.
and tomulatiou, from formulations to tm-acute, trom toreoaats to operatiOns,
in wb.1ch it obta1u

.tr••h ev:l.dence either tor the oontinaation or tor the

revieion of ex1at1Dg views. uS

2.

InTerae insyht-.

"When I aa;r that an event 18 pverned by ebanoe, I

6 This atat__t ot Polany1. t 8 illustrate.

deD7 that it 18 governed. by order. n

the role of iIlYers. 1.r.ud.sht, lfhieh

1ntellil1bility that
"direct

ODe

ar&8p8 tbe

fact that the tJPCI of

anticipated 18 ab••t. Aa Lonerpn aaya that wh.....

wicht grupa the point, or

."8 the solution,

or oomea to Jmov the

reasoa., 1m'ene iu1ght apprehenda that in. aome tuh10n the polnt 18 that there

-

4Ibid., pp.

34-3S.

)Ibid.
6mcbae1 Polarqi, Peraonal Knovledp (London, 19$8), p. 33.
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15 no point, or that the solution 113 to deq;y a solution, or that. the reason 11
that the rationalitY' of the real adm.1ts distinctions and qualif1catlons. 1t
Inverse insight i8 not concerned with the corrections of .false or inadequate
answers to questions

80

much

&15

it is concerned with the legitimacy of the

questions themselves, or with the wa:;r that they are asked.

"In a demonstrative

scienae it is to Pl"OTe that a question ot a given type cannot be answered.

In

an empirical ac1snce it 18 to put forward a sucees8ful. hypothesis or theo1'7
that aatNll'188 that certa1D questions miatakenl7 are supposed to require an
answer. It7 An example of iDV'erse inaigbt in ampirical. science is Newton' s
denial that cou1;irmance of 00DStant velocity

upon the action ot

SOinS

ext.emal torce.

~

straight-11ne motion depends

Tb.1a ne,ation "ruu oounter to the

spontaneous ant1c1pations ot huma1lintellilGDCe, for spontaneously one thinks

of uniform mt10n not u of a state like reat but as of
6

an ext.eraal

&

chaDp that require.

~e."

). !!!!. emp1rioa~

residue. What Lonergan calls the "empirical. residue-

bears some resaM>lance to invarae 1na1Sht, tor there i8 a denial of intelligibility in 'both. But there are differences between. the two concepts.
ences of

~,

IIP!O!,

Wfer-

and 1ndiv1dualitZ belong to the empirical. residue, which.

"(1) COD8iata in positive emp1r1c&1 data, (2) 18 to be denied

int.ellic1h111ty of 1ts ova, and () 18

7LotJ.el"garl, p. 19.
8~., pp. 21-22.

CODUcted

any'

ilnmanant

nth some compensating
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intelligibility ot notable importance. tt

'J.'hua, unl1ke innrse insight, there is

na mention ot a denial ot spontaneous questiou--ordinarily people do not
spontaneously suppose that there is a reason for one place being ditferent fro
another place,

01"

¥by this moment is not the moment that preceeded it.

It is

further unlike inTer.e ins1gbt in being ·connected with some compensating
9
intelligibility ot DOtable importance."
The

~ating

higher intelligibility ot the empirical reaid\1e is the

posslbility ot scientific generalisation and collaboration.

For it there was

a different 1DInanent lntelligibility to different times and places, "every
place and eftrT time would have its own pby'a1ps, it. own chemistry, its own
biolo8'7J aDd siDee a science cannot be worked out 1netantaneouely in a single
place, there would be no physics, no chemistry, and no biology. It And in
relations to scientific generalization there is another important aspect of the
empirical I"esidwt, namely, that mare17 numerical differences are not explained
by a direct insight.

"Thus,

the pbyalc1st otters different explanations ot

'red' and 'blue' J he otters different. explanations tor dttfercmt shades of 'red
and be 1IOUld discern no sense in t.he proposal that he should try

to find as

many different explanations .. there are different instances of exactly the
same shade of exactly the same colour. 1t The merely.-pirlcal difference of
numerical difference can be further illustrated by the fact that Ileven it there
vere reached a single comprehensive theory of evolution that explained and
explained difterently e"f'f!IrY instance of lUe on tbia planet, still in strict
logic we should haft to inspect all other planets before we could be absolutely

9

-

Ibid., pp.26-29.
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certain that in tact there did not exist another instance ot evolution similar
in all respects ...10

4. OlassUication

~

correlation.

Since individuality pertains to the

empirical residue, the "nature" that one seeks is universal.

Understanding one

set ot data is, at the same time, understanding all similar sets ot data.

1'hua

in working out his heuristic structure, the mathematician writes down the

properties ot x, but the eupirioal enquirer notes that the "nature ot • • ."
that he seeks must be the same tor all similar seta ot data.
types ot similarities.

(1) Things are similar in their relations to the

o'b8erver--aimUar in color, shape, sound, taste, touch.
known

But there are two

These similarities are

betore "the nature ot • • • It baa been d1acoYer8d, and torm the buis ot

preliminary elassilicationa.
another.

"T'hus, they

'lIJIq

decrease concomitantly.

(2) Things are similar in their relations to one

be tound together or apart.

'!'hey may increase or

They'fIJIIJ.Y have similar antecedents or consequents.

They may be sWlar in their proportions to one another I and such proportions
may

torm series of relationships, such as exist between the elements in the

periodic table ot chemistry or bet_en the sucoessive torma ot lite in the
theory ot evolution. ltll
'!'he s1m11arities

ot things in their relations

"proximate materials ot insight into nature.

to one another are the

Hence I the empirical inquirer, to

emphasize thi. tact, will say that hi. objective 1s not merely the 'nature of

-

10Ibid.
11 Ib1d., p.

:37.

pa
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• • .' but more precisely, the unspecified correlation to be spec1tied, the
undetermined twlotion to be determined. tt GalUeo went beyond hiB Ar18totelean
opponents who spoke merely ot "the nature of wight," to diacover the specific
oorrelation between the distance of a fall &lld the amount of time it took a

bodT to travel that d18tance .12

5. Cl..sioal heuristic anticipations. The specification ot the correlation and the determination ot the .f\mction i8 carried out by Muurement,
tabulation ot meuuramenta, insight into the•• , and expression ot th1a iuight
in a general correlation or twlotion.

It this .tu.act1on is verified, it "vill

detine a limit on vb10h converge the

between all subsequent

relatlo~

appropriate l'I188.8UreImeota." Classical heurist10 at.ruoturea anticipate insight,,:;

"ot a type 1I08t easily identified

by mentioning the names

ot Ga1Ueo, Newton,

Clerk-Maxwell, and Einstein. 1t And the presuppositlona behind th1a tJl)8 of
beuri8tic structure are "the m1n1mal suppositions that iu1ght.a ot a oertain
type occur and that 1nqu.1ry' a1m1nc at. such insights 1U1' be not haphazard but
methodical. Iti.3 Just as the mathematician 'Works out and writes down the
properties ot x, ao alao the empirical 1nqu1rer can -.,rk out a differential
equation that expru.ea athematically certain Ter7 general teatures ot the

data. tt14

-

l2Ibld., p. )8.

1.4Ibid.,
-

llIbid., pp.

44-45.

p. 39.

po
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6.

Invariance.

1'1:me and space perta1n to the 81flP1r1cal residue.

But

pby'8icists deal with motion in time and space, which leads to the cOll8truction
or rererence trame. which designate. all points and iutant.a relative to a
particular point and iutant. Cbanpa in reterence frames can result in
changes in the statement of laws.

Nevertheless, "when a special ertort i. made

it is possible to state law mathematioally' so that the etataant does not
change

desp1 te cbaages in reterence trame..

This 1nftriance means that

physical lava and pr1nc1pl.. can be the same tor all observer..

One explana-

tion tor th18 that 18 aomet1mes given 18 that ltJ>l\rs1cal objects look the same
.trom all observational standpoints. It

LoD8l'~,

however, sa.ys that he prafars

the position taken by Einstein, wb1ch state. that lan can be 1nvar1ant because

"phyaical pr1Dciples and laws are simply and completely outside the range ot
seeing, hearing .. touching, teeling, and all other direct and indirect acts ot
observing." Tb1. position. is consi.tent with the premi.e that it 18 the
relations of things to one another that science seske to discovers
For, as baa been remarked, observationa give 11'111' to meaeurements J
meuurement.a relate things to OM another rather than to oar sene.. J
and it i. onl7 the more r . .te relations ot meuuremeat. to one
another that lead to empirical correlatlona, f\mctlons, laws. Nov
clearly it law are reaohed by elllll1Dat1Dc the relatione ot thinp
to the een.e. ot ob....... and b7 arriV'1ng at relatiou bet....n the
meuured relat10118 ot thiDp to one another, then there ex18t.a an
extremely .olid toundation tor the attirtation that principle. and
law are the __ tor all ob.ervers bee. .e tbq lie limply and
completely' outside the range ot observational actIY1ties. It 18, tor
example, not the appearance ot colour. but the pIleral explanation in
terms of wave-lengtha ot lIght that 18 exaotly the same no _tter what
mq be the state ot observer
eye., the lighting bT which thaT see,
or the speed with wbich the)" mq happen to be in relat1ve 1'IIOt1on.15

t.

15Ibid.,

-

p.

41 •
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7. Relevance

~

classical heu:r1atic atructures.

'!'he preceeding summary

of some of Lonergan's statements about classical heuristic structures can be
expected to provide the reader with no more than an insight into the W&7 the
tarme are being used, it 18 impossible, within reasonable spatial limits to

follow Lonergan's analyais into detail.

Lonergan's

ana~1s

is ot classioal

heuristio structures as operative in mathematiw ph;ya1os. The relevance of
olassical heur18tic struotures for the stud7 of the integration of the little
oommunity is not in the mathematics, and it is not in the restriotion to sense

----

----

-

data which is leg1t1mate17 made by pb7aics, but in the abstraction from the

empirical residu.e.

8. It 18 not in the _tbematics, for the uae ot mathematios in soience
depends upon meanrements, vb1ch are not as neoe.8&l7 in the study of man as in

the stw:b" of atoms.

The ext.raordina:r'.T success of the pbyaioal so1enoes natural17 enough led
investigators ot the organism, the J)87Cbe, and intelligence, to a
servile rather than an intelligent adoption of the successful procedure.. In phy8io. and ohem1atryJ meaaur1ng is a basic teobnique that
take. inquiry from the relations ot tbinp to our sen..s to their
relations to one another. But When one mounts to the higher integratiol'lS of the organism, the psyche J and intelligence, one finda that
maaav1Dg 10... both in aignificance and in ett1oaC7. It los.. in
sign1t1C&DCeJ tor the higher integration is, within lird.ts, independent
ot the exact quantities of the lower an1told it qatematiHd. Moreover, the higher the integration, the greater the independence of lower
quantities, .0 that the meaniDg ot one's dreams i. not a fUnction of
one's wight, and one's ability in mathe1M.t1os does not vary with one's
height. Besides tbU loa. in s1gn.ilicanoe, there i. also a lo.s in
eftioaq. Cl.aasioal method can select among the fUbat10ns that solve
d1tterent1al equations by appealing to meuurement. and empirical17
established curves. What the differential equation is to classical
method, the general notion of developnent is to genetic method. But
while the differential equation is mathematical, the general not10n
ot development ia not. It follow that wbi.1e measurement 1. an
efficacious teobnique for f1nd1.ng boundary conditions that restrict
dUferential equations, it possesaes no ..signable efficacy wben it

....
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comes

to particularizing the general notion

or

deV'8l0pnent. 16

Man 18 an organism, a psyche, and an intelligence, allot these must be studied

not statically, but u dewloping aspects ot:man. Besides the tact that
society conditions the developnent

or

the individual, it is also true that

society and culture themselws can develop, can make progress or decline.

9. Not in re&tr1ction .................
to sense data. The restriction to sense data in
physiCS pertains to its criteria 2! relevance. The contents ot dreams,
imaginations, personal desires are irrelevant to the physicist, but not to the
psychologist or the sociolOgist, tor these all bave a great intluence on the
behavior ot people.

What the pb.7eicist must ~gDOre they 1II1St explain. 17 Corre

-

sponding to what Furtey calla "criteria ot relevance, tt is Lonergan's canon ot

selection. This states that "it a correlation or bJ'pothes18 or probability
expectation or theory or qatem pertains to empirical 8cience the (1) it

involve8 sensible consequences, (2) such consequences can be produced or, at
least, observed. NlB And he &cus••• th1a canon in relationship to the
soiences of mana
As we have tOl"Jllllated it, the oanon or 8election d8D&lds sensible
oonsequenees. Bltt it IU1' be urged that 811p1r1ca1 Mthod, at l ....t in
its es.ential features" 8bou1d be applicable to the data ot
conac1owmess no 1..8 thaD to the data ot sen... Nov, on th1a matter
a great deal Dd.pt. be said, but the present is not the t1m.e tor it. We

-

16lbid ., p. 463.

18Ibid., p.

-

n.

pas
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have followed the ccmmon view that EIIp1rical science i8 concerned
with sensiblY' veritiable laws and expectations. If' it i8 true that
essenttall.;y the same method could be applied to the data ot
consciousness, then respect tor ordinary usage would require that a
method, which only in its essent1als i8 the same, be named a generalized
empirical method.19
10.

Classical!!!! . .-ab;,,;at;.;.;;..,rac;;;.;.,. ;;.t.

demands some explanation

To MY'that classical laws are abstract

ot the term "abstract." ROn a simple and common view,

the abstract is an impoverished replica ot the concrete. ,,20 Lonergan, however,
mainta1n8 that th1s 18 an incorrect view, abstraction ia enriching rather than

impoveriah:lna. For in 1ta first 11lO1'ItIftt, abstraction :La "an eariching
anticipation ot an intelligibilitY' to be added to aenaible presentationsJ there
i& something to be known by insight." Second. abstraction :La "the erection ot
heuristic atructwea and. the attainment ot i1'laight to reveal 1n the data what
is variously named as

-i;he

aip.U'icant, the relevant, the important, the

essential, the idea, the torm." And the third moment :La "the tormu.lation ot t
intell1c1bllit;y that 1nIight has revealed."

It is onl;y in thi& third moment ot

tormulation that "the 1nsip1ticant, the irrelevant, the negUgible, the
incidental, the merely empir1cal res1clue tJ is lett out.

"Moreover, this

omission i. neither absolute nor der:t.nitift, for the empirical residue posse.se
the universal property of being that from wb1ch intelligence abstracts.

Such a

univeraal propertY' provides the baais tor a aecond aet ot heur1atic procedures

that take their stand on the simple premise that the uoD.8)'8tematic cannot be
8ystematized. n21 This second set ot heuristic procechtres constitutes

19!!!!:!., p. 12.
2OIbid., p. 81.

21Ibid., pp. 88-89.

jii!ii

6)
statistical method.
Classical laws are, then abstract in their heuristic antic1p!tion. And t
enriching intelligibilit7 that is anticipated is anticipated as univeraal:
lithe nature to be known will be the __ tor all data that are not s1gnitioantl

different, and the correlation to be apeoit1ed is reached only it it holds tor
all parallel instances.· And thq are abstract in !!erim.ental technique.

~

diSC0!!l'l1

For the experimenter makes no pretence to deal with concrete situations
in their nati.. complexitn on the contrary, he aima overtlY' at
reducing that complexity to a minimum and so he does all he can to
bring the concrete into some approximation to an ideal, typical,
detinable conjunction ot materials and ~t8. Accordingly, as he
beg1na with an atfort to secu.re mat.eriala from which all impurities
have been removed, 80 he ends with an argwy,aent that rests on their
theoretical definitions. A.s be begins by requ1rina instruments
constructed in acoord with aocurate spec1t1cations, 80 he enell by
interpreting their performance on the baais ot their ideal, otten
schematic structure. He measures, but he does 80 many times, and his
accepted result is just the probable mean ot actual reaults. Ue
reaches a conclusion with vb1ch others apoee, but the agreement makes
allowance tor the intrusion of ext.raneou factors and it acknowledges
no more than a limited DUIJlber ot aignU1cant decimal places. At everY'
turn 1t seems apparent that the concern ot experimerlt is to determine,
not the part1cular observable qualities ot the part1cular _terials
with which one deals, but a theoretical correlation betwen definable
and abstract ent1t18s. 22

Third, they are abstract in their tormulationl
Aa law, they are correlations 11.Dlc1ac correlatives, and the oorrelatives
are never the unique data ot sane particular time and place. Indeed,
they are not EmIIl genera11sed data, but genera11zed combinations ot
combinations ot combinations ot data. Nor mq one suppose that the
data, taken 1n these serial oomb1Dat10na, uniquely deterJll1ne what the
law lTIU8\ be. For the discontinuous set ot ob.......t1ona, represented,
say, by po1nts on a graph, can be satist1ed by any munber ot lava, ot

22Ibid., pp. B9-90.

-

•
which the scientist ohooses the one that, all th1ngs considered, he
reputes to be the simplest. Enrich1ng abstraction is still at lIOrk.23
Finally, the abstract nature of clusical laws is true of their ver1t1cation:
For veritication is reached, not by appealing to this or that isolated
instaDce, but by securing as larp ad var1ou8 a range ot ilUJtanoea as
both direct and indirect procedures make posa1b1e. It to11on that
what 18 .....iti.d ia, not this or that part10ular propoaition, but the
general, abstract formulation that alone admits the large and various
range ot app1ioatioll8. A.p1n, to repeat the arcumeut from another
viewpoint, what is verified is what can be refuted or rev1aed. What
can be ret\1ted or revised, is the pmeral, abstract formulation. And
so what is ft1"itied ia the general, abstract formulation. 24
11. Conclusions.

1'be sign1t1caDCe

ot classical. laws tor the study of the

integration ot the little community is not in the mathematioa1 form they' take
in physica, nor in tbe restriction to sense data as the basis tor pl'Qraical laWl
but in their abstractness in (1) heuriatic antiCipation, (2) experimental
techniques ot disco....ry, () tonmUation, and (3) ftritication.

The heuriatic

antioipations ot cwsica1 :method are anticipations ot sCientit1o, u opposed
strictly mathematical, insights.

Inverse 1naYht is the diacovery that the

spontaneous anticipation ot intelligibility ia mislea.d1ng, that one ia asking
the wrone kind of questions. What direct insight abstracts from is the
empirical reaidu.e-...... d1tterenc.a ot time and plaoe and !l\UI1ber--wbioh is
denied any innaftant intelligibility ot its own.

It is becauae intelligence

abstracts !rom the empirical residue that elua10al law are univeraal, that
can say that aimilar aeta ot data are similarly understood.

It is necessary to

distinguish between similarities ot things to the observer, whioh torm the
basis ot preliminary descriptions and clus1t1oatlons, and similarities ot

-

23Ibid., p. 90.

0
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relationshiP' among thinp 1n themselYe', whioh are the proximate materials ot
inSight into nature..

'l'be abatraotnees ot 01u.10al tOl"Dl.llat1ons, however,

requires that one i.e seeking to determine theoret10al correlations between
lIabatract and definable ent1tie." rather than to determine "the particular

observable qua11ties ot the particular material. with which one

deal..

In

phy81c" the emp1r1ca1. 1Dveat1ptor can work out "a differential equation that
expre.ses atheaa.t1ca1.ly oertain very pneral features of the data," just as t

mathemat10ian

O&rl

work out the p:oopertie. ot the UDkrlovD, x, in order to solve

tor x.
Invar1ance ot formulation of pb7&1oal la!8 1& po8lible beoause of their

abatractn..&, because "pb,Ja1cal pp1Doiplee and 1_ are simply and completely
outside the raage ot seeing, hear1ng, touob:1ng, teeling, and all other direct
and 1nd1rect act. ot observing. If It 1a

~

. . . from all oba....Q:biona1 ataDdpo1Dts."

ot

bee. ._ "phyaloal objects look the

'l'b1a 1. a1cn1fioant, tor the emrpnc

an explanatory'ri.npo1nt that can cope with the question of relativism.

Aa

lAnergan 8&78, 1t baa taken 80M time tor thi8 Yiewpoint to beooIIle e8ta.bUahed

in .c1enoea

·one Dd.ght 8&7 that 1t baa taken modern se1ence tour centur1e. to

make the diacoftry that the objects of i te irlqu.1ry . .ed not be imag1Dable
ent,lt1e. mov1Dg through imaginable prooesses 1n an 1mag1nable apace-time. • • •

Even before E1ut.e1D arad Be1aeDberg 1t was olear enough t.hat the world
descr1bed by so1enttats . . strangely different from the wrld depioted by
arti8ts and inhabited by men of common senae.

But it was lett to twentieth-

oentury physioist8 to env1aage the poulbility that the object8 ot their .oieno
vere to be reached only by .evering the umbi11cal cord that tied them to the

p
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maternal :lJrag1na.tion ot man ... 2!)
B.

CAUSAL-FUNCTIONAL MODELS AND CIASSICAL LA\t1S

The abstractness ot classical law baa an important bearing on the usefulness ot imaginative mdels in the studT of sociocultural integration.

Por

models are not abstract, l:N.t concrew, imaginable. ADd both Redtield and
Sorokin make use of mode18 when discussing integration or the holistic approach
1.

Redfield'.!!!.

2!mod
__"_18__

"What is the fora of the

the parts of the conception to one another?

arTangeJMnts

of

Or, to what model, present to

experience !'rom scme other aouroe than the human cosam1t)", does th1a chosen

bol1at1c concept tend to coutorm?1t Redfield ,uggests as

e.tlIJ'VC"S

to his

question a "1d.Dd of maoh1D.e," a IfTUt orgam.sm," a Iftextbook on tormal logic,"
or "drama or other tem. of l1ter81'7 art.. tt26 Be notes the tendencY' in the
social sciences fltoard concepttona
parte within the whole.

or tamotlonal or

causal relationab1ps ot

Ver)" predolll1nantl)", the more developed conceptloruJ tor

deacr1bing human whol., approximates the model ot the machine or the
organ18m. w27

In tba cau.aal model clua. ot phenomena are arranged in the form

ot general causal 1.avs wb1ch would

make it possible tor au :ldeal observer to

predict all tuture atates of a 8)"8tem from conditions at a giVtm time. ,,28

In

-

25Ibid., pp. xx-xxi.
26.n. Little C08IlUD1tr, pp. 1$-16.

-

27Ibid., p. 164.

2B'*The Relation of Anthropology to the Social Sciences and

Pp. 733-734.

the Human:lties,
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the .t"unCtioDal. model Ita oult.ure or a soe1et,. is seen as an organization ot
aeaDS designed to achieve oertaln enda _.,29

2.

~ ~

observer. An 1111t1&1. observation can be made conoerning the

notion ot an ideal oba8l"Y8r that om prediot all future state. of a 818tem from
conditions at a given time.

again and again in sociolocr.
Un1versal Mind that . .

Th1s assumption

ot

an ideal ob.erver tUl"llll up

It . . . . to have ita roots in the idea ot a

auae.t.ed

by Laplace..

Polany,l. points out some ot the

weaknesses ot thi. Hind, even it it " ... a poH1bl1lt1'1
Assume, tor the sake ot argume1lt, that we po••••• a oomplete atcm1.c
theory' ot 1nan:1Jr.ate matter. t'l!e can then envisage the operations of
a Un1veraal M1nd ill the 88Me ot Laplaee, The initial positiou and
velocities ot all the atoms ot the world' being given tor one mmem
ot t1Jne, all the torces acting between the atoms heille lmowD., tbe
!..aplacean Mind could compute all tuture oonticurationa or all atoms
throu&bout the 'WOrld, ad fl'om this reault va could read ott the exact
physical and chemical topography of the world at any future point ot
time. Bv.t we nov lcnov that there is a great and YU1.ed olus ot objocts which cannot be identified, and still le8s understood, by
establishillg their complete J>h7aioal and oh.emioal topograpb.y, for they
are constructed with a view to a purpose which pbyalcs and ohemistry
ommot defifte.. So it tolle. that the Laplacean Kind would be nbject
to the sae lif.',itatlolll it could not identity any'machine nor tell
us how 1t 1IOl"u. Indeed the Laplac.an Kind. could ldent1t;r no object or
process, tho meaning ot wb1ch cone1ats in serrlng a purpose. It would
ignore ther.tore the ex1atenc. not cml7 ot machines but alae ot any
kind ot tools, foodstuffs, hous.s, roads and any writt.n records or
spokea

mea.aps.30

.,

The postulated ideal obserTel' ie, according to Polany1, incompatible with using

the analolY ot a maob1ne, tor the type ot knovledp poas.8aed by noh an ideal
obserYar does not include the knowledge ot purpose.

-

Soroldn 8eems to recognize

29lb1d.
3O:m.cbael POlanyi,

!h! Stu~ ~ !!!!'!

(Chicago,

1948',

pp.

48-49_

p
68
tJds, although he does not call attention to it, when he modit1es his earlier
statesnents that a machine 18 a pure cauaal-tunctional
mach1ne is a

m~ !'d21-causal

oonnscted with

0_

~

by saying that a

system beoauae the parts are "all causally'

ar»tber and all created by' the p!u?>sive activiti.s

ot the

gE'Oups. till

It is not neceeHl7, bavever, to enter 1nto the realm ot tm'POsiva
functions ot meohan1cal art1tacts to Cl"iticize the ideal observer ot Laplace.

It can be recalled that. in t.he &01188ion ot 1rlYar1ance, the position that
"PbTsical objects look the same tr_ all obaer"V'ational ltandpoints" wu rej.cte
in favor

ot

the E1ut.e1n1an polition that

limply aDd capletely outside the range

and all other direct and indirect acta

~cal

or

ot

prlncipl.s and 1_ are

s.ing, hearing, touching, teeling,

oba...n.na •.,.)2

So a non-mechanical

example ot a eauaal-tunotlorl&l. qJJtem liven by Soro1d.n, the solar qetem., "can
serve as a bridge back to the conoept

Lonergan.

ot cWlioal law as developed

by

Per the solar qstem, unlike a mach1Da, need not be understood in

reference to a purpose. It 18 a . . . .

!! ...N_OUl'r--._ano
............... which

can be predicted 1n

all it. fUture statu .from lc:novladp ot oondit1oDa at a given t1me.

Lonergan tenna, Ita

~t1c

It is what

process,· wb1ch il a result ot a concrete

Werenae from alaesieal law.
,3.

Szptematio I!'!cesa. A concrete inference from abstract laws i. not a

.3l.Society, Culture,

32Lcmerpn, p. 41.

!!!! Peraonal1tl,

p.

334.

•

I""'"

,.cbaAiCal deductive process that could be performed by an interenc8 machine,

tor only insight can graapl

"(1) which 1_ are to be selected tor the

:1nf'erenoe If (2) how the selected laws are to be canbined to represent the spatial

and dynamic contirurat1or.ul ot the conorete situation, and (3) what dimensiolllJ it:
the situation are to be meaeur't)d to supply numerical values that particularize
8u.ch inference caD be carried out by a

the selected and combined law. ff

}X"8.ctical insight that occurs onl,r when a suitable concrete situation arises.

But it is also pou1ble, by

U8DI

of a oomrt.:ructift insight, to 'WOrk out ideal

pI'Ocesses without att.1ng tor app&"Oprtate ooftCll'et.e sit.uatiou

to

OOCNr.

SUoh a

constructive insight "tends to be a tree exploration
of the potentialities ot
,
knOwn laws, and its pri1'lCipal f'Nlt. is the torJlll1at1oD. ot ideal. or typical

processes that are dominated thl"oughout by hu1It&a iDtelUpnoe. For 111 such pro

cesses the basio situation is any aituatioll that sat1sfias the requirelleDts ot
the coutructive insight and, prov1d.ed the prooen 18 closed

ott

apinst all

extraneous infiwmoe, every antecedent and oouequent situation must. aasu.me the
dimensions determinsd by the suoce..!.,.. staps ot the imaginat1ve model." It

such an ideal prooe.s can be 'V'erified in a s8l"i.. ot concrete s1tuat10u, then
one insight or set ot tm1t1ed wights grasps both tbct wbole process and every

event in the process, a corresponding set ot laws expresses the insight or set

ot

insights 80 that &TlY situation OM be deduoed tram any other without explio1

consideration ot the illterven1ng situations, and thus data on one situation is
equivalent to data on the whole proc..s, data a1grd.f'i.cant. in one situation will
be eign1t:1oant in

a:r.rr other,

and

a report, on any situation can be checked by

p
-~------------------------------------------------------------,
10
b1 reports trom

arrr other

sltuat1on.;3)

4. !2!-sID!!!!t1c i!!CU8. Bat 1deal.17 conet1"U.oted processes need not

be

qstematlol
Let us define syatetAat10 process. by the
tles that, other tb1np beine equal,

alreadT enumerated proper-

(1) the whole of a qatematlc process and 1.t8 eft17 ewnt
possess but a single intelUg1bl11t.y that COl'rnpoftde to a lingle
wight or a lingle set of un1t1ed iulghte,
(2) any situation can be deduced from 8ZtT other without an
explicit coDllid. .aUoa of 1nt.er'nln1nc sltuat1oD8, u.d

(3) the 8I'Ilp1r1cal lImtat.1ptiol'l or such prooe.s.. 18 marked
not. only b.r a notable t80111. lAueet"ta1!l1nc aD:l ohecldng
abundaDt and a1p1t1C&1tt data bt&t. a180 by a aupreme .....1; whea
all data tall into a s1ngle perapeot.lft,: ~ deductiou become
pou1ble, and au.'bsequent. exaot predlotlons repl.arl1' are tulfilled.
Now ....... a Sf'OUP or s..i.e. 18 ~ em. de~t.e
pr1Dolpl_, it. 18 al1f&1'8 pos81ble to COlt8truot a d1.tter8llt group or
series by the simple expedient ot violating the ~ pr1ne1plu.
Jut the p-oup of .:yat....t1c proce.... i . ooutruoted on detezom1Date
pr1noiplea. therefore, by violatlna the_pr1nelplu one can oonat.ru4t
other procen.s that are non-a1lltem.at1c.-'"

'l'bu, in DOn-ar.rat;emat1c proceaa there is no .iDale 1uight or srO\lP of wights
that

~ups

tba

p.l"OO8S8

as a whole, &ad there will be

DO

correapond1ng set ot

related law. lfoG-l7IIteu.t10 proc... an be understood, bat. understanding will
be tbrough a ..t of dilter_t
seta

wicht. or through a .et ot dUterea:t unified

ot inlight,s. Revertb.el••• ,

i t the law apreSling all the releftnt.

wight. are completely knolm, it there 18 no extraneous :l.nterterenoe with the

process, it there is full intormat,ioD on

llz.o.rpn, pp. 46-47 •

-

.l4n,1d..,

pp. "6-49.

0'n8

s1tuat.iqu, it there are correct.

p
n
1D81&hts 1nto "he baaic .ltuation, 1t t.here i. _tielerat .kill in the ma1pula
~1on

~e..lolllJ,

of aat.heat1oal

it there an oorreot

dedaOfJd .1tuat.1cma, aad i t there is no

ts... 11Dd.t on

wicht.

the

1ato all

proc...

of mald.rlc tblt

de<JU,Ot1oD, then--and only th8l1--can ....17 8'nIlt 1n a DOIl-qat,_tic proc••• be

decluced.3~ It

a1.ght be noted, hovever, that no merely human m1ftd i . likely' to

baTe autt101eu\ kDowledge of 1... , 1ritormatlon _

the basic .ituation, skill ill

dedUot1on, or time to make tbe dedu.ot.ion to deduce all the .'t"eII\a in 8l\Y

qate.matio

proo....

~hermo... J

DOD-

it a Laplacean M'1nd--Redt1.1d'. ideal

o'baerftl'-...1a poAulat.ed., 111. 111 at.Ul aeoulU7 to aaHl't that ROb a m1Dd would

.t111 be UDable to

i~

a aacbW or an

0~pn111D,

mm tJltNlh lt understood

all the :plv1r1eal. and ebem1eal law that wen ...l...-ant.

5.

C!!I!:!:!:... EftD tbouah

a non-qatemat1c prooen 1. th....t1oal17

deaible 1a all lingle eventa, it stUl ....'1£1•• co1llc1dent.al . .epte .. in
wb1ch "(1) tba lII8JII1Mrs of the aarepte have 80M lUd.v'based on .patial

jUxtapoett1on

01'

'temporal ftCoe..ion or both, and (2) there 111 no oorreapond1ng

a1ty' on 11M 1 .....1 of

1Da1&bt

proces. a ao1Dc1.deat.al

and. iat.11.1c1ble relat1oD. 1J Jot

aarecate, .. alao

the .evval part,8 of nou-e,..telJlat1c

onl.T 11 the

we the aeeveral 11l8tpte by which

pro....

are und.er'atood, a and

80

alao ..e

the "auco..e1on of ditt. . .t prat.aee b7 vb1eh dUferlftt stap. of non-

I18temat.1e

pl"Ooe•• . , .

be dadv.ced.,,- Pol' all \bree po..... a um:ty based on the

apat.lo-tallporal UBit.)" of the total prooes., but po..e . . no correepondi.rag \Ud.ty

on

tba 1...1 of 1atellJ.&1b111t;y.)6 SoroldA'. CODC8I"1.. oorreapoDda to

3SIb1d., pp. 48-49.

l6nwi.,

pp.

49-50.

p
IAmC"gatl"

eoincldf.mtal. agrepte. A ••t ot . .utal-tunotional law expla1n1.Ds

the dU'terent ennu in a

nol'l-~.at1o

ooapriu of log1eo-meaa1natul

~,

pro.... or ooacerl.•• vwld it••U be a

tor the 1awa would

DOt

haft a unity'

OD

the level of 1ntellig1lri.lit 7. but onl.7 on the bui. of the epatio-tempol'al

Ul'l1t.7 ot the data.

6.

!!:!! oanon !! 0P!!'!t1ou.

Tbe coutru.ctiw iu1ght by which ideal

proouaea are eonatNoted b7 cOD8Nte W ....DCe8 from known lava 1. ... tr••
GPloratioD or tbe potRt1al.it1_ ot kD.own law. ad ita pr1naipal mit 18 the
tOl"Jllllat1oll of ideal or tf1pical prooeuu tha are dom1u.t.ec1

auman 1ntel11pDoe.

For 1ft INCh process..

t~

~t

b7

basic situation 18 utl' .ituation

that aat1afiea the requireme.rata of the col'l8'tirw:t;iw wight and, provided the
Pl"OCea. i . olond. ot¥ qainft all edr&l'leOU 1ratlwmoe, 8"IfIl'Y antecedent and
COJUlequent

fri.tvatm

mut, ...... the d1meDs1one detAnlinad by the noc_81ft

stage. of the 1.ma.g1nati.......1. lf31 But coutruotive

wilbt

C8Il

lead not.

01'1l.7

to the coutruotion ot ideal 1ugiDative mod.ta, but &leo to teobnololictal
development. Han can build JIIIOh1De8 baaed upon the -tree aplorat1oG
potentialitiel

ot

lcDo'tm

law.·

or

the

A. techDoloctoal 1na1abt, aa Po1aD,y1 and Sorold.n

both haft 1Dd.1cated, _at utili. pbyeioal l.awe and pd.noiplea in order to

achieve a purpose. and thus mut be able to idenwitT a purpole and to graap the
relat.loD8h1p of ptqaioal pr1nciplea to the at.tainment of tbat purpo.e.
Lonergan

data

call. the "canon of operat.1one" states tbat "juat as

ot aenae y1.elds

1ne1ghts

Wbat

1nqu1r,y into the

tbat are formulated in olaaeical &lid .tat1stical

laws, eo inverselT, the lava provide premises and rule. tor the pidance ot

31Ibid •• p. ,,1.
1.

-
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hUm8l'l act.1Yit.T upon NDS1ble Object.s •

..38

The oanon of operat.ioraa proYLdes a F1!elple

!! cumulat1ve !!p!Il!lon, tor

"law guide aot.1YLties, which bring forth new law, wldoh pide turthar

activities, and
a 2;!1t!iple

80

torth 1nd.et1n1tely." Bat more tban this, the canon also 18

!! ~lon'

Han kraov8 beat wbat man makes tor h1u.U aDd 80 ". bepn oar studT ot
lnsllht b7 exam1n.i.Dc that elementary artefact, the cart-Wheel. But t.he
denlopmant ot SC18l108 is followed b7 a teohnolos1cal expanaiOll, by a
vaet iDOl"eue of the t.h1np that man can make tor himself and 80 oan
uod.arstand adequat.el)" beaaue be baa aade 1hea. Moreoftl", the .,..
ret1ned &ad reaourcetul technoloQ' becomes, tbe greater t.he trequenq
of t.he art1t1oia1 synthesis of natural products. TINa, Nature ltselt
becomes U1ld...t.ood in t.he same iub.101l aa maD'. own 8l"t.etacts.39
It. is a pr'1Dclple of anal18iss

01...1,., man can aaal.y&e t.he objeota t.hat. be h1aaelt can GOut.ruot.
But. it. 18 DO le.. true that he can also anal,... objecta wb1oh, ..
yet., he cannot manaae to ooU't.l'uct.. For anal.yals is a mental construction ad, where oper..c.:a.onal control taila, tbeoretloal lmovledp
can step in to accoUftt tor the failure of control, to ldeftt,ity the
WlCOlltl'ollecl tactors, to detand.ae aod. me&8U'e tMir utint,. ad.
1ntl.uence, to d1aeount their perturbing etteot, 8Dd 80 to extrapolate
to the law that would bold did th87 not 1atertere.40
Tb1s C&DOn 18 1mportant in other reapecta--u a principle ot C\UII1latlve

verifioation, a teat of observationa, .. pr1nolple of systemat.1zation, 8lld a
source of Mabel' n.ewpotnta41_-tbat e&mlOt be elaborated upoIl at the IIOUIlt.

-

38Ib1c1., p. 74.
3
9 rp.: 7;;1.
!
Ibid.,

-

40n,ld.

-

-

41Ib1d ., pp. 7$-76.
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The po1nt 18 bere that tb1e pr-1noiple 18 a practlcal princlple far techDololical advanCe, but as a practical :r:rinciple lt aida ln the theoretical under-

,tanding of nature tnsotar .. there 18 a Q'Uthea18 of natural prodtlcta.

But

be.ide. aiding theoretical understanding in thi. manner, it alao 18 a theoreti-

cal pr1nc1ple of

~18.

But in 'both cues, there is required an wicht to

acbieve a concrete Werenee froIIl abstract law. And both instances are relevant to a d18cuaa1on ot models, for a model is constructed in accordance with
knOwn pr1Dciple. and la....... and can be either pbJaical17 ooutruoted or

1lrtag1DatiYell' coutructed.

-----

-

-

-----

7. Alternative. of oluaioal or .tatl8tical heur1.ttc nruoture••
....................
..................
Concrete 1Dterenoe from ow.iDal law can reault in either qat_tic or nonayetematio proce...

Nov it an ideallT ccmetruot.ed qat_tic proce.. can be

verified in a .erie. ot concrete 1nataDce. there 18 given a a1tuat10n similar
to that described by Redfield in hi. torttlUlatlon ot the causal model--it 18
po.8ible to predict all tut\U"8 state. ot the 87lltem trcm conditiou at a
time.

I1Yen

Tbu, "our planetary IIJ'IItem i. periodic J it 18 an ind1'ri.dul .et ot

. . . . . , moat ot them are ri..ibleJ and a relat1'V8lT small llUlIlber of concrete
1naight. makes it po.aible to determine an indefinite sequence or partlcular

42 Obaervatlona or the planetarT qat. coutltute a ramp or

cuea.·

can be ent1rell" aubsumed under clu.ical heuriaUc structures.

data that

I t . . atated

that it 1. hJpotbeticallT possible to deduce every event in a non-,ystematlc

}rcce.s, given autticient time and intormatlon, and sutf1cient kDovledge ot
cl&88ioal law.

But as a matter of fact, cl&8,loal inquiry does not attempt to

42Ibid., p. 67.

-
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explain ewry e..nt in a non-8)'1S'teat1c proce... For rIOt on11' would saob. a
deduction demand luller knowledp ot clua10al 1&118 ttum 18 po•••••ed, it alao
1I)uld require more Wonution and more time than 18 a"nl11able, and the result
would be lacldng in generality, tor the oonoluaiona WOl1l.d not even be a eate

approx1tnatlon to the eYellt. of another

noa-a~tto

proce•• with a .licht11'

d1fterent baslc ait.uattoa. 43 Aooord1nal;r, a raqe of data can aleo be sub. . .
UDder atatl8tical heuriat10 .tructur•• baaed

OIl

the ant1cipation of a dlaconr

ot probabl1itz ot ooourrence of events, rather than on the aatlc1p&tion of the
d1acoftr,y of the theoretical oorrelation between definable and abatract
oorr.lati.,..•• 44 On the hypothesla that a I'uae
ot obaervatioBl 1. to be
,
subsumed UDder ol..aloal heurlatlc atructure., ttlt will be po••ible to diaoo
aome order17 aeri.a, prop'.asl.on, or lI'oUP1na." Oft the bJpotb.eai. of
natl8t1oal hnr1atic s'Wcture., "no aucb aerl.. , procreatoD, or iP"oup1Da
ex1ats. Both bypotheaea can be formulated, their implications are to be 1IOrk
out, aad the tacta are to decide 1ib1ch bJpotheaia ie, it DOt ultimate truth, a

leut the beet aft1lable opinion at the l1.,..n .tap of .c1ent1t1o deYelop-

ment."

45

---- -

6. Soroldn and Redfield

---

statl8tical method.
- .............................
..- .......
OD

In the aecond chapter it

was ahown how a little cOilDun1ty turns out, 10 Sorok1o'. qatem, to be a

44

4.3n,id., pp. 56-57.

-Ibid., p. 60.
4S Ibid., p. 67.
-

F'
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~;i'ul-causal system by

det1ni tion. And this brought up the question of

the ver1£ica'i,ion of the defini tiona which serve as premi._

tor thia ooncl.ua1on

It seems that the causal and rnean1ngful integration of a colll'll'W1i.ty

10._

significance as a question to be decided by empirical investigation.

notions of systematic and non-ayatemat1c prooesae8

IU"e

U tbe

applied, however, it

can be seen that eftn it mea.ningful interaction is accepted aa the generic
object of stucty J an orr:anized interaction process doe. not neae8aar.1q beccme a
systemat·· 0 PI"'OCeSS, tor the events conetltuting such an 1.ntAraet1on proces.
need not be deduCible i'l'om a single unif1ed at of abstract law.

!.t the ..

ewnt.a are not 80 deducible, they constitute .. non-aystematic process, end
require the use of atat1sti cal methods.

Redfield and Sorold.n both recognize statistical Il'Ilthod." but __ to
reganl them . . .ana to obtain causalo:r .functional qatema.

Redfield, tor

exemple, after saying that causal laws make it possible to predict al.l1'u.tu1'e

states of a qat.em !rom conditione at a g.t.wn time, goes em to say that there

are two

lnqS

of deftlcping a causal ilJyffbem, either .",.

conoe1~

a ay'stem ot

uni'1eraal relatiomrh1ps out of the observation ot one or a few case.," or "from
stat:1.stical interoorrelat1ons of t,raits and tra1t ocapl. . . . n46
And Sorold.n, although he distinguishes between

_yatem and oonr.eri....

aystem.atio and non-ayatema.tic process, approximately.........e alao to regard
Itntistieal mthod as roore17 one of eeftnU. ways ot arriving at causal-

functional

lawSI

"almost all of the eontemporaJ'7 social. scientists assume that

46ftTte Halation ot
PP. 733-7.34.

.Anthropology to the

~'ioc1al

Sciences and the Humanitie.,"

-77
culture is a tunctiOr.al unity. 'llirougb experiments, throUf!,h statistical
ctn-reJ..."J.tion. through obsel"'f'ation. through the comparative historical method.
throur)l '(',ase studiJ'Ja,' and

thro~

all the other possible methods .. approaches,

and tec..lm1ques, the,. haw been bus:! hunting for the causal-tunct1oncl relationships, unU'omitiea, ltnd laws VtiOO

8'!JPPO~

exist between

culture var1ablea. n47 This indicates a. tendene,y

two or more

'.n Soroldn to :regard causal

and functional law as expreSSions of relnt1OMbip8 between concrete f!1'Ironts and

laVa are abstract} he rejects the positJ.on
1magine.ble'

~

UWb.ile the pb.ysioal sciences haw

the objects of science must be

aJ.reaq,

aba.ndoned the atom ...

the elementary' un! t, and haw found t.bat an ~"ing lI.1JI.ber

ot

the

eleinentary particles are of a less and les. 'material' nature, our tbome-made
~sici8ts'
a.1:;Qms

are still pl.a7ing with atomic marbles, std.l.llook1ng fbI' social

as the simplest and _llest units at perJChoeocial ):ile~.J.L.6 Yet 1t

can be questioned. whether Soroldn' s idea of ab8traction 18 adequate I for he can
8~.11

hold t11.at causal...tunctional law are "1mpoveriahGcl replicas" ot the

concrete eleraentary particles, ewn though the. partlcal.s ere len "material"
than atoms.

On th0 view th.!lt abstraction is impoveriehing, although one can

ach:1. t that t.b.$re are cws:i O$l nM statistS.cal laws.. "one

41

~c~,

I, 18.

48rade and Foibles in

1956),

~

wm.. n ol..aims

,

Con~r& 5oo101or;: -and Related Science.
,

_ .

(Chicago

F
I"""

Lol'lBrr,an, "be at a los8 to determine sc:ae coherent manner in 'Which both
eJ,.ass±cal end statistical law can be aelcnowl.edged.."

For S01"Okin and H8df"i&ld

both, stat1nt:1cal lAllS are a typt'J ot causal. or functional. lad} they both.

disPlq'

Q

sort ot reduct1om.. that hel1tatea to acknowledge tlm distinct. t)rpe_

of intell i gibilit:y.

Accord~,

a look at the reason tor the ditt1cul:t;y of

the view that. abstraction is Smpowrishing 'Will not be 1r.relevants

Let A,B,C, denote semsibl.e data, and let a,.' ,a tt , • • • J
b,b',b", ••• J c,et,c·, ••• J denote ttm tot~t,y o£ tt~~
Utpcmtrisbed replicase Then, there is no aspect of seMible
data vithO'lt its impoverished replica, irlvereeq, the totality
ot aanaibllJ data can 'be constructed Ouit of the totall t.y of
i.."!lPOver1hd replicas.
Henee, it one admits 80.I00I olassjoal: laws, OM admit. tllat
some iIrJpoftl'18hed replicas ant related 81'8temat1~. Moreowr,
i f one admits the class:' cal In:WIt as objectiW, there MUnt be
systematiC relations not on~ betwc-en the impover1shed repl1caa
but also between the COllCl'\9t..e aspects of 8EmeS.b].e data to Which
t.hey OOrftlspond. It follows. that the claea1eal laWI can be
object1.ve only if tr.ey hold in the concrete. F5.nally',:i.t
will be onq by ~ the canon ot complete explanation or
an data, thnt O!'8 can ednrl.:t. ~mtic :relations l::etween some
~'Wr.lshed nplicas and del\r s.rstematio relations t.etween othent.
It Will follow tlmt the only law 11111 be olassical lmrs, and
that sta'ti Itical lave cannot be more than e. cloak for 19nonmce.
l'lWerae~,

i f one admits some statistical l.ttw, then one
relnt:1.ons 'be~rl !:'lOMe ~mpoVt=lrished :replicas •
.If tho s1iatifJt~tcal laW8 are object!\!'e, there cannot be ~t1c
rea,tions between the oorrespont:1irlt1 aspect.s of sensible dat.....
At least in those case... claSSical. l.avIJ ArIt excluded. !-'fOreoYer.
to shml that class 1 001 lnws flm not )"';~rely the mnClX)SOOplC illmr.t.on
resulting from a multitude of microscopic, random ocournUloea,
t1 correct theo:r.r of the abstract is needed J and in the present
~t.he.1., that correet theo1'7 is J.e.ck1ng1l49
001'11019 ~7stefl.aMC

the correct theo17, acoording to Lonel'gan, is tt18t abatract1.on is enrtclW'I.
This has al.read;y been treated :in tJl1s chapter.

..

'l'he 'V1eu that abstract.1on is

19
~riahing leads

either to a position of

dete~, in W:'d.ch

laws cannot be more than e. cloak for ignorance," or ot

ttstatistical

1ndete~ in which

"classical J.sws are • • • merel¥ the macroaeopic illusion resulting from a
multitude of microscopic, randc:n occu.:rrence:..."

10.

~.

law was stressed.

In the preceding section, the abstractnelt8

'It.d.a abstract':.on

itJU

said to be enriching.

ot claasica1
In the present

section, t.1-te alternatiw theo17, that abetmotion is !mpowrish1ng, has been
seen to lead e1ther to a determ.1.n1sJl or an 1ndet6m1n1em. The det.e:mdn1st

ca..rmot acknoWledge non-aystemat1o process,
acknOWledge ayatemat.1c proceeD.

On

erA the

1ndetendmst cannot

the theo17 that abstract,ion is enrich1.nc,

the construction of ~~.l~. either Jlb1'sical or imaginatiw, 1s not a1mp~ a

process of matching up ~r1ehed replicu w1th concnte ~erenta, but

require. creat:2:v" irudghttl. The. insighta can be practical or thaoret.1cal,

that i8, a.:1aed at understanding the implications of a I1tuat1on that baa
occurred, or aimed at explori.ng the potent1al1t1ea ot known laws. Furthermore,
these insights

ani clo~

Nlated to the canon of operations. For the canon

of operatiOns requi.ras that the empirical inquirer leave the rea.'la

ot the

abstract, in which the mathematician pcrpetueJ,q dwells, and re....nter the realm
of the concrete. HG thus use_ his lava to guide technological production, and

to create imaginative lJOhemea as a

:aoatUS

of analp:ing what would happen i t

circunstancea beyond hi.s power to control did not interfere. '!be canon of
operat,:tOl18 provides
can

Q.

conai~n~ guide

principle of vcrt:fieat1on as vall, tor on.'l\v correct law8
concrete operations succe.eat'ul.q.

Such concrete

intorences from clus: cal lava reqtdl.-. a grasp of how law can be utilized in

the atta1rmlent of a

~se,

and as rruc..'l are beyond an flideal observor,fI at

leaSt if this obsel"\fer is ooncei'Ved after the Laplacean Unlwntal :iind. The

ideal obaerver also seams to utilize lat", that are oorreln.tions of ~.he4
replicas of concrete objects.

lledtield's formulation of the cs.'l.1581 model

would :imrJ¥ a deterministic posi tion,

ultirlw.te~»

in the user of that MOdel.

Sol"Okw, howe'\'6r. as ehall '!::e seen, leans toward the indbtel'll'Jn1st side of the
dilemma.

c.

THE REUTIOlrSHIP or CIAsstC".L A.ND STATISTICAL

can be tJtudied b7 clu..:i cal law alone, but i f it constitutes a llOn-tr;1atematic
process, stat.istical method is neec1ed alao. Sorold.n claims that human histo17
i5 e. non-syst.ematl0 prooeu.

culture is caueal.l7 or

"It should be noted. here that, sinee no broad.

logi~

integrated in its totality, histoMJmS Who

(as lrl.storl.ana) attempt to deal with all it. aape~. are Ul'ltiI.ble to provide a
.....

II

b

thoroughgoing formula of un1tcm1ty, Vletb.er causal. or

OtheM.ee."~

Human

history is a pert of world process, and Lonergan sq. that "wheth()l" wol'''ld

proce•• ia 8ysteJllatic or non...,-stematie is .. question to be settled by' tJia
empiriccl,

method of stat.1ng both

bJ'pot.~_.,

worldng

out .a

~

.s one can

the totality of their implications, and confronting the implicatiOns with the

obael""lable facta." Sl If, as Sorokin oJ.ai.n'..a, no broad cultu,,""C.l is

to~
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integrated, then both human history and the world process of which it is an
1ntegrEl1 part are non-systematic.
mere~

'!ben the use of statistical l1JEItbod is not

a cloak for ignorance, but a necessary means of understanding world

process.

Closely related to the difference in the kind of process that ('.an be

explained in terms of classical laws alone or in terms of classical laws joined
to them are the following four elementary differences between classical and

statistical heuristic structure au

(1) Unlike abstract laws, which are the goal

of classical investigation, statistical investigation regards concrete
aggregates of events-nthe sequences of occasions on which a coin is tossed or
dice are cast, the sequences of situations

c~ated by

the mobility of molecules

in a gas, the sequences of generations in which babies are born, the young

marry, and the old die."

(2) Rtatistical inquiry is concerned with the actual

results rather than with the theoretical process, the probability of casting a
Itaeven" or the rate of death, rather than with the laws of mechanics followed
by the dice or the diagnoses of the causes of deaths.

(3) The attention ot

the statistical investigator is not directed 'to correlations of spatial"
temporal, and other variables, but toward frequencies that answer the question
!tHow oftEln1tt

(4) Classical investigators discover new theories by paying close

attention to minute differences, but "statistical inquirers make it their
business to distinguish in their tables of frequencies between significant and
merely random differences. n52
But random differences are factual.

As such they can be data for inquiry.

But since statistical investigators ignore them, there is something like an
inverse insight than denies intelligibility to these random differences for the

-
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statistioal :.nvest1gator to decide that differences that are not random require
turther inquiry, but that it would be silly to try to inquire further into
merelY random differenoes.

The defect in intelligibility i8 not in the sinele

.wents, but in the frequencies of events.

For, as haa been seen, every event.

1n a non-syste-fl1atic process is theoretioally dedUCible, given the proper conditions.

Thus, the assertion of random. differences in frequenoies does not

necessarily imply that single events are indeterminate, random, or not.
deducible.

And just as the assertion of random difference. arises &om. an

1nverse insight so also non-B,ystematic process depends upon an inverse insight
that denies to non-By'8temat1c process the unt.t:.1ed intell1gibilitQr characteriati

ot systematiC process. The properties of non-systematio process "are very
surprising indeed when they are canpared with what caumonly Laplace i. 8U.pposed
to ha.ve meant when he olaimed that any situation in world history could be

deduoed from ~ other.- S3

2.

Creativ," moment!!! ..,st
..&.t.i..s..
ti;;.;W--. method.

It. 1s true that 01as8ioal

inqu1r.r could lead to laws that explain every event in non-8j'lJtematl0 process,
but as a matter of taot neglects such process.

For not only would a classical

deduction of ev"ry event demand more information 'than is to be had and then
require unlimited time in order to conrplete the deduction, it would also cOlle
up with a result lacking in generality, tor the conclUSions would not be even

sate approx1m.ation to the events of another n':m-s;rstematic process With a
Slightly different basic situation.

But because what statistioal SCience

&
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studies is what classical science finds lacks the anticipated intelligibilit,y,
"besides the devaluated inverse insight thut has been our conoern hitherto,
there is to he acknowledged in statistical sOience another basic moment that is
positive and creativer"

Aristotle was quite ~are of whntwe have named non-systematic process,
for he contended that the whole course of terrestrial events was just a
aeries of acoidents. But to this devaluated inverse insight he failed
to add the further creative moment. Instead of discovering statistical
method, he attempted to account tor the manifest continuity ot the
terrestrial senes of accidents by invoking the continuous intluence
ot the continuous17 rotating celestial spheres.54

3. Probabill:!i'. The 1ntellig.1biliV
inq'dr;r is that of Erobabill:!f:.

In

t.~at

illustrat~onJ

of the insight that grasps that the probability

tosses to be one-halt.

is sought in statistioal

Lonergan analyzes the genesis

ot head.s in a series ot coin

"In my given instance the result Ttight have been

different if (1) the initial position at the coin had been different, or (2)

different linear and angular momenta had been imparted to 1t, or (3) the
motion had been arrested at a different point.-

The possible combinations of

all of these determinants i l very large, but the wole set of possible
c",mbinations divides into two equal parts, tor in a.I\Y and ever;r oombination the

coin can start from either a "heads" or "tails" position.

Ever;r sequence of

actual combinations of deterninants is a randOlPl selection from the set or
possible combinations, and the relative actual frequency of "headsn i8 obtained
by dividing the number of "heads" in the

series of tosses by the total. number

of tosses:

Clearly, this fraction can and often will ditter from one-hill. For
the result of each to.1 is settled by the actual combination ot
determinants, and that combination may be any combination whatever.
However, ditferences between relatlve actual frequenCies and one-

-

84
half" must be a coincidental a€wregate. For if they were not, they
would f"orm an order17 series; if the dif"ferenoes tormed an orderly
series, the results would have to fom an orderly series; i:f.' the
results tormed an orderly series, the sequenoe ot combinations or
determinants would f"orm an orderly series. S hypothesi, this
conclusion is false; therefore, the IItlPPosition ',m1S false. :1ore(J'I1er, relative a.ctual. frequencies cannot help oscll1atinf't about onehalf. For the set of posaible combinations divides into two exactly
eq"al parts; and ever-;/ seq;.lence of actual c:;.mbinations is a ra..l1dom
selection .from the set of possible combinations. How in a random
selection of a sequence the sequence is stripped of all order, a.ll
regularity, all law; hence, while it can and will include runs of
tthaads" and runs of "tails, It it cannot possibly stick to one
alternatIve to the exclusion of the other, and so relative aotual
frequency ia b"tmd to oscillate about one half•

• • • Intelligencr" then, can grasp a regularity in the
frequencies by abstracting from their random features and by
settl ing on the centre about which they o;;cillate. That a..')stractive grasp of intelligibility is the insi'ght that is expresaed by
saying that the probability of "heads" is ana-halt

.,5

4.

Analog.!!: heuristic structures.

There ls am analogy b!1tween

cla.ssical and statistical heuristic struotures.
"nature of • •

.If

or the

If

state ot • •

..It

The unknown is

na.:~lOd

the

Both heuristic structure. pre-

suppose a given, but whereas olassical heuristic structures seek to understand
"data. of different kinds, It statistical heuristic structures seek to understand
"ordinary and exceptional, nor:r.a1 and abnormal

ro:.tnS

of events."

And .just

as classioal structures utilize the "heuristic theorem" that It similars are
sLnilarly anderstood," so statist.1cal heuristic structures operata "because

a notable regularity is compatible with random differences in runs of events,

states are linked with runs that desPite occasional lapses are ordinary or
normal or, again, with runs that are pronounced exceptional or abnormal
though they contain a few ordinary or normal elements" --state of one's

health, the state ot the market.. the state of the na.tion.

-

Classical

-
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explanation is achieved thr::mgh the discOV0ry and verifioation

:yf

functional

relations; sta.tistical. eXplanation is "in the association of sets of classes
eVents 1,dth corresponding sets of probabilities. 1I

statistics

mO\f9S to

Like classical sCience,

scientific description, repla.cing the adjeotives "normal"

and ltabnorm.a1tt t-litb_ c';unting events and tab,:;lati':!n of rates.
J!lathe;~tica1

ot

Just as

reasonir.g is relevant to classical lnvestigat-: on, statistics

utilizes the calculus of probabillti es, techniques to )"1o'/e from relative actual
frequenci~s

to probabilities, and opr:'rator equationc which yield eigen-iunction

and eigen-va1.1]('s Ifthf'.t serve both to select classes of events and to det'Jrmine
the

r(~spHcti va

probablli ties of the selected «¥asses. It

Both classical and

statistical constrlctfl abstract from rtthe empirlcally rcsidual aspects of
indl T;.cuali ~;~r, of the continuum, of partiC"..llur places and tif1es, and

conste.nt velocl ty.1f

ot

But classical lallS also abstract from coincidental

agrrerates, demr:ndirl{ t i1e q'lalilication "ot.l}er things being equal, tf whereas
statistical states abstract from random d1fferi':'nces in rolative actual. frequen-

eios in order to reach an intelligibility in coincidental aggregates.

Both

types of laws .must be verified, and bot:l yield v111id predictions, "hilt. because
relative actual frequencies differ .at random i'rom probabilities, statistical
predi.ctions

nri~lU'i1T

regard the probabilities of ever.ts and only secondarily

det"r'r,lne the corresponding frequencies that differ at random fran the
probabilities."

,.

56

?robabilitl

2!

events

!!.E .2! ';erificati ons.

There is a distinction in

regard t::l probability- which is important at this point.

Not only is tt1ere a

86
probability ot event., investigated through statistical heuristic structures,
there is also a probability ot verifications.

The first probability .eta •

norm from which relative actual frequencies do not systematically diverge.

"It

is the regula:l"ity in the frequencies and it is to be known by a leap ot oonstructive intelligence that grasps the regularity by abatracting from the random
ness. It Probability of verifications is not known by a "leap of conatructive
intelligence that abstracts from random. differences, for sUch leaps never yield
anything but hypotheses."

ences.

Verification does not abstract from random differ-

itA prepondera.n.ce or favourable tests does not make a conclusion almost

certain) indeed, a very rew contrary tests

~tice

to make it highly improba-

ble." Probability of verifications "is known through acts of reflective understanding and judgment J it means that an affirmation or negation leads towards
the unconditioned; and it is estimated, not by counting verifications and
abstracting from random differences, but by criticizing verifications and by
taking everything re levant into account .. 1t57
Thus, probability of verifications is on the leval ot judgment, and

probability of events is on the level of insight which must be formulated and
then verified as probably true or not.
6. Sorokin'!I ~

:?!

statistical !l?ncepts.

Sorokin' s inc lusion of

statistical concepts in causal-functional method oan be illustrated.

n
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Causal-functional formulas like the Newtonian Law ot Gravitation sum
up brien,. a prodigious number ot separate relationships. They are
like a beam ot light that cuts acroS8 chaotiC darkness through all
its unlimited depths. This, with proper Nservations, can be said
ot 8f'l1' CAUSal tormula. It achieves its purpose by' establishing a
ot relationship between the variables urder scrutin;r.
'.l'hrOUiih a vast concurrence ot tragmentar,r events, torms, objects,
and relationships becomes a comprehensive whole. i:1ben the formula
shows that the variables A and B--depreselon and birth rate, modes
o! production and ideological forme, isolation and suicide,
urbanization and crime-are more or less un1torml,y ASsociated with
each other in the sense that B nomal.1y follows A or change. with A,
this unl!orrrd.!}l binds the variables together, introduces a readil1'
understOOd causal order into disorder. 58

u.n1torm1N

Depression is a state, which is a statistical concept, as i. also birth rate.
And in all ot the examples except the one ot the law ot gravitation, the thing
to be determined seems to be the degree

some clus ot events.

or,

,

state, ot rate ot, or trequency ot

In the law ot gravitation, however, there i8 no question

ot how frequently a change in gravitational force accompanies a change ot mass
or distance.

There i8 indeterminacy in how precisely this change can be

measured perhaps, but there i8 no question of the variables nuctuatinc
together .ore or le88 frequently', normal17 or abn01"'!1lally.

On

the other hand,

the relevant question in the other examples is "How otten?" How otten i8
isolation toll owed b.1 suicide?

How otten does crime occur in urban communities

as cOOlpared with rural oommuni ties?

How trequent are births in depression eras

as canpared with prosperous times?

7.
a

~e

ItIntensiY-"!!!. relationshi28.

Sorokin, however, does not distinguish

of intelligtbilit,r that results in the specification ot a determinate

F'

68
tunct10n or correlation from another tqpe ot intelligibility that re8Ulta in the
establishment ot a probability or ideal treque:l1CY trom which relative actual
frequencies di'¥Vge only non-s78tematically. He rather speaks ot a correlation

ot rates or trequencies ot events as a meane of establishina the same type ot
correlation of variables that the phys1cist obtains in h18 dUferential
equatiou.

Rather than a distinct type ot law, he speaka of d1tferent degrees

ot intensity: "Oaueal-tunctional connections vary

80

greatly in degree

2!

intensity that we not only have cues in which we can be reasonably certain ot
the causal nature

ot the association, but also others in which

we

are not

certain whether the association 18 really c8.W!al or merely incidental
2!"opt!r

!'!2! and

{E2!!!!2:.

the like).,:59 This fits in perfectly with bia conclusion that

"cultural conglomerations can be ranged theoretically upon a scale beginning
with those which are a mere spatial congeries, that is, are unintegrated in the
proper sense ot the word, and ending with those which are completely integrated
lOgically.,,60 There is a smooth contiIlUU.'1l ot a.ggregates ot events and objects,
ranging from mere spatia-temporal unity to highly' integrated unities. And there
ia a corresponding continuwn of tormulations, ranging trom the logical unity ot
a mathematical treatise,

to the unity found in Newton's law of graVitation,

to the unit.y ot relationships in the

way

economic prosperity and birth rates

fluctuate, ending in the mera catalogues of men and evants that a historian
might report.

59Ibid., p. 28 •

60Ibid ., p. 48.
-
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8. External!!!2 internal relatioDSbip,!. Aa a result of th1a extension of
the idea of f\mctional relationship, whioh is based upon a mathematical analog,

Sorokin baa to say that Ittunct1ona1. or cauaal connection of separate units 1s
almost al..,... interent1al and external; it rarely' gives us an intimate or
internal comprehension of the connection." He says that "experimental or
observational or statistical manipulations It enable us to determine only

two variables seem al".,.. to go together, but not !!5[ they do so.
examples--force ot

~aY1tation

~

He gives

varies with mass and distance, volume ot gas

varies in inverse ratio to pressure, hydrogen and o:x;ygen combine to torm
water--and sa)"8 that Hall we know is that
they have usually' done

80, and

w1~in

the limit. ot our perception

that they will probably continue to do

80

in the

future. ,,61 Soroldn t.bus atf1.rms that the type ot laws that lonergan t.erms
classical, establish a pro'ba'biU.ty tor future events (as contrasted with being
probably verified), rather than giving an explanation of how a certain process
takes place.

9.

~nt

2!. inteEation.

Very closaly related to the position that

causal laws give onlY probabilities and external relationships is Sorokin's
tendency to speak ot the Tariable. to be correlated as concrete objects or
units.

Th-,se variables will then be upsets of concrete data, and as such will

never be tully determinate.

"fore preciM conceptualization and measurement is

always a possibility implying, as long as this possibility remains, a certain
degree of indeterminacy.

Causal-f"unctional laws, in themselves, are logiCO-

meaningful systeu. According to Sorokin, the !.,ntern:a]. unity of' such systems
can be grasped.

Each concept has a meaning in relationship to the other

coaoeptdl a

the tOl'1llUlat101l.

tbq Mil .1'81' ....

tbat to.l17

UD1u,

Oft

the other bad, 11nce

M17 deWrm1ned 1D 1;be.el"..l, caaaot. be said to haft th1a

de~

1~te

But \he 00Il0N1ie

oauaal

01' f"aaot1olta1

01'

I'el.tio_hip betwea other
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Mericm. bu po1ated out how tbe

GODOept,

ot tbe uteDt

ot

iAteptat10a . . . .

Sorold.n'. dUt1Dot1oa bet__ qat.ea &ad ooqer1e. 1.aok prHin -ardlaa. Be
praise. Sorold.n, aa,1.rla that he "baa l»olcllT OOIItroDted the problea

daterm1aa tlle uteIR to wb10h nob

1atep'at~

ot

bow to

Ooev., reoolllu1na, d.eep1te hie

rltr1ol10 o_ata oa tile etat1at101&u of our . . . .te .... ttla to deal. with
the utant or

decr"

of 1D1;e&rat1oD .......11.,. 1apUe• . , . ataUattoal

......... art be adda that Itonoe the 1'101;10ft of exteDt

ot ateIV.tion 11

mtro-

d.uced, the exine. . of t1P88 of Imowledp vb1ab an aot 1nteptated with the
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0_ make. tIM cI1ft1aotion be_•• olaaa1oa1 aDd nat1n1cal bnrlat10

atruct.urea, tao......... , the

!n!!

of . , . . . of 1moVledp \hat

000tU' OU
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8ft...

law>,

and tile

fr!9!!!!l
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... _

. . aa1d of other IOOlal and
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ot cl.auloal law,

terI18

but rill be Itud1ed 1D their coaerete ocourrenoe by

et&t18t1oal JIltIthod.••

10. Indetera1!!"l- Althoulh Sorotdn d18tinFiabea bet'tlMen a oaual
~

aDd a caual. law, wld.oh 18 in It.. U • lo&1co-1'QNDiDgt'ul qatea, he

~

to 1nter'pret caual la_ concretely. . . tbouch the,. expreaed relatioft8h1pe

between concrete ....... and th1Qp.

Ioaerpn 11&71 that. it olue1oal law.at

be 1nterpreted coDDreteIT. "tb.elr eaaent1al d.e~ 18 In radical cont1.1ct

vttb the haliaa of daM, and
BQt olua1cal

'.l'hq

80

o1.ue1cal law eesent,1allT ... lmftrU1able.-

lave ,..d not be 1Irkrpre\ed eoncrete171

can be atat.emanta ot eI._ata 1ft

~traot ~

Dr.

(1) t.be abatract, qatem 18 ooaetltuted b7 impl101tly deftaed

relatlou ad .......
(2) the abeVact qatea 18 connected w1t1l data ncrt. dlreot17
bu.t t.brcucb \be ...station ot a oampl~ ..t ot desorlptlw
conoepta, aM
(3) the law of the . .vaot qatem are aa1d to be 'ftl"i.t1ed
i.DaSDlOh AI they _1&Q 11ll1ta OIl *1., otlrar thbsp beiq equl.,
YUt .,..let.l. of data eOD'ftZ'p.
tb.1a ebow1r.as. the OOIJplete1;r deteralu:t.e retat10a ot claulcal
law are 'betW8l1 the oorap1etel.y deterJd.nate twru they 1IIpl1oltly
define. ftd.8 oloaed etraoture 18 referred to data tb.roqh a ..t
ot descrlptive an4 eo &pJ:rox1llative oo_eptdJ. rs..ll3', the cloaed
atruotw. 18 prOYed 1'.1....' to data, DOt 1M uaot oo1Do1.dellOe,
()Q

but

It

0JJe

b7 -i&n1nI

tbe 111l1ta

on vh10h data 8OImIl"p.6)

aeJmow1edp. ol.au:loal. tau to be abnraet, tbert it 18 po.elble to

d1acover deteN1laat.. relat10u betwen detend.rtate teru.
verified 1Daotar . . 1t ..sipa l1m1ta

Oil

'!'he tormulatiOn is

vb10h data ooanrp. 'l'h18

new adldta
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a pr1DC1ple of 1rIdeterll1Dao7 1D the appUoat1oD ot deterlll1nate law to
~ of

l1tuationa, 1:Nt doN DOt P u far .. Sorok1a"

ooaore1;e

the oaual

torslat1ou \baMl......

11.

obaer'Nl" •

&1ft11

~

RedtleU, on the

otw

baD4, 1a apea:td.q of an ideal

.-1<1 1Ipred1ct. all Mure state. of a qateIIl tl'OIIl ooDd1Uou at a

tUe,· fornalate. bt. aauaal mdel in ~ of a det.ertDi.m..

..,. tbat d.termm:J.a .te.. from Itthe Galilean VOl"ld vin.·

'01"

LoDll'"pIl

alth:nJ.p

OI.Uleo'. law ot tall1q bodie. lD&qW:'at.ed 1IOdIitrn lel.no., Qal11.o did DOt

recop1•• "bat the law 18 abatraot. 'J.'hue, 1DIat.ead of plaolDe tbe propoeu of
loieDOe 111 tile treultlO1l from d.Norlptton

~

u;planatlon, be spoke ot red.uc

the mere11' apparftt, aeooadar7 qullt1. of t.h1IIp to their obj.otl...., real,

Pl"i.Jnaz7 qul,lt1e., vt:d.ch

"he COQOelved .. tbe JU.t,heatloal d1analo_ of

utter 111 .,"lon. II !berefore, the "Oall1.eau lava of Datur. ar. DOt OODM1ftd
in abltranlon troll ..D81ble or, at l _ t , iaa1aabl• •18lll8lltl and,

oonaeqwmt.17, • • • the 0.111.... law . t a . ill \he ti.ld, DOt ot

ow.ieal Ina, bat ratMI- of
and. 1IIIc1:aaJ>le

our'

abstract

.obeae. ot reovreu. ill .1ob abatran

lawI

.l.eaenta . . CCIIlb:Lae.1I bre tollowl a _ebatat det.erld.l\1a

wb1ch 18 bu1oal.1¥ hoatll. to .tat1atlO1l.

'or,

OW'

1_,

in the abetran, ol.aulcallawa pone.. UD1"....liV aDd . . ..11'.7_ 'fbe Gall1._ aoknovled&e' th1I \Ud..,...eallt7 ad Dloea.l_ bat
C&IlDtJt
tt. abet.re.otneu. For hla, it 18 attached
u-d1&t,ely to lM&iDUl.e pantol•• or .. lmeci_ble aet.her or both.
For Ida, 1t 111 a1.ru4y oonorete, aDd 10 11'. 11 not 1m lIMd of .tuz.t1Ier
de~1oM to reach oonor.t.eae... 101" Ida, the turt.her determ1....
Dattoaa, vh10h vov.l.d hi DOD-qat.emat.loall¥ r.lated to 0118 anotlm',
.1IIplT do not ex1A. AocordiDIl1', 81ao. be baa 110 doubt. of the
ex:1AeDoe of ol.ua1oal law, be OUlDOt w.t reprd natUtlca1. law . .
...... tozw.latloM of 0\11' 1pranoe. !bare 11 aOM YUt agrept.e of
d1Hrete or cODtialou bat ~l.e .te.a.taJ tllq are abject to
untft1"l&l. ad DIce....,. law. aD4 the buSM•• of t.ba eo1ent1at 1,
the hard taak of detmWd.llc tho.. law ucl • pred10tiDa wbat CIUDOt
'but ocotar.

NCO_..
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Moreoftr, v1t.h1a tid.. o_text, the _ptlon ot statUtioal 1_
1m'o1ft' m.echalWm. A ach1De 18 a let of i.J8aC1nable part., each of
wh1Ch .taad8 1rl detel'ltd.Date 8)'11teutlo relatiou to all the otbar••
In 11ke II&DD8r, the univerM, baplia1t in Ga111ean metbodolol7, 11 an
earepte ot '11Iq1raable partl aDd each 11 related 178tematloally to
all the other.. Tbe .ole ditterenoe 11 that, apart from the macb1ne,
there are ot_ iMCiaable el. .ft\8 that can i.ftterfere nth ita
operation, but apet frOlfl t.he un1ver18 ot 1Jaaa1ft&ble eleent.., what
i.J8aC1nable iJaterYent.iO¥

'become. a det.end.n1...64
12. WeaJmeH!! 1lO
........de
........l.....

0&Il

Sorokift, as baa been Hen, reject. t.h1l

dBterm1n1em for an 1Ddat.erm1ra1.8ll.

object

ot .eience to

tllere ..l.e? Mecbu1.8a aooordi.aalT

Be exp1101tlT reject.. t.he re.trietion of
"Whlle the phTaical .ci.nee. haft a!rea

the i.J8aC1nablel

abandoned the atom .. the ete.nt.arT unit, and have tound that an ever-

inCre..i", number ot the e 1. .ntar7 particle. are

or a

1... and le.. 'material

nature, our tbome-made pbJw1cllta' are .till P1.¢nc with atomic marbl•• ,
still loo1dDc tor .oa1al _to_ .. the .:Lmpleet and _ l l••t W11t. ot pqoho-

1001&1 phenoama.- It 11 1nt.ereat.1nI to DOte, bowYer, that Sorold.A rejeotl
eeneible or

~

wt

clauical law,

partiel.. oot

80

_ch becaue ot t.he abatract nature of

beC&U8e ot an 1Dcreu1q 1mm&ter1alit,y ot the objeeta

"out t.here- to be .tudied. '!'hl. . . . . to remain _ ooncrete trrterpretatton of
cla••1cal la.... , ta.llT coruti••tellt. 'l,li.t.h hi. pr1Mr7 exampll!'t8
the orpn1.a.

ot the

_chine ADd

It baa been ...n how the concrete 1nterpretstion of olanioal

law. can lead to elther a det.ermud.• or to an 1Ddet.ertllD1S11. SorokiD'. treat

ment ot cl...1o&1 lan tellda toward 1Ddeterm1n1a. Redfleld, wbo al80 I1ve.
the _chiDe

-

&I •

pr1mar7 example ot a clas.ical or caueal syat.ea, treats

6hIbid., pp. 130-1)1.
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cauaal la_ in a det.era1JUat tubion, altboqh hi. tot.al position is not
of 1II8obaD1et datend.D1sa.

Ollll

It 1a also relevant at th1e point to call attention

to the tact that Radt1eld's conoera

nth

IIIOdela rather thaD _thode indicates

a teDdeaoy to 1JaaI1ae _at soi_titio 1&_ are aoine to look: like, tor models
are imaps.

Imag1Dary IIIOdela haft 8Il iaportaDt heuristic furlotlon, but vben

the t.maa1Uz7 model beOOlll8. the ......ion ot soientitio explanation, tben
there hae been a tailve to diat1np1sh betwe. the ab.tract la_ and the
concrete

iMp.-_· tbe U1Ilbilloal cord that tied tbft to tbe ..terDal tmaatna-

13. Conoluaion. Sorok:1D'. oaua1-ttmatioD&1.
_thod aDd Redfield's
,
oaueal IIIOdel inolude DOt one, 'bu.t two, buio tOl'lU ot tboupt or heuristio
antlotpatiou. Classical bHr1atl0 atnotures anticipate abatraot
...klDg to lcrM:nr tbe "nature of • • •• or,

11101"8

preo1ee11'J

·80_

.,..t,e.,

uupeoUied

oorrelatlol18 to be epeo1t1ed, s. . 1ndeterm1Date hDotion to be detersrd.ned."
Stat1stlcal Murlatic structures antic1pate a detarm1aatioD of probabillties

ot concrete e_uts, uk:1q questiona about trequeQC7 rather tban about the
natures

ot th1np.

D1st1np1sb1na bet....en tbI

two heur1et10 str11ot1lre.

doe.

not l180esearilT Nt. oat ulna stat1etioal oorrelatlon as a . . . ot
diaooftl"1D& olase1oal la....

01"

Iqpot.hese.. More trequDt17, how....r, there is

a t7P8 ot olassical bJpotbesl8 'betore stat1at1cal 1Ilftet1ption 18 'bapn. And
tbi. tqpotbeaia 11111 1aplloity or tacitly be oonoernina the explanatory
det1D1tlon of a olaas of pbeDO_U. TIme, the -aniDi ot suioide would be
implioitlT defined by ita relatioD to i.olatlon, the _anina ot ..:mal
interoourse vou.ld be 1aplioltly detlD1d bT its relatlon to eooDOldo oonditione
(birth rate aDd depre..lon), ad the -an1Dc of criae vou.ld be blplicit17

defined bJ' ita relation to tile Yarioua upeota ot city lite. Tb.1aprocedura,
bowver, impl1e. an iumled1ate relation between tbI term. and the ooncrete
events, and

80

a concrete interpretation ot caua&l aDd tu.nctlonal laws. And

slnce there 18 DOt a aterad.nat.. relatlouhlp .. yet discovered (or likely to
be discovered in tbe near future) between nicide and :I.801&tlon, birth rate

and. d.epre_toll (which 1., bu1oall,y, a quetlon ot wh1' sexual intercourse
ocou.rs), oriM and. city lite, the tqpotheaea cannot be aaid to be ver1tied,
be,ond a¢ng what e'ft1"1bod7 lmew alreaq--tbat birth rates I08s up in
depreSS1oDII, or 1D
etc.

sa. ot the., that more or1aes are coaa1tted 1n the 01t7.

Theretore it one 18 COIIIitted to an

1~termiD1_. he

will speak ot mare

1nteuee and. l ..s inteDH tustional relat1ona, it one 18 collll1tt.ed to a

determ1D1em, he will take retup 1ft hulnble stat.ement.s about the "1rIaatv.rltr'

0

the behavioral sCienoes, a:ad spur b1maelt on to heI"c\11ean ettorts 1D. the field

ot metbodolopcal apeculat10n,

hop1Dg to scmehow uke b1a subjeot matter

conform to hie untortunate metuoc101ogical pOatulates.
D. SUMMAB.Y AND OOrIJUJ'SIOIS
1. !!P!!'1enttal ooNgat.s.

In cl...1cal henr1et10 structures,

ODe

seeks to lcDcnf "the DAtare of • • • • " wh10h 18 speo1f1ed b7 some it... trOll

experience, nch as "the nature ot

!!!:!. n

"the _ture ot 1OO1et7." tba nature

--

at a fr.. tall." 'lbeae speo1ticatlons are descriptlft, 'baaed upon tbe
relatione ot things to the obserwr. The7 are what Lonergan terms "e.x;per1ent

cOnjupte.,· wh1ch are terma or "correlatlws whoae meming 18 oxpressed. at
l . .t in the lut analya1a, by appeal1ng to tbe content at SOM human

exper1en06." Thwa, ·color,· .. defined by appealing to the experiences of
.seln, red and blue, and

"sound"

when deflDed by appealing to experiences at
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bearing dUterent 801M., are exper1eDt1&l. .onju..:be_.6S Bxpertenttal co$ptea are tbe words _n uae to reter to the concrete pre..ntatioDII of their

ow experteDOe.
2. ~ !!N!ptea.

"hr.

(oJ' expl.au.to17) coDjqatel, Oil the other

band, are .orrelati.... detiDed 1JIp1.lc1t'17 bT 811p1rloau';r .art.abl18hed correla..

tlone, tuDOt.lou, l.w, tbaor1e., 1,1Itau. tI

66

Pure ooujuptea are .ad to

expre•• the nlatloD8bipe bet.en tbiDp in t . . .l ..... , and are defined
1mplloitlT. 1'b.a7r...lt

frOIll

inallbt into ttthe _tun ot ••• - or 1ft.

indeteraa1nate tunotlol1 to be determ1nad." !'bey IN . .1c terJu and terJII
darlftd trOll the.. buic terM, and r ...1t

tr,_ lDaipt_ that ren1t in Ita

circle ot teru and relattou, nob tbat the tel'III8 ttx the relat10., the

relatlou tix the tene, and the i_tabt ttD. botb ••67 Cluaiaal law are
abatraot 111 tbe1r axperu.atal teclm1q1&e. ot dl.00ftZ')"1
. . . . apparellt that the

00I.lCerR

"At

1 ....l'7

tura, it

ot experl_Dt 1. to determine, DOt the

partlov.lar ob8erftble qualit1ea ot tbe partlcular _wiale v1t1l whlcll oae
deala, but a theoretical correlattoD betwea det1Dab1e and abetract Intlt1e•• •
'!'bey.e abltract in their t01'llllat1cm.

ItAa law, they are acrrelatioDl

UnkS ... correatl.... , and the correlatl.... &1'8 DilftI' tbe \Ul1qu data of lOla

partioular t1u and plaae ...68

tbe "detinable aad abstract en1tll.," the

correlatl.... 1.1n1ced 'by conelaUoDl, are ezp1auato17 oonjugatie••

6,LoIlVPIl, p. 79.

61Ibld., pp. 11-12.
66Ib1d ., p. 80.

68IbW•

• 89-90.
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3. EvaN.

Statistical law deal Vith tbe occurrence or eftnta. For

.wry questiOD about the _ture of 8D object, there ls a further question t.bat
aslea whether there are

arQ' nch

objects.

It 18 po_ibl. to

aDIIWl'

noh a

"estlon for ren.etion" by "Y•• " or "No, II but 1t 1. s1117 to Manter tbe
question as to the sture of fire by "Ye•• " SUch "quest1ol18 for intel11pDOe"
IU"~

be &DIIWred by at&tina the DAtura, the correlation, the function.

"GenerallT, the emmo1atioQ of eftl7 law

caD

be toll.owad by tile quut10n tor

reflection tbat asks wbether tbe law 18 ,..Ul8d, and the det1D.1tion of .""7

term can be folloved by t . question tor rellection tbat
defined ex1ste or occurs.
existence or oceurrence,

IDftr.e1T,

0_

wbeDaver

un

whether the

one ....rts 1'WU1cation or

mq be .sked wbat 18 YerUied, what ex1sts, what

occurs.· low eveata are to ooaJuptes, .. qu,estioDS tor reflection ... to
qwt.t:l.ona tor intellipncel

"Vlthout 8Warta, ooDjapto. OM be aeitller

di.oo.....d nor Termed. Wlt.hou.t OOJIjupt., events

caD be . .ither

dlst1u-

piahed or related." Statl.tlcal laws deal with the frequenoyof eveuta.

4. Proce.s.

Proce••

69

oons1at. ot a aer1es ot .vente. Tbua, the differ-

ent type. ot interact1on--orpnized or lluorpnlzed or d180rpnised, solidary
or antagon1nlc or neutral, integr-ated

01"

aerie. of ....nt., .1.nce 1nteraot10D 1. a

Wl1nteerat.d--are different t7Pe. of

proce...

The d1tterent types of

swots that c1eterm1oe whether an interaction 1s orpnized, intesrated, or

aolidazoy, and the extent. to .hloh the interaction proce•• 18 one of th..... vil
be d1at1np.1eb.ed

-

on the bu1s ot ooDjuptee.

69Ibld., pp. 82-8).

D
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Processes can be botll 8)'1Item.atio and DOft-qa'teMtio.

It the)" are

qatematic, 8"'1"ye'f81lt in each process CAD be predicted 801e17

OD

the bu18

of kncn,ledge ot olaaaioal. law and the 1Dit1al 81tuatlon. It proce•••• are
DOt s,..tamat1c, .venta oan be pred1cted s1.DclT, but DOt as a whole.

with the . . . . . ot tba whol.

pt'OOe•• ,

to cleal

statistical 1_ are Deeded vh10b aeek

to d1800ft1" Pl'obab11itl...
.Redtield &lid Sorolda both 1.aek a tboroqll dlet1ftctlon bet....n clue1eal
and atat18t1oal 1_. _ e they botll tend to ooDtue ....ata and OOD.jqates.
Tbe caw model of Bedt1eld illpl1es a aeobalat detel"lda1. and ult1MtelT

camaot aokDowledce stat1stloal law, and the ,oauaal.-tuatioul 1ntell'atloft ot
Soroklft d1aplap an iadetermim.. that recarda 01_1oal law u

stat.eDts of

probabilities. This JUT YV'T _11 'be the reason what _ orpntsed P'OUP 18
for 8orok1ft

&11

1Iltell"aHd W'd.ty

b7 det1a1tioa. For lutell'ation beoo.s a

question ot "more or le.s- that 18

'ftry

nex1ble, Ii...n an indetera1D1a.

The contrat 'between descript,ion and explaDat10D baa been empbuized

so.-what, blat neede more preo1ae application to the 8'tia.dT of the little
OQ1lJllUnlt,.. There 18 the quat10n

ot

wbat. is to be expl.a1ned, wh:1ch 1nwlwa

the metaaoc1010,1oal quniotl ot thl criteria ot relevance.

There will be a

diaounlOl1 ot th. wide and the outside ri.ew of the little colllWl1ty, and a

CODlpaoieon ot the.. 't"1e1fII ot Redfield with Sor0ldn-s d1at1u.etlon betwen t.he
psyoholol1oal &rlCl 800101oatoal read1np ot CNltural pha___na. ADd the
relation ot the 1'1ewpo1nt. taken to the quanton of relat.1T1n will be
The quation ot relati'f1lra 'br1np OIlt the need tor the expl.aDator7

diaouued.

Y1ewpoint :La 100101011', wh1ch i . a need to CO be10nd tbe uaa

coDjupte. to the
exper1.race,

11M

ot pure

urader~,

OJ'

uplaaawl'70onjuptea.

aDd .1Ud. .-

ot Q;per1ent1al

It. fill be aeea that.

oompriae not oalT a heviatic at,rv.ot

ot the acta aatlc1pated by the sOieDttat, bat alao are 'baa1o teru reterr1Da
to aN obaraoterll1q the o'b"e" nudied b7 the soi.e. . . ot man. !he.. are
CODaclou acta, ad. OU oaly 'be laIo'wD

1na1&ht,

1'7

tald.q the luide Yiev. Exper:Le:ace,

and jud..... are not uplaMto17

teru in tbe natval ac1eaeea,

bee. . . 1a.orpnS.o mater1als, plut.., ADd lowr aa1ale do not haw experle. .s,

1na1ahta,

and judpeata.

Mea do ltaw them, alone with emotlona, deairea, and

wlltlcma. ADd theIe are an ....ntial part ot the data to be explained.
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1. Me\UOle. . . III 8OO101olT,
the data to be colleoted.

_aabap,

Sooio1011n.

~

norma, and value. are part, of

DOt oDly 1Ibe abje0t.8 of later-

actiOn aDd \bail' propwt,l.., bu.t a180 behavior, .,.nta, pro..... , and the
prod\lOt. ot ach bebanor. And aIlODI tbe produob ot human actlnt,. 18 h\1:I&an

\mOwledp. It 18 a part ot wltve. . t , as Polalvi sap, Ita man'. 111ulo_

are not tbe . . . aa h1a knov1e• • M Ther.tore, "pre_tlT we t1nd ow..l ••
_said niDI kaowledp or allepd lmovledp, in tt. . . . ....,. .. vheJl ... reneot

on what _ our.elves krxJv, or beUew we

lmov."

loc1c1&U d18t1np1eh bet__ lcnovledp ot

He CO•• on

~np

to note that

aftd reflection upon the

.

knOlfledp of til!. . . tbe cl1tterence between science and metuoience."

1

800101081, iDaotar as 1t lDcludea men', kDowledp and tb81r value. in 1"
aubject matter wl11 have

I1AD,T

ot the charact&r1atic. ot a meta-acience, as it

18 here dttaceibed by Pol.an;v1. One should 0. caretul to note, however, that
cr1tical re.f'leot1on \lpon kIlowledse or npposed knowledge 18 not do_ only in
a JIletucieatUio co.a.Wxt..

Indeed, 1t . . . . to '"

ODe

of the moat lmportant

aspects of "ientilic me\hod, for uo ftr1tioattoa ot a Iq'pothesia (apposed
Ia1owledp)

caD take

the bypothea1.s.

place without. crltical. ren.otton upon . .t 18 stated 1n.

Tba aclent1at IlU8t ask, "Is this tOrJlU.latlon correct?-

2. Metaaociololl. Ketuc1ent.it'ic reflect.ion would aeem to be raneottoa

on the f!19!iplea

0"

u.a

ln 80181'1111£10 refleotion.

Tb8 que8tion 1s not

80

much "Is thi8 tornw.lat1oD correct?" bu.t "By what Erlnc1ples or oriteria do I

jud&'e

tb1a tOl"lllllat1on to be 00l:"l'ftCt or 1ncQ1'reot?"

This 18 clearer 1A

101

Furta,.'s descr1ptioa of the tuk of Mtuoclolo.,. .. atudtiIII lithe _tbodolopeal pro.suppo8tt1ou aeoeUU'7 tor 0&l"l'71Da
st.ructtna -101.0810&1

~, aDd

CNt

aooioloc1oa1 r .....oh,

erltt01stac nob. r8. . . . . and 8\lOh

COIl-

~

after they haw beeD OOIIlPlet.ed • .,2 Buell _tuoololopoal theary, aooordi.. to

Robert Bieratedt who

ue. lt, "18
OD

the

DOW

COI'lV&I'7,

UI4IS

the t.erII\ 1.a a .ue YfIr'T s1Jd.1.ar to the ..,. hrfey

a blablT deftloped d18c1pU.-.1t But ''8001010c1o_1 the..".
18 nUL .. 1fHk &ad pall1d

tb.1nI whoa.

pu'8U1t 1"8oe1....

DO

apeo1al acour...... w1th1n the prot_lon ad . . . major acb1eY8M.u
trequeat17 . . . DOt troa acad8l1d.c1au btlt boa .ftllata, jowDali.at8.

pibl1c1aU, aacl tho.. re1&t1.,.17 fn 800101oa.u's vbo ... DOt afrald of
eplthets like 'uuo1ent1tl0.' ",3

3. Cr1w1a!! ...
ra_le....'A_DCe
•
Metuoc1oloc7, aooor41Dc to hrf., -.at
iioiiiiooiia
oolltribt.l.. oriMr1a of rel.eYalaoe to 8oc101os1oal reaearcb. nt.pttee &beNt the

def1D1tton of 80010100', t .. aaaple, are Mtaa00101oatoal d1ept&tee

0ft.I'

\be

orlter1a of releftD08 .., up 'by dUterent eoo1olopate. Ie 8Oclolo.,.
cenceraed nth hiator1oal. taota, peJObolol1o&l natas, or curreat Pr'Obl... ~

It has bee. _ted tbat crlteria of re1Jrtuc:le baft alreaq bee. Mtabl1ahed
tor the

p&"_.

theela, by the . .tHr'e aooeptaaoe of Sot'old.Jl'. "aeaa1n&:fUl

1nteraot1oftu ... the nbjeot matter ot eooloto.,., 1d.th the d1T1810D tate

2,..t87,

I!!! $!?Op.e !!!2 Kethod ~ Soc10101l,

p. 8.

laoben B:l.aratedt, "BoDdnal and Real. Dats.n1tlou,· ~81lua 011
Socloloc1!!l tbaoU (eel. Llawll.7n aroas (Iftutoa, IlltilO; 1959Tpp. 124-

is.

4rvt87',

ru~U.

"!be Problem of Values," Sl!lR2s1a

OIl

-

S00101osioal

·

tbaoU,

pp.

-102
IOc1ety, culture, a1'ld

p8r8OQaUf,y.

1'be shd.l.ariV between orlt.eria

ot

ot ..lection hu &leo
not.iced, Lonerpn,
1t will be recalled, eqs that the "'MIl ..i.e. . . have a d1ttere. canon ot

rele't'lU1Ce and

~rg_'s oaJ1Ol1

pleot1on hom the natural

beal1

8010. ."

in that the,. deal with the data

ot

well &I wit.h the data ot saDIe. !be data. of conso1ouanus

COUC10W1.U ...

are irrel.evaa\ t.o pl'q1I1ca. S Bec... the lIlCoeu of the Datural 801ence8 baa
led 80me who

nuq MIl to a 1I8r'f'11.e rather tban an 1ntAlllpnt adoption of

acientif1c procedures, th... bu reaulted the
William B.

wtvte.

pbaDO'll8DQD

called -scienf,1Im."

Jr. sqa that this 18 "the Pl"cxaiae that with the

88M

tech-

niques that. haft WOl"ked 1n the ptqBical acie'¥'e. we can 8V8ntualq create an
ex.act sci8llGe ot man. ,,6 1'h1a prOlld.ae aad hope t.ellda to lead t.he p!"utltt.o.rs

ot soient1lm

to

appq

the . . . oaDon ot _leot1cm to the social .o1ellCes ..

the pbpic1at appUn to b1a .ei.... Th1a

violatina aaother important
e!J2luat~.

08l'l01l

C&nl'J)t

ot aoi.elm1tio

be done I however, Without

_thad, the

It1ftle &0&1 ot emp1rioal metbod, t't it

nate.,

to be the complete explanatlon of all pb.tmomeQll or data."

4. Criteria!! eel_tittc 9!!Utz.
1Ibat tbe tOl"JllUlatlona of a

_ann

aN

The or1ter1a

canon

~

complete

ItU cOIIUIDllly stated
6a

ot 'reltmmOa

dat4trla1De

to be about J 1:Mt tbe croiter1a ot

scientific qul1V determ.ne lISOre preo1eeq the obaracter1at1o. a propoaltSoD
IIUIt haw it it, f.a to be att1aed.

III " ....ch, a source ot 1ol1cal ocmtuiOll

'WM1"p.n, pp. 11-12.

&nae Or",.uioa !:!! (N.. York, 19)6), p. 26.

6ar.onerpu,

p. 84.

10)

otten 00-. tre "tM tall.aq ot the OODRqant,.
Couider the .......

It J:v'.pothea1. X 18 true, then oouecpmcea x,T. aDd
toU..".
But, 11.,7, aad z do follow.
'1'beretore bJpotbeal8 I 18 1;,ne.

I

11111

0bn0u17, the -au-nt dou DOt really pro.... that X 18 true, 1t
....l;y p,roTe. that X can qpla1D 11.,7, amd z. Howwr, there
..,. u1at . . . alteru.t1.... ~11. l'vb1oh caa al.ao expl.a1n
thea. Moreovw, vban a 1I1d.er ranp of pbe....,... 18 exaalDlad,
- - tact v lIlT tun\ up Whlob OaD be uplaS.ned by bat aot
by X. Far Xto be ....it1ed o01lri.J:tcila&1T 1t would be D8C8N8l"7

r

to ..pe.

It, !!!t !!!k !;!, IvPotbelta I 18 tne, X,T, &ad I will
to11Ow.
Bu.t. XiT, aad I do tollow.
:
!htlNtore X 18 true.
In other 'IOl"'da, tw X to 'be oODT1M1Dgly 'fW1tied" 1t muat not
0Dl7 u.pl.aia all the kaova tacta, but 1t . . t be 1aIovll to be t.be
~

tvPot1aea1a vb1ch can expla1n them.

Iu prac\1oe, it 18 unall;y "IfIr7 d1tt1eult to exclude all
altemat,iw b7P0--... &ad to atate w1t.h ~ t.hat, l u
the cml.7 pou1ble ceDaraliHUn that, can oonoe1ftb'q expla1u
the kDo_ tacta. tforMlq, .cd.ea.tUt.1 do DOt olal. t.b1a aort
ot ftl'it1.eat1ou t .. their puval1latloua.1

S. So1ent1t1o SUal1tl !!!! yalue 2!l!!nt..
do DOt

The tact. tbat ao1ellt1ata

ow. absolute lo&ioal Terit1oat.1on tor their h7P0the... leads Purtey

to the ooDOluion that .olent1ata accept. bypothe... Oft the buts of ftl_
judpellte.

"As Ru4ner bu ftry vell ,aid,

low I take 1t that no analp1a ot what oonn1t1l'tes the JIletbod ot
100ence would be aat1ataotory uul.eu 1t oompr1aed __ ueert.10n
to tb8 etten t,bat the scient1st .. sc1eDt,1at aocepta or rejecta

tqpot.he.... Bu' it thie 18 80 then olear17 the ao1Amt.1at. u aoltmt1st doN aake value judpenta. For. atnce DO ao1entU1c )vpothe.1a
18 ever oomplete 17 ftr1t1ecl. 1a aooept.1na a lVPo~1a the 101eDt1at
J1USt, ake the decia10n that the evidenoe 111 nttio1el'ltli{ .trona or
t.hat the pt'obab11it7 i8 ntt101eftt.17 hich to warrant
aeceptan.oe
ot tdw b;ypotheeis.8'
1'h1a, hotre'ver, trequent13 18 not recognized 111 accounts of .o1entUio _thocl.

Pol.alJT1 aqa that alth.oqh "8D7 critical ver1f1catlo11 ot a lCient1t1o stateme

require. the same power. for reoop1z1nl rattonalit7 in nature as doe. the
pl"ooeN ot 801ent11"lo d18ooftrT." .;J1ent1tic methodolo&1ata olterl 1&Rore this.

"When ph1l.oaophera ana11M the \'VU1oatiDn ot lC1ent.U'1c law, theT
inftr1ab17 choose as 8peci.ama such law .. are not in doub\, aDd thus
1DeV'1tablT overlook the inter'ftnt1on

ot

the.~ powers.

practiOl.l deaoutrat1oa ot IOlell\1t1o law, and

6.

!!:!! context !!. a1!dpnt.

If

verilied 1a the . . . . that 1t 18 tbe

fact., than Rudner's etat..ement.

tb.at,

DO

h1cb

t,o

110' 1ta ..1t1oa1 ?Vitiation.-

acientific tvPotbeata 18 completel)"

=17 !Q'pot.haa1a that . . upla1a

the

"the .c1entiat -..t make the deo1eion

that the ev1deD.ce 18 attic1ent1T 8tronc
eutt101entk

Tbey are dea..1blDc tba

01' tbat,

the pt'obab11itT 18

varraat ,be acoeptanee of the tqpothesu- 18 correct.

And l'artey adda that before the so1ent1at can

an the

deol8iGn that a

bypothes1e is aooept&ble or probable, he _ t make aneral prell.DArT

dec1alou as to "wbat makes a re18VlUlt obeC"....t1oD. what oontrola shou.1d be
applied in tak1a& obaervat1ou, vbat obaenatlou

0\lIht to be

_de,

what 'mode

8IbW., p. $1" (f&Ot1D& 1U.cluard Rt1dnsr, "The Sc1eD.ti.t S!! Scientist Make
!! Science, II (Jamtal7, 1953), pp. 1-6.

Va.lue ~,- Philosophy

9po l.alv'1, p-~ bovl!$!P, pp. 13--lb.

--lOS
to use u .. ~work for ob8ervationa, aJ'ld

80

on."lO Now all of these

Ifdec1s1ou" are baaed upon "ucJa-nta. One's put jud.pMmta

"_in 1d:hh hill.

It",.,. fora a bah!tWll orientation, preaent and opeNt1ft, but

behind the acnae.

onlT tro.

'fhe7 10Ye1'rl the d1rection of attention. evaluate 1na1ghta,

guide to1"fllU1at1ona, and influence the aocept.aaoe or rejection of DeW 3WJIJl8nta. ttU !he habitual or!entation one baa . . a reault of a context ot put
judgments 18 net unique to oneself, tor

MD

in the 8 _ aultural .,......

share an o1"'1entation that is, to a large utent, the ea.. Pol.an1i
illuatNtes th18 b)r a di.ute betwen two oOJllPetent so1entist.a. In crder to
have a basis tor ~ntJ each . .t
be

Nq.-

.~

standarda V11ch be believes to

obl.1ga'to17 both tor hiD8elt and the other. Eve..,. time e1 th&tr of them

_1<8s an uaertion as to what is tJoue and valuable ill sOience, he ..11.
bl1nttq

8c1enoe.·

1.

a whole ayatM of collateral tacta and _lues accepted bT
12

Oft

~01"

lmowle<!e.

accepted by sotenee would

Th1a 8)"8teI of collateral. tacta and Yaluu

H_

-.tuc1entit1c theor;r, but also
syatn of science oan ltan4

peraoaal knowledge ot oaq a

~an, p. 277.

to correspond to the realIt, no"

or

~

ot

OU'I"NDtl,J' accepted scientific theo17.

onq ineotar u

..u .trac-nt.

M1I

1ndiv1dual scd.anUs., who haw
of the total1\y' of so1ent1t1o

106
1
theolT, tNet other scientists to uphold their parts ot the system. )

Polauy1

sq'S that although he dissents tram lOIIle ot the accepted standards of sc1ence,
"such beterodox.1e. must raain tr. . .lltar7 it science 18 to sum.ve as a
coherent qst. ot 8Upenor knowledge, upheld by people mutually NCOCniz1ng
each other as eeientilts, and. acknowledged by' m.odern society as ita guide."
Besides SCience, Polan,r1 includes in superior knowledge "all that 18
coherently belieYed to be right and excellent

bT men

within their culture ...lb

There 11 a huge m.uaber ot hwaan attirPlatiolll, only a small £repent of which
is visible to &D3' . .bel"

ot the culture.

They' are the utterance. of prophets, poets, lecialators, scientists
and other masters, or the ••ssages ot men who, by their actions,
recorded. in h1ato1"7. have .et a pattern tor posterityJ to which are

added the livilll VOiCH of cont.por8l".Y cultural leaden, coapeting
for the allegiance of the public. Thus we may regard in the last
anaJ.,yaia, the entire auperior knowledge _bodied in a modern highly
articulate culture a8 the SUll total of what its clusic8 haft
uttered and its hereea ar:d mnte han done. It we balOlll to thia
cul tun then the.. are our great men. .." to whose lI1.lp8ri.ori.ty we
entrot cmrsal.va., by tzoy1nl to understand their vorda and to follow
their teachings and ex&I!\ples. Our adherence to the common beliefs
and. atand.arda on which lntallectual exchanges within a culture
depend, appears then equivalent to our adherence to the 88M aasters
as tountaina ot authority. • • • When reterr1.ng to such superior
knowledge .. are not lq1ng down standards tor judging the persona
to wbaa we attribute thi. knowledge. we are subm1ttlll1, on the
contrU'T. to the standards laid down by them tor our own guidance. 1'

8. S!p!rior knowl!dg8!!!! _tuociololl. It would 8e_ that a hulc
task or metuocioloQ' would be to make explicit .. DlUCh of this qst. ot

l.3z.on.rgan,

14Polazvi.,

_.

l'Ibid

pp. 703-106.
Personal Knowlec!se, pp. 31,-316, original. in italic••
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au:perior knowledge al poslible, at least insofar u it would bear on sociological research.

Darld BidneT sqs tbat the 1IIportant task of metaetbnology

or met.aantbropology or metaaociolOQ' is the "inve.tigation of the basiC,
logically primiti"e Ulwaptiona as to the nature of the world and of man
involved in arr:t one given cultural. STstem." This, however, is a task that the
posltivistic OI'ientation ot .eae .ocial scienti.ts has led thea to overlook.
It is h1chl7 s1gnitioant, theretore, that a sociologist ot
the stature ot Soroldn has endeavored to introduce this metacultural perspective into contemporar,y sociology. His Social and
Cultural ~ca is baaed upon the major pradae that f.hi · itpreauppOfJOu ot a culture detel'11l111e its empirical un1te.tationa and. iut1tutiona." His analyaia at all cultures into the
au.pertyp_ senaate, 1cleational, and ideaUat10 i. an .tteapt to
provide a "logico-mean1ngtul" hula tor t.he integration at arr
given culture (inaofar as it i. integrated) in term. ot itl ultimate
epi.temologioal....taphya1oal presuppositions. The point I ..
concerned to JU.ke here 1s that there il • real funotional clitterenoe
between the phUosophical taskl ot the metaanthropologist and the
aetuooiolog1.t, on the ODe hand, and that ot the empirioal
anthropolOl1st and sociologist, on the other. The taot that so
taw .ociologists have been inclined to tollow the path indicated by
Soroldn demonstrates how exceptional. tn hi. phUosophical interpretation ot the role ot the lociologlat.16
There

.881. to

be a cliaorepanq between Bidne7's concept

.tu.

metaanthropopolOQ', and. tbe
would not . . . to regard a

~oncept

ot aetuooiolOO" or

.. uaH by' rurttq and Bieretedt. Fu.rtfl1'

as a.tuooiologioal UDle.. it eng.,ec:l upon an

ana.l.7a1. ot the ltepist.8mological.-m.etapb7.1oal preeuppoa1t1ona" ot the
SOCiologist,. iuotar u

th••e had a bearing on hil 8ociological. ruearoh.

He

e:Jq)l1cltly place. S0r01d.n· 8 .tudT or the fiuctuation ot dirt.rent cr1teria ot

n

108
tr'Uth 1n the realm

17

ot the sociology ot lmowl.edge.

And Bi81"stedt' a statement

that "..tasociology is now a. hllhly developed diao1pl1ne ft seems to indicate
that he would not use the term to charaoter1.u Sorok1.n t s work, which 18 along

a path which tew 8oc1ologists have been wUl1ng to follow, according to
B1d.ney'.

9. Contrast between metuoc1ol2ll .!!!! !!!! sociolos:r .2£ lmowlSe.
Metuooiology, as a "highly deT8loped discipline," seems to consist in practioe
in a set

ot norms that are to guide the scientist's research behavior. Meta-

sociology illYOlves ana.l.yals pr1mar1l.T
culture

or the

norma aspect ot the ideolOC1cal

ot the sociologist, neglecting the iJr!iegration ot these norms with

other behav10ral norma ot the .ociologist, and ot norma with the meanings and
values he also holds.

The soo1010Q'

ot knowledge, on the other hand, would

ooncern itselt with the total ideological culture ot the sociologist, and with
the relationship

ot the SOCiologist's meanil'.lgs, nOl'lU, and value. to his actual

situation in the sociocult.ural. universe. And although, u B1eratedt aqa,

SOCiologists are quite willing to lq down norma tor research behavior, the;r
aeea to be quite reluctant to recognize the relationship at their own
metaaooiological oonvictions to their place in a living social
Gideon Sjoberg s...,..

.,..tem..

As

"Contanporary SOCiologists when evaluat:b_ social

scientist. at the past an prone to 'ri.4N these mell .. products ot their oul.ture
and historical period.

rmt

these s _ sociologists are reluctant to conoede

that they too are oaught in the web ot d_andJI 1apoaed by their own prilurr

17rurt.." "The Problem at Values, If p. S20.

109
group, by the nOl'U ot Bci.noe, and especially' b7 the broader socIety in which
theY live. 1t text. on _thod, he claiu, general17 di8regard ttthe 1JIpact ot
the sociocultural syataa upon the inve.tigator, upon h18 techniques, and upon

his mode ot anal78is.

Although conaidel"ing the researcher as rtIl'Iloved. trom hi.

social qatem-i.e., u i t tunction1.Dg in a vaouwa-ma;.r prove in aOM inatanc..
a useful anal3'tlc device, it ls deoidedl.;r unrealistic and distorts 1!I1U\V'
aspecta ot the real world. in which the social scientist DlUIt neo.ssar1l.7

tu.nction••18
10.

Conclusicma. Criteria ot relennc. cannot, it . . . . to the writer,

be arbitrary_

Rel....anc. criteria that deIV

~e

data

ot conaoiousnes., and

-

thereb7 dtmT the aignit1cance of meanings, noru, and values are being
arbitrary in their denial ot an 1Ilportant part of the data.
would

rule out aqr such study as the soololocr of knowledge.

Such oriteria
Furthermore,

relennoe criteria that den.r that the sociologist doing the study' has an

lnterpretative tr-.work, aoqu1red in a proce.. ot encultvation, shaped ""
the aoc1ety and culture in which he vas educated, and that would d.eIV that thi.

interpretative f'rD.evoI"k i. highlY' influential in the re.earch and conolusions

ot res.arch, are

meTano. OJiitel"ia

that arb1trar117 rale out verifiable tacts.

Sociologist. have noms and v&1..u•• that can be subjected to sociological

analysis. When the aociologist 1s considerecl aa operatIng in a vacuUII,
detached and un1.ntluenoed by hi. sociocultural. qst.em, he Is--oonscious17 or

unconsciOU$17--..eldng to ....WIle the position ot Redtield's ideal observer, ot
a Laplacean Un!vereal Mind.

l8ftOperationalia and Social aesearch, II SppoaiUlll!!! SocIological 'fhe0!'f,

P. 610.
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To acknowledge oneselt u having enculturatecl experience that lnfiuences

one's research is, however, to put oneael.t in the position o! having to cope
wi th relativism._

"How, tt asks Sjoberg, tlis it possible to gain generalizable,

uni V'eraal knowledge it this knowledge 18 mere17 a reflection ot the
intellectual'" own culture or of his position in the social system?u19 AccordinglJ", since Redtield and Soroldn both recognize that they' are 1nnuenced by

their culture, it will be receasar;y to look into their treatment ot rel.ativia.

In disoussing Re<lt1eld's positd.on, his ooncepts of "the inside aDd the outside
viewpoints" will also be diaouaaed.

And in

concepts ot the "psychologioal reading- and

d1.cussl~
~

Sorokin' 8 posltion, his

"sooiologioal-phenomenological

reading" ot au! ture will be diecuaaed.
B.

RBLATMSM.

REDFIELD

1. Relatlvism!!!!.!!! llttl.e cOllll1Wl1tr-

When gOing into a amall

oommunity ot a cul tuN ditferent frat. his own, the inve8t1gator must be .ensitive to the tact that the people he w:Ul _et and talk with are 101ng to have
atandarde ot right and wrong, truth and. tal.itT, that mq be 80J1ewhat d1tferent

trom hie own. Even within a sincle wide culture area such as the United. States
such ow.tural d1.tterenoea are recognized in the popular stereotype. ot the
silJlple tara-boT and the sophisticated city-slicker.
cultural relatlY1_ in anthropology is a result

According to Redfield,

ot anthropologists askiDI

whether one value 18 better than another.
!he anthropologists have, on the whole, considered. the question
as asking it their flcienti.f'1c m.ethods are applicable to questions

-III
abou t whether something is better than sCIIIlething else. Not beine
theistic theologians, they have not aeked it the intrinsio good
can be determined b7 consulting the revelationa ot God, and not
be1rc philosophen,
have not sought a rational demonstration,
resting on co_on knowledge alone, that one way ot thought or
action is better than another. '!'hey have tound that the way they
use their minds in coa1.nc to a conclusion as to what 1d.n4 of pottery
people make or what ld.nd of values these other people, not
anthropologiete, place on cannibal.1a or on chastity does not work
when they are uked to e.tablish that one value is better tor a man
to hold than another. And they h.... not experienced much trouble in
distinguishing tact statements hoa value statellents. The tormer
onl1', they' are sure, are their bueineee.20

th.,.

2.
IJ"8

Redt1eld

t.

critlque !! relat1v1a.

llerskovita states that It judgments

baaed on experience." Redfield note. that the aperiences ot anthropolo-

gists

8ft

cl1anS1na, and b:r the principle of r,latlT181l itself, their judgments
When thq are asked to anthrapolo-

about relatin... haft also been chancing.

gl_ the lane, tor example, rather that

8OA'le

r_ote tribe, it is cI1fticult

t

them to maintain a detached neu.traUty that g1..... equal validity to all

cul.turea. Ms is eapeCial.ly difficult since, in practice, 1"8lativi_ haa not
enjoined a cessation ot valuation, but positi.... evaluations.

The anthropolo-

gist is auppoae4 to be neutral tor eYer.ybod,y.21 AnthropologiSts have alW8J's
tended

to value stable and vell integrated SOCieties, perhaps because of the

anthropological practice ot comparing oul tuns u unchan&ing qat. . . 22

But

the anthropologist will value the integrated socle. over the d1alntegratecl
80ciety on more huaan18tic grounds as well.
comince us-or himael.t'-that

-

fOrb.

-

80

"The anthropologist can hardl7

tal" as he i8 concerned a disorganized culture

--

Pr1m1tiT8 World and Its Transtormationa, pp.

22Ibid., pp.

l49-1S0.

143-144.

U2
that talla to prov1.de a desire to l1ve 18 ... nJ.1d as arv other.

Equal

validity can be aatelJ" attributed onl.T to culture. t.hat arrange it

80

people

do what t.hey' want, to do and are convinced that 1 t 1. the right thing to do ... 2)
The most dec181.,.. crit.1c1sm or

arrr

radioal relat1Y18Dl, however, can be

aimed at the princ1ple .. applied. to 1tself.

Herakovlts has to recognise a

deVelopment in knowledge which enabl.. him to toraulate a principle which he
would not expect the primitive people he studie. to tormulate.

It he holds

the principle as valid, he cannot help tacitly a88\lDling that the society Whoae

enculturatlon Pl"OC._ enables him to tormulate the principle
better than a

aoc1~

or

relativism is

whoae enculturation proqes8 makes this impossible.

Redtield says that anthropologi8ts reoognlze a trend in historr which bas

resulted in a Btandard. ot truth and good inherently better than that ponesaed.
by the pri1111Uves-"1nbel"ent.1y' 'batter, not just better relative

impressed on hill by hi. enculturated experience.

to the judplent

• •• The pr1rll1tive Man is

not expeoted to raach the kind. or truth w call Bcientific wi tb. the __
aucea.. with WHich Civilized man is expected to reach it.

There has be"n a

tramslormat.iou ot judgment as to truth ...24

l. Science.!! ~ ...
cul,;;;;;;;.;;;t.,;;;;;W"
...al-. value.

This tranatomation ot judpant as to

truth is based. upon the development ot a qat. ot fJUpmw knowledge which
include. acience

&. an ideal.

Polany1 tormulates it

88.

11'
the ideal of a highly difterentiated intellectual lite pursued
colleotiYal.1'J or more preciee17, ot a cultural elite actively'
conducting such an intellectual life vi thin a sociaV' respOD8ift
to the intellectual pasaiona at thia elite. The acoeptance ot
these assumptions Mal. a pact ot _tual contidence within the
communiV of scientista and. seala the dedication ot society as a
whole to the support ot their s.ient1t!o pursuita. '1'h1s dedioation
takes ettect in the utabliahrllent ot aCient1.tic institutiona, aet
up tor the &dTanccent ot sclenoe and. tor its d1••end.rJation throughout
society under the authority ot SCientific opinion. ArJ1'One who
integrallT belong. to the sool" In question vUl 8h... thereby its
cultural. dedication and the ueumptions which underlie this
dedioation.2S

Anyone who haa UDdel'lODe the enculturation process in such a sooieV vUl, the
sbare thi. ideal, unle.s he is a rebel or a deYiant.

his ideological culture &til hi. behari.oral cUlture

And to the extent that

aN

integrated, he vUl

engage in, or at least support, scientific ""arch. But PolAn1'1ind1catel
the strange result. thi. haa for eoc1ology.
The contrast in which I have set th11 lOient,.lf1c COIl8lMUa with

the specious coherence ot a company ot traude or tool. haa shown
that I share the asawapt10ns underl;r1ng this COn88D8U8. M7

unqualified use ot accreditat1ve uaum:ptions like '801ent1t1c
ataularda' and • scientifio valuu' in tonwlattng these uewapt10na
had alread;r implied that I subscribe to what I was describing. I
bell.... that tacit endore. .nte ot thia k1nd are uuvoidabl.e in
referring to the bel lets and valuations wtlich one sharea, and I
shall return to thia tact later on. MeanvhUe, let .. add that in
subscribing to the ullUDlptions and pasaions shared by' a society in
the Cllltintion ot science I al80 lend-to thia extent.....,. support
to such a society. Arrr sociology which accred1. ts the beliefs on
vhioh society ia tOUlXleci toru a juet1t1cation ot thi8 SOCiaty.
And i t the wr1. ter is a _ber ot the socia. in question, h1.a
100101087 is a declaration ot loyalty to it. Indeed, consistency
requires that in the affirmation ot socially shared nlu•• our
eleeleationa should agree with our particlpation in &IV' .ocial
actlviti. based. on the ...umed 'l'aliditT ot the.. affirmations. Yet
it is precisely this consistency which rendere the un!verBal intent

2S

Polanyt, PerBoDll Knowlse, pp. 218-219.

jP

ot such eleelarationa suspect, since it shows that they lend support
to established. powers, after having been inatUled in us by the very
society which they '9'1nd1cate.26
4.

Sociol9Sl!!!! acientlfic nluea.

Several threads ot thought can now

be woven into a scaewbat more integrated pattern.

Biersted't at.f1.rmed that

JIl8taaooiology is a highly' &mtlopEKl disCipline, but that SOCiology', or at 18...t
sociological theol7, is b;y contrast weak and pallid.

Now 1'Iletuociology in this

.ense is a statement of the _taaociologiattl lOienillie idu1., an ideal which

he share. v1 th others whom he truts to uphold their ahare of the task ot
scientific deftlopment.

This statement of an ideal is an aft1rmation of valuea

and of nonas by which th... values mq be real:1zed and maintained.

But the ..

noms and values are part ot the subject matter tor sociological theory-some-

thing to be apla1ned. SOCiological theory, however, baa a'VOided. the i . . .
bere, acept in the handl ot those tev sociologists who, as Biersted.t mentions,

are not atra1d of being called unao1ent1tic.

Sjoberg affirms that ·cont.por

8ocio1ogi8ts • • • are reluctant to concede that they too are caught in the web
of damanda ilIposed by their own pr1m.a.r:r group, b7 the nol"l18 ot SCience, and

eapecial.ly by the broader IOciev in which they live. 1t And he indicate. a

possible reason for thil reluotance.

If

How is it p08lible to ga1n. generalisable

universal lmoWl.edge it this knowledge i. 1lerel.T a reflection of the

intellectual's own culture or ot his position in the soclal ay-stem?,,27 Th18 i.
precleel¥ the point noted by Pol.an71 when he states that the consistency

26Ibid., p. 219.
27

Sjoberg,· pp. 609-610.

bet1fMn aftu..tione and participation in soc1al activities-i.e., integration

ot ideological. and. behavioral cultve--renders auapect the declarationa of
sociology.

1tA..ny

sooio1ogr whicb accredits the beliefs on which a societor is

rounded fona a justification ot this society.

And if the writer i8 a mabel'

of the ,ociety 1n question, his sociology i. a deolaration of 10)"alty to it."

But the expliCit ideals formulated by the sociologist in his JHtaaociology
torbid tlw entrance of "declaratione of loyal.1t into the real..m. ot .oientitic
attirmatione.

'!'heretore, text. on mathod generally' disregard "the 1mpact ot

the aooiocultu:ral system upon the investigator, upon his techniques, and upon
hiS mode of analya1., "even though" conaideriJ?g the re.earcher as r8Jloved trOlR
his social syataa-l.a., as it tunctlon1na in • vacuua-- • • • ia decidedly
unrealisti.c and distorts

maD)"

aspects ot the real world in which the social

.cientlata must nece8sari1y function."

s.

Objectivity and evaluation.

28
Redfield state. that scientific objectlv-

ity doe. not demand that the sOientist retrain from all value judgmenta, he
maintains that it i . impouible not to value.

It can be recalled that 7urtey,

in presenting crtterta ot scientific quali t,., affirmed that. the acceptance ot
most SCientific hypothese. inTolve. ftlue judpenta on the part of the
scientists.

For Red!1eld, objectivity demanda verification, not elimination ot

value••
The neoessit,y to understand the values of the people one 1s

st~

iDa requires, I should • •, the projection into untadllar lIOrda

and. actione of human qualiti..-a,mpath;r, pride, neh to be appreCiated, and .0 on. otherwise the ethnologi8t will not f1ncl out

-
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what the people he i8 stucb'1ng an proud about or what, for thaa,
desern. appreciation. My own opinion is that it is not possible
to make use of theae hUll.-l qualiti. in field work, as I think one
1I\18t, vi thout aleo valuing what one ae... In the "'l7 necesaity
to describe the native, one must feel tor b1a-or perhaps against
him. The te.u~. are mixed with mutiona. • •• Objectivity
requires that I hold in suspense each formulation I make about the
natift 11te. It requires ... to beccae aware ot the value. I have
that may lead .. in one direction rather than another. It demands
that I subject ,., deecriptiorsa to the teate of doowaentation,
internal consiste.nay', and it poe.ible the evidence and judgments of
other observers. But I do not think that 1t &aka of me that I
divelt lQ'lelt of the human qualitie., including valuing. I could
not do mr work without th_.~

6. Scienti_!!!! value..

A. strict believer in the rigid applioation

ot

natural soienoe techniques to the studT ot man would naturally be hostUe to
aedfield'. oontention that objeot1vJ.ty does not require him to divest h1uelt

ot ttthe hWl.an qualities, including valuing." Yet otten they will not heeitate
to use psychologiCal. tests, interview., questionnaires, etc.

And

according to

Wh,rte, those who make up and administer the . . evaluate both in the tormulation

ot the que.tions and

the interpretation

ot the answere.

But ubecause 'percen-

tUn' and 'coefficient.' and 'standard. deviationa' are of themselves neutral,
the sheer methodology of using them can convince people that the,y are translating uncertainty into certainty, the subjective into the objecti"., and
eliminating utterly the bugbear of value judgIl'8nts.

But the mathematics does

not elinl1nate values, it onl,y obscures them.")O Furthermore, every type of
interview, que.Uonnaire, poll, or projective teat involves cOlIIIlUnicat10n
between two hwI.an beings as subject.

29Th. Primitive World

)~, p. 204.

!m!. ~

or

interaction.

This interaction i8

Transformations, pp. 15)-154.

F

-

111

aeaniDgtulJ ani ror it to be intelligible to both the inteJ"9'1ewer and the

subject being interviewed, they both mst a88UJ1le that nch teNs

in approximately the sae vq by both.

&I

ttunderatandj

What Redtield • . - about coammication

lI1th people of an unfamiliar culture he att1.rma also ot communication within

one'. own culture.

"one DlUat begin by aaawdng, as common senae assumes in

trying to reach understanding in talk1Dl with &nother person, that something is

the a.e in that

w..,. ot lUe and one's own. 1t31

7. R.elatina!!! heuristic principle. Although the principle ot
reiativi ... brings on serious doubt .s to the \In! versali ty of acient1.t1c
affirmations when it 18 raised by its 4fwoteea to an absolute principle, in
addition to becClll1Jlg self-contradictory in such m elwated position, it 18

oerta1nlT valid and necesa817 as a b.eur1sUo principle. For it is in bas10
agreeaent ld. th LoneZ'l&ll t s statement that the sc1.ences oE man IIlU8t utUi. the
data ot oonsciousnessJ it protects the inveatigator ot the little OOlIIlUnitT
froa aubjeotiye projection

bun upon

atl

people s .. things ditterentl7 trom the

oversight ot the taot that other

war

one see. the h1aeelt.

As Redfield

puts it, the inveatigator MUst view the COlmRuniV not 0Dl;y trom the outaide,

but also tl'Oll. the insidea

a. ••t

tiret take the poai tion ot the nomad or agricultural. 'fillacer
or citisen ot a small town in a modern state and look out on soaethine as that person looks out upon it. The investigator has to aee
the uardng, understand the valuation, and feel the teeling connected
with object or act in the mind ot the native. Onl7 atter he has
aeen it trom the native t s point ot view mq the investigator change
his viewpoint and look at that object or act-together with the

31The Little Oa.un1t,z, p. 93.

P'
U8
meanilll and the value it bas tor the nat.lve-as an object ot
,ci.ntitic intereet now to be deaoribed .from the outside and
related by t.he investigator to other things according to the
demand. ot a more detached and abstract understanding.
This neees'ity to see ths thing tirst from the inside and
then troll. the outaide aria. . in underst.and:1.ng aDTth1na personal.
or cultural, it la true in understanding a pot or a plow or a
aledge, for one must take the viewpoint of the native at least.
long eDO'tlgh to ee. that to hiRI the object haa the uses and other

meanings that are suggested by our worda "pot" or "plow" or
"sledge. tl • • • Much ot the advance of anthropoloclcal wisdom
has come with the more d18criDd.nat1ng and. careful aa8Ullpt.ion of
the inside view ot things. Thus, the concept of totem1sm seemed
a simple and urd.tora oonception in ear17 anthropology when t.he
aota ard objects called total181l were looke4 at pretty DI1ch from
the outa1de. Then all totemic people seead much al1lce, but as
inside accounts appeared of Autral1an totem:t_ and ot totaism
in other part. of the world. the ver:1 great difference. in
meaning of the things called totem.t1Jll beCame apparent, and. the
concept changed. its nature and ita uaefulnu•• l2

8. ..........
Need -.......,
tor both inside -and outaide Y1ev.
Redtield notea t.hat it 18 not
.
necessary for the student. of stare or starfish, of chaaical. elements or of

atOlll8, to try to learn what these things think anc! feel.

"Btlt the aentiments,

ideas, and judgments ot good and bad. that make up the Mntal state. ot other
people are the verr stuft ot the pereonal. and cultural studies, th.., are the
data

out ot which such science ls to be made as lta atudenta can make. On the

other hmd, theae lIMIlltal atatea ot other people do not becOJlle data. do not
enter into abstract and general 1mo1tledge. until. t.hey

aN

looked at troa the

outslde and glven name. that relate thea now in the m:.1nde ot outside students
to other noh data...l ) Thus. there i . a lla1t to the extent to whioh one can

32nw Little Community', pp. 81-62.

-

3.3zb1d., p. 82.
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take t.he inside

viftl

"There was a studmt. of the Zuni Indiana years ago,

Frank Cushing, Who assumed the inside view eo perfectly' that he bee_ in

etfect. a Zuni Indian and was made, I believe, a Priest of the Bow in their
But attar that. he told outsiders nothing more about the Zuni ... 34

religion.

Cushing carried out in concrete action the ordera ot "absolute relativisaJ"
the

w..,. that the Zuni looked at thing. wu

just

88

good

&8

the

WIq'

anthropolo-

gists look at things, ....n t.hough the Zuni outlook placed no value upon tel11n&
out aide,.. about th. .elvea.

§t.!EarZ. Redfield a81'8 that anthropologiata do not practice strict

9.

relativ1-.

'1'he.r are

suppoaed to value every :oulture poaiUvel.7, not pass1~

judgrdent on the buic suppositions of that culture, but tound thil 1lIpoaaible
lIhen they were called upon to anth1"opolog1H 1IOdern co_un!Ues.

Th.,. tend to

value atable and integrated. locietie.. ArJd t1nal.lT, they cannot u•• the
principle upon it.selt, they muat aclcnowled£_ a development in judgment.

But

relativi8 U a lIoti... tor aociologists to at.taIJlpt the "flight into the
V&Cuua"

were tn..,

can view society as detached, ideal obs_"era, tor they

believe that an expl.ioit declaration ot loyU. to t.he aociet,. whioh
engendered acient1t1c values in t.heir minds and willa would make their work

ttunsciantit1c." A belief that .thaatical un1pulation ot data make. suoh
data un1nnuenoed by one'. own value. is a r&ll&Cy' ot soient!..

For

4mIIl

get such data, one must take the inaide view, which involve. valuing.

'!'he

to

example ot Frank Cushing, how8"18l", .hows that one IlU8t not g1va up the OI1taide

-

3hIb1d•
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ri."" altogethe1".

The mathematical. manipulation ot data gathered by taldag the

inside view i8 misguided. only i t it tn.. to destroy a certain tension between

the inside and the outaide 9'1_ by' pretending that the" is no inside .iew.
-This tena1on," s . . Red.t1eld, "between the inside and. the outside nev, this
obligation to m.anage corr80tly the relationship between the, is the central
prob18lll in

studies ~ cul tun or ot peraonallV. It)S

The stud;y

ot relatin81'll .s treated Dr Sorokin wUl require two aections,

one dealing wi til hi. pqahol.og1cal. and soclologlco-phenOll8nologic&1. readinga of

culture, and the other deal1ag more explic1t17 with vhat he baa to s., on the

subject ot relatinsa.
B.

SOROKIlh

PSYCHOLOOICAL Atm SOOIOLOOICO...PHENCMENOLOUCAt
RIWlIlll OF CULTURES

1. Mental!,.,.. ! bcr18t1o ant101paUon. Red.t1eld aqa that Ittbe
aent1menta, ideu, aid 3U"'nta ot good and bed that malce up the mental. states

ot other people are the

very'

sturt ot the personal. and. oultural. stucl1u. II

Sorolc1n 8&78 that all aeantugtul. intel-action baa three aapeota, the soclal, the

cultural, and the personal, and that the oultural component conalata ot the
t..hrM level. of ideol_lcal culture, bebaY10ral culture, and. mater1al culture.

Redt1eld's "mental statea ot other people" oorrespond to Soroldnts ideological
ou1ture.

In hi. p,rpes.os, Soroldn reters to this u the 1nternal upect ot

oultur&1 ptwtnc.aM, or the "cultUN unt.al1ty.·

Apart

trom thia internal

aspect, the _ternal upeota do not even pertain to oulture.

))Ibtd
_e

It'l'b1s means that

p
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tor the investigator of an integrated .8tam ot culture the internal aepect is
paramount.

It detEmtU.ne8 which ot the external. existing phenomena-and in

vhat ..nee and to what extent-become a part

ot the ayatem....36 'l'hua, tor

Sorokin .. tor Redt1eld, the di8covery at culture ..ntality or meaning 18 going
to be a bulc heuristic anticipation.

Soroldn distinguish.. between the

psychological and the 8ocio1oc1co-phenameno1011cal reading ot oultUN
mentaliV.
2.

P!f!llolOg1cal re!dYB.

According to the pqchological method, "the

correct read.1.. ot the internal. upeot ot culture i8 that which regards it

ex&C'Yl.!:.e !!!! .!!!! !!l !! .!& !!! rsarded .9t i:!! creater8 .2£ modifiers.

It an

investigator can show that. h1a interpretation i8 indeed identical w1 th that ot
the per80ns or P'OUP8 invol.wd., then hi. 18 correct u

reading. It

a psyohological.

1'b.1. often 18 a a1mp1e task, tor .. the uan1J::lg or pvpoa8 18 otten

clear17 and explicitly' announced by the creator." And even when this 18 not
the

0"',

the "character at the cultural object4 th. . .1Tee-1naoriptioDa,

letters, ChroniCle., boolc8, 1IMtIB01r8, and other 'evidenc.s'-often .furni.h.. a

autfic1ent bas18 tor the re.toration ot the or1.g1nal meaninC lntemad by the
creator..

It thi8 were not so, the whole science ot history would have to be

discarded because nch a psychological reading at culture is one ot the main

procedure. ot histo1'1' ...

'1

'l'ry1nc

to get at meanings

exactly in the way that the

creators or modlliera ot a oultural. phenoaenon viewed th_ seems to cOrNspond
rather closelY' to Redfield' 8 idea ot taking the inside view.

~C8, I, 55.

-

31Ib1d., pp. 51-58.
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His;!:orl.

Sorokin sqa that the psychological reading of culture is

one of the ma1n procedures ot histo1'7.

Th1s would . e . to con.t1m the state-

ment that taking the inside view is .. deacr1ptift procedure, tor Sorold.n
regards history as adesoriptive sCiences

"Most historical works are merel:1

catalogues of men, events, object., value., organized mechanically' on the
principles of t.ime or apace adjaceucTJ and their 1nterenc.. rarely haft

beazo1nc

beyond the specified area or group which they stud;r ....38 Related to this is the
disUnction between history as an individualising science and sOCiology as a

generalizing science.

'lihereu history concentrates 1 til attent1qn upon the study of the
soc1ocultu.ral pbellOllUm& that are unique and lll'lNpe..ted. in t1me
and space (the United state. as a distincti V'e nation; Chriat1ani V
as a UD1que Nli&iooJ Abrahim L1ncoln aa a particular man, the
Th:l.r'tq Yearts war as dias1tn1lar frail all other wars), lOOio1OO"
studi•• tbe pzoopert1 •• of'tthe auperorganic tbat are caaon to all
sociocultural. phenomena (general sociology) 01" ela. to all varleti.
of a given 01_ of aociocultural. phencaena-to aU wara, &1.1
nat.i.OlUI, all revolutions, all religions, etc. (special sooio1og1.. ).
By 'f'.l.rt,u of this generalia1Dg quality sociology differs profoundl7
from history and other indiv1dualizing humanistic dtsciplines • .39

However. u Lonergan

B.,..,

general systems and structure. must be "discovered,

verified, and applied in data that are all individual."

And in the preface to

the Plnam.ici Sorokin brings out this relationship between sociololY and historyl
The main material with which this invest.igation deals 18 that probT the Qruco-Roun and Western c1V1l1aat1ona during the
more than twenV-ti ve hundred years of their history. In briefer
tuhion it touch.. &1.80 on the FQptian, the Babylonian, the
Hindu, the Chine.., and the Arabic cultures. It i8 not, hO'iNVer,
• hiato17 of the•• cultures, but a aoclo1oq E! their cbamp.
vided.

-

38Ibid., p. 30, footnote J9.

3980018".. Culture, !!!!. Personalitz, p. 7.
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What the difference 1s between these two, the work 1tsel.t should
make clear. tlor haa the W'al'"k, in its choice of materials, its
principles, aethods and aims an;y1.hing to do with what is called
Cul tural History. Of the semi-historical diSCiplines which it
resembles, it 1_ nearest to what of'ten 1. styled. PhUoaoplV' ot
Hi.stol'7 • Since almost all great sociological. systems are a brand.
of philosophy ot h1story, and since most of the great phUosophi••
ot history' are a sort ot SOCiology ot cultural. change, I do not
have "" objection to the use of this nae by arvODe who tanai••
it to describe the present work.40

It would s. . to follow that the psychological reading ot culture 1s nece88&lT

in order to obtain the data to be explained by the general systems and
structures ot 100101ogy.

4. Sociolopcg-phenomenolos1cal reading.

The soc101ogico-phenomenologi-

cal reading ot cul tura mentality i8 baaed. upOb the fact that "the obj eot1",
results

ot

an activitY" can Itdeviate greatly

who undertake it.

mult1tudel

tl'Om the subjecti. . aims ot tho..

Poets are lelion who aim to write gNat '9'81'88.

ot Icientist.

There are

and scholan ltlo aim to be Platos, Newtona, Danr1na,

but do not in fact achieve aqything but mediocre result •• "

Theretore, to .ay

that there is no meaning outside ot the psychological "would mean to den.r an
obvious tactl

that.

the d1acrepancy between

lin

intent10n and ettect does not

necessar:il.y' make a cultural coasplex meaningless.llla.

Is Sorolcin identit)1.ng the

psychologiCal. meaning with "subjective aims" and "intention," and the
sociologloo-pbencmenological meaning with "objeotive re.-.llte" and "atteet?"

It

this 18 true, it would s . . to follow that in reference to Sorokin's desor1pti
of the emergence ot a eociocultural system the distinotion between the

~oe.

-

I, x.

4lIbld., pp. ;8-;9.
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psychological

am

the sociologico-PMIlOIlel'lOlogical readings can be claritied.

For Sorokin givee three pha.e. 1n the emergence ot an empirioal soeiocultural

q.tezu mental integration. empirical objectifioation, and socialization.
Speaking

ot mental integration. Soroldn say.. "When such an integration 1s

created tor the tirst time in the history ot manldnd, 1t is an abaolutelT new

1ntegration. w'hen an existing integration of meanings is le8l"n8d b.1 a given
lnd1vidual or group.-f01" instance, by a pupU 'Who learns the IIlU1 tip11oation

table-it il new to such a person or gl')up •• 42 It would . . . that a pupU,

lookiDg at the symbols

by' wr!ich the DIUl tipl1cat.lon

table is _pirieally'

objectified, would be ••ekiDg to regard. the tmp-t1plication table ftexaotl;r

l!!! .!!!! !!t !! !! .!!! r!Jarcied .!?Z ~ ereaton !t 1IOdif1era, am thus
It

be attempting a paycboloa1cal reading.

!!!

wou1d

It, however, tne distinction between tb4

psycholoa1cal and the eociologioo-phenomenological reading i. that between
seeking the Itsubjeoti".e aiult of the originator and aeekiDg the "objeotift

reaultaft ot the act!'f'ityJ then the student 18 ob'f'iOU8l.7 attempt1Da a
8ociolog1co-phenc:llllenologieal reading, tor he

Oa:N8

nothing about the subjective

II\OtivaUon of the creator. of the multiplication table.
But Sorold.n Slfts thl int.n,>retation

ot Aristotelean ph1l.oaopby aa

for the poaeibU1ty of a psyohological reading.

ev1Clt,,'LImC.-

"WhateYer mIlT be the differ-

ence. in the interpretation ot minor points of the Aristotelean philosophical
posl tion, it. e••entials are well known aDd similarly understood
oompetent scholars.

by' all

None ot thai would ucr1ba to hill the pOSition ot a

-12;
materialist in m.etapby'8ic8, a pure empiricist in epistemology J an indirldual1et
in social and polit1cal. theory ... 43

It this is an example ot psychological

-

reading, psychological reading 18 not l1m.1ted to an anal.7s1.. ot the subject1ve

aims ot the creator.

Btlt then the distinction between the pqchological and.

the soc:1ologioo-phellCMnological readings remains as vague and contusing as
eYer.

;. Cauaal-tumtional readinl.

SoroldD gives two type. ot soo10logioo-

phen0ll81l010£1cal readina., tho•• which aim at causal-functional relationahlps,

and. tho.. which &1. at log1co-meaningtul relationships.

'!'he causal-

.tuncUonal Nadine . . . . somevhat more clearll distinct from the psychological
reading.

It'1'heoret.icall;r at l ...t it LOClaal-tunctional read:i'Ofl aq be quite

independent

ot the payohological. rH41ng. The .1gnit1cance of the relati0D8b1p

between da1a1tq of population and cr1ae, business oyol88 and the aortal1ty rate.

mod_ ot production and forms of proy:.Htrty, religion and the d:1:f'orce rate, are
exanpl.. ot the

801'1;

ot phenom.eDa to 1Ii11ch the causal.

reading aq be applied. "h!

The cr1u rate can be oomputed, for example, just on the bui. ot the 11IlJIlber of
cri.me. cOll1'l1tted, without aqr reference to the lIlotlna of the different

criminal. or how they conceiTed their criaes. This iD:lependenoe from the
psychological reading 1s cnl1' relative, however, tor the investigator 1s going

to have to depend. upon lUlJY' difterent 80urces for his 1nt01"Dlation as to bow
fI18D¥ crime. have been coamd.tted.

This dependence i8 onl1' val1d insolar .. the

investigator can uaume that all of hi8 eourcu are using the word crble in the

4l~.. I,

-

la4Ib1d.,

p. 60.

;8.
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same sense.

This puts him back on the level of inter.Personal communication

again, which ultimately reste lJpon the a ••umption that those other people who
are talld.ng about ori_ have had. a aaMWhat simUar enoulturation process as

one bas oneself.

Furthermore t not only is crime defined in ditferent 181&1

terms in ditterent places, but these det1n1t1ona also usually include . . .
reterence to the .tate ot IId.nd of the criminal-whether or not he
Of'

1naane, vbat his motives and intentiol'l8 were.

The distance

WM

aw.

an idiot

from the

pS'.10h01og1cal reac!1ng of the investigator, the tact that he him.selt does not
attempt a pqcholog1cal read1ng, doe. not obliterate the ult1lu.te dependence
of his data on "the inside view. It

6. L2S,1co-meanlStul

N!dinI.

Sociologico-phencmenological readings

which aim at. d18COYfIlJ'1ng logico-aeaningtul. relationships appeal' to be even 1...
iDiependent

or the psychologioal. re.td1ng. in spite ot Soroldn t s protestations
He sI\Ys that even though we know not.hi.ng about the psycholog-

to the oontrat'1'.

ical. meaning or oausal relationship. ot cultural value., the tollowing
questions m .,. be a.keds
or are they

l~ 10

"Are the eleaents of a given culture logical.lJr united

al17 oontradicto17? Do

they make a comprehensible and

consistent ayat., or do ther not? It thq do, what is the nature ot the

&yst.? Are there un11)1.. principles that permeate all the components ot a
given configuration, or not.
answered regardle••

These

am

s1mUar problema

ot .",. pqcholog1cal reading of

'I.'IJ.q'

ari88 and be

the cultural configuration

in question." The nature of this independence can be seen, according to
Sorokin, in such examples as the reading of

an.r work,

"beginning with the

examination papers written tw students whom we do not know, and ending with
the muterp1eoe

ot a

known or an anorpoua author.

We can judge all the..
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writings with regard to the logioalltT or inner oonsistency' of their ideu,
regardless of their authorship or iDlnediate purpose. nbS

The queetion that

seems to this Wl"iter to be crucial 1s that ot how the ItlogloalitT or inner
consistenC".f of the ideas" ot the student or o£ the known or

IUlOI\YfJlOUS

author

ean be judged u."'lless sane attempt is made to disoover the ideas that each
intended to oOi'llMUnioate in hi. work.

that the first task 1s to

tr.r

In reading W1lf written work, it seems

to di.soover what the author i. tr;y1ng to SII¥,

what ideas he 18 tr,y1.ng to express in the words or the text.

46

the _pirical. objeotit1cation

'l'bes. words are

ot hi. mental 1nteiration. Through

the . . worcbs,

the reader 1s trying to approxiJ:ate, at least" the insights and concepts that

the

au~

is trying to ccamun1cate.

7. Dependence.e paychological. re!d1pa. Soroldn naes the limitationa ot
the psychological reading to bring out his distinct:i.oru

The point is that lIlOst 01 the ouJ.tural. phenomena represent the result8
ot the activiti•• ot m.a.n.v indiv1duals and groups, whose purpose. and
meanings !DIllY be d1tterent trom one another, otten opposite. They all
Dd.x together, partly reintorcing, pU'tl.y inhibit1ng, partl7 mod1t.y1ng
one another, to 8Ilch an .tent that there 1.8 little likelihood ot
our d1stinguish1nc one trom another. Whether we take the Parthenon
OJ' one or the great Christian cathedrals or a set ot mores or laws
OJ' beliets or AnT other cultural oreations, they all are the
manitestationa ot the activities, ettor+'A, aims .. volitions, ideas,
teelings, ot large mu••• ot 1Ddiri.duala and combinations ot group••
It would be next to iJIpoesible to decipher or separate what in theae
complex cultural values unitest. the aim. and aeantngs ot each or
the partiCipants in their creation, or what i8 the "ps.rcholog:1cal
readinglt ot each. Meanwhile the Parthenon or the oathedral or the
aet or mores or belieta or 1.,. exist. unqu8at1onabl1' in the cultural
world and tumtions in it as a vehicle ot the internal. aspect ot the

-

4Stbid., pp. 60-61.
46nm-tc•• IV, 6)-64.
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culture. If it cannot be read psyohologically, it can be understood
eith{~r casuallY' or logico-_aning~.
For readings ot these sorts
we need: not know the documents necessary tor a psychological reading.
we can take the elements or a given culture as data and can inquire
whet.l'ler they logically tit one an other. 47
Again, the elements of a given cul tUN are only going to fit logically or nonlogically in terms of the meanings and ideas that they express.

These ideas

were either grasped by the people in the culture-the human subjects ot
interaction-ot they ware not.

It they were gra8T}ed by the people who created

the Parthenon, or the cathedral, or the set. ot laws, and it these people
expressed their meanings-gave them empirical objectifioation-through these
vehicles, then the logioal reading ot the cul tl1re phenOlIenon is going to involv.
the investigator trying to grup the meanings held by the people of that

culture.

Then the logical reading of culture is not independent of the pqcho-

logical reading.

It the meaning that the investigator seelea is not a meaning

grasped by an;y of the people in the culture, then it !TIllst be a meaning
attributed by'

SOM

other people to the object in question, for Soroldn himself

insists that objects enter into social or cultural By'Stems only insofar as they
are given meanings over and above their physical, ch8llli.eal, or biological
properties.

6. IndiVidualil\ng

~

generalisi,! rMd1r!ss.

The only distinction that

seems to result fran all of this is that the psychological reading is
individualizing whereas the soclologico-phenomenologlcal reading is generaliz.
ing,

The psychological reading seems to aim at a reconstruction or a sort of

biographical sketch ot each individual involved, uncovering all of his complex

41Ibid,.

pp. 61-62.
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motivations, ideas, and teelings,

"It would be next to impossible to decipher

or separate what ln the.e cODIplex cultural. value. unitesta the aiJu and
meaning.

ot

each of the partlcipants ln their creation, or what is the 'paycho-

logical reading' of each."

1'h.1s cl1sUnction tit. in well with Sorokin'.

distinctlon between h1atory a. an indiYiduaJ.is1ng sclence and socl01ogy

.s a

genaraJ.ising sclemoe, tor he sq. that the psychological reading i8 one of the

main technique. of history.

-

But the cl1sUnction does not s. . to rest

8ssentlall7 upon a dl.tinction between those .anines whioh are grasped by the
members of the culture being studied and tho.. meanings which are sOlHhow
"lndependent" ot the individuals in that cult"!"'_

Yet Sorok1n does formulate

the distlnction in teru ot the independence ot sooiologloo-phenomenolog1cal
readiDg £1'0. the pqchological reading.

ot Sorok1n such u tho..

And this perhaps juatit1es or:ltici...

made by B1dney and Znan1eold..

Bidne.r • .,.. that in

SoroJd.nts the01"1 "culture is said to act aa it it were a kind ot spiritual.

8utotu.ton operat1ng in conformity with its own 'organio' 1 _ ancllogiC
in4ependent ot lts huun carr1ar....

h8

ADd Znan1eold.'s u1n objection to

Sorokin'. theor.r is that he tail. to apP17 the "hwun1at1o ooefticientB-the

postulate that flevar;y situation must be studied. by the investigator ... lt 1.
experienced by the particular human lncl1Y1dual. who is coucioua of it.,,49

Beoau.ae

or

thi., Sorokin t&11s to reali_ Itthat a 800ial group, as aperienced.

and emuated. by ita MSBbers, baa the e...ntial characteristios Which he

48B1dney,

p _ 38,.

49nor:lan Znan1eold, '!'be Cultural Sciences (Urbana, Ulinois, 19$2), pp.

241-242.

-
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ascribes to other cul tur&1.
9.

Phclc:aeno1W.

..,.tenu.. "SO

'there 1s a reason for Soroldn'. tendency to make

oulture into a "sp1ritual autcaaton. 1t It lies in his interpretation of what he
mearul by a "soeiologico-pheDOlllenologio&1.· read1nc of oulture phenomena.

ttl

use the term phenomenolocical in a sense oongenial with E. Ruuerl's term,
indioating by it the sooiaJ.ly 'objective' existenoe of a meanirl&, regardless ot
whether it Coincides 14th the ps.robological

be sooiall1' "objective" 1n the sann that

meaning.·51 Meanings here se. to

ttuv-

are somebow "out there- to be

looked at, and, being "out til..... are not dependent upon BUT mind that grasps
them.

.And this technique of look1ng cannot

g~t

bqond a deaoriptl" point of

viev, it is a basio weakne•• ot the phenomenolog of Huaserl, whiob Sorokin
cla1ms to tollow.

A. Lonergan

...,.81

Soient1tio deaoription can be no I1lOre than a preliminary to scientifio
explanation. But Hu••erl begins tram relatedneu-to-u., not to
advance to the relatedness ot terms to one another, blt to mount to an
abstract looking trom l1ihich the looker and the looke<l-at haft been
dropped because ot their particularity and contincenoe. The vitality
ot an1m.al extroversion i8 attenuated trom .ensitive perception to
intuition ot universals and troa intuition of universals to the more
1IIpalpable inspection ot tomal es.enoe. (approx1matel1', Scholastic
transcendental.). As objects increase in cenerality and purity,
subjects shrink to intentional acts. With remarkable acuteness and
discrimination there are uncovered, deSCribed, caapared, &1'ld ol••itied
the pure torms of noetic experience terminating 1n noematic content••
But the whole enterpriae is under the shadow of 1matanenoe, and it taUa
to tranacend the model tor the pure ego. In briet, phenomenology is a
h1&hl7 purified empirici_, am it did not take lona tor it to topple
over into an existentialism that describe., not the abstract poe.ibU.
ity 01 descript1on, bolt men as they' are.

-

SOn,id., p. 378.
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But description i8 not enough. It 1 t clai1lls simply to report
data in their puritY', one m.,. a.k vbi' the arid report sho"ld be added

to the more livelY' experience. If it pretends to report the
significant data, then 110 i. deceived, tor significance is not in
data mt accrue. to them trom the occurrence ot 1nailht. If it urges
that it presents the insights that ari•• spontaneously', 1mmed1ate4r,
and inevitabl7 from the data, one must remark that the data alone are
never the so1.e det.erminants of the insights that arise in arq' but an
int&ntUe mind and that be;rond the level ot insight there is the
leYel. of critical renect10n with ita criterion ot the v1rtua1.l7

unconditioned. sa

It might be auggesteel that the independence ot Sorokin t a logical reading of

culture trom the psychological reading bean some ruemblanoe to

ftan

abstract

looking i'ro."!1 which the looker and the looked-at haft been dropped because

their particularity an. cont1ngenoe." And

~

ot

ttntore impalpable inspection of

formal •••enee. (approximatel.7, Scholaetic transcendentals)" ma;;r be more than
superticiallT saUtU" to Soroldn's study' ot the fiuctuation ot the major
premises ot logically' integrated cultures.

For these major prei... are in

terma of the nature ot realitT, the nature ot the ultimate good, and the ..,.t_

ot truth, 'WbiCh are, apprcx:l.matel,., the Scholastio transoendental.. ot being,
good, and tl"Uth.

10.

Heuristio antioipation

s!.!!l! inside!!!!.

In oonclusion, it seems

to the writer that although Soroldn's d1.stinctlon between the pqcholc:gical. and
the sociologioo-phenomenological.

readi~8

ot the inner aspect ot cultural

phenanena is simUar in Matv' respects to Red..t1eld's distimtion between the
inside and the outside views, Soroldn t s tormulation ot the d1stirx:tion leads to

untortunate couequeno... 'or it ..... to ignore the need, in .tud;y1nc
_aninga, to tr7 to det81"mine what meaning. people tried to expresa or

n
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cOlllllWlioate in their writing, art, and 01"lania.tions.

In place ot this,

Sorok:l.n seems to substitute an "objective" world ot meanirJg. "out there" to be
looked at by the trained investigator, which exist independentl3 ot 1nd1Y1.dual
people who meant what the meaning. objecti.,.ely mean.

This . . . . to the writer

to stand in contradiction to Sorold.n· s own statenent that one II1U8t reter &!IT
social, cultural, or personality' atuct;r back to the actual triune cOIIpOIUmtial
.tructl.1J'8 ot meaningful interaction-society, culture, and p8l"8onallt.T--it
one' ••tudT is not to be distorted or inadequate.

Heuristically, this critici8JI

of Sorold.n· s .oo1.olog1co-phenclllellOloa1oal reading meana that one is not to

anticipate the diHOftl'7 ot ayst_ of meaniZ1li\. whioh are independent ot the
meaning. intended. by the people beine studied.

'thi. heuristic principle help. one avoid the danger ot aubject.1ft projec-

tion.

'!'he investigator w1ll expect that the people be studies wUl haft

experiences that an s1Jdlar enough to hi. own to pendt
but that

SOlIe

oOlllmUnicatlon,

are in acme or ma&'l7 respects tml1ke his own. '1'hus, he can alao

antioipate that the insights of the people w1ll. be somewhat ditterent trem his

own, and that the,y will haft a dUterent pattern ot habitual judpent.. as to
good and truth.

with a .et

Neftrtheleaa, the lrrreatigator wUl approach the coonun1ty

ot acient1t1c

n0l'll8

and values that gives hill an explanatory Yiewpo1r. Iii

whioh he taoi tl7 or explio1t17 _st att1ra 18 a superior interpretative frame-

work.

He believe. that wi thin this tramwork he oan lllAke judgments about that

communi ty that he i. .tud,yi. that are scientifically more correct than the
people wi th1n the society i tselt • And according13, he cannot elevate cultural
relativi_ to the poei U. on of an absolute principle.

D
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D.

1.

RELATIVISM,

In1!n!retative trameworka.

SORon.
"It is highlJ" significant, therefore, that

a sociologist ot the stature of Sorok1n hu endeavored to introduce this
metaoultural perapecti.... into contellporary 80010100'.

• •• Sis analysis of all

cultures into the supertJpes sensate, ideational, and idealistic is an attempt

to provide a 'logico-Maning1'ul' baai. tor the integration of &1'\V' given
culture (insofar as it 18 1ntegratM) in tel"lU of its ultimate epistemologicalBl8taplV'eical prenpp0e1t10na ...S3 Soroldn give. three 1m.portant implication. of
10gioo-aean1nctol reading of culture.
deductive

am.

"first, the application of the canon of

inductive logiC, ,"ond, the

re~ization

of the posslbUity that

the major pralin. ot various culture• ..,. ditter, third, the u8Ul'llPtion ot an
impartial po.ition 1n regard to the validity or 1nvalid1t,' of the major
prem1.e....Sb. 1'be last condition seems to bit a statement of a relativi.tio
position, but at present it i . the f1rst two that are important.
enlightening to

OOJlpIl'8

It wUl be

the.. two assertions to an anal.7sis of judgments about

knowledge ude by Polan,y1 t

(1) Correct interenc.s

!item.

wi thin a true
ErrOneoua conclusions amve'diithin a true q . t .
(like an error cOllaitted by a coapetent scientist).
Conoluions
arrived at by the correct use of a fallaciou•
(3)
.,..t_. fbis is an tnc.,etent aode ot r ...cm1ng, the
relUlts ot which pos•••• au§lecuve
(4) Incoherence and obe••ai. . . . . as oS.;;::;;a Ii the ideation
ot the
particulii'G in .chiaophrenia. The morbid
reasoning ot sutters trom qatautic delu.ions .hould
alao b. classed here, rather than under (3) ••ince suoh
:lelusions impair the verr core ot a person'. rationality.'S

(2)

valid1Fn.

s:naan.,

$3B1dne7, p. 169.

S4Bfn!miC8, I, 63.

$S~~.~nal

KnoWleSse, p. 314.
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Each of the.. involves a judgment about (a) the interpretative fr__ork, and
(b) the application of the framework.

ItU we accredit both (a) and (b), we

have cue (1)1 if (a) but not (b): cue (2), 11' (b) and not (ah cue (3).

Our

rejection of both (a> and (b) defines the uniIIportant c .... that I have not
listed, when a fal.e trllMWork is applied erroneouel.7, whUe cue (4) is now
seen to represent the abeence of arv interpretative framework. 1t56
Sorokin's first condition tor logico-meaningtul reading--ttthe application

or the

canon ot deductive and inductive logic"--corresponda, not to the

interpretative framework, but to (b) the !PJ?lication ot the tramework.
second condition--"the realisation of the

pos~ibility

And the

that the major premises

ot various culture. mq ditterfl-correaponds to the 1n:mretative t'ramework
itself.

Sorokints third conditlon--"the assumption of an impartial position in

regard to the 't'8lldity or invalidity ot the major premiae.It--would, then, ....
to implT a relatlnetic pOSition regarding interpretative framework..

But he

denies that he is a relatinat.
2.

Sorckin' • .-de
..ni
__al;;;

2! relativ1ea.

the bulc &88UIIptione i. the concern
p~siclan,

He sq. that the "praise or blame ot

ot the police, the moral educator, the

the m1.sional7, the statesman, and all tho.. sociocultural agencies

that decide the choice ot value., and delend and perpetuate them, once Chosen. It
But he strea... that this does not malee his pOlltion a relativistic one.
An unattentive reader, obser"l'1..ng in subsequent parts ot th11 book
remarks about the relativity and variabU1ty of the .,.staa ot
truth, of ethiCS, ot art, f'Jfq conclude that the author belong. to
the group of relativlsta. skeptios, and the like ••i!X'e the work
cont.enda, tor instance, that there are at lout three tundamentall.y

1))

d1tferent systems ot truth, of knowledge, ot art, of m.orali VI and
admits that, within their major prmses, the7 are all valid and
that there is no deo181.,e evidence which can show one ot these
qst_ to be valid or aupenor and the others to be invalid or
int8l"1or. To an lnautticl.ntly discriminating ndnd such a position
may appear to be entirely sophistical. But if the distinction between
the abaolute character of the canon ot logic as applied in the
logical. reading ot cultures 18 properly considered, together with the
relatint,. ot tbe empirioally given major premis.s of various
cultures, the pOSition of the author appears absolutistic, phenomenological, having little it anything to do with any genuine relativistic
apostlc, skeptic pointe ot viw.57

Here, Sorolcin seema to combine an abaoluU_ regarding the norma of logie, with
a relativ1Sl1l regarding the major premises.
premiaes can be interpreted. in either ot two

This relativ1a regarding the major
Wq&c

(1) the interpretati....

frameworks tomed b.1 the major premiaes of different culture mentalities are all

equall.7 valid, (2) in stud;y1nc the culture mentality of a coaauniV it is
necessary to realize that the major premises ot other peopl.. are likely to be
dU'terent from onets own.

In the way that Sorokin states his poe1t10n here, it

sounds as i t he is tald."g the tirst interpretation, but as a matter ot fact, he
does not take the first position, but the second.

'l'h1s can be seen from an

examination of his position regarding the three main culture t'iJ'pes, ideational,
sensate, and idea11st1c.
).

Ideational culture.

There are tour maJor premisses I

"(1) Reality' ia

perceived u nonaenaate and nonmaterial, everlasting Being (Se1n); (2) the needs
and enda are

JU1nlT ap1r11alal;

(.3) the extent of their satisfaction is the

largest, and the level, highestJ (4) the method of their tul.t11lment or
realization ia .elt.imposed minimization or elimination of most ot the pl\r8ical.
needs, and the greatest possible extent. 1f On the basis of the fourth premise,
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Soroldn distinguish.. between ucetic ideational culture, wn1ch tollove the
tourth premise as stated, and acti"e ideational culture, which adda activity
upon the enril'omaent .. a Meane to achi."e the gOals. 58

4. Sensate cultu:re. The premiaes ot .en.ate
opposed to the premia•• ot ideational. culture,

cul tuN are radicall,.

(l) Reality is ffonl7 that which

18 pre.ented to the .ense organa ••• a Becad.ng, Process, Change, nux,
Evolution, Progre•• , Transtormation."

0)

(4) tlThe ••thod ot reali8ing them i8 not that

Max1mum .ati8taction i8 sought.

ot a modtticat.i.on within the

(2) Needs and ends are phy'sical.

human individual. CCftPOa1ng the culture, but of a

mod1tication or exploitation of the external. ,orlel." And again on the buia ot
the fourth premise he diatlncuish•• between active .ensate mentalItq, p!!.i....

mentalIty, and c;rn!cal .ensate mentalit,..S9

S. Id.eall.8tic

culture.

.ensate mentalitie., the onlT
ideali.tic culture mentality.

ot u.n;r poUible mixture. of the ideational

0_

that ia log1Cally' integrated i. the

"'or it re&1.1ty i . !I&ll7 aided, with the aspects

ot everlasting Being and ever-changing Becoudrc ot the spiritual
material.

and

and the

It. needs md ends an both spiritual and. Iltater1al, with the

mat.eri&l, however, subordinated to the spiritual.

The method.

ot the1r re&liza

tion inYOlye both the llOd1tication of .elt aM the transtormation ot the

external sensate world.
and the Sensate. ,,60

-

59Ibld., Pp. 73-74.

-.

6Orbid., pp. 74-7S.

in other words, it gi"e. !!!!! cuique to the Ideational

1)1

6. Sorok1n's cnlture mentalitz. Sor'Okin, unlike social scientists who
want to regard the1uelves as if operating in a

TaOUWIl,

recognises that he haa

a culture mentality must as much as the people that he is 8tud.'ring, for he must

haVe an interpretati.,.. trauwork.

In the preface to the Dream1cs, he describes

a process of dieUluaiollMent that led hila to break avq tl"01l1 what had been a
preciOlllinant17 senaate Hnt&1.iVl

-This work has grown out of r:r:r efforts to

understand something ot what baa been happeninC in the social and cultural

world about me.

I _ not ashaed. to conteas the World

War

and most of what

took place atter it were bew1lder1ng to one who, in conformity with the
dominmt currents of social. thought

ot the

~lier

twentieth century, had

believed in PZ'OgNss, l"8Yolution, sociali., democra.c.r, scientific poe1t1V1sm,
and man.Y other 'i_s t of the same sort••61

It cannot be laid ot Sorokin that

m

i8 unwilling to admit the impact of the social and cultural s;ysteu in which he

lives upon hi. Sociological research.
But in giving up his more sensate interpretative framework, Sorokin does
not thereby 0e00D8 tree of such a fr__orkl

"The trt.and:point aseumed is

Idealistic in the specific sense ot the term ... used in this work.

It is the

only' point of view that permits us to see without serious distortion both

extreme typea of integrated cultuN-the Ideational and the Senaat....62 'thus
it would seem that in practic. Soro1d.n did value one set of major premises oyer

the other two.

-

61+~i<1.'

-

Furthermore, in the fourth volume, there appears a position

p. ix.

62 Ibid., p. x.
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named "integrali8Jll, It which Sorokin doea not ae. to identity exactly with his
idealistic position, .. can be seen tram hi. explanation tor the fluctuation ot

culture types.

7. Fluctuation

2! !lsteu .£!.

t.heM of bi. tour yolUIH wor),n

truth.

In volume one Soroldn states the

"In spite ot its great si•• , the work deals

wi th only one central problem, ruuaely the chang. and fluctuation

ot Ideational,

Ideal1stic, and Sensate culture....63 In volume tOUl" he shows a re..on tor the
fluctuation and recurnmce ot these difterent "euperaystena" ot cultures:
The preceding Y'Olumes ot D[ne1os have shown that at the bas1a
the I4eational. or Idealistic or Sensate tOnt or integrated
culture l1e., aa its major premise, 1ts Vat. ot truth and realitq.
It i . thi. prem1.. that, to '118. W. I.
terra, "de1'1nes the

ot

ThOra.'

ai tuation" tor the rest of the related compartments

torma ot culture.

ot ·,ach ot these

Art and philosophy, ethic. and rel1g1on, science and tonu of
social organization ot a Sensate supersystem are articulations ot
tb8 SeMate 81'8tem ot truth and reality. In Ideational or
Idealistic or Sensate cultures, th... compartments articulate
Ideational or Idealistio or Sensat. ayata ot truth and. reali• • • • •
A. It one ot the •• 8,Ystaa i8 ent.i.rely true--is the oDly
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth-then the other
two .yateu ot truth and reali V are entlrelT or mainly' tals••
Urder such an assumption the true .,.stem ot reality-and a oorreapond1.~ tom ot culture-can exist and dominate torever, without
arrr tear or poe.ibllity ot being dislodged b7 the tala. &yst...
• • • • Being true, it giv.. an adequate knowledge ot the reality',
through that it permits ita human bearers to live a real lite, to
adapt theuelvee 8UCoe88f'ull7 to the ad.equatal7 known env1roDm.entt
and, through all that, to enjoy' a better social lite and culture
than a SOCiety and oulture baaed exclusively upon error and
ignorance• • • •

1)9
B. It we as8Wle that each of the.. 57stau of truth and
reality 1s entirely talse--i8 nothing but an error and fallac-y-none ot them could dominate for &IV" length ot time, and still
le•• recur, because no human be1~s, no society, no culture oan
endure under the condition of complete ignorance and error. • • •
as a matter of fact, each of our three main qatenus dominated
for centuries and recurred several time8 in the history ot the
Gruoo-ROIlWl and We.tern ou!tur... And 80 they did also in
other culture••
C. Hence the .uper-rbl'1JlII studied ..... to b6 possible onJ.y
under the conditioD that each ot the three main &yates of truth
and reality-and the corresponding fol'll of oultuJte.-ls p~ true
and partly talse, partly' adequate and part:b' inadequate.64
Now there

SefIU

to be

IDl

over-s1Ilpllfication in the reasoning here, caused in

part, at least, by a. failure to make the d1etinction between (a) an 1ntel"'preta.
)~or

tift framework, and (b) the application ot thAt trUIfIWork.

it seems

posaible that a culture could have a oorrect system of truth, or interpretative
framework, and either (1) failed to have applied i.t correct.ly, or (2) failed to
have developed all it. potentialities.
the tirst, could lead to a rejection

And the secom pos8ibiliV, aa well as

ot the 8"/8tem. Furthermore, intellectua1.

development i8not isolated !rom the total social and cultural development of
a people, and thia total social and. cu.1tural situation provides men with
b1.aae8 whioh hinder the oorrect application of an interpretative frameworkt
tiThe planets would move in straight lines it there were no gran tatton, but in

tact thtIT move in perturbed ellipses.

In lik. manner, tt

serte Lonergan,

..

"social development would be simply a matter ot inte11eotual. development, it
the human p8.1ohe were without its contribution; rut in fact man's sensitive

nature constitutes both the d1nam10 materials to be ordered and the eubjectlve

64BrB!eics, IV, 741-742J C. originally in italios.

oonditions under which the Qrder 1a diSOo'ftNCl, oOJllllUnioated, accept-ed., and.

executed.

So it ia that social order finda in the deairea and aversions of

individuals and interaubject1ve groups both an enomous17 powerful ally' and a

pel"l'l&lUmt source of egoistic and 01... dn1at1on. ,,65

8.

l!!! canon.s!

Op!rations.

Sorokin'a argumentation, becauae of hi.

fallure to d1at1ngu1.h between a ayste:n and its correct or incon-ect application, . . . . to the writer leee than oonrlnclnl.

Nevertheless, the general

principle beh1nd his reucm1nl . . . . to coincide with Lonergan's canon of

operatlor:uu

ttTbe canon of operations is a principle ot cumulative Y8rit1cati

'or lave guide operations .uoc....tul.17 in the, lHUUre that they are oorrect.
Hence, 1naotar u lava and their implications 1n a vast variet,y ot sltuatlona
are repeat.edl1' found .uceeoM guides ot operations, their initial

66 Sorok1n reasons that .ince none of

verit1cation 1s CUIIIUlat1Y'el.1' oontil"R\ed.n

the three systeu of truth guides the activ! ty

ot a culture oorrectl7 in all

situatiOns, none of the i8 adequate.

9. MfiuHl.s! integrali_. Soroldn says "that each of the three main
eysteu of truth-the truth of taith ifdeat10nal
L!dealistic

.ste5',

and of the .e. . . LHnlJate

and nothing but. the truth, is almost e'Y1.dent.

rqatA!Y,

the truth ot reuon

flTSte5'-ls

not the whole truth

It it were so, ita partiSans

would be the 1'08seaaora ot the abeolute truth in all its manifold. 1nt1.n1ty.
They would be the Cmniecient God.

6SLonergan, p. 597.
66Ibid., p.

-

7,.

No error, and no further progress of elther
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rel1.g1on or

phil080P~

6
or science would be possible under suoh an assumption. II

By- the same reasoning, his integral.istio qstem oould not be "the whole truth

and nothing but the truth. 1t

As a matter ot fact, Sarokin does not make this

claim. tor intagra1.iam.J he merely states that, since it em'braces all three ot th

other s,yatema, it Itis nearer to t.he absolute truth than any one-sided truth of
one ot thes. three forms. f •68
Sorold.n goes to some length to defend the legit1lla.Oy ot the
truth

ot ideational culture,

the truth

.,..tem at

ot taith. He 15878 that intuition i8 the

source or the buic postulates ot arv science, ot language, and 18 the
foundation of art, ethics, and. religion.

Not, only rloes intuition provide the

foundationa, it is the "starter at an enomous llUlIber of sensol'1' and dialectic
disooveries and inftntlona in aU the creative fields ot culture.,,69 Hi8
documentation i8 so abundant, hO'We"Ver, that it leave. the reader contused as to
just exactly what intuition is-insight, beliet, rel1g1ous faith, II\Ystical
8CStuy, aesthetic experience.

And

Merton questions the amount ot talth

Soro.kin actually puts in lntultion himselt.

In order to justlt.Y the "truth ot fa! th"-the only' i tam. which would
remove him traa the ordinary critena used in current acientit1c
work-..he indioates that ftintui tion" pl&;18 an important role as a
8CNJ"Oe of soientifio disoover.r. But doe. this meet the issue? 'lbe
questIon is not one of the psyohological source8 ot valid conclusions,
but ot the ontena and _thode ot V1Il.idatlon. \fuioh criteria would
Sorokin adopt When "supersens;r.yrintultions are not consistent with
empirical obserntion? In such oase8, preaumably, so far as we oan
judge fran his work rather than from hie comments abOl.1t hi. work, he
acoepta the tacta and rejeota the intuition. 70

67Bre!!iCS, IV, 174.
68rbid., pp. 748-752.

-

69Ibid., pp. 762-763.
7Qterton Sggial 'l2.\ttQa.&lll soqiaJ, atno1;Jlrt, pp. 475-476.
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Merton thinks that Sorold.n is diacuaaillI under the label 01 -truth" three
distinct and not comparable types of judgments," and that he never resolves the
probl_ of locating hi. own work wi thin the oontext ot "radica1ly dIfferent and
disparate cri tena of truth ... 71

Merton'. critio1_ seas to the writer to be wll-ta.ken.

seem that it goes tar enough,
taken.

But it does not

although it doe. indicate the line. that must be

The distinct.1on that needs to be made is between the sourcea

knowledge and mtetu of knowledge.

ot

Borokin does not distinguish adequatel,y

nor conaistentl.7 between the tundament.al. structure of human cognitional process
wi th its difterent acts

ot experienoe, insight, Cld judgment,

and. the contents

01 exper1enc.., insights, and. judgments, whIch are elaborated into articulate

systea of thoucht-science, lIterature, philosopb;y, theology.

Soroldn doe.

not cooapletelT ignore the ditference between oognitional. acts and the contents
of the acts, but he does not apply the distinotion conaIst.ent17.

It 1s verr

l1kel,y that this tatlure i . due in part to his use ot the pbenawnological

method by' which he looks at the Ilobjecti",e" cultural facta "out there" rather
than .tw:I¥1ng the properties

ot haan 1nd1'f'idu.a1. and

buUding up social and

cul tural systems through intelligent grup of how the.e properties are related

to one another.

He tends to start out with ideally constructed, logica1l7

integrated cultural q.tems, and then to argue back to the type of system ot
truth that should be posse••ed by th1a or that type of cu! tu.re.

Then these

systems of truth tend to be ident1tied wi til different acts ot knowledl_
8enaation, logical. reasoning, intuition.

method make. hi.

WOl"k

Sorok1n's us. ot the phenomenological

subject to Lonergan's criticIsm that "phenomenology i8 a

highl1' purit1ed empirici_, It and, .. Lonergan sqs, mpir1ciam is espec1al17

wea.k when it attapte to reach a Yalid explanation ot knowledge.
• • • i t one hope. to reach Ws end in an inquiry into
knowledge. then one had better not begin with the assumption
that lcnov.lng i . '.oraething theN to be looked at and described. t
for lcnov.lng i8 an organioally integrated aotiviQ" on a now
of .ensiti.... experience, inqu1r,y intelligentJ.T generate. a
CUDNlatl" auooesaion 01 ineighta, and the significance of the
e:x.ptfrienc•• ftl"1e. ooncord.tan~ with th. oumulation of insights,
in memory'. store of experience. and in the formulation ot
acoumulated tnaighta, retleotion grasps approx.11Iations towards
the v1rtu&1.lT unconditioned and attainments of it to issue into
probable and oertain judpenta ot tact.
oonceive know1Dg one
1I\1st understand the c:t;vnam1o pattern of experiencing, inquiring,
retl.ecttna, and. auoh understanding is not to be reached by taking
a look.
att1nt lcnoving it is usele.. to peer inside, tor the
ctynamic pattern is to be found not 1n thia or that act but in the
unfolding ot mathematics, 811IPirical scienoe, oOlDon senae, and.
phUoeopbTJ in that untolding must be grasped the pattern ot
lcnov.lng and, it one teels inclined to doUbt that the pattern really
extsta, then one can tr.r the experiment ot attempt1. to escape
aperienoe, to renounce intelligence in inquiry, to de.ert
reaaonablene.. in cri tioal retlection.

'0

'0

In brief, -.pirioi_ as a method reata on an elementary oonfUa1on. What is obvious in lmow1ng
indeed, looking. CCIIlpanc:l
to lOOking, insight 1. obscure, and grasp ot the unconditioned i .
dOtlbly' obscure. But empiriCism amount. to the assumption that
what i. obvious in knowing i . what knowing obti.O\ASlT i.. 'lhat
as8UJlption i . fal.e, tor it one would learn uthematio. or science
or phUoacpl\Y' or i t one .ought c(Xlllon-.ense advice, then one would
go to a man that i. intelligent and reuonable rather than to a man
that i • •tupid aDd s1l1T. 72

i.,

Soroldn, becaus. he does not ent1relT e.oape from. a puritied empirici_ that

c11ng. to the d.escript!ve viewpoint, cannot cope adequateq wi tb relati
for .. Lonergan • .,.., there i. no help tor such relativ1a "as long
cling to the descriptive Tiewpoint ... 73

72Lonergan, pp. 41,-41.6.

-

73Ibld., p. 541.

&8

ri_,

lien
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10.

Sorokin's stw\r ot the fluctuations ot ideational, sensate,

and ideal1at1o 878tema ot culture is primari.lT a stud;r ot the fiuotuat1on ot
the first p1"'1noiples of a culture that constitute ita interpretative trauvork.

In the fourth volume of the Dz'r!!!ios, Sorold.n relates these fIr.t principla

int1lllately to their foundation in d1tterent act. of knowledge, but faU. to

-

di.tingu1ah conei.tent.ly between acta ot knowledge and the sy.tems ot thought
elaborate4 fran the contents ot these act..
his use ot the phenomenologioal. method.

The reason tor thi. seems to be in

And the re8Ul. t ls that he

adequately' places hil own work within hi. own sTstem of thought.
consl.tent with the aHWIPtlon that knowing

1~

nefti"

This 18

a kind of looking, for looldng

is ....ntial.l.y extroverted} a look does not look at ltHlt. Sorold.n neYer 11"..
up to his

statement that the inftsUgator of oulture sbould take an imp&rt1al

position concerning the major prem1_ of the cultures he studt_, preo1selT
because th1s 18 1aposslble.

It one ls to investigate, OM must value a culture

that toeters scient1t1c knowledge aver one that diacouragea it. Sorold.n, ot
cour.., acknowledges thls, but reu1ns hampered by' hi. descriptive viewpoint.

I.

1.

PRIMITIVE TERMS IN SOCIOLOO!

Deecription!!!! !!planation.

explanatory point

ot view

It 1t 1. Sorokin I s adherence to the

that aak.. hi. treat.-nt

ot r.lati....s.a incatlplete, it

tollova that an explanato1'1 viewpoint must be attained.

Fundamental17, th 1s

involve. a transition frat experiential oonjugat8s-"correlati"... whoa. meaning
is expressed, at leut in the lut &n8l.7S1a, by appeallng to the content ot s
huun expertence," to explanator;y conjugatea-"correlatives det1ned lmplicit17

14S
by

811P1r1ca1.~ establiahecl correlat,ione, .functions, lan, theorie., syatems.,,14
2.

Generalised _thode

To aq' that acientitic adn.nce is through

description to explanation is to state a requirement tor a transition from
experient1al to pure conjugates.

Yet this transition can be carried oat in

two distinct ...... , tor there are two type. ot descriotion and two types of
explanation.

An inquir;y can start with a deacr1ption of the data of sen.e, or

wi th a description

ot the data of conaoiousD888. The S01elXl•• which study man,

as haa been ...n, have to take the inaide view to sOIle extent.

The sCience.

which stut\1 "star or starfish,n chemical. el.ent or atom do not need to take

the iMide view.

They limit their inquir,y to, the data

ot sens.

by employing

the tlcanon ot selection" which atatea that !tif a correlat.ion or 1J¥pothesis or
law or probabU1ty expectation or theory or &Tstem pertains to empirical

8cience, then (1) it involve. sensible consequences, (2) such consequence. can
be produced or, at least, observed. It

In stating this limitation ot empirical.

science to senae data, Lonergan rollows lithe CO/limon view that empirical SCience

i. concerned with senaiblT veritiable laws and. expectations.

If it is true

that essentially the same method could be applied to the data or consciousnes.,
then respect for ordinary usage would require that a method, which only in its

essentials is the same, be named a generalised empirical method. It 7; This can
be put in terms

or

experiential and explanatory

experiential conjugate..

conj~ate8.

DeSCription ampl

In arv experience, it 18 possible to distinguish

between 'tthe content and the act, between the seen a.nd the seeing, the heard

74~.,

c
pp. 79-00.

7Szbid.,

pp. 71-72.

-

and the hearing, the tasted and the tuting, and so torth." Let A stand tor

8.

oontent, such aa a color as seen, and.A' stand tor the corresponding act at

seeing the color.
represent

8.

Following such a scheme, the pairs .AA.' J BB', CC', DD', •••

series of experience. in which the primed letter. denote acta and

the unpr1Dled letters oontental
Nov oorrelations 1Iq be reached by oombining t.he unpr1med oomponents,

A,B,C, ••• or b.r oombining the primed oomponents A', Bt, CI, •••
or by combining both pr1.med and unprimed components. In the first
oase one will deal with the relations of contents t.o one another and
one will preacind trom the oorrespondi.!l& acta. and in thu fUhion,
without al\Y mention of things, one deals with what hitherto has been
named the relations ot things to one another. In the second cue,
one will preacind from contents and correlate acts, to obtain a
psychological. or cOlnit.1onal theory. In the third case, one will be
employing experiential oonjugates and turther information will be
needed to settle whether one is working towarda the goal of natural
sOience or ot oognitional theor,r.76

).
studies

Newton's disOOYEl17"

ot PSYCholOfa' or

Generalised empirioal method is not limited to

the process of learning, however, for Itgeneralized

method has t.o be able to deal, at least oomprehensively', not only' with the data
wi thin a single consciousness but also with the relations between different
conscious subjects, between conscious subjects am their milieu or envirol'lllent,
.and between consciousness and its neural basis. 1t77

An example taken from

Soroldn can illustrate different approaches to the same data, depending upon
whether one's goal is natural sCienee, cognitional theory, or a sociologioal
theor,r that deals with relationships between different C0l180iOU8 subjeots.

76Ibid ., p. 81.

-

77Ibid., p.

244.
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example is a description ot Newton' e discover,y of the law of gran tation:

one memorable day, an apple falls with a slight thud at his feet.

"On

It was a

trifling inCident whioh bas been idlY noticed thousands of times, but now like
the click of some small switch which starts a great machine in operation, it

proved to he the jog which awoke his mind to action.

As

in a "Iision. he saw

that i t the nvater10us pull of the earth can act through space as tar as the
top of a tree • • • 80 it might

8'9'en

reach so tar as the moon. ft 78

description is in experientIal conjugates.

This

The cognitional acts and contents

are kept together; the deSCription is of the apple as seen falling and heard.

or

thuddi~,

the 8:lPer1enee ot the great

insig~t

or "vision" as well as the

content ot that Tision-!tit the lqsteriou8 pull of the earth can act through
space • • • ."

The relationship

to cognitional theory, and

4.

!!p1rical method.

ot this account to

the science of mechanics,

to SOCiological. theory will be treated in that order
Empirical method, as distinct .from generalized

empirical _thod, prescinds frem the fact that Newton saw his hypotheSiS
a vision. 1f

"d

in

The science of mechaniCS i8 interested in the correlation which

states that the toree of gran tation 1s directlY' proportional to the muses and
inversely proportional to the square of the distance.

f · k.;.m2.

Lonergan,

in illustrating pure conjugates sqs that "masses might be defined as the

correlatives implicit in Newton t 8 law of inverse squares.

Then, there w:>uld be

a pattern ot relationships const! tuted by the verified equation, the pattern of
relationships would fix the meaning of the pail" ot coeff'ic1enta, ml,m2,
and the

meaning

80

determined would be the meaning ot t.he name. mus." 79

78~cs. IV, 754. citing L.T. More, Isaac Newton (New York, 1934),p.288

79Lonergan, p. 80.
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Sorokin eqs that this is a "causal-funotional law, II b.Y' whioh the praetica.ll7
unli..'1litcd chaos of the universe u presented to one's senses is ordered into a
series of cOO1prehensive 8y'ste;.-..s.
Nem'tonian Law of Gran tatioll

Sll.'ll

"Cs.usal.-functional tor'!1Ulas like the
up brieflY'

Ii.

prodigious rru.mber 01 sep&rate

relationshiPa. lf80 Causal-.t'w¥:tional. lawa or tormulas reter to causal or
functional BYstans.

Newton saw that if the tore. of gran tation could act

the eU'th. to an appl., 1t might also ext.end .from tne ea.r-.Jl to the moon.

law is part of the explanation of the sol.n- syatem.

.rrc.

His

for it giTeS'" precis.

spec1fication to the ltfUnetional dependence ot tho members of the solar Q'ltem"

which 1s, aqs Soroldn, itthe reason why ue recard it as a unity _ong the rest

ot the heavenly'bod1ea,"
~tween

and to the Itst:Ul cloa8r tunctional 1nterdeperJdence

tho earth and the 1lO0nlt Which "makes them a aubuni t7 in the looser and

larger un! ty ot the lolar ayatea. t1

s.

Cgpitional theoa.

61

To treat the event whioh va the diacOY'817 ot the

lav ot gravitation tJ'0J1 the viewpoint ot coan1t101l8l theory means that, unlike
the natural aCientiat, one il loing to be quite interelted in the tact Newton

saw the pos8ibUity ot gra'fitational toree between the earth and the moon "as
in ... vision-If

Scrolein introduces the exaltple as evidence to support his state-

ment that "intu1tion has been the starter ot an enormous number ot eensOl"7 and
dialectic discoveries and inventioM in all the creative nelda ot oulture,
beginning wi ttl 8C1ence, trom mathematics, technoloa and biology, to social Hnd

hup!.a.nistic disciplines and phUosophy', and ending with art, religion. ethtLCB,

~os, I, 23.
8lsocietl, Culture, ~ Personality, p. lL6.
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and other cultural .y.tenus."

82

And this stateent, in tum, i. a part ot his

defense of hi. Itintegralist" theory ot cognition, which embrace. i.deational.
truth, idNl1stlc truth, and .ensate truth into one qstem ot truth which "is
nearer to the absolute truth than any one-sided truth ot one ot these three
forma," and "with its sourc.s ot intuition, reason, and the .enses, i8 a Mar9r
approach to the infinite metalogical reality ot the coincidentia 9S?P9S1tlorua
than the purely aensory, or pure17 rational, or

pure17 intuitional. realiV.

given by one ot the systems ot truth and reality." Sensate truth i8 one-aided
becau.e it relies too heavl17 upon the senses whioh, "not controlled by' reason
or intuition, can gift us but a chaotic mass C!t impre••ion, perceptions,
sensation, incapable ot aup-plying artT integrated knowledge, q-th1ng except
dieorder17 b1 t. ot pseudo observation and pseudo impres.1on. If The idealistic
truth ot reason i. one-sided because "mere dialectic speoulation camot

guarantee to u. any valid knowledge ot empirical phenomena.

It can give u. an

un1Drpeachable 87'110118 or a mathematical dectuotton, but such a syllogiam or
deduct10n will be empirically valid only when it. _jor md minor praU••• are
empirically valid." And ideational truth ia one-sided because "intuition uncontrolled by the truth ot NaSon and the .ense. goes ver.y e..ily astray, and
gtv•• u. ail intuiti.... error instead ot the intuitive truth."S) Sorokin here
preacinda trQlll the contents ot the.e acta ot knowleqe in order to work towards
a

theory'

ot the role of the•• acta 1n any valid knowledge. An upe\lt ot hi.

B2Brn!!icI, IV, 7S2.

8J;bid., pp. 762-764.

1,0
cognitional theory which i8 not well brought out here, but which 'brings it
somewhat closer to the theor,r ot Lonergan's which is being used in this theais,
is brought out by his discussion ot how the principle

discovered and validated.

Regarding discovery, be

ot integration

S&;1S

oan be

that "the principle

m.q be suggested by observation, statistical. study, meditat10n, logical

a.nal.ysia, even by dreaming and by what is called mere t chance,' or t 1ntuition. t
The question as to the manner of validation 1s anl!nfered by saying "that the

cn tena ot valid! ty are virtuall1' the same as tor 8.lV' scientitic law. Firat

0

all, the principle must by nature be logioal, and second it mwst star¥! success.tully the teat

them. It

ot the 'relevant tacts,'

that

~s,

it must fit and represent

84

6. 800iolggic&1 tbe&. From the viewpoint ot soCiological theory', which
1s ooncerned primarily with the relationshipa between d1tterent oonacioua
subjects (m''1aningtul interaction), the interest in Newton's intuition will
tocus more around the tact that it waa the initial. step ot "mental integration"
in the three steps ot the emergence ot an empirical sociocultural s78taa.

The

sociologist is conoemed with the cODmlnication ot this new concept to other
conSCious subjects through the steps ot ap1r1ca1. objectification and sooialil&

tion.

He 18 concerned with the relat10nship ot the law of grantation to total

ideological, behaVioral, and material culture from. which it aroH, and, to whic
it added new elements.

Thus, he i8 interested in statements like Polanyi'.

to the effect that science i. a 8001&1 and eul tural. ideal which proVides norma

for the behavior of the mebers of the society dedicated to the cultivation of

lS!
science.

For Newton's discoveries torm an tmportant part of the progress of

the scienoe of mechanics, and this progress

11&8

deoisive in consolidating

society's dedication to the cultivation ot science.

Furthermore, it shaped

men's idea ot what sOience was to be, and thus guided the behavior ot men
engaged in the pursuit ot scientific truth.
into the world

new ot western oulture,

Thus, Newton's discovery entered

and was at the same time a confirmation

ot that world View through its successful applioation.
7. Primitive terms. J'rcn axper1ential conjurates which have m.eaning in
terms of hUllan experiences, it i8 possible to go on to pure oonjugates ot two
ditterent types.

those which relate contents, of cognitional acts, and those

whioh relate the acta themselves.

The first type of

pUN

conjugates are

employed in the explanato1"7 tonmdationa of empirical soience, the second t\rPe

of pure oonjugates are empla,red in the explanato1"7 formulations ot the human

SCiences, using the generalized empirical method.

Pure con.1ugates of both

types will include a set of pr1.'IJl1tive terms, becau8e explanations ot nature and
explanations ot man will both require basic inSights, and "tor

everr

basiC

insight there is a circle of terms and relations, such that the terms fix the

relations, the relations fix the terms. and the insight fixes both." An
example of a primitive term i8 mus, which is implicitly detined in Newton's
law.

Kas. , however, i8 not just a term employed in

ultimate mechanical concept.

8i~le

lawaI it 18 an

On the bu•• of such ultimate concepts,

explanations on the buis of the data of _nee can reduce the element ot
hypothesis to a ndnimurn, but can never eliminate it altogether.

Exnlanation on
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the basis of the data of oonsoiousness, however, can eeo&l)e this li.l'I1itation,
according to Lonergan.

8.

as

Revision!!! 'Phy;sical soienoe.

Why

does an elem.ent of hypothesis

remain in the explanations of physical. soienee?

"To reach the element of mere

supposi tion that makes a:rry 91'stem of mechaniCS subject to future revision, It
sqs Lonergan, "one must shift attention trom single lava to the set ot
primiti...e terms and relations Which the system employe in .tormul.atJ.ng all its
lava.

In other words, one has to distinguish between, sq, mass as defined by

cOl'l"8lations between masse. anei, on the other hand, mas. as en,joying the
pOSition ot an ultimate mechanioal concept."

ot mechanics will bave to explain

,Then,

althougb atl7 tutur. 8'1stem

all the data now covered by the

c~ncept

ot

mass as now used, all future systems of mechanics do not haft to satiSfy this
data 'b1 emplo,i.ng the present ooncept of masst
Further developments might lead to the introduction ot a different
aet ot ultimate concepts, to a consequent reformulation of all laws,
and 80 to a dethronement of the notion ot masa from its present
position as an ultimate ot mechanical s;yatem. Renoe, while empirical Method can reduce the hypothetical to a m1niuaua, it cannot el1minat. it entirely. Its conoepts as concepts are not hTPothetical, for thq are detined implioit1y by empirical17 established
correlat.ions. None the lea., its concepts as systematically significant, u ultimate or derived, as preferred. to other concepts
that migbt be empirical.l.7 reached, do inYOl.". an element ot mere
supposition. lor the selection ot oertain concepts as ultimate
occurs in the work ot ••tematisation, and that work is provisional. At aD1' time a STSt-. i8 aocepted because it provide. the
simplest account ot all the known tacts. But at the
time it is
acknowledged that there U1' be unknown yet relevant facts, that tbq
might give rise to further questions that would lead to further
inSights, and that the further insights might involve a radical
revision ot the accepted 87st_.86

8_

8Sx,onergan, pp. 334-335.

86xbid.

-
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9. ReYision.!!:

~

human sci.nc.s.

The study of man can escape this

radical revision because 1 t tlenjoy1l through consciousne.. an im.'lled.iate access
to man, n which i8 utllized in description and explanation. Lonergan started
with a descriptive account or insight, pointing out "that it was satisfying,
that it came unexpectedly', that ita emergence was conditioned more by a
d:yruIDic inner state ot inquiry than by external circumstance t that while the

first emergence vas ditficult, repeated occurrence vas e&87 and spontaneous,
that single acts ot insight accnmmlate into cluster. bearinc on a single topic,

that such clusters may remain vi thout exact tormulation, or m..., be worked out
into a qat_tic doctrine. If

Descriptive

explanatory detinition by relation.

pr~edure.

gradual.l7 gave way to

Since all definition is subsequent to

inquiry and insight, and since data, percepts, and i,-rnages are prior to insight,

these had to be defined. ftas the materials prnupposeci and complemented by
inquiry and insight. 1t

Since the tonwlationa ot insight remain hypothetical,

there i8 the question tor reflection.

Renectiva understanding grasps the

fulfillment or non-.tultil.lment of the conditions that nIl1st be tulfilled that
the tomulation be affirmed, as well aa establishing what those conditions are.
The grasp ot the tultillBu,nt of the conditions lead. to judgment, the
affirmation ot the tormulated insight. 87 Lonergan .&\1S that such an explanato
account of human knowledge escapes the po8sib11it,y of a radical reY1sion "that
involves a Shift in the fundamental terms and relatione ot the explanatory
account ot the human knowledge underlying existing

-

67Ibid., PP. 333-334.

COll'l1lon

sense, mathematics

and empirical science."

And this is because of the very notion of revision.

A revision appeals to data. It contends that 'Previous theory does
not satisfactorily account for all the data. It claims to have
reached complementary insights that lead to more accurate statements.
It !:.hows that these new statements e1ther are unconditioned or more
closely approximate to the unoond:1tloned than previous statements.
Nov, it in tact revision i8 as deSCribed, then it presupposes that
cogni tiona! process falls on the three level. of presentation,
intelligence, and reflectionj it presupposes that insighta are
cumulative and complementary; it presupposes that the head tcnrard8
a limit deecribed by the adjective, satistactory; it presupposes a
reflective grasp of the unconditioned or ot what approxilu.te. to the
unconditioned. Clearly, revision oannot revise its own presuppositions.
A. reviser cannot appeal to data to dellT data, to his new insights to
deny ina1gl1ts, to his new formulations to dellT formulation, to his
ren..oti ve g-rup to deqy reflective grasp.
The sarae point 1Uir be put in another manner. Popular relati vism is prone to argue that empirical iCience is the most reliable
form ot human knowledge; but empirical science is subjeot to
indefinite re'1isionJ therefore, all human knowledge is equally
subject to indelini te revision. Nov auch argument is necessarily
fallacious. One must defini te17 know invariant features ot human
knowledge before one can ..sert that empirical scienoe is tlUbject
to indefinite revision; and it one definitely knows invariant
featuNa of human knowledge, then one knows what is not subject to
revision. Moreover, as is obvious, such knowledge surpasaea
empirical sCience at leut in the respect that it 18 not subject to
revision. 8e

10.

Primitive terms

!.!:l

sociolovical theorz-

Data, crueation, inSight,

formulation, refiect10n, and judgment all are prim tin terms in hUDlan acience,
which are spoken of initially in experiential. oonjugates, getting their
;nea."1ing by reterence to human experience, and then become pure conjugate.
insofar as they are defined iJIlpllcitly in statementa 1filich express basic
inSights into cognitlonal process such that the terms tix the relations between
the tems, the relat-lons fix the meanings of the terms, and the insight fixes

S8~.,

pp. 335-336.

lSS
both.

It is the writer' 8 opinion that Soroldn, in his integralist theory ot

cognition, never quite makes the transition
As Merton

Sa.r8,

rro.

experiential to pure conjuga

"in so far as Soroldn adq>ta the position ot radical.17

ditferent and disparate criteria of truth, he wst locate his own work within
It mq be said, though an extensive discussion would be needed

this context.

to documant it, that he never reaolves th. problem... 89

The wr1 tar's conv1ctio

that Soroldn's integralist theory is both vague and a somewhat inadequate
tormulation of his own methods, along with the tact that in 8ooioloO' the acts
of knowledge anticipated by the inquirer are acts, not only o:t' the sociologist,
but also ot the people whom he studies, and

~

such, become primitive teru in

any adequate sociological flY'8tem, formed a decisive part of the rationale
behind using Lonergan's concept of heuristio structure in the the.is.

Sorokin, h0W8Y8r, doe. provide primitive te1"ll8.
course of the discussion alread;y.
emergence

or

an

Mental integration

empirical. sociocultural system,

The •• ha..... cOIle up in the
88

the tiNt stage in the

CO!'I'88ponde

to insight.

The

phase of empirical objectifioation is aimUar to formulation, but go.. be70nd
the conoept ot f01'l'llUlation to include arotistio or technical production or overt
behavior of the interacting individual as

!lt88n8

of empirioal objectification.

The phase of empirical objeotifioation require. some Yehlol. ot meaning.
Vehicle would seem to be a primitive term therefor., which would include
different types ot vehicles-material objects, overt behavior-bJ.t 'Which gets
its meaning fixed ultimatelJ" l:tY its relationship with insight or m.ntal

integra.tion.

Mental integration oan be a grasp ot meanings, norma, or valuu.

89}tobert Merton, Social Theon and Social Struoture, 2nd. ad. (Glencoe,
Illinois, 19S7), p. 41~.
---

•
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Norms and values bring in the basic concept of desire or need.
of :nan 1s the desire to know.

A basiC desire

The desire to know relates directly to the first

of the major premises Sorokin gives for logically integrated culture, the
nature of reality.

The inclusion

ot other desires relates directly to the

second major premise of Sorokints, the nature of the needs and ends to be
satisfied.

Sorokin's third major premise of logically integrated culture,

Itthe extent

to which these needs and ends are to be satisfied," reters

primarUy to values insofar as different needs and ends can be of relative
value.

The fourth premise, the "methods of' satisfaction," reter primarily to

norms, just as 8cient1ticmethod a8 a means
a norm fOr SCientific behavior.

o~

satisfying the deaire to know is

90

"Meaning" would be a nrimitive term, defined implicitl7 by its relation to
insight, formulation, and vehicle.

For meaning is that whiah is grasped by

inSight, empirically objectified in formulatiOns, or in other vehicles,
including overt action.

"Value" would be • primitive t8rll1, for it would reter

to a meaning grasped. by a practical insight, which reters to • pos8ible state
of attairs judged to be good, and Which is a possible or l1kel.7 content ot an
act ot ChOO81Dg.

"Norm" would be a primitive ten, defined implicit17 by its

relationship to value, for a norm. points out the
value.

w., to achieve or

maintain a

On the other hand, socialiu.t1on ot meaning would not be a primitive

90th. major prn1aea aref "(1) the nature ot realitYJ (2) the nature of
the needa and ends to be satisfiedJ (.3) the extent to which these needs and
ends are to be satisfied; (4) the methods ot satisfaction. It J.?fn!!n1cs, I, 70,
original in italios.

lS1

term, for it refers to a complex process including objectification, persuasion,
on the part of one interacting individual, arxl acts at experiencing, under-

standing, judging, yaluing, and chOOSing on the part of other interacting
individual..

Nor 18 a human being as the subject of interaction a primitive

term, tor human being. are things defined
themselve..
many

by'

conjugates, not conjugate.

"Interaction" is a derived tem, tor it i8 defined in terms of

d.1tferent kinde of acts of difterent interacting subjects.

Similarly,

soci_V, culture, and personality are all derived tel"lU, since they are
defined in terms more basic than the.elye••

Sorokin, hOW'ever, as haa been seen in

th~

cue of m.eaning, when called

upon to detine a term, w1ll trequentl7 gift e1 ther a nOll1nal definition or a

definition in tenaa ot experiential conjugates. Lonergan notea that one must
remember that "theoretical ana.lJ"s18 is one thing, and concrete practice i.
another.

Thus, one would be inclined to say that physicists move eu117 and

unconac1ou.l3' back and forth between the use of elCperiential and pure

conjugatee. 'When they are called upon to define their terms, canmonlJr they'
will suppo.e that detini tion come a at the beginning and

80

otter detinitiona

ot experiential conjugate.. On the other hand, methodologi8U

and theorists of

empirlcal science will be puzzled by the multiplicity' of detin1tiona available
in a mature science and

80 they

tend to disagree vi th one another • .,91

PUrther-

more, when the science under disousion is a soctal science there 1s an
apparent overlapping of the field of the relations of things to

U8

which

results in u:perlent1al conjugates. and the field of the relat10ns of thinp

91Lon.ergan, pp. 81-82.
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to one another, which reaul ts in pure conjugates.

But "the d1f'terent

procedures of description and explanation prevent the overlapping from being
more than apparent, for description is in terms of the given while explanation
is in terms of the ultimates reached by' analya1s.,,92 Thus, 't!ntersubjeot!v1t:r"
is something experienced, lying in the field ot the given, as opposed to the
ultimates reached by Sorokin' 8 analy's!s ot the components ot meaningful
integration. Redfield's intuited whole is in the field of the given, as
opposed to knowledge of the communitq' as an analyzed system.

D.

1.

Description

SUMMARY

.!!!! exelanation. In

take the inaide viewpOint, tor the studT

other men.

stu~ng

man, it i8 necessary to

ot man involves communication with

And it one is to grasp accurately what another means, one must

recognize that his meaning is in reference to his experiences, insights, and
judgments, along with his desires and values and habitual choices.

In order to

arrive at an accurate description ot the world view ot a people, one must take
the inside view to a very great extent.

But unless one' s goal remains

descriptive, one will have to take the explanatory viewpoint, which is an out-

side view, alter one has described this world view.
very similar to

Taking the inside view is

what Soroldn calls the psychological reading ot culture,

what Lonergan calls description ot the data of conaciousness.

-

and to

The outside

view is not the same as Lonergan t s explanatory viewpoint, however, for one can

treat the c01lll'fPlll1ty as it is related to the outsider who looks at it, and the

-

92Ibid., pp. 291-292.

explanatory viewpeint lIlUst drop the netien

et the real.

ot the investigater as a spectator

For this notien binds one te the use ot experiential conjugates

which state the relations et things tc the ebserver rather than pure oonjugatea
which state the relations ot thinga te cne anether.

Ncr is the explanator,r

viewpoint the a._ as Soroldn' 8 socielogico-phenoaenologioal reading of

culture, tor thia is a use ot phenClllGnology in a sense s1mUar to that at
Husserl' 8 phenomenology. which remains a hiabl7 purified BlPirici8l'll.

Such an

empirici_ cannct _ke the distinctien between experiential and pure conjugate

between desor1ptien and explanatiGns. Although the tact that through
consciousne.s man baa an 1Dtmediate ace.,aa to himaelf
resul t& in an apparent
,
overlapping ot experiential and pure conjugates, it also reaul ta in a set ot

pr1nd.t1ve te1"m8 which are beyond the radical revision which always rema1na a
poa.ibUity in empirical science.

Revision cannot rmse the appeal to data,

to further queltions, to better insights, to more adequate tOl"llUlatioms, to
clGser approxilnatiens to the unconditioned in reuonable judgments.

Further

primitive terms in SOCiology would be desire, need. value, norm, Choice, and
vehicle.

To arrive at implicit detinitions ot such terms, one !tlUst take the

inside view, utilize the data of consciousness, and gc on tc seek the relatiGnship. between dtf1'erent cODscious acts and patterns of experience.
2.

MeiuociQloq..!:!!! oulture. MetaaOCiclogy seems tc deal primarilJr with

the noru 01' sociologiSts.

It doea not attempt to investigate these

empir1oall.T and. relate thea to the total vq of lUe of the sociolQgist, but

rather to speoity or! teria ot relevance am aoientU'ic quality.

The meta-

Sociologist, in other words, seeks to formulate a superior 1cnovledge to guide
the sociologist..

to give him an interpretative framework.

The SOCiologist,
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however, in his investigation ot culture, studies the interpretative trameworks
ot men in relationship to their whole social and oultural system.

He can,

likewise, study the interpretative framework of the metasociologist, using the
techniques ol the sociology ot knowledge.

Sorokin does precisely this in his

studT at the fluctuations ot the three supersystems ot ideational, senaate, and
idealistic eul tUl"e..

But he is not able to locate his own s7stem precisely'

lIithin this structure, and elaborate. a tourth system Called "integrali_."

Sorokin'. recognition at the need to plaoe his system within his categories is
pra1sewort.hT. but without a distinction between BTStems and acts at knowledge
that is consistently' applied, he does not

3. Heuristic anticipations.

suc~ed.

The Criticism ot Sorokin' 8 sociolog1co-

phenanenological reading ot cultures resulted in the metasociological judgment
that one's heuristic antiCipations in the studiY' ot the little commun1tyr as an
integrated whole would not include systems of meanings and vehicles that are
independent ot meanings meant by' the people in the society or culture being
studied.

Theretore one not onlJ" expects to experience data, get inSights into

that data, and tomulate and verity what one yTrasps by insight, one also
anticipate. the discovery that the people one is studying have had experiences,
partly si:nilar and pa.rtl.y' ditterent from one's own.

One will work to try to

get the people to communicate their experiences to him, using whatever
techniques he judges to be he1pM.

He will antiCipate that people have

insight. into their experiences, most of thEn lett unformulated or empirically'
objectified onlY in artistic manner, or in overt actions, or technical norma
put into practioe but not spelled out in laws and rules.

One will antiCipate

that the people in the com.'mlnity will have habitual. patterns ot judgment, both
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as to the nature of reality and as to the nature o! the needs and ends to be
satisfied.

These latter judgments, value judgments, will be influential in

their habitual decisions.

And t..l-J.eir decisions,

ot course, will be an

lmportant factor in the explanation ot their overt behavior.

And finally, the

lnvestigator will still retain notions of causal relationship, f'unotional

relationship, logical relationship, aesthetic relationship, genetic relationship, am dialectical relationship as tentative hypotheses regarding the
relationship of the variables 1"rom the viewpoint of the total integration ot
the community.

CHAPTER V

Since anticipation of meanings is an irAportant heuristic antioipation in
the study of the little ccnmuni ty.. the investigator will have heuristic
antioipations as to how these meanings are integrated.

The weakness

ot

oonceiving the little community as an imaginable model has already been
treated, but the logical model has not yet been discussed.

Anticipation of

logical relatJ..onships between the meanings he1d b.1 the members of a community
is a natural, spontaneous anticipation.
model baa decided weaknesses as well.

Yet it shall be seen that the logioal
First, it will suffer because the terms

used by the members of t.he little communityI or by members ot modern urban
cOt!Jl'lunities, are not, for the lIlost part, preoisely defined.

Men ordinarily do

not in8i5t on O'l'!ore precise 1!onoeptual precision in their everyday language than
is ;:oequired for consistent use ot that language in communicating with other
men.

And in everydq oommunication, !INch more than C')1lcepts are communicated;

feeling., desires, aversions, subtle nuances are indicated not only bT
verbally oODllUnioated ooncepts, but b:I gesture, expression of face, and tone of
voioe.
Added to this weakness ot the logioal model for culture integration is the
static nature ot logical detinition and relations.

The viewpoints ot men are

c;;ntinually urdergoing development, and thus the genetiC torm of relationships
mlSt be antiCipated.

Furthermore, there is conflict in the ideas held by'
162
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different men, and. often even among the ideas held by' a single man.

Tn1a

confiict demands the heuristic expectation of dialectical relationships.
An

integrated rtewpolnt will oonsist in a series of related insights into
But these insights vUl not, in the cue ot

more or l.ss corrmon experiences.

the small cOlJ1lllU.n.1ties under consideration, be formulated into logicall7
preoi.. definitions.

They will rather remain as a latent store of ideas,

expressed. in terms that are onlJr ncminally defined, that form a sort of theory
of the universe by practical anticipa.tion.
but are expected to be adequate

baa insights remain incaaplete,

to deal with the concrete situations that aris

through the addition of an insight into the concrete
situation to be dealt
,

with.

Such inSights enable the man ot oommon sense to select the right words

to describe the situation, IIld to select the principles of action that will
To try to make a logical tnatise O\lt ot

help him to deal with the situation.
such a system

ot meanings

A.

would be to distort it.

DE.'FENSE MIDHANISMB

1. Lguy•

.!!!! relativi8Dl.

or

AN INTIDRATED VIEWPOINT

Redfield sa;ys that the investigator ot a

little community must take the inside view even in stuc:O'ina

fl.

pot or a plow

or a aledge, It in order to ... whether the manings of the worde he u..s to
deecribe the .. things correspond. to the u.s &ld other meanings attributed to
the thing. by the natives.
then things.

For the natives use different vorda to identity

And Polaqyi sq. that "our most deeply ingrained convictions ar

determined by the idiom. i!'! wh1c h we interpret our experience and in term8 of
whioh we erect our articulate systems.

Our fomally' declared beliets can be

l6h
held true tn the last resort only because of our logically' anterior acoeptance

of a particular .et ot terms, trom which all our references to reality ere
construoted. tl 2 Here is a statement ot relatl vism whioh puts judgments in

relation to a set ot terms rather than to enaulturated experience,
Herakonts· formulation.

88

in

Yet the two statements are not basioa.l.ly different,

since the acqui81tion of a particular set of terms i8 part of the prooess of
encu1turation.
2.

Ls,!!«e ~ encul turation.

has learned their use.

Words only have meaning to someone who

TheY' "convey nothing except by a previously acquired

meaning, whioh ms.T be eoMWhat modified by'

t~ir

present use, but will not as

a rule have been tirst diaoovered on this ocoasion.

In ant cue, our

knOW'ledge of the things denoted by' words will have been largely acquired by'

experience, in the same way as animals come to know things, while the wards
will have acquired their meaning bY' pre1'ioualy designating suoh experience,
either when uttered by other. 1n our presenoe or when used by' ounelvea •• )

Lonergan calls terms that get their meaning from a designat.ion ot some human
experi8110e "experiential conjugated."

h A cbUd going

through the process of

enculturation must place confidence in his teachers, for they give hL'1l not
only information, but the very intellectual habits and tools by' which he learne

2personat Knowledse, p. 287.

-

3xb1d., p. 92.

~ergan.

p. 79.
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to interpret. his experience and to judge his interpretations.

Polanyt sqs

that the trust that a learner places in hi. elders 1. .imilar to the heuristic
anticipation ot the discoverer who bellev•• that hi. problem has a solution
.and that he has a chance

ot discovering the solution. But the learner's

confidence is not in his own power of d1acoyery; it is in others--he aseumes
that the words used in his presence have meanings, the intellectual junior
trust. that the doings and sqi11gS ot hi. intellectual superiors haft hidden
meaning. which will be satistying to grup.

J. Zande !Tstem .2!.

~lie1'..

5

Pol&l'\11 illustrates how the logiOally

anterior acoeptance ot a particular set ot

te~

oonst.itutes a "theory ot the

universe" by' which reality 18 interpreted by reterring to the account giftn by'
Evana-Pr1t.cbard ot the Zande belief in the "poison-oracle ...6 This oracle

answer. que.tions Mthrough tne ettects on a towl ot a poisonou. .ubstance
called beple," which i8 gathered from plants, but is thought to becOJlll8
etfective on17 Matter it has been addressed in the words ot an appropriate
ritual. tt

The Asande are not forced in any vq to believe in the power of the

oracle, but believe Tery firmly' in it 'because of an idiom whioh
reality in terms ot witohoraft and oracles.

i~terprets

Thus, it t.he oracle oontradicts

itself, there arelfno 1••• than eight seoond.ar,- elaborations of their belief. by
which Asande will account tor the oracle'. tallure.

They mq asSUM that the

5Personal Knowledge, pp. 207-208.

6:E.

&. Evane.?ritchard., '",'itchcratt, Oracles, and MagiC A.!T101lS
(Oxford" 1931), cited in Personal Knowle&:e, p. 28r.;-

~ Azand.!'
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wrong variety

ot poison

had been gathered, or a breach

ot

that the owners ot the forest where the poisonous creeper

taboo committed, or

rrrows

had been

angered and avenged themael..... by' spoiling the poison; and so on. tI

Evans-

Pritchard asked A.antle what would happen it beDJe were administered to a fowl
wi thout tbe usual ritual address, thus proving that gepge 18 a natural poison.

"'l'he Zande,n he writes, "does not know what would happen and 1s not interested
in what would happen; no one haa been tool enough

to waste good oracle-poison

1n making such pointless experiments which only' a European could imagine • • • •

Were a European to malee a test in which his view proved Zenda opinion wrong
they w::.>uld stand aased at the credulity ot

~e

European.

It the towl died

ot the tovl

they would siMply • .,. that it was not good begse.

The very tact

dying proves to them 1.ta badnea8. tI 7

ot Asande to what seem to

The blindness

Europeans to be obvious tact. i. sustained by remarkable ingemrl.

va " They'
t

reason excellentl,y' in the idiom ot their bellets,' (says Evans.Pritchard), 'but
they oannot reason outSide, or against, their belists beoause

tb.,. have no

other idiOlll in whioh to express their thoughts.,,.8

4.

Det.nee _chant_.

integration, not only

The As.ande haft achieYeCi a higb degree

ot their ideological culture, their

rut also ot their behaVioral culture, tor
aqs that the stability of the 878tem is

ot

system of belieh,

th.,. act upon these beliefs.

m.

Po11l1V'1

to three -detense mechani.uu·

1Evana-Pritohard, pp. 314-31" cited in Po1&nT1, pp. 287-288.
8Ibld., p. 33R, cited in Po1&Q11, p. 288.
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circularitY', automatic expansion of the
pressed. nuoleation. It
,.

Circularity.

one by one.

e1rcl.~

and the principle of ttsup_

Each will be treated briefl;y.
The circularity or a system enables it to meet objection

"B;r this I mean that the convincing power possessed by the

interpretation of al'\1 particular new topio in terms or such a COllOeptual framework is based on put applications or the same framework to a great number of
other topics not now under coneideration, while it

~

or these other topiCS

were qusstioned now, their interpretation in ita turn would Similarly rely' for
support on the interpretation ot all the others."
results in the strengthening of all the

challenged by' the doubt.

The deteat ot one doubt

tun~ental

Convictions which were

"Thus the circular! ty ot a conceptual eystaRl tends

to reinforce itself by ever:! contact with a fresh topic."

A further illustra-

tion ot how this works in an English dictionar.r, which manifest the
"circularity ot the theory ot the universe embodied in any particular language.'
It i8 possible to doubt that a particular

adverb has

a.rv .aning

in .English.

E~lish

noun, verb, adjecti" or

But nan English dictionary dispels this

doubt b.r a definition using other nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs, the
meaningfulness ot which i. not doubted tor the moment.

Enquiries ot this kind

will increasingly' confirm us in the US8 or a language.

SiMilar17, an

axiomatized

8)"8tam

ot ut.'lematics is circular.

"Every assf!rtion of a deduotive

system can be demonstrated by, or e1s. shown to be implied as axioms or, the

ot.'lers.

Therefore, it we doubt each 8.8s.rt1on in its turn each is found

contimed by' circularity, and the refutation

or

each consecutive doubt results

in strengthening our belief in the system as a whole. "9

9Pe£Sonal lQ9Kltdg!, pp. 288-289.
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6. Automatic expansion. "A second aspect ot stability arises from an
automatio expansion ot the oircle in whioh an interpretative 8,Ystem operatea. Q
'Thus, there will alway's be available elaborations ot the syste."!l

~hioh

co"er eventualities which seem to be embart'aBsir1f-; at first sight.

will

Furthermore,

this principle operates in conjunction with the principle ot supore88ed
10
nucleation.

1. Smmre88ed nucleation. This principle deniss any ground for a rival
conception to take root.

Experiences which support the rival conception could

be brought forward only' one at a time.

"But a new conception, e.g. that of

natural oausation, whioh would take the place, of Zande 8uperstitutlon

liJi1

could be established or..ly by a whole series of relevant instances, and such
evidence cannot accumulate in the minds of people if each ot them is disregarded in its turn for lack of the concept which would lend significance to
it. II

'!'he reaction

ot the Azande to Evans-Pritchard's argu..rllent that be!?ie was

a natural poison "illustrates the kind of contemptuous indifferr0nce with which

we normally regard. 'l.'1ings of which we have no conception. nil

8.

l!'.x&r.ples

E.!

closed !ystems.

Pol~i sq8

that extreme objectiv1a

"has forced modern bellefs to take on implicit forms, like those of Azande.
And no one will del\Y that those who have mastered the idioms in

w~, lch

these

beliefs are entailed do also reason most ingeniously within these idioms, even

lO:rbid., p. 291.

-

111bid.

lfhile--agai n like Amanda-they- unheei tating13 ignore all that the idiom does
not oover."

He quotes a former ifar:x1st and a former Freudian

illustrate the high stability of two modern

interpretati~le

PSYCholos;~ist

"to

framel:orks. based

on these prinoiplesf
My' party education had equipped my mind ~d th such elaborate
shock-absorbing buffers and elastic defences that everything
seen end heard beoame automatically transformed to tit a preconceived pattern. (A. Koestler, in The God that Failed, London,
1950, p. 68.)
---

The system of theories whioh Freud has gradually developed is so
consistent that when one is once entrenched in them it i8
difficult to :nake observations unbiased bY' his way of thinki~.
(Karen HorM1'. !!!
2!. ?syohoan:!:l.l!ia. London, 1939, p. 1}12

;,,,,,8

The wr1 ter believes that Duncan and Sohnore' s ~obs."ation concerning the three

different perspective. in SOCiology that "theae perspectives are not only

different. th.,. are

80

different th.at it 1s difficult to explain and justity

one of them to • SOCiologist com.m1 tted to another" might also be explained in

teme of circular1ty, expansion ot the circle, and 8Uppresled nuoleation.

And

when Polanyi says that modern objectivism hu made modern beliets take on an
implioit torm, he se..s to be getting at a basic reason for the
Sjoberj notedt

t~t

that

"sociologists are reluctant to concede that they too are caught

in the web ot demande imposed by their primary ?;roup, by the norma ot SCience,
and especially by the broader SOCiety in which they live."

'!'hey are, in

Znanieoki's worda, using hypothe.e. "dogmatically to prevent the discovery of
facts" rathor than "heuristically to search for facta."

9.

InX!n?retati" frllDl8WOru.

The Asande possened an interpretative

franaework di tt.rent from that of Evan s-Pri tabard.

l2!1As1., p. 288.

I at they reasoned very well
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within that framework.

Their conclusions about benge are excellent examples

of the correct use ot an incorNCt interpretative tramework.

The "theory

ot

the univerae ff implied in their language was judged to be inferior to a theory
of the universe which makes room tor the concept

ot natural causality. AI thoug

5Uch an interpretative framework is acquired by an enculturation process in
whioh one learns the language, and al. though it is defended by the mechanisms

of circular! ty, automatic expansion, and suppressed nucleation, it is possible
to change one's interpretative framework somewhat.

Sorokin, tor example,

changed from a predominantly' sensate outlook to an idealistic outlook, which he
then modified to his integralist position.

~

fact that Koestler is a toraer

Marxist and Horney a former Freudian illustrates a change in their Itprecon_

ceived pattern," their "&y'8tem ot theories."
18

a context of judgments which

gOVerrt8

One's interpretative framework

one's attention, and influences the

occurrence ot insights and the acceptance or rejection ot judgments.

Because

of the circularity of the system, it is impossible to criticise the whole
system all

at once. it provides the terms in which the critiCism wUl be made.

-

Nevertheless, a8 is Ulustl'ated by the tact ot men changing their interpretati ve frameworks, it is possible to

cntici.e

one t s own interpret.ati.... f'ramevork

Lonergan indicates how one can correct mistaken belietst
• • • learning one t s errors is but a particular cue of learning.
It takes .. its starting-point and clue the discovery of some
precis. 1s8ue on which undoubtec:lly one wu mistaken. It advances
by' inquiring into the sources that MaT have contributed to that
error and, perhaps, contributed to other errors as well. It asks
about the motives and the supporting judgments that, as they once
contirmed one in that error, may still be holding one in others.
It investigates the conseqllences at the view one now rejects and
it seeks to determine wrJ8ther or not the;r too are to be rejected.
The process is cumulative. The discovery ot one error is
explOited to lead to the discovery ot others; and the disoovery ot
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othel"8 provides a stUl larger bue to proceed to the discover.r of
still more. MoreoYer, this cumulative process not only takes
advantage of the mind's native process of learni., in which one
insight leads on to other insights that open the way to still
fUrther insights, but it also exploits the insistence of rational
oonsciousness on oonsistenor; tor just as our love of consistency,
once we have made one mistake, leads us to make others, so the s _
love of consistency leads us to reject other mistakes, when one is
rejected and, at the s.e t1.me, it proTidu us with abundant clues
for finding t.i-te other. that are to be rejected.l)
Of oourse, a preoondi tion for the occurrenoe of suoh a process is the admission
that one mistakenJ one cannot, like the Aaande, display' "contemptuous indiffer-

ence" to new concepts that might prove one's habitual outlook to be mistaken.
The desire

ot rational. oonsoiousness tor c )n8istency will, when one re,1ects the
f

possibility of being mistaken, ineTitably res6rt to defense mechaniama to

reject the intrusion of different concepts.
10. ...'tlo.-r_l..
d!!!!.

The student of the little community who seeks to under-

stand the tnterpretative framework of the little community that he is
1. working with their "world view. lt

stu~ng

Redfield says that the attempt to

characterize a woole ocmmunity in terms ot their Ifoutlook on lite" 18 a
ffco.mmitraent to tho inside view to the uttermost.fll4 Here the outsider must
withold his suggestions for 8,1stamatizing the whole until he discovers whether
or not the people themselves have c::mceived of an order in the whole.

"It is

their order, their categories, their emphasis upon this part rather than that
wnioh the student listens for."lS

lltonergan, pp. 714-71S.

14Th.

Little Community, p. 87.

lSIbid., p. 88.

Nevertheless, as is illustrated b.1 the
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example ot Frank Cushing, it, when studTing the native, "we use only his tems
and forms

ot thought we merely' beccne natives like those we study, speaking

and thinking as he doe...-imag1n1ng tor a mom.ent this impossibility could be

achieved-and no cOlllmunication to the outsider would result. If Redfield calls

this the ttethnographical. dilemma," and claims that it is "the scientist' 8 tom

ot the problem encountered in our camnon-aense life as the :problem ot 'intercultural. understanding.'"

Furthermore, the problem ot understanding Itanother

people through det1ni tions ot expertence that are dUferent frat those we are
trying to understand" is ult1matelJ" "the problem

ot catBmlnication and under-

standing between alW' two hu.u.n beings. ,.16

11.

--

ComBlunication between Evans-Pritchard and the !zande.

The problem ot

cOi1lltUnication between &I\T two human beings raise. the problem of cultural
relativism to rather frightening proportions, it one wishes to make an absolute

principle of it.

For every individual's eooul tvated experience is unique-

even identical. twins cannot haw exactly the same experiences throughout their
lives, starting tram the moment that one tollowed the other out ot their
mother's womb.

-

Yet there is the tact ot communication and understanding betwe.

individuals and between individuals ot ditterent cultures, which eases one's
fears in the face at any theorz that might state that it 18 impossible.
when Evans-Pr1tabard tr1.ed to convince the bande that benge was

&

Thus,

natural

poison, they understood what he waa try1.ng to do well enough to soott at his
stupidity.

What he could not c01Il1lunicate to them was the necessary concepts

to make them seriously doubt their belietst

l6Ibid., pp. 92-93.

Ifa new conoeption, e.g. that ot
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natural cAUsation, which would take the place of Zand. supersti tution

[SlY,

<:rJUld be established on1.v by a. whole serie. of relevant instances, and such
evidence cannot accumulate in the minds of people if each ot thertl is disregards
in ite turn for lack ot the concept which would lend significance to it."

17

Evans-Pritchard talked to the Azande, who listened and understood enough to
reply, and Evane-Pritchard, in turn, understood enough ot their viewpoint to
wr1 te down a great deal of it (in his own terms, of course) in an et.hno-

graphical report.
12.

A8!u!ption.2! c ommen experienoe.

11though each man t 8 encul turated

experience i8 unique, communication depends u'.{>on the assumption that .!2!!
exverienoes of the two part1es are alm1lar.

Redfield 8.,.S that -the

wtq

to

understand1ng seems to lie through an alternation ot taJ.ki.ng a.nd listening.
One talks to the other, expresll1ng one's sell to him eo that he mq interpret

your .ignals to him through a projection of himself into you.

And

then one

li8tens to h1Jll with the best projection of one'. own 81lllpathetic feelings and
thought about the other that one can achieve, held in suapenH and made subject
to correction."

ae 8878 that to study and report the

wtq

of life ot another

people Itone must bec1n by .e8U.Dling, as oommon sense a8su.n:tes in trying to reach
understanding in talking with another person, that something is the same in
that wq ot life and one t s own.
from. us, the peasant people.

or

•••

OUr

neighbors are a little different

Macedonia a little more difterent; in India, in

New Guinea, there 1s 80mething more alienJ and yet we cannot go 80 tar as to

17

Personal

Knowle~e,

p. 291.
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reach entirely be.yond the familiar.-

18

13. Suml1ugy. Ars:r communication depends upon sOO\e common experience, for
otherwise there can be no mutual understanding of the meaning ot words.
degree of understand1ng was necessary tor

This

Evans-Pritchard and the Asande in

order that they could realize just where it was that they disagreed or that
there was misunderstanding.

Points ot disagreement or incomprehension between

two different world views or interpretative framework. stand out against a
baClcground of similar elements.
incomprehension.

On

Otherwise there can be nothing but ftlUtual

the pointe where the two perspectives ditter, the

enculturated experiences that lead to the two ,different perspectives Mq be so

ditterent, and the de tense mechanisms ot
and.

suppre.sed nucleation

be reconciled.

lIl&y'

circulari~,

expanSion of the Circle,

be so effiCient, that the two perspectives cannot

It is even possible that those possessing one interpretative

tra;'f!8vork nd.ght be unable even to grasp the concepts necessary to understand
the otber Viewpoint, the Azame lacked the concept ot natural. causality, for

example.

A study of the little community can now be conceived as an attempt at

communication between two different viewpoints_

The world view ot the 'People

1n the community must be made known to a community of scholars possessing a
scientific world view.

In this task of achieving comlnunication, the

investigator, as Redfield

8~S,

must maintain a delicate balance between the

inside and t,he outside viewpoints.

18l'!l!

ti~.tle

Community, p- 93.

17S
B.

1.

Terms.

rUy defined.

THE [\1?ORTANCE 01 LAmlJAGE

Terms, as has been s.en, oan be nominally defined or explanato
Nominal detiui tion tells one how the term is used; explanato1'7

definition explains the "naturett of the

t.~lng

to whioh the term refers.

A

diotion.a.ry gives nominal de.finitiona of the worda of a language and is, as
Polan;yi states, a circular system, it defines words b.'r other words which are
not, at the moment, in que.Uon.Explanato17 definition aY'Oids circularity
because of the fact that "definitions do not occur in a private vacuum of their

own.

They.erge in solidarity with experiences, images, questions, am

insights. • • tor every basic insight there i, a circle of terms and relations,
suoh that the terms fix the relations, the relatiol18 fix the terms, and the
19
insight fixes both.tt
The terms grasped by such a basiC inSight are primitive
terms.

And they are pure or explanator,y oonjugates, whioh are "oorrelatives

defined implioitly b.r a.pirioallY established correlations, funotions, laws,
theories, &y'stems. lt20 The o1roul.ar 8}"stem of a dictionary doss not give pure
oonjugates, for the terms in a diotionary are nominally defined, whereas
implicit detinition ls explanatory.

But besides pure conjugates, there are als

experiential conjugates whose meaning 18 fixed by an appeal to some huIun
2l
experience.
Through a series ot experienoes of watching the Azande gathering

19Lonergan, pp. 11-12.

-

2Orbid., pp. 79-80.
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creepers, reciting incantations over extractions from the plants, givil1l the
substance to a fowl, and basing predictions of events or
the fowl's reactions,

~vans-Pritchard

i~portant

decisions on

learned what ranges ot experiences the

Asande designated by the sound benge.
I!Rortance.S!! nominal definition.

2.

Evans-Pritchard had to get a nom.1

definition of beps.; he needed an insight into the

word.

~

that the Asande used the

And he gave thil definition in experiential conjugates, using words

that referred to and pointed out elements ot human experience.
nominal definitions of the words used

One lnust get

bt a group it he wants to get their

viewpoint, i t he wants to use their terms and ,their categories.

The possiblli

of nominal. definition 8ees to rest on four laws, t8l'lled by Polanyi "the law ot
poverty," '·the law ot grammar," "the law ot iteration,1t and "the law ot
consistency. It

3. .!h! 1!! 21. Poverty. According to

t.'1i8

law, one

rtl18t

not onJ..y

&SS'\l.!"le

that other persons have had experiences similar to one' s own but must also
assume tha.t

mazv

ditterent experiences that one has had personaJ.17 are similar

enough to one another to be designated by' one word.

For it is possible to

construet I by different cClIllbinations of sounds already in use in English,
enough eight-letter "code words lt to rtlplace every- sentence ever printed in the
English language by a difterent word.

"This m1ll1ontold enrichment ot the

English language would completely destroy it; not only' because nobody could

rementber

80

meaninglesa.

many words, but for the more important reason that they would be
For the meaning ot a word is tomed and manifested b;y its

repeated usage, and the vast majority of our eight.letter code words would be
used only' once or at any rate too rarely to acquire

ann

express a definite

177
meaning."

22

Poverxr of n.umber of words is thus an essential features of lam-

guage.

4. !h! l:!! 2! _G...ra.:
...·nmar.. . . . . . . . This la.w affims that slnce a relatlvely' tew
words must

be

used to make millions and millions of statements, Ifa fixed

vocabulary of suffioient poverty must therefore be used wi thin some fixed modes
of combination, whioh alwqs have the same mea.n1ng. n23 Every' language has
such fixed modes

or combination, or a grammar.

S. l!!! ~ 2! Iteration. According to this law, words must

be repeatable J

and if words are to be identified as repeated in different spoken or written

sentences, phonemes and lettera must be

repea~ble.

"They must be chosen for

and defined by some feature poseessing the kind ot distinctiveness whioh
Gestalt-psyohology haa described as

nanz

and whioh I have acknowledged

betore, • • • together with other types ot order, by contrasting it with randcm
configurations. tt

24

This oont.rut is much the same

a8 that

made by Sorold.n

between a system and a oongeries.

6. lh! l:!!!!!. Cons1stens:y. This law states that tfonly when repeatable
utterances are used consistently' can they' have a definite l'l'.ea.n.1ng, and
utt.erances without definite meaning are not language. It

Pol&n71 a&lits that

rconsistencylt is somewhat lnpreels., but says tha.t it must be so because it
deSignates an unspeci£iable quality:
Since the world, Uke a kaleidoscope, never exactly repeats Iln7
previous situation (and indeed), it it did we would not know it,
as we would have no means of telling that. time had passed in

--

22Xbid., pp. 78-79.
23Ibid.
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between), we can achieve consistency only by' identifying manifestly'
different situations in respect to some uarticular feature, and this
require. a series of personal ,judgments. First. we must decide what
variations of our experience are irrelevant to the identitication of
this recurrent feature, as forming no part of it •• i.e. we lmlI!Jt
diScriminate against its random baekp'round.. Seoondly, we must decide
what variations should be accepted as normal changes in the appearance
of this identifiable feature, or should be taken, on the contrary, to
discredi t this feature altogether as a recurrent element of experience.
'!bus the Laws of Poverty and Consistency imply that every time we use
a word tor denoti~ something, we perform and accredit our performance
of an act of generalization and that, correspondinglY, the use of
such a word is taken to designate a class to which we attribute a
substantial. character.
Moreover, by being prepared to speak in our language on future
oocuions, we antioipate its applicability to future experiences,
which we expect to be identifiable in tems of the natural classes
&Ceredi ted by our language. These expeotations fom a theo17 of the
universe, which we keep testing continuoUsly as we go on talking
about t1inge. So long as we teel that our langaage clusifies things
well, we reu.1n satisfied that it is right and we continue to accept
the theory ot the universe implied in our language as true.2S

7. Consistency.!!!! integration. The consistency ot the theory ot the
universe embodied in a language 18 manifested 1n its circularity.

AtV" doubted

term can be explained by terms which are not, at the lftOment, held in doubt.
1'11i8 circularity has been termed a tfdefense mechanism" employed b,r an integra

v.1ewpoint or interpretative system.
logico-meaningtul integration.

For Sorokin, consistency is the basia of

He says that the basis ot unity ot "the science

of mathematics, Plato's philosophical syatem, Bach's!!!!!!!!

!..M.!!m:,

Dante's

Divine Comedy, a Christian Credo, the Civil Code of Napoleon, • • • is the
logical or aesthetic consistency or their meanings-norma-values.

All system.

of meanings-noma-values that ahow such a consiStency are meaningful, logicoaesthetic unitiee, beginning with a simple propoBi tion:

A is B, 2

-I-

2 • 4, and
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ending with &1..1 the oonsistent scientifio, philosophioal, religious, ethical,
artistio systems of meanings,-norms-valu9s. n26 Furthermore, Sorokin affirms

that language is one ot the 'fI'l4in

fOl":nS

or logioo-:neaningfUlly integrated

cultural syste:ns, and perhaps thellost important tom.
8.

Language.!!.! cultural systan.

Sorokin sqs that Itull!terlying all the

other systems is language (oral and written), which in its grammar and syntax

(but not in all its words) represents one ot the most marvelous systems,

mainly ot the oo-ordinated tuPe.

That this 1s so shown by the closed character

ot the grammar and syntax: ot arv developed language. ,,27 Soroldn indioates the
same defensive attitude that Polanyi spells

ou~

more in detail in description

of the circularity, expansion ot the circle, and suppressed nu.cleation.

For

Sorokin l:1a!.ntains that limy developed language in its. graillmatioal and
szwtactical

nartAB

is a real un1 ty whose rul€!s

C')I'\])OS8

one closed ttystern and

?llutually' suppltllment one another and jealously guard an intrusion

heterogeneous-... eontradictory--element or rules.

ot titlr1'

It such an intrusion happens,

the respoot! va parts must reorganize thEF'lSelves in order to become un1 ty again.
Otherwise, they remain-under the name ot texcept!ons'--oongeriea to the rest
of the system. 28

9.

Description

2! .! S"'/stem.

the system of sOience, the system

26soo1etz. Culture,
27D.!'!!!!!cs, IV,

-

Besides the system of language, Sorokin

ot religion, the system or fine arts, and

.!m! Personality,

no.

28 Ibid., pp. llQ-lll.

aivee

p. 146.

the
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system of ethios, and sqs that "these tin rr.ain systems (essentially different
trom one another) exhaust the main tundL"llImtal oultural systems of any oulture

area. tt29 Philosophical, politioal, and eoon:;m1o S18tems are derivative
systems, oanbining elements fran the main five. 30 It can be seen how language
underlies all the other 81'stems, for a desoription of any system in a culture
area will be primarily in the language of that oulture area.
description of an:! system in
nominally defined.

III

Jturthermore, the

ou!ture area will be primarily in words that are

One' IS task in investigating suoh a system is first of all

that of one who is working on one aspect of a world view, and as Redfield
S~8,

the outsider' ~t withold his sugge8tio~ far systematisation until he

discovers how the neaple themselves have conceived an order in the Vlole, ttit
is their order, their categories, their emphasis upon this part rather than tha

whioh the student listens for.,,31

Thus, one will oome up with a description

consisting of a set of nominal detini tions of the main terms in the systems of
science, religion, fine arts, ethics,

~hllosopny,

economiCS, and politics.

Thi

will amount to III set of specialized dictiOnaries} more could be added for le88

important cultural systems or for specialised subsystems.

Add to this an

account of tm grammar and syntax of the language, and one baa ASsem.bled, b.1
parts, a deSCription of the system of language ordered. acoording to the world
view of the people, rather than according to the alphabetical. arrangements of

30
-

29Ibid.. pp. 110-120.
Ibid., pp. 120-121.

lLrbe

Little Communi~, p. 87.
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a dictionar,y, which omits the stress on same concepts rather
world view or theor;y of the universe it i.!llPliee.

~~

others in the

One cs<nclusion for the

investigator of the little community, or tor any culture area, is that
technique. elaborated

satherini

.2!. cultural

£! lilljUistics !!:! !!!l:

~

!2!: !!!!

2l. ~

science

data.

If one 1s not an expert in linguistics, he should

helpful

be at least well enough a.cquainted wi th the subject to utilize linguistic
analyses that have already been made of the language ot the area.

10. SMffi!!£l. Linguistic techniques have been judged to be important tor
acquiring an inside view ot the community one h8;'Jper.a to be stud;ying.

investigator must seek insights into the wtIT

~erms

The

are used, much in the same

manner as the child learning the Wa:/' of life in a community must get insights

into the

WIq

these tenu are used.

fie will haft a different viewpoint however,

for he does not stop with the inside view, but seeks explanatory relationships.

The residents of the

COlllmUni ty

will not be scientists, but men

ot COf!mlon senee,

who look not for relationships between things in themselves, but are interested
in

.!:!a relatlonshiEs 2.!

~roup..

thipg,s

12 themselves .2!:12

th.eir special interest

They are not in.terested in how the community i6 integrated, but in how

the integration of the communitY' can be used to attain their goals, to satisty
their needs.

Accordingly, when +..aking the inside view, when using the terms

categories of the people one studies, one 18 not e;oing to expect explanatory
definitions of these tems, but nominal definitions.

He vUl expect a poverty

of number ot words, which will form a system ot circular, nominal definitions.
These words, tor the most part, will get their meanings thro"gh identification

ot some aspect ot

human

experience.

The consistency ot' a system

or

language

refers to ita intee:ration as a cultural system., and depends not so muoh on

precise defin1 tion and logical rigidityJ

a.8

it doea upon a set of buic

insights which grasp the wq the worda are used md related to one another in
use.

And

this bring. up the question of the use ot the logical model.
C.

1. .......
Sorokin's
use.
;".;;;;,;;;;.;;;;;.;;...;;;.-

THE Loo reAL MODEL

Redfield sqs that Benjamin ....lhort, in studies ot the

relationships ot linguistio categories, use. a logical model, seeking to
discover the l'Ilaj or 'Orem1ses ot a culture in order to deduce MUch ot the rest ot
the culture.

Relationa between element. 18 that ot logical consistency.

"Sorokin' a oharacterizations of culture
this model."
premise

.32 It has been seen

how

~., It

Soroldn

he adds, "probably represent

~qs

that the most important

ot a culture consists in ita qatem ot truth and reality. His stress

on the norma ot logic appeared in volume one, when he appealed to hia assertion
that the noms ot logic were the same tor all cultures as evidence for the tact
that he wu not a relativist.

And

it was further seen that, in practice, he

could not c&rrT hi. relativism even far enough to retuae to judge on the major
premis•• of ditterent culture types.

idealistic mentalit;r • .3.3

'or he place. his own work in the

The primary stres. in idealistic culture mentality i.

on lOtrical reasoning as a system ot truth and reality'.

This preference for

idealistic cul ture is, then, quite consistent with his emphasis on the _olute

nature of the norms ot logic.
In the tourth volume, as it has been .een, Soroldn embraces an integralist

32ftTbe Relation of Anthropology to the Social Sciences and the Humanities,
p. 734.
33
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position.

He a81's in criticism.

sp(~culation

or the

cannot guarantee to us

truth ot rea.10n that- Ifmere dialectic

ar.w valid

knowledge of empirical phenOlllSna.

It can give us an unim.peachable syllogisln or mathernatlcal deduction, but suoh
s syllogism or deduction mll 'be empirically villd onJ.y 'ltThen its :'I1a.jor and

Jrlnor pl"Grnises are empirically Valid. ttJ4 The rules cf logic,
do not giva an adequate account of

~;)W

,i.i1

()th~r

\fords,

the huma.n :11.0<\ arrivea at tfotzthJ they

must be suppler1entcd by sense obeervi1tion and intuition.

:~Ot.or

this \ifas not

denied by !Jorold.. in the first 'I101ume, but there doos seeln to 00 a (.\lrr<8rent
emphl.si8 in the tourthvolu..'ne.
first.

'!:'he inadequacy-

for eulture

or

intagr~tion

For he doas not

the norms ot logic

is also inadequate.

f'lt?lnt..i, on

s~gge$t

integ:oo.1ism 1.n the

that. the loeical model

For it ism)t logic that

lntegr3.t.os sCJnaatiol'l, lorie, and int'ct1t1on.
2.

L1.mi ta-liions ,2! lOSic.

Lonergan ind.ic,aUta the inadeqll¢l.cy ot the

logical modal, or the logical reading of' cultUl--aa

ale:nents of
tbte.

l~iZio

"A. ffuiliarltT with the

can i>@ tlot!:\.tned b:r a very modest ettort and in a verr ahort

U:'I.Ml one ha.s made notable progress in eognitlonal ana1y"sis.:)oo is

constan~

tEr.lpted to mistake the r,tl'3s of logic tor the laW's of' t.'1ought.

And

as all reading inTOlve. interpreting, tnere follows automatioal.ly the
imposl+.1on upon dOCllments of '1oa:r'lings and i:rrpllcations that 'logioally' they
mtlst possoss but in tact do not bear. tt35

Lonergan gives five lin'.itations to

the logical treatise, whioh oan be applied to the logical model.

34Bzn!m!CS, IV, 763-764.
35tonerg81, p.

573.
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3. Ordinary lane8ae;e.

The tirst l.1m1tation to the treatise 1s that one

must use ordinary language to express the basic detint tions and rules to be
used 1n the system.
automatical17.

Once theae are set up, everything tollows logical·lJr,

"But one has to take onets initial steps into this realm ot

automatio security without pertect exactitude and without rigour through

expression that is relaU ve to an audience and successful when the audience
happens to be sized up correctly ...36
~n

Soroldn recognizes this when he insists

the importanoe of discovering and verir,r1ng the major premises ot a

logically' integrated system.

4. f1athematlcs.

'!'he second lbdtation

c:t

the treatise is that, 1n

•

lllathematics J although formalization of artT system resul ts in a treatise, Godel t
theorem implies that 11 for every set of ma.thauatical detin1 tiona and axiau
there is also a set ot further questions that arise but cannot be answered on
the baais of the definition and

u:1.OIIS.

,,:31

Soroldn recognizes this when he

states that in practical.ly every qstem of meanings there is an element of
congeries,
Even the most conaistent system of mathematics contains some, e.,..n the
m.ost integrated systems ot philosophy' and logics ha'1e their "antinomies"
and unrelated congeri.s, • •• The same is true of practically any
other 81atema law-oOOe, ethioal qatem, social and humanistio
disciplines, political ideologies, religiOUS bellef's, language
(exceptions to the granDatic and syntax1.o rules), tine arts, and 80
on. Some glaring or obscure congeries and contradiotions are present
in 8lJ'1' system because a.ny concretely given 87stem of meanings, from
m.athe.tios up to religious beliefs, is 1n an incessant process of
development or change; some new "discoveries" or "untoldings of new
illplicationsu ince.santly go on. These new discoveries are either

-

36rbid., pp.

-

37Ibid., p.

573-574.
574.
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unrelated or contradictory to the old counterparts 1n the systan.
Also, in aqr vast system t,here are alwl\Ys some "survivals" that
are antiquated and stand either unrelated or cont.radictory to the
rest ot the meani~s ot the system. The perennial pX'esence of
nnw d1scoveries" and "survivals" ~n W13' vast system. are due to
the imposaibility ot continual re-examination and logico-aest.l)etic
"stra1ghteningtt ot the whole system (soience, phUosophy, law, at",.).
In vast systems it takes time, and sometilll98 a long time, to understand the unrelatedne •• or oont,radiction oi a new discover;y or
implication to the rest of the S)"8tem, or to fraap the obsolete and
contradictory character ot the survivals to the other parts and to
the new d1scareriea.38
,.

P&sics

~

Chend.s!rl.

Sorokin recognises the fact ()f the impo••1bili

ty of coaplete I1'stematization of mathematiCS, even it he does not point to

..

Godel t • theorem as the explanation.

His explanation in terms of new

discOftries and survivals shows a recognition ~ot what Lonergan calls the third

limitation of the treati ••, which

8hOWS

up in science. such as phy$lcs and

chemistr;yl
A logic ot term8 and relations, universals and. particulars, is no
longer adequate. There are needed distinctions between terms that
specify experiential conjUfllte8, explanatory conjugates, events,
and thingS) there are needed relations between experiential
conjugates, between explanatory conjugates, between things and such
relations, and between con,jugates, frequencies, and events. Moreover,
the greater logical complex1 ty is only the ~inor dittioul ty. For
while static aystem constitutes the intelligibility" ot physics and
ehemistry, still our knowledge of sucn system is on the move. Its
more or les8 detinitive acquisitions can be cut quite usefully in
the torm of a treatise; but the contemporary state ot the question
in any science never consists simply in such more or less definitive
acquisitions) there also are tentative solutions, tendencies, and
unsolved problems that point to the lines ot future development
yet would be quite misrepresented i t expressed in the form ot the
treatise. Accordingly, while the historical development of phySiCS,
chemistry, and allied SCiences can be indicated by an unfinished
series of treatises in each subject, still the series ot treatises
cannot represent adequatelY the series of states ot knowledge in the

38SOCiev, Culture,

.!U!!

Personality, p. 327.
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6. Bioloq ~ PSj'Choloq. '!'he fourth limitation of the treatise is even
more drastic.
The limitations of the treatise became painfullY' evident when
one shitta from the statio systems of p~sics and ohemistry to the
dynamio systems of biology and psychology. Besides the previou8
l1m1tationa iJIPosed by' the more coraplex logiC and by the development of our lm0'4ledge, there now appears a stUl further ditt1culty. For the treatise expreShS S1'stfn, and each biological
species and, on the human level, each individual psyche is system
on the move. Unfortunately, treati8es ca1'lt'lOt move. definitions
and postulates have the eternal qualiW of Plato's ideas; their
implications are perpetua1.lY' the S&m8J wt the growth of an organi_ or the development of a psyche is a movement fran a generic,
rudimentary, undifferentiated system to a specific, expert, differentiated system. and the proper concem of the scientist 1n the
field of genetiCS is not the several staie8 of the dJnam1c system
but rather the operator8 that bring about the successive transformations trom each stage to the next. Nor is one to entertain the
hope that some day when such operators are well known there may be
deYeloped a more oQllPlicated logic that will handle the operators with
the exactitude, the rigour, and the automatic security that now i.
enjo,yed b.Y the mathematical treatises. For neither the organiSM
nor the psyche develops exactly, rigorously, and securely; 1t
advances tentativelYJ it adapts to a non...systematic manifold of
circumstances; it is what it is because exactitude, rlgous, and
automatic 8eourity are irrelevant to the problems that are to be
solved only vi tal.l7 and by consciousness.40

Sorokin, again, recogni ••s the oasio fact to which Lonergan points, but
speaks of a lack of integration

rath~r

than of a genetic type of integration:

Not infrequently.. vacue and poorly integrated systems of meanings,
som..,tim~s even oongeries, may have and, indeed, do have much better
external suocess ot expanSion or apparent survival than the perfectly
integrated system. of meanings. Tarde puts the matter aptly, stating:

.39Lonergan, p. 514.

40zbid.,

pp.

574-575.
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'In the matter of political organizations, it hu frequently
been observed that the most selt-conaistent--those that are most
logioally deduced • • • are leut adeted to meet the requirements
ot their inherited and natural enrlronmentJ and, conversely', that
the Most practical are the least log! oal. • •• The same remark
applies to grammars, religious II the tine arts, eto.; thus the
ane perfect grammar, the only one whose rules are quite without
excention is the gr8flltl1ar of--VolapUki It applies to organi8m8 as
well, there are some that are so perfect as to be almost incapable
ot living, and that would be better t1 tted lor life it they were
l ••s pertectJ_tor perfectness ot accommodation m81 detract from
aupplene•• ' .41
Sorolr..1n indicate8 how tar his conception of logical integration is trom a

d;ynanio eyatem on the movea

"their vaguenes8 is exactly their Nemesi8.

.A. larg

politioal part,y or a religious creed aocepted b.v millions is practioally a
serioa ot parties and creeds, diftering from ene another, and not one party
or creed.

Thay diffuse themselves an:! survive by, so to speak, their incessan

death and replacement in ti_ and space of one short-living system ot meanings
by another partl.7 similar to it, partly di8similar, but adjacent 1n tL'1l8 and

vehicles and preserving the ssme name. Q42

7.

Human culture.

study of human oulture:

The fifth limitation ot the treatise appears in the
1'1'0 the oomplexities ot genetio method there have now

to be added the graver oomplexities of dialeotical method."

This method is

needed to stud.Y the osoillation ot men and p'roups between different and opposed

principles and tendencies1
ei ther the real. is being or it is a subdivision in the 'already out
there now' J e1 ther object!vity is reached. by intelligent inquiry and

hlDztl!!!08, IV, 78-79, quoting Gabriel Tarde, Social Laws, p. l~O.

-

42Ibid.
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critical refiection or elee it is a matter ot taking a good look at
what is t out there' J either knowing is mounting up the levels of
experienoe, ot understanding and formulation, ot refiective ;rup
and judgment, or else it i. the ineffable confrontation that makes
the known present to the knower. Still theee contrasts stand
between e:JCtraee. Men live their lives not in the intellectual
pattern of experience nor again in the elementary pattern ot
experience but, tor the most part, in some al tarna.tion and fusion
of the aesthetiC, the dramatiC, and the practical patterns. In
this middle wq they oscillate between tendencies to emphasize now
the intellectual orientation and now the el_entarr; commonly' they
never settle outright tor either view, their mirrls remain
ambivalent and that ambivalence mocks all attempts to practioe
Soerates' ma1eutic art ot definition in the hope ot bringing them
to clear and distinct knowledge of what they happen to mean. Not
only must the treatise on human meanings dispense with precise terms,
it also has to get along withOtlt definable relations. 'or, as we
have seen, c~~on sense oonsists in a basic nucleus ot insights that
never is utilized without the addition ot at least one further
insight into the situation at hand. Not ~onl:r does this nucleus vary'
with occupation, social group, 'Place, and time, but essentially it
is something incompleteJ its content i8 not relations between
things but • more or les8 invariant element in variable relations;
and that invariant element not only is without precise terms,
thrcuch which it might be defined, but also without verifiability
through which it might be fixed by its oorrespondence with concrete
s1tua tiOtUJ. 4.3
Sorokin·. very explanation ot the fiuctuatlon between idealistio, ideational,
and. sensate types

ot integrated

dialeotical m.ethod.

cu1turee is an example

ot the un ot a

And his integralist system ot truth is not a logically'

integrated system, but a barm.onisatlon ot oppond S78terts.

Finally', his

insistence that a cultural congloil!eration i. never tlllly integrated is an
acknowledgment ot either (1) non-systematic elements which will require the use
of statistical heuristic structures, (2) an initial generic indeterminacy which

w111 require the use of a genetic heuristic structure, or ('3) an opposed

prinCiple ot integration 1m'pllclt 1n the system, which will require ..

4lx.onergan, pp. 575-,76.
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dialeotioal method for its study.
this in explaining that

e'~ery

his ideoloeioal culturel

Sorokin himselt seems to oal1 attention to

indlv1rtual oont.ains some degree of oOllferies in

"The whole dialectic logiC of st. AugustIne, Erigena,

:acolas of Cusa, Hefel, ot most of the Oriental and Oooidental mystic thinkers
with their olaim that every concept contains in itself its own negation, that
in its full form any concept is a ooincidentia oppositorum, that there is a
dialectical identity of the opposites, that a thesis contains in itself and
puses into antithesis and this into a synthesis which as a new thesis contains
again its anti tMais and passes into i tJ all this dialectic logiC gives
S,YstematiC evidence of an implioit or explicit presence of inner contradictions

:

and congeries in atW' concept and in any system. of meanings."
D.

1.

Principle

2!.

4h

THE NOT! ON 01 DEVELOP;'fENT

1mm.anent chge.

Soroldn's asaertion that no culture can

be completely integrated logically cm be interpreted, then, to be not so much
an l.'ttpertectlon in every culture as much as a basic lim1 tation of the logical
modal, patterned as it i. af'ter the logical treatise.

It was seen above how

Sorokin said that a very ohangeable 57stam was not really' one system at all,

but a succession ot difterent systema.

ot a logical 8Y8tem.

But

This would stan from the static nature

when Sorokin presents hi' "principle of immanent

change lt as a principle explaining the nuctuation ot culturaJ. systems, he is
not using the logical model, but concepts Which are very similar to Lonergan's

genetic and dialectical heuristic structures.

So true is this that Scroldn's

ennunciation ot some or the implications of hi' prinCiple of immanent change

hl1aQC1ety, CJ.&ltux:e,

.!!!2

Personality, p. 327, footnote 3.
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serve as a presentation ot manr ot the basic principles of genetic heuristic
structures.

1. The reason or cause of a change of &l\Y sociocultural STstem
is in the sys... itself, and need not be looked for anywhere else.
2. Additional reason for cha:nge ot a system is its milieu,
which is again composed m.ostly ot t."e 1manentJ.7 Ch&qling systems.

3. ArrJ' sociocultu.ral qst. changing immanently, incessantly
generates a series ot immanent consequences, which change not onlY
the milieu. ot the syst_ but also the systan i teel!.

4. Bearing the seeds ot ita change in itself, any sociocultural
system bears also in itselt the power ot molding its own destiny or
lire career. Beginning with the mcment of emergence, each sociocultural 5ystem i. the uin tactor of its own destin.y. This destiny,
or the s;ratem' 8 subsequent life career, ~epresents mainly an unfolding
or the bnanent potent1alitie. of the qatem in the course ot 1tIS

matenee.

s.

The emr1romental force. are not negligible, but their role
consiats essentiallY in retardation or acceleration, racilitation
or hindranceJ reinforcement or weakening, ot the realisation of the
immanent potentialities of the system. Sometimes they can cruah
the qstem and put an end to its existence, or stop the process ot
untolding the immanent potentialities at one of the earlY phases.
They cannot, however, change tundamentally the immanent potentialities
ot the system and its normal de.til\'r in the senee ot makillf,: the life
career of an u.nfolding acorn that of a cow, or vice veraa.

6. So tar as the system, since the moment of its emergence,
bears in itseU its tuture oareer, it i& a determinate eyatem and
in this senae deterministio. So far as the future of the system is
determined mainly not b7 external agents, but tv the system itselt,
such a determinism is indeterministic or free, u fiow1ng
spontaneou.l,y, in accordance with its nature, frOia the system itself.

1. The process of unfolding the immanent potentialities ot the
fJmerged system is som'what predetermined by the 87stem, but this
predetermination leaves a oonsiderable margin tor variations. In
this aense it is not absolutely and narrowly precon<.iit.ioned. Only
the main direction and the main phases or the unfolding are
predetermined, the rest, including most of the details, are tt tree"
and become an unforeseen and unprediotable matt~r of chance,
environment, and tree ohoice of the System.
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8. Since the destiny or life career of any' system is the result
of the &TStem's self-control and of the influence of the environmental
forces,. the relative share of each of these two factors in molding
the system's career is not constant for all sociocultural systems.
The share of the self-control of the S,1stem is the greater, the more
perfectly the S,Ystem is integrated and the more powerful it is.

9. As a rough indicator of the elusive concept of the power of
a sociocultural 8.1stem, the following less elusive combination of
the criteria is offered: the greater the membership of the s.ystem;
the better the members biologically, mentally, morally and socially;
the greater the actual wisdom, knowledge and experience the system
has at its disposal; the better it is organized; the greater the
total SUM of Means of infiuencing human behavior and forces of nature
at its disposal; the more solidarily (or consistently) the system is
integrated; the more powerful it is; the more independent from the
foroes of the environment,--the greater is the share of its own
control in molding its desti~.4'
2.

Emergence.

To compare this with Loruirgan' s heuristic structure for

genetic method is, to a large extent, to compare a general structure to a
specifio application.

Although Lonergan's heuristic structure is more general,

the basic heuristio notion is development rather than merely change, as it is
in Sorold.n.

The first characteristic of the notion of development is the

principle of emergence.

Just as the transition from arithmetic to algebra is

the achievement of a higher viewpoint, so also in the physical world, "chemical
elements and compounds are higher integrations of otherwise coincidental
manifolds of subatomic events; organisms are higher integrations of otherwise
coincidental manifolds of chemical processes; sensitive consciousness is a
higher integration of otherwise coincidental manifolds of changes in neural
tissues; and accumulating insights are higher integrations of otherwise
coincidental manifolds of images or of data. n46

4SPfnamics, IV, pp. 619-620.
46Lone

an

• 451-452.

One might go on to

8~

that an
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integrated sociocultural system is a higher integration of an otherwise
coincidental manifold of subjects of interaction, vehicles, and meanings.

The

coincidental manifold is a non 8,Ystematic aggregate, similar to Sorokin ' s
congeries.

And it has been seen that for Sorokin a certain admixture ot

congeries in any logically integrated system makes for change.

3. Correspondence.

The second characteristic of the notion of develop-

ment is the principle of correspondence which states that "different underlying
manifolds require different higher integration," if the difference in the
underlying manifolds exoeeds oertain limits, beyond whioh the same higher
integration cannot exist.

For example, one

c~

work out the same theory from

different data, but the data cannot be altogether dissimilar. 47

Something

similar to this would be found in Sorokin's principle of limit.
If a given system has unlimited possibilities of change, under such
conditions, the system can change so radically that it will lose
all its essential characteristics and become unidentifiable. Such
a change means the cessation of the existence of the system; when
a system becomes unidentifiable and loses its sameness, it disappears. Hence, so long as a system lives, it has limits in its
change. The selectivity of a system leads to the same result. An
unlimited possibility of change for a given system means it can
become an.ything, can ingest everything, therefore can become
radically different from what it was and unidentifiable. Such a
change is equivalent to the cessation of the existence of the
system and to its replacement by another--quite different--system.
For these almost axiomatic reaaons, practically any system MUSt
have and does have limits to the range of its change. The limits
transgressed, the system disappears.48
It has been seen how Sorokin uses the principle of' limit to explain the
fluctuations of logically integrated cultures.

-

47Ibid.
48pynamiCS, IV, 702.
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4.

Finali~.

The third principle that Lonergan gives in the notion of

development is the principle of finality.

A higher integration can be static,

"when it dominates the lower manifold with complete success and thereby brings
about a notable imperviousness to change," or d;rnamic, "when it is not content
to systematize the underlying manifold but keeps adding to it and modifying it
until, by the principle of correspondence, the existing integration is
eliminated and, by the prinCiple of emergence, a new integration is

introduce~·

The prinCiple of finality declares that the "underlying manifold is an
upwardlY but
of being ... 49

indetp~nately

directed dynamism towards ever fuller realization

This can be compared with Sorotqn's seventh principle of

immanent change:

"Only the main direction ani the main phas". of the unfolding

are predetermined; the rest, including most of the details, ar"

t

free I and

became an unforeseen and unpredictable matter of chance, environment, and tree
choice ot the system."

5.

The rourth characteristic ot the notion of development

Development.

is the principle of development, which is "the linked sequence of dynamic
higher integrations."
integrated systems

50

m~

This prinCiple states that a succession ot difterentlY

themselves be systematicallY related.

Sorokin never

states such a prinCiple, to the writer's knowledge, but his explanation or the
selt-direction of integrated social and cultural systems indicates a continuity
in change that would perhaps approximate the notion of a linked sequence of

49tonergan, pp. 452-453.

-

5Orbid.
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systeuuu

"Out of similar tamUles or states--tbe family or state whioh is

perfectly integrated, where the relationships are solidary, where all members
spontaneously and. deliberatel.;r strive towards the same ends) have the same
mentality and objective.; have a unified system ot aims, efforts, and
activities-such a tamil.y or state is a builder of its own tuture muoh more
than the tam1l.;r or state wi ttl lower causal. and lIleaningtul integration, where
the causal interdependenoe ot the members is loose, relationships less
solidary, and where heterogeneous aims, confliCts, and antagonisms extst."

6. Difterentiation.

Sl

The tirth characteristic of the notion ot

development is that I'the oourse of
explanatory ditterentiation. tt

d"'.lopmen~

is marked by an increasing

The original single ceUs of oreanisms do not

difter as muoh as the later, tully d.".lopfld and .functioning organisms
difter.

52

The counterpart ot this i8 in the oriterion ot better organization

ot a group a8 a guage to its power, tor organization include.

ftthe existence

or nonexistence of the social stratitioation and differentiation, with their
division ot labor...

7.

'3

Flex1b11lt;r.

Sixth, development is nex1ble in that it can reach the

same goal by dU'terent paths.

ItThus, a normal sea urchin can ruul t from an

embryo subjeoted to distorting presaurasJ psychic heal. th can be due to

SlD.r'n!micS. IV, 611.

52t,onergan, pp. 452-453.
53Pma!iCS, IV, 616-617.
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untutored. spontaneity or to the ministrations ot the psychiatrist, the same
SCience can be taught successtully' in accord with different methods,and the
88Ile discovery can be made in different l!WUlers. "S4

Seventh, besides the minor nex1bUifq of reaching the same goal. by'

different routes, there is also a major tle:xibUity which consistlil in a change
in the ultimate objective.

!tIn biology this is the ta'YIiliar fact ot

adaptation; in depth psychology it m.ay be illustrat.ed by sublimation; in

cognitional activity it appears in the manner in which inquirers, otten enough,
begin from one problem only' to find themselves by the logic of issues forced

to engage in the solution of another."

In

th~

light of these considerations,

Lonergan deflnes a development &8 fla flexible, linked sequence of dynaaic and
lncre&8ingly differentiated higher integrations that meet the tension of

succesnvely transformed underlying manitolds through successiva applications
of the principle.

ot correspondence
E.

1.

HSel.!!!!! Sorokin.

TrlE

and em.ergence. "SS

NOTION

OF

DIALECTIC

In explaining his principle of immanent change,

Soronn refers to Hegel, among many others, as a predecessor of this principle

as he, Sorokin, understands 1t.

He 88I1S

or Hegel's

p.hllosoplv":

It 18 pos81bl1 the most consistent and universal conception of
1.mm.anent change ever created in the history of huun thoucht.
Its dialectic principle, the identity of OPPOSites, i.
ite epring of 1mIIanent change; 1ts phUoaophical realism and
univeraali8ftl. logically follow frOPl 1 t and lead. to the concept1on
or the Absolute Spirit as the A.bsolute-and all-embrac1ng-Reality.

ShLonergan, pp.

-

SSIbid.

4S)...4S4.
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Since the Spirit i ••alt cognizant, selt.determining, selt-changing,
and. Selt-d1recUng, ..ver:r part ot the Universe (as an _bodiment
ot the Spirit) bears in itselt the raason for its change. mxl is
a participant in this selt-directlng and selt-changing process.
Since the Absolute Spir1t is the etemal, the completely True and
Rational and Good, the whole process ot history, or Change, becomes
also a rational movement f'rcn an unconSCious potentiality to an
entirely conscious actuality.
From all theM standpoints, Hegel' 8 conception ot immanent
change has never been surpassed.56
Sorokin' 8 adm,iration for Hegel perhaps explains his attat.chment tor what seems
to be a dialectical synthesis in liis integrillst syatem ot truth, as well u

tor the dialectical tluctuation between ditterent super8y'stema ot culture.
This also can account for the accusation that Bidney made that Sorokin makes

.

cul tUN into a ldnd of autanoton independent Of the individual human bearers

ot CUlture.
2.

Hsel

!.2! Lonersan•

Since the writer, following Lonergan, believes

that the notion of dialectic is an important heuristic antiCipation tor the
stud1' ot man and aocietq, without w'r'J.ch an adequate study of integration cannot
be

conducted, 1t is necessar,y to distinguish caretully between Hegel t s concept

ot dialectic

and

the C,)ftcept to be used in the investigation ot a society or

oulturer

In the first place, then, Hegelian dialeotic is conceptualist,
closed, neceSsitarian, and immanental.. It deals with determinate
conceptual contents J ita successive triadic sets of concepts are
complete, the relations ot opposition and sublation between concepts are pronounced and necessary; and the whole dialectiC is
contained wi t.h1n the field det1ned b.r the concepts and their neaess&ry' relations ot opposit1on and sublation. In contrast our position ia intellectualist, open, factual, and normative. It deals
not with determinate conceptual. contents but with heuristically
detined antiCipations, it awaits trom nature and hi8tOr,y a succesaion of tentative solutions. Instead of binding these solutions

S6Brnelca, IV, 63$.
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by' rutoeS88l'7 relations, it regards them as products of a cumulative

succession or insights and it claims that the succession followe
neither a unique nor a. neces8817 path; for identical. results can be
reached by difterent routes, and beside. valid developments there are
aberrati0n8. Finally, the appeal. to heuristic structures, to
8.CC\UInllatlng insights, to verdiCts awa! ted trom nature and history,.
goes outside the conceptual field to acte ot understanding that rise
upon experiences and are controlled b:r crl tical renection; am so
instead or an immanental dialectic that embraces all positions and
their oppOSites, ours is a norm.ative dialectic that discriminates
between advance and aberration.
'l'he foregoing differenc •• have a COJ1non source. Hegel endeavours to pour everything into the c")ncept; we regard concepts
1.8 ~roducta ot the development ot understanding and place understanding itself in an intermediate role between experience and
cr1. tical reneotion.,7

It would aeem that an applioation of

Sorok1nt~

own integl'alism would give a

somewhat similar distinction between Sorok1nt s sociology of historioal ohange
and Hegel t s philosopby' of histor,YJ Sorold.n does not make the contrast. however.

3.

!

general notion.

Dialectic, as used by Lonergan and by the writer,

has a more general sense than Regelian dialectic I

"Hegel employ-eel the word to

refer to his triadic prooess from the ooncept ot being to the Abaolute Idea.
Marx inverted Hegel and so conceived a8 dialectical a non-mechan1cal,

materialist process."

But the term was used long betore Marx and Hegel.

flln

Plato, it delloted the art ot philosophic dialogue and was contrasted with
artstic.

In Aristotle, it referred to an e.t"tort to disoover olues to the

truth by revieving and scrutinizing the opinions or others. • ••

Summarily,

then, dialectio denote. a combination of the concrete, the dynamic and the
contradiCtory; but this canb1nation may be tound in a. dialogue, in the history
of philosophic opinions, or in historical process generally."
;7Lonergan, pp.
S8~., p. 217.

421..422.

S8
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4. Fluctuation.2! culture wes. It can 'be seen that Sorokin's conception ot historical process is ....nt1allT a dialectical. concept.

The premises

of each ot the three culture t)"pes--ideational, sensate, and idealistic-are
JIlUtually opposed.

Yet they are bound together, tor their buio premise 1s in

their systems of truth and reality, which are, in turn, founded upon different

acta ot knowledge,

intuition, sensation, and logical reasoning.

But al\?'

adequate human knowing involves all three aots.'9 Historical process is
concrete, for it consists in events whioh ... concrete actions and reactions of
human beings.

Theae actions and reaotions are expres.ive ot the meanings,

norms, and values possessed by the human beings, and thus are classified as
behavioral culture.

The actions are with reterenoe to other twman subjeots,

and hence are interactions.

The interaction ot men, both individuals and

groups, can be solidary or antacon1stio,deperding upon whether the meanings,
norms, and values ot the interacting parties or groups are opposed or in
harmOl\Y.

60

Now it . . . . to be a tact that men tend e1tMr to regard reality

and the ultimate good to 'be derived. :l"r<a reality as either a sensate

satistaction ot animal desires, .an ideational striving tor spirt tual goods to
the denial of animal desires, or an idealistie caapromise that seeks to
harmonize the two.
is an aggregate

Lonergan sq_ that "there will be a dialeetto, i t (1) there

ot e'Venta of a determinate character, (2) the events U8 be

traced to 8i tiler or both ot two principles, ()

the principles are opposed yet

bound together, and (4) they are modified by the chargee that succeleiV'8lT

'~amlcl, IV, 763-764.
60s0Cie!(. Culture,

.!!!2

Peraonalitl. n. 9).
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reeult frau them."

61

Soroldn's initial idealistio viewpoint oan thus be viewed as an attempt
prlnolpl;:~8.

to integrate two opposed dialectical

By tho

til'll. he reached the

fourth volume, his idealistic position oame to be viewed as a third opposed
principle.

'l'hus, events, in Sorokin's system, m1l3' be traced to an::! one of

three rather than just two prinoiples.
F.

SUMMMlY AND COnUSIONS

1. .-Re;:;;:l..a;.;;t-.,iv1
__s_M!!!! dialectic.

Relativism a&1onishes the investigator of

a community to be aware ot the fact that the people he studies have deeply

ingrained convictions that have been

determin~ by'

an idiom that mq interpret

experience in a somewhat ditterent manner from the way the investigator
interprets experience.

As PolatV1 sa.ys, !tour tormally declared beliefs can be

held true in the lut resort only because of our logioall.y anterior acceptance

of a particular set of terms, fran whioh all our references to reality are
constructed."

The dialogue between Evans-Pritchard and the Ala.nde is an

example ot a dialeotic in which the interpretative tra:m.evorkt 8 ot the
dlacu.asants fomed to linked but opposed principles.

Their interaction in

discuseins beese was not solldal"T, but antagonistic.
2.

Relativism!!!!! development.

'!'he different basic set of terms held by

Evans-Pritchard and the Azande were the results of ditterent enculturatiQn

processes.

And the process ot encul.turation is a developmental process--a

successi on ot more comprehensive insights or the growing ohild which grasp the

relationa ot a wider varletq or experiences. These inSights are higher

61r.onergan. p. 217.
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integrations which ocour according to the p1"1noiple of 8lHrgence.

They will

differ in difterent individuals according to the principle of correspondence,
for ditterenoes in exoerienoe provide different data to be understood by
insight.

These serles ot insights are a linked sequence, for later insights

oannot occur without the previous occurrence

or

other insights.

And en-

oulturation .s a process oan be nexible in both major and minor wqsJ
different experiences within t."1e same culture can result in adults with substantially the sae world views or interpretat.ive frameworks giving a minor
nex1bll1ty; or

80M

individuals in a culture mq undergo experiences or get

insights that result in changes in world view ,that are quite substantial.
Homey and leosUer are 8X&"l1ples ot web a major flexibility, which would be
illustrated b.Y aqy example of a person learning to criticise and correct his

own mistaken beliets.

3. L5Jic

~

world.n!!.

The system ot thought or theor,r of the universe

implied in onets language which is acquired by the process of enculturation is
'not priu.rily a scientific vi" of the universe, but a common senlte view.

t~en

do not live in the intellectual pattern of experience exclusivel;r, nor even
primarily, but are more oonoemed with dramatio living with others and with
getting practical tasks done.

Aocordingly, lithe treatise on human meanings"

IIlUSt both "get along without detinable relations- and also "dispense with
preoise detinit.ions."

For floommon sense oonaists in a buic nucleus ot insights

that never i8 utilized without the addition of at leaat one further insight
into the situation at

hand.~

Rather than oonducting a formallY logical

analJ'sis, the investigator will have to look for suoh consolidating techniques

ot a world 'liew as the employaent ot oircular definitions and reasoning,
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Polanyi's

c1rculari~;

he will

deal with new situations

&8

loo~

tar "automatic expansion of the s,ystem ft to

they occur, recognizing that the very lack ot pre-

eise definition in a common senae view makes it capable of such expansion; he
will try to discover the w.,.s and means a viewpoint has ot suppressing the

nucleation ot experience. that would give rise to insights that would point out
the error in that viewpoint.

4.

\iorld.!!!!.!!!! l!Di!1!lge.

The inveatigator

ot a cOlIIIImlni ty will seek

to get at the meanings of the community through ita language.
take advantage

ot the law ot

pOV'8r~

He will try to

to get at the fundamental concepta ot the

language, and to discover the way th•••

C0nc.~ts

study ot the lan ot the grammar ot the language.

are united and related by a

!ia will have the law ot

c:msistency on hi. 8ide, tor cOIIWUnication within the conmunity is only
posaible insofar aa the people within that cOnJIlunity consistently ident1t;y
certain aspects ot their experience by uttering repeatable s(')urnis.

Polartrl

says that "by being prepared to speak in our language on future occasions, we
antiCipate its applicabU1ty to fUture experiences, which we expect to be
identifiable in terms of the natural classes accredited by our language.

'lb.e

expectat10ns form a theory of the universe, whioh we keep testing continuouslY
&8

we go on talking about things."

Tr~s

anticipation ot the applicability of

language to future events is closely related to the oommon sense antiCipation
that an incomplete cluster of insights can be caaplemented by a. further insight
into the concrete situation that will enable one to deal with the situation.
And as long a8 the theory of the universe that the set of terms and the

oluster of inSights 1aply enables

III

individual or a group to deal suooe8stullY

with th'l situations they encounter, there will be little likelihood of a
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radical ohange in world view or interpretative f'ranevork.

S. World.!!!!!!!! dialeotio. A series of experiences that cannot
succ8.a.tu.lly dealt with

by

be

the present world view i8 likely to cause a

disintegration ot that world view.

Sorok1n, tor ex:a.'1Iple, ohanged his outlook

as a result ot being disillusioned by the experience ot eYGnts toll owing the

F1rst World war, particularly the Russian revolution.

There occurs a

dialectical process between opposed principle., the new experiences oppOSing

the old ideas.

Ther" can also be a dialeotic between dU'terent individuals

and f-'roups, based up:m OPPOSition in their ideological culture, it can result

in outward events through empirical

objeotlti~at1on

verbal. behavior or otherwise, and material culture.

1n behavioral culture-

CHAPTER VI

THE DEVELOP1'iENT OF LNDIVIDfJAL AND OF

cx)~UNITY

The unknown to be investigated has been stated to be the integrat.ion

society, of culture, and ot personality in tne little conmunit7.

ot

"Integration"

reters to the wq t.hat allot th. difterent elements within the cOllmUnlty are
The •• relationships can be

interrelated.

statistical, dialectical, genetic.

ot ditferent kinds--classlcal,

The dialectical. and developmental relation..
,

ships are to receive further attention in this chaptor.

locus will be on the

development of personality, not only within the community, but also ot the
For the investigator l'III1st arrive at a notion ot objectivity' that

investigator.

require. a deliberate appropriation of his own rational and moral. consc1owmes.
Personal development dependa, however, on cOl'llrJU.Ml. development, just as rouoh as
oonmunal cultural. denlopment depends upon the development

lIithin the oOllRUni\y.

abnormal

&8

Personal and oommunal development both can tollow an

well as a nonaal path.
A.

1.

ot individuals

TRE LImE CmOO1NITY AS A GENERAL IZED BIOlRAPHY

!!!!!! ~ ~

ifflportant thiqs

!!! ~

cOimlunity.

SOCiety is not a

thing, but a group ot tilings, "the tot.ality ot intera.oting personalities, with
their sociocultural. relationships and processes. ttl Culture is not a thing, but

lSocietz, Culture, ~ Personality, pp. 63-64.
20)
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"the totality of the

;!1,-·anin:~s,

valU'3S, and. nt)ImS possessed b.Y the interacting

persons and the totality of the vehicles which objeotify, socialize, and
2
convey these meaninps."
11u1'noo heinps are thi 11gs, with sooial and cultural
properties.

Sorokin uses a metanhor to illustrate the relationship between

personality,

s(~ietYJ

and culturel

Sooially, eaoh of 11S is a pole attached bjr a multitude of IIvnres lf
to several and diverse social. and cultural systezns, as a member
of the state, of a religious orGa~ization, of the ra~ily; of a
politioal party, of an occupational union, of a certain territorial eOl'lIiTlun! ty (village or city), and of a num.ber of various
educational (sport, art, scientific, pt:tilanthropic) associa.tions,
different from one another. Culturally again, each of us belongs
to various cultural sYstems and is a bearer of their values, like
the system of belief of the Roman CatholiC; religion, of democratic
political. ideology', of roma.ntic art values, of empiriCism in
nhilosophy, of oertain value systems in eoonomic or other cultural
systems.)

2.

Unitz.!?l concrete reference.

All of these different syste:ns are

united by being "wired" to the 6&lIe ind:tvldual, but this does not necessarily

mean that the,y are s,rstematically united, either in themselves or in the
personality of the individual.

Sorokin says that there is a "biosocial.

pluralis7t1 of egos" contrary to the eom.1lon belief "that the normal individual
has a monotholic unity of personality with an indivisible self, one ego. tt4
The biological. ego Ifis composed of' the nutrition-ego, self-protection ego • • •
sex ego, and so on.

Since these needs now and then clash with each other and

give contradictory orders to the')rganism, they are really separate biological

-

2Ibid.
3Bznamies, IV, 11.
4Society, Culture,

!!!£ Personality;,

p.

345.

egos, bound together

Oft

one organism and constituting in their totality a

mosaic-like constellation. It

S Furthermore, a man haa as

there are social groups to which he belongs.

m&l\1 social egos as

His Itfamily self'" is difterent

from. his "occupational selt" and from other roles he m.ust pl.,..

as a lIlember ot

&

state or bualneaa group m.ay be in contl1.ct With his belief'S

and actions as a member of a church group.

united by meana

His actions

"The various egos may appear to be

ot the integrative functions ot the nervous system, by'virtue

of their incorporation into one body.

This superficial semblance of' un! t7 i.

espeeia1.l.y impressive when the 810S are lIlUtual.l.y solidary and ba.rmonious.
Nonetheless they remain distinctly difterent. . The7 mq be as difterent as the

music at Mi.sa Solemn1a,

~

.!1!!: River, .!!:l!!!!!

Danube, and the ~._L_ou
.........i_a

Blue., even though plqed on the same phonograph-our nervous 81'stem and

6

body."

Sorokin's view seems to be somewhat extreM here.

reterence is a!!!!. unity, even though it is

~

Unity by concrete

S!!! unitZ2!.! szstem. It

. . . . to bear a very close res.blance to Sorokin's indirect causal-functional

3.

Indirect causal-functional int!Jtatton.

Sorokin sqa that objects

in his .tudT-"books, manuscripts, typewriter, logs in the f'il"e-place, fishing

tools, clock, pictures, various

~:eSJ

turniture"-have an indirect causal-

functional unity because they "all happen to be united through a common agent,

the lnd1:v1dual. and his needa.

Each of' the is in causal-tunctional relation-

Ship with the individual and his needs, and, through this common agent, they

S.ill.!!. I

-

p.

347.

6Ibid., p. 348.
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are indirectly connected by causal-tunotional tie., one with anothor."

Logica.lly, this same type ot unity seems to exist between all the difterent
social and cultural. systems to which t."te individual is "wired," all the
dilterent flrecords" plqed on the Itnhonograph" ot the bod;r and nervous system.
'fhe biological and social egos are related to the needs-biological and social-

ot the individual just as much .s are the objects in a mants study. Indeed,
the objects in Sorokin's stud;y are vehicle. ot the meanings, values, and norms
which SOl"Okin haa because ot his partiCipation in various social and cultural
systems.

The books, manuscripts, and tjypewriter are not unrelated to his being

t'wired It to the social and 001 tural system

nam~

"Harvard Uni \Tersi t.r • "

Tn.

clock is not unrelated to a culturally' acquired and tran.m1tted nom ot
behavior--that ot being on time, ot doing thing. at appointed times.

Yet

Sorokin is correct in not being satisfied with establishing that this ldnd ot
integration be concrete reterence.

Bidne1 states that Malinowski' 8 concept of

cultural integration is inadequate because it one says that culture is
integrated insofar as it satisties all the huic J:mman needs, this au! ture will
remain an &€gregat., not a system ot institutions unless there is an In'tegrating prineiple tor the ne.ds which are fulfilled through the institutions.
Malinowski, hovwer, conceivss man as a mere aggregate ot needs and impulses.

4. Integration

~

deftlopment.

8

Sorokin conceifte integration of

personali ty as a task t hat is more or less euooes8M in different individuals1

7Ibid., p. 145.
Saidney, pp. 369-310.
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"The frowth ot the individualfs personality consists in the unfolding of his
potentialities in a given setting, in the increasing differentiation of his
abilities and functions, in the structure and integration of his egos, and in
the qualitative and quantitative enrichment of his world ot meanings, actions,
and vehioles.,·9

The fact that the systsns and structures of the total

cCt'll!l1Unity are retlected. in the personalities of individuals suggests to
Redfield a possible wq of studying the way that the community is integrated.
H. speak. of a sen_ralized biof?"aphy that describes the Whole community "by

am

lasting character of the !!l that men and women
10
enter and pass through a social structure. It
In Sorokin t s "ego" terminology,

emphasizing the general

this would amount to the study' of the way that men and women acquire, modify,
and integrate their different social egos.

Redfield says that the first

principle of ti ,is type ot study would be to take the inside view, to lIpresent
every aspect of life in the order and in the way that it appear. to the
individual at the time he encounter. it."

Therefore:

one would ducr1be the technolOU not as an organized system of
operations in which perhaps many men, women, and children take part.
One wO'..ud instead describe the lIf/J:'y the ohild begins to enter into
the work and pla,y of the home or the labor of the cornfield-how
gradually he cOII'les to assume activities and share understandings
about the use and meaning ot the practical acts and objects. In
the 88118 way the orgalisation of the village and community would
be presented, nov not as .. social. struoture of permanent and
tunctl. onally interrelated parts, but 88 a succession ot added
comprehensions ot th e meani~ s of those acts whioh express kinship
connections or public lUe. In 'the acoount of Chan Kom that I now
imagine, one would ... a boy helping hie father, a little later
assuming hie first public ottica under direction ot the village
9Society, Culture, and Personality, p.
lOTii;; Little Corrmuni'fi:" p. 52.
U Ibid., pp.

56...57.

715.
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authOrities, and then fultilling the rolea and statuses nov seen
as he experiences them and comes into them. It wou1d be the
regular transtormations ot act, mind, and personali tq that one
would deSCribe. The new system would b. unified in the form of a
course of development in one generallzed person. 11
On the inside view, tili. development would be a series ot experiences, of

But in order to de80ribe it as the entrance into

added comprehensions.

d1.tterent roles and social. struotures, it would be nace8s&ry' to take the outBid

view.

The members of the Community ver:r likely do not think in terms of

"social structure."
,.

Develpent

2!.

common sense.

The encul.turation process by which a

1'6l"80n acquire8 a world view has been menti0tlC!d already in relationship to

cultural relatlvism.

One ot the main tactors in thls proceal is acquiring

skill in the use ot language.

But the growing child not only needs insights

into the way 'Worda are used, he alao needa to "ahare understandings about the
u.e and mea."1ing ot practioal acts and objects."

Lonergan puts the buis ot

this development in the tact that there ls, "cQIIrIlon to all men, the very spirit
of inquiry that constitute. the soientitio att.itude."

This "light and drive of

intelligent inquiry untolda methodically in mathelJ'.atlcs and empirical science.
In the human child it is a secret wonder that, once the mystery of langu&fe has
been unravelled, rushes torth in a casoade ot questlona. It 'When a. question ls
toll owed by an insight, "one has only to act, or to talk, or perhaps merely' to
think on the baais ot that insight, tor its inoOllpleteness to come to light and
thereby' generate a further question."

The acquisition of a set of related

insight. "in which each succean va act oomplem.ents the accuracy and covers over
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the deficiency of those that went before" is aided by teaching.

And, ot cours

parents are not the only ones who teach--siblings, kin .. and community, as wen
12
as formally conati tuted teachers do so also.
This development is cO:l\llllUllal.. What one man discovers or invents passes
into the possession of others, and i8 subjected to their Criticism and

:nodification.

The collaboration of indiViduals in intellectual achievement

becomes the communal development of the knowledge possessed by tanrl.ly', tribe,
nation, race.

"Not only are men born with a native drive to inquire and

understand, they are born into a community that possesses a cO!'lUllOn fund of
tested answers, and from that fUnd each m81' dl:'aw his variable share, measured
by his capacity, his interests, and his energy."l)

It haa already been

mentioned that the world view implied in the language one learns is not a
scientific world View.

Science seeks general knowledge .. but common sense

specializes in the particular and the concret..

"It is common without being

general, for it consists in a set of insights that remains incOlIlplete, until

there is added at least one further insight into the situation at hand; and,
once that situation has passed, the added insight is no loneer relevant,

that common sense at once reverts to its normal state of incompleteness."

60

14

Therefore, !tit would be an error for common .ense to attempt to formulate its
tncomp1ete set ot insights in detinitions and postulates and to work out their
presuppOSitions and intr'lioationa.

l2toru,rgan, Pp. 17.3-174.
l)~., pp. 174-17;.

-

14Ibid., p. 17,.

For the incomplete set is not the
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understanding ei th~r ot any concrete situation or of any general truth.
,Squally, it would be an error for common sense to attempt a systematic

.formulation of its completed set of insights in some particular case. for eTery
ayatematic formulation enrlsages the universal; and every c,morete situation is
l
particular ... '

6.

!!!!

biologtcal eso !.! experienced.

biological, sinee man is an animal.

Human development is partly

And man 1s conscious

ot some of

the

biologioal needs which Sorokin says determine the different biological
N~8

810S.

can be discoyered in both plants and animals, for in both there are

"aggregates of events" in which "insight

dise~

an intelligible unity that

comonly i8 formulated in terms of biological need or purpose. If But to the
higher animals, unlike plants, men attribute a pattern of conscious experienoe
somewhat similar to their own.

This pattern is

II

a eet of intelligible

relations that link together sequences of sensations, mem.ories, images,

oonationl'l, @!lotions, and bodily movements;

aoo

to

na."a8

the pattern biological

is simply to affirm that the sequenoes converge upon terminal activities of
1ntus8'U:SOept1on or reproduction or. when negative in scope, self-preservation."

16

Yet an animal is conscious ollly a part of the tillle, and during that

time, only a few of the events taking place in his

~

are conscious.

Consoinusness is a "part-tiM employee" in t.he business of life which is called

upon to deal with external situations.

-

l$rbid., pp.

175-176.

Thus, extroversion is basic-.. there are
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external stimulating objecta and a responding subjeot. 17

7.

!h!

aesthetic pattern

2!

e!perience.

The pl. of children, the games

of youth, MUSic and dance are all evdience of a spontaneous exuberance which
goes beyond serious biological purposiveness.

sake of experiencing.

Experience is sou.ght for the

Art gives a liberat.ion from rigid biological purposive-

ness, at the same time frees creative intelligence
verification.

.!!:2! .!!!!

burden

2!.

The act of creation i. the verificatlon of the creative insight.

Art pos.e••es meaning not by precise formulation, but by symbolizing.

It

communicates meaning by a participation in the inspiration ot the artist.

It

conveys the radical wonder of the subject, anc:t the reality of the object of'
man's wonder-it views man as questioning, but concentratu on the moods in

which great que.tions arise, and on the experiences of answering the or
18
ignoring the.
B.

'l.'lle IntellectUal pattern

2! experience.

The flexibility of the

authetic pattern oan develop into a tool tor a lIore serioWl purposiveness, not
bl01ogiC8l now, but for the spirit of
MUst use hi. outer

MI18.S,

in~1r7.

For in inquiry, the observer

not tor basic biological functions, but for a

selective alertne•• under the domination ot elaborate clu.itieationa.

Even

subconscious ot the investigator collaboratea 1n providing the suggestive
inuage. and missing link. in the problem.

Probably all live in this pattern for

brief interval •• the more ta1.alted lind that their experience fit. ra.ther
easily into this pattern.

-

17Ibld., pp. 183-184.
18Ib1 d., pp. 184-185.

But even the very talented l1lUSt pract.ice much
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abnegation to make inquiry the center of their lives.

Years of effort in whioh

living is absorbed in the effort to understand are required. to get many
complementary insights, whioh gradually become more a'ld more oomprehensive as a
19
givon field is mastered.

9. .!h! dr&utic pattern.2!

~riance.

artistic, biological, or intellectual pattern.

Daily living is not in the

The pattern of daily life is

characterized by a desire to get things done, but also to get them done in a
dignified or effective manner.

Eating and mating are two things that must be

done; but mere animality is offensive to man.
a means of keeping warm.

Clothes are adornment, not .,ust

The first work ot cu:t ot a man is his own life; and

t.'lis is a dram.utoLG artistry', in the presence of others.

One lives well not

just to appreciate the value of his own life, but also to win the admiration,
respect, and love of others.

The characters in the drama are moulded by the

drama itself, for it is by insight into that drama that each discovers the
roles he might pI." and under pressure of artistic and affective criteria
chooses and adapts his parts.

No one can choose whether or not he will have a

oharacter, and the pattern a man chooses is going to be constructed out of
20
materials that are already patterned in a W8'3' that he did not choose.
This
fits in well with Redfield's characterisation of how generalized biograplV
would present the organization of the village and the community, nnot

AS

a

social structure of permanent and functionally interrelated parts, but a.s a

-

19Ibid., p. 185-186.
2~., pp. 187-189.
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succession of added eo.llprehensions of the meanings ot those acts which express
21
kinship connections or public life."
It also provides evidence for Sorokin's
affirmation that the cultural aspect of personality is not aC(juirf'Jd biologicall
but is molded by societr and culture:

";:lan f s beliefs, values, and norl'll8, his

emotional and volitional expressions and hie meaningful actions (but n:)t his

purely reflexive and instinctive raactiolUl) are furnished and processed by the
social groups with which he interacts.

There is no other sou.rce for the social

and cultural properttes of the individual.

'He ha.e perhaps a margin of

selection of these ,-aluefl and moanings, but he can choose and create them only
22
from the material ot hi.! social and cultural apvironment.'f
10.

Si..IlIi.TlG.ry.

be by "concrete

The integration of Society, culturo, and personality can

i~eterenceJ If

every individual personalltu is l'ldredlf to a

!IUltl tude of difterent social and cultural qsterns.

A1 though this introduc38

a sort of external unity or indirect causal-functional unity anong the systems,

it also introduces a diversit,. into the personality of the individual.
Sorokin c/)lls this a Ifbiosoc1al pluralism ot egos. H

Human development occurs

through the acqu.isition of egos and in t.he integration ot these egos.

This 18

a ooncrete example of the general principle o! development that a de"1elopment
i8 ch.aracterized by' increasing explanatory differentiation and a sequence of

higher integra t.i.ons.
o!

developm~nt

Redfield suggests th.at an account ot the typical. prooes8

within a communit,. might be a

as a whole, as a generalized biograp!V.

21The kittle Commun1~, pp.

22501.)1etz, Culture,

w., o! oonceiving that oommunit,r

The integration ot a un's different

56-57.

!!ll! .!:£.a.2nalitl.

p. 342.
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"egosl! is not,

accord:!'rlfc~

to Sorokin, al.1to'natic.

conflict with i:lis religious self.

His nolitical self

ma..v be in

In tn?s case, there is an illustration of a

dialectical relationship.
I,onergan nuts the basis of the development of C071'lon ser.se in "the 'TErry
spirt t of inquiry that canst! tutes tne scientific attitude, if the Itlight and
drive of
~,

intellli~ent

inquiry. If

This desire to knoW' is a princ12le

and as such, is also a basic princinle of lntegration.

2!

develop-

For not only is

it the desire to know that leads the scientist to formulate integrated systems,
it is the same desire that spurs the child on to acquire the related set of
insights that constitutes a tested fund of answ:ers to funda·lental Questions
possessed by the community.

The desire to know can IBad a man beyond the

biological pattern of experience, and through the dramat.ic and aesthetic
patterns, to the dominance of the intellectual pattern.
B.

1.

ABNC;R:1AL !1EV'iLOP;'1ENT

Neural!!!2 psychic det>1r'''inations.

Man has a vreater flexibility in

the num.ber of different skills he can learn that do animals.

His faculties are

initially less deter:'1inate. withou.t the more definite organization of neural
processes into patterns of stbrulus and response that characterize anil"JAl
development.

Thus in man there is a rreatAr possibility of the conSCious,

psychic deterrnination ot neural nrocesses in such c011pllcated patterns as 1e
ing how to speak, learning to play the plano, etc.

are demands

or

Inversely, however, there

neural processes tor conscious psychic representation.

in the optic nerve and cerebrum call tor a conscious act of

s~~eing.

Changes
These neu-

ral demands are conditioned 'rI:I such t."'1ings as intensity of the stimulus, health
of the senses, interest, anticipation, and activity.

F':Jr the demands are met

21,
in one or anot.lter of the patterns of experience.
consciousness are already patterned, there must be

Since
SQ119

t~le

elements that enter

pre-conscious selection

and arrangement" and consequentJ.y re1ection and exclusion.

The function of

exclusion of ele:;ents from consciousness is fa.-niliar as Freud's "censor."
Thus, the demands of neural patterns and processes can be met in a variety 0f

ws.,vs.

But t.'1is nexibility is li::1i ted, for there remains an exigence for a

conscious comple."OOnt, an eJdgenee whi.ch" if violated, "invites abnormality. 23
2.

Dra'!l.a.tic~.

Insight can be unwanted, and .1ust as prejudice biases

theoreticlll investigations, so also passions and affections re,ject understandilll
in personal :natters.

Exclusion

~

one inSight ,excludes complementary inSights

that would lead to a balanced viewpoint, and leads to acthi.ty that results in
misundersta"1dirlp' both in oneself and others.

This exclusion of i.nsight

consequently favors withdrawal into a world of onets own making.

There results

a differentiation between the "')ublic persona and the private ego.

This duality

tends to rob one both of the criticism of onets own developing understanding
and of the experience of others. 24

3.

Scotosis.

Flight from understanding can be termed scotosis, and. the

blind spot that results, scotoma.

Although scotosis is unconSCious, arising in

the oensorship that p:overns psychic contents, this spontaneous eXClusion does
not inhibit all contrary insights.
correct, but rendered

harml~ss

These contrary insights can be acoepted as

b,y refusing to ask further relevant

~lestlonsJ

they oan be rejeoted as inoorrect, or they can be immediately brushed aside

2ltonergan, pp. 189-191.

24Ibid., p. 191.

-
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wi th horror wi thout ever judging their correctness.

And inversely, the

insights that expand the scotoma, and carry it out to its logical consequences
.may be rejected as inp1a'lsible.

Thus, the sootosia mq remain unconscious but

be acoompanied b.r conscious bewllderment, doubt, rationalization and inaeouri-

25

ty.

4. B!Preslion. Scotosis is
censorship.

an aberration of' both umerstanding and

For censorship buically' is constructive; its arrangement of

materials and consequ,ent rejection ot materials 18 so that insiehts might arise
in consciousness, not so that insight might be prevented.
the censorship acts to prevent the images
would give rise to the unwanted insights.

.f'r~

But in repreSSion

coming into consCiousness which

It dictates how neural

demar~s

,!lCll to be. met, but admi te any other materials in Bn:Y other arrangement.

are

This

is, it TI1USt be noted, ditterent £rom a oonscious refusal to behave in a oertain
26
manner. it is an unconscious refusal. to understand.

5. Inhibi tion. There are neural denum:!s tor both images

and affects.

Unvanted. insights, however, arise only from images, not trom aftects.

Thus, it

a neural demard for an affect oan become detached from its normal apprehenSive
oanponent and b.r association attached to some other image, the repression "i11
not inhibit this demand.

Thus, by an investigation of ASSOCiative paths, it

seems possible to argue from an affect as attached. to an incoDgrous object to
its initial objeot.

Thus, u the conscious affective attitudes of the 2ersona,

2SIbid., pp. 191-192.

-

26rbid., pp. 192-193.
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or outer actor, are grounded by the acotosis, there is also the repression ot
contrary demand functions, which vill emerge into consciousness with the
affect detached trom its initial object and attached to SODle associated object.
The

8 &me

will hold true tor the inner, L'llaginatlva pertormances ot the E,

so that the persona ia accompanied by a non-conscious anima, and the .!.12 by a
~onacioua shadow. 27

6. Perf'omance..!.!!! dreama. Division ot conscious living between.!1.2

and

persona makes smooth dramatic pertol"SlW1Ca more dttticul t, since the sentiments

of ego and it. non-conaciou8 shadow can slip over into the outward behaVior ot
the persona, maldng it difficult

to keep

COll8~U8

attention away from activit,-

which normally should be governed by hab!t 80 that higher-level contro18

skills and understanding can receive the conscious attention.

It is also

possible tor ruIUl'8l. demands which are repre•••d. to be met through the
as attached to some seconda.r;y, incongruous object.

ot

drs_.

To penetrate into the

latent content of the dream i8 to uncover a secret that has been hid.den trail
the subject himself.

7.

26

l!!! problem .2!..!!!.

The preoccupation

ot depth psychologists seems to

be due to the tact that the peculiarities ot sexual. development make it the
commonest source for scotosis.
greatly change.

But sex development is both prolonged, and simul taneousl:y

organiC and. nsychological.

27

~ ••

Hunger is present frOl'll birth, and does not

pp. 193-194.

28Ibid •• pp. 194-196.

Besides waywardness, there 1s room for mistakea,
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misunderstandi~,

and secretivenes8.

RandOJll occurrence of mistakes or

wqwardness can be corrected by the function of the dream, a healthy environment, opportune in8truction, and inner acceptance of the drive to understand
with its aesthetic and moral 1mplicatiotlll.

ness accumulate in such a

wlrj

But repeated mist.akes or W8i1Ward-

that the improp'c\r handling ot one situation

makes the improper handling of the next situation much more likely, and a

8cotos18, which is 8111lultaneously an aberration ot understanding and an
aberration of eensorship, is eatahlished.

Mislead neural demands ean become so

t1rmly e.tablished and pervasive that they cannot be met in dreans, but emerge

into wald.ng consciousness in the torm ot compu;1sion, pain, and anx1eties.
Control of dramatic living cannot be maintained Itand only thrangh delu8ions can
it pretend to its old maatery.tl 29

8.

Catharaia.

Betore caaplete

1088

of oontrol of dr.lllatic living occurs,

there ean intel'"'Tene a social phenomenom
It was remarked .bove that the dre81ll prorldes release !'rom. 'the randO.ll
repres8ions that are m.ore or less inevitable and that the development
of scoto8U reaulta from the CWIUlatiV'e effect ot succesai.,.. adverse
situations. Now, when adverse situationa become the rule for most
members of a society, then the 800iety can survive only by providing
a regular public equivalent tar the
Such prophylactic group
therapY' will exist wh.....er unconscious needs are met in a disguised
manner. Dr. Stekel's description of the theatre as mass therapy
ech08 Aristotle's statement that tragedy effects a ca.tharsis ot tear
am pity'. Nor is the invention of such therapy in a prim! t1.,..e
culture any Blore difficult than the invention of the cultural
organization itself. For th'3 constrains of the organization give
ris. to corresponding dreamsJ the relief afforded by the dreams can
be noticed, this advertence ~ be given dramatic expression. the
dramatic expression would .et in a disguised form the unconscious

dra..

29

-

Ibid., pp. 196-198.
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nuda of the communitTl and it the draatic expression is not in-

cluded in the cultural organisation, then the culture will not
survi.... to be investigated. by anthropologista.JO

9. Latent function.

One ot the models proposed. in the t1rst chapter as a

h,J'pothetical expreSSion ot the relationships between elenents in the little
community was the tunctional model, described. by Redfield as ua culture or a
sooiev • • • seel .s an organisation ot means designed to &ehieve certain
ends ...

Jl Merton makes the distinction between consciously acknowledged ends

and goals which are not Conscl ou.sly recOin! zed by the oOllllUni ty.

The

conscious goala involve run1teet functions, the unconsoious goala involve
latent fUnctions.

32

Latent functions are ill-qstrated by Lonergan's ax:a.'1lples or

the dream, in the oase ot the individual, or of

SCl!lle

type of dramatio group

therapy, in the cue ot • community.
10.

l!:!!

mbolic model.

between the elements

symbolic model.

Another hypothetical torm ot the relationships

ot a little conmuntty suggested

by Redfield. i8 the

ItIn stloh a model a culture i8 oonceived as represented in its

oharacteristio properties as a whole by certain symbolio representations--epio,

dance form, allegory, etc.

The symbols may be transformations of the reality

represented an:! of the impulses projected

or

perhaps quite fantastio nature}

3<1:bid., p. 198. Lonergan rerers to Wilhelm Stakel, Technique or
!nalYtiC15iyohother!p1 (London, 1939).
Jll1The relation ot Anthropology to the Social Soiences and the Fhtmanitles,
pp. 733-134.

32Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, 2nd. ed. (Glencoe,
Illinoi., 19,1), pp. 64::65'.
-
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assumed is the capacity of symbol-creating and imaginative beings to trame
33
meanings for themselves."
Such symbols are created in the aesthetic pattern
of 8Xpogr1ence, and m8i1 serve latent !unctions of group therapy unknown even to
the creatort
The aesthetic and artistic are symbolic. Free experience and
tree creation are prone to justifY themselves b.Y an ulterior purpose
or significance. Art, then. becOO!es symboliC, but what is
symbolized. i8 obscure. rt is an expression of the human subject
outside the limits of adequate intelleotual formalation or appraisal.
It seeks to mean, to corwq, to impart 8anething that is to be
reached, not through sclence or philosophy, but through a partiCipation
and. in 80M lashion, a nt-enactment ol the artist's inspiration and
intention. Pre-soientific and pre-philosophic, it ~ strain for
truth and value without defining them. Post-biological, it 'I'rIIfq
renect the psychological depths, yet by ~hat very fact, it will go
be,yond th_.34
.
The prophylactic .fUnction of dream symbols and of the dramatic representation

of such sYDlbols to a group has already been mentioned.

It is not only' the art

ot prim.1. ti.,.e lTlan. how8Yer. that can reflect the "psychological depths, tt as
attempts to apply depth psychology to literary cr1 ticisrn have tried to
demonstrate.
11.

----

-

--

Primitive non-difterentiation.

................

............................ .......;;;

The lMchanism ot symbolization and of

unrecognized satisfaction ot unconSCious needs is fiexiblel
This basio meohanism admits a ae1"18s of applioations that raft(e
from knowledge issui~ forth in prophylactic purpose through
SUOCUSiV8 stages of intellectual obnubilation to close approximations to abnormal phenomena. '.yan's oapacity for art and SCience,
pBy'Chology and philosophy', rellgi on and lTlorality. operates in the
primitive and in the uneducated without awareness of the differences

33MThe Relation of Anthropology to the Social SCienees and the Humanities,

pp. 73h-73'.

~onergan,

p. 18,.
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between these departments and wi thout any sharp distinction between
them and underlying impulses or needs. In the complex phenomena of
totem1SDl t in t.11.e rites of the >~other Goddess, in the II\1ths of the
Sky-Gods, there appear renections not oril.7 ot the 8001&1 organization
of hunters, agriculturalists, and parasitic nomads but also or hu.'1Uln
sexuality'; nor did the Mosaic proscription or images prevent the
backsliding lamented by the prophets, nor the nG"stical. night from
sense of the Buddhists eliminate the earlier Brahm1nism, nor the
rational criticism of the Greeks forestall popular hatred or the
Christians.)'
Taboos result from a similar failure to distinguish between moral judgment and
moral feeling, so that moral feeling can take the lead and bec')me disassociated trom its ordinary objects to be extended to a. host of incongruons

Objects. 36
12.

Summ8l]"e

.

The little ocamunity has Deen looked at tram the viewpoint

of development of the individuals within that oomunity'.

The desire to know is

a principle of development, it leads to insights into psychic representations.
Yet other human desires can interfere with the pure desire to
night from insight.
two principles,

mow,

causing

Psychio representations originate from the operation of

neural demand functions, and a pre-eonscious selective agency

referred to as the noensor. It
of a dialectical process.

The action of these two principles is an example

Censorship can select in two

W","St

it can select by

the oonstruction of images that will lead to insights; or it can select by the

repression of images that would lead to un.wnt9d insights.

Censorship would

seem to be the device by which people suppress the nucleation of experiences
which would enable them to get concepts that would show their viewpoint to be

),Ibld., pp. 198-199.

-

-

)6Ibid., p. 199.
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in error, as in Polanyi's

exa~ple

of the Azande.

The repressive activity of

the censorship results in scotosis, inhibition, and difficulty 1n preserving
control o'ler dramatic consciousness.

Drea.:ns provide release for repressed neural demands through attachment of
affects to secondary, incongruous objects.

Dream-symbolism can take nn a social

function when they are given dramatic expression; unconscious needs are met
disguised manner.

in~

The dramatic expression thus possesses a latent function. It

also provides a symbolic integration of the community, for they are united in
the satisfaction of the unconscious need, which symbolizes the psychological
state characteristic of the members of the

cOrn!l\uni~.

Because the primitive

does not distinguish between different areas of culture--explanator,y differenti·
ation is a result of development, t:r.e satisfaction of unconscious needs, often
sexual, is not olearly distinguished from religion; he fails to differentiate
between science and 1l'lagic, between moral judgment and moral. feeling.

Integrat1c~

of the various areas of culture will oe quite different in a primitive
communi~

from integration of culture in a full7 developed civilization.

in the primitive

oo~~unity

For

there has been less differentiation of different

areas, and conseqt.umtly there will be little conscious questioning of the type
carried on in advanced societies.

Primitive men do not conduct seminars on the

relationship of sOience, philosophy', and religion.

Integration is rather on a

more 8,Ymbolic or aesthetic level, a feeling of moral and religious meaningfulness pervades m8.%\Y or :nost areas \")f life.

And although this could be looked

upon as an ideal by someone perturbed t1y the cOl'nplexitles of modern culture, th4
investigator of the small oommunity that is rt:.ore or less pri.mitive should keep
in mind that the failure to make

prop~!r

intellectual distinctions can lead not
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only to "abominations" in the name of religion, blt also to a crI1shing burden
of irrational taboos in the name of moralit,y.
C.

1.

!t!!

wirationa

COMMUNAL DEVEtGPMENT

.2! £!ls !2!.

wrote about me Kaya Indian village

~

Chose Progress.)?

Redfield gives an account

ot a book he

ot Chan iCom in Yucatan, entitled a Village

lilt is the story of how then villagers, leaders and

followers, made up their !I1inda to do something and then did it.

The unity

of the history ll.s in the central fact of the oonspicuous collectlve eftort
of these people to make their c01IIIluni ty the progressl va chief cODllftUni ty of

their region. n38

He s.,s that the ethos--the ,traditional. moral attitudes, and

the world nev--the outlook on real.lt7--rema:ined relatively the same, but that

against this stable background the mind ot the people changed.
that the people tormed aspirations."

"Let us say

The decision for progress was "attended

with a conception of a glorious future, of wl1ding , a village just like the
Americans. ,It 39
2.

Mental. lntmation.

The conception of a glorious future tor the

vUlage ot Chan KODl correaponds to the first phase ot the emergence of an
empirical sociocultural system,

has three phases,

a8

outlined by Sorokin.

(1) mental. integration (2) empirical objectitication, and

0) sooialization. He sa;re of the ti.rst phue:

3?(Chicago, 1950).

38The Little Communttz, pp. 101-102.

39

~., p.

He says the process

106.
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The integration ot two or more meanings into one system is an act
ot creation occurring in the human mind. Whether such a concention
or a new system is "tvo and two make tour"; or a syllogism; or

an idea tor a poem, picture, sculpture, or song; or a unification
ot two or more technical ideas into a new invention; or a synthesis
of two or more meanings and systems ot meanings into the complex
system ot .. sclentitio theory, religious creed, code of law, artistic creation or into an economic, poll tical , or an organizational.
..,st-.-such an integration of meanings is aJ.va;rs the first logical
pbaae ot an ..ergenoe ot 8D,1 new sociocultural 8Y'Stera. For our
purposes it is unesa.ntial whether it i. done deliberatelJ' by
the given individual. or without any preconceived intention; whether
it evolve. througb a long serie. ot eftorUl, experimenta, oalculations, deductions, or apontaneously, in the twinkling of an eye,
through .. aamentar;r intuition--sCIIIleti.'l9. even in a dream ot ec...
stasy, or in any other wa;y. Likewi.e it is unessential tor our
purpose. whether such a synthesis is prodDced in one or in lI1&D7
nuda, suggested by a tortunate combination of extel"nal cireUlllstance., or started by' some need or cur1~ity- telt by the integrat.ing person. What is important 1s the act of integration itselt,
which evolve. a system. ot meanings (however simple) out ot what was
before disjointed congeries ot meanings. When such an integration
is created for the first time in the history ot mankind, it is an
absolutely new integration. 'When an existing integration of meanings
is learned by' a given individual or group--for instance, b,r a pupil
who learns the mul tlpllcation table·..! t is new to suoh a person or
group. 40
).

Empirical objectification.

realm of ideological culture.

The first phase remains entirely in the

Keaninrs, values, and norms that "su! t frau a

mental integration must tind vehicles.
To becOl'le a real empirioal system it has to incarnate itself into a
eet of empirical vehicles through whioh it can be conve;yed to others.
It Newton' 8 Principia had been thought through by Newton but never
told to othare, or wrItten and published, his system of physics wOt1ld
not haye been born lUI an empirical socioeultural system. it would
have remained in the realm. ot pure meanings. Empirical.l7 it would
have diecl at the steee ot conception. When it vu written and published-that is, incarnated into a set ot _teri&! (color-light) conductors
(manusoript ot book)-it took the second step in the prooess ot
transition from the realm of pure meanings into that ot empirical

4~ics, IV, 62-6).
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sociocul tural reality. When other persons read and accepted it, it
took a next step in its grounding.4i

4. Socialisation. Thie next step is that of socialisation:
A B,1stem incarnated into a eet of vehicles sometimes does not find
other individuals 88 ita recipients, users, and bearers. In that
case it 1s stillborn, empirica.lly dead at the moment of 1ts birth.
Thousands of P08l1l8, novels, songs, pictures, sculptures, and
political, religious, SCientifiC, or philosophical systems are
c')uceived and then printed, told, broadcast, objectified through many
empirical vehicles. And yet most of them never succeed in socializing themselves, in being accepted and used by &n1'b0d7 but their
authors. • •• Here again are different degrees of grounding. Some
systems spread. and are acoepted by large masses 01 people, some by'
only .. few persons. Some enter into a close allianoe with other
existing ayatePtsJ some remain completely isolated. The differenoes
are mAlV'. But all systems that are born alive, And live for some
time after the second phase, have to pastt through the above three
phasel.42
.

5. Emergence 2! .! sociocultural !lstem !!! £2.!!!!.2!. In Redfield t •
account, the conception of a glorious tuture tor the Village vaa a mental
integration.

It. was an !!piration for the future, conceived as somehow

difterent trom the past.

Redfield contruts the aspirations of Chan !tom with

the conceptions at the future had in more isolated little communities.
Aspirations are conceptions as to how the future will be or oan
1'he concept is called torth when
we attend to people whose states of mind are changing under changing
cirCumstances. If we study' a stable and isolated community.. we
shall probably find, as I remarked earlier, that the future is
conceived to be like the past. Such people have no aspirations.
But the peonle of Chan Kom, like people in thousands ot other little
communities allover the world at present, have tormed aspirations.
So we need the word to desoribe an element ot their state of mind
that i8 distinct from ethos and world view, though of course related
to both. The old way of c onceiving the norma of conduct and the
be m.ade different from the past.

41 Ibid., p.

-

42Ibid•

-

64.
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nature of au things persists, but now aspirations to make things
dU'terent lead the wq toward change, and. we are required to exa..une
the ettect ot the old ethos and world view in li",.1 ting the
aspirations, or the ettect ot the aspirations in modit,ying the ethos
and world view.
Aspiration corresponds to myth. It is a vision of the desired
state ot things. But it is prospective, and it is more C"loselJr
related to action than are the retrospective myths ot the lit-Uechanging communities; the past cannot be livedJ the tuture must be.
So asoiration gives rise to policy at the point where the people
tormulate means to realize the aspirations. '!'he people ot Chan
Kem formed a Doliey to accomplish their upirations to become a
modern town. They determined on ways of appeal to the atate government. They adopted a program ot leadership among the neighboring
villages. They imposed on themselves obligations of work and service
that vould make theil' oonmIni ty something different from what it had
been betore. Policy is the servant ot aspiration, the expression in
real lite ot a dream ot improvement. Po~iey is primarUy politioal;
it haa to do wi til controls and -4nfiuence. on aotion, internal to the
community and external, domestic and. foreign. Poliey, like aspira.tion, is a conception that i8 needed in the characterization or
changing communities.43
In Chan Kom, mental integration vas, in this ease, largely' in terms ot a
political, SOCiAl, and economic organization ot the community.

Empirical

objectification was initially in the tOl"Jl ot talking about the new conception

ot what

Chan KOII

wu to be.

Th1a conception had to attain the stage ot

socialisation betore a new phase of mental integration took place, that ot
torming policies to achieve the goal.
process ot putting them into etfect.

The policies were socialized in the verr

Once the aspiration was shared by tbe

majority of the OOlllllUn1ty, the sooializat.ion ot the means to achieve the goals
tollowed easily.

The ut}iratlon, in Soroldn's terminology, was not a Simple

integration of meanings; it was a value.

Policy consisted in norma for

activity direoted towards achieving that value.

43The Little Community, pp. 106.·107.

The activity itselt was an
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u:pr&8sion ot the norms and values, and thus was a vehicle for these norma
and values, an instance

ot behavioral oulture.

6. Mental integration.!!!! iruJight. 5oroldn's "integration ot two or more
meanings 1nto one system" se8ll18 to correspond closely to Lonergan's concent1on
of insight.

Sorokin gives examples ot different kinds of lnsight--"two and

two make tonr, tI a syllogism, an artistic insight, a technological insight, a
scienti.f'ic, religious, legal, or organizational insight. Mention has already'
been made ot the artistic insight.

It is characteristio ot tbe aesthetic

pattern ot consciousness, it is a liberation from strict biolOgical. purposiveness as well as from the burden of scientific ,veritication, it linda! its
verifioation in the artistic crea.tion itself,!a4 or, in Soroldn's terminology,
it finds its verifioation in the phtlSe of empirical objectification.
Scientific insights, of oourse, are quite difterentJ they are not considered
verified 1n the aot ot formulating them, tor at the stage of formulation they
are merely hypotheses which must be tested.

But the insights behind the

aspirations of the village ot Chan Kom were neither scientitic nor artistic,
rut practical.

As Lonergan says, "human intelligence 18 not only speculative

but also practical.

So far from beirg content to determine the unities ancl

correlations 1n things as t.hey are, it 1s constantly on the watch to discern
the possibilities that reveal things aa they might be. u45 Both types ot
insights result in mental integration, in integration of ideological culture.

b\oner!San. PP.

184-185.
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The integration ot ideological eulture results in a "pure system ot meanings. II

As has been seen, whether or not a system at meanings is integrated or not does
not depend upon its being veritled, but upon its logical or aesthetic
conslstency in 1taelt, or its lqsical or aesthetic dependence or interdependenc
of the elements. L6

7.

ot

Transtormation

£!

little cOl'lll1UIrl.tlea.

Redfield sqs that the "people

Chan Kom, like people in thoTlsands of little communities allover the world

at present, ha.ve f'ormed aspirations. 1I

And he notes that aspirations, unlike

the myths of' the primitive community, are f'orAard looking.

The
,-

control the direction of' development is

.ll! ...Tr....&nS
........
t...,Ol"...mI.;.;;;.,;;,...
;ti o...,ns
....'

~scribed

in

1'his attempt to

-

Primitive World and

"Man 1.s selt-made through the slow and unpremed1ated.

growth of culture and civilisation.

~an

later attempts to take control ot this

process and to direct it where be wills. ,,41 Aga.1n, Redt1eld sqs that in a

tolk SOCiety, "the 1I10ral. order 1s, on the whole, taken as given. • • •
tirst cities bring a literate .lite and

and to record.

&

new

freedOIll

But the

ot the mind to criticiz.

Then the l"lloraJ. order, th01lgh it i8 shaken by clv1lizlltion, l..s

also, in civilization, taken hy reason into charge."

48 Education takes a new

slant.

<-).3

Since primitive man tends to seE! the .future

a reproduction ot the

L'lltllsdiate past, education i8 geared to produce adults that are similar to their

parents.

In contrast, modern education emphasis.s change; it is geared to make

46Sorokin, Socie1ir:, Culture,

47Th•

l!r1m1t1ve World

48Ib1d., p. 119.

-

.!!!2

"Personality, p. 1M, l?lnamics, IV, 21.

!!!2.!!:! ...Tr;".;aIl;;;;;.;.;;8..,to;;;;rm;.,;.;;;;;at...i;;.;::o;.;;nB;;;.'

p. 113.
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children into adults ditferent from their parents, it is an instrument
progress.

49

or

And Redfield notes in this context, as he did in the discussion of

the aspirations ot

Chan Kom,

that the myths of primitives tend to look towards

the past, but that the Jq'tha of modern man look to the future, to shape it in
a w., different from the past.

50

-

8. Pr1m.1tive world
view.
,

Lonergan

says

that in :p1"1m.itive

man

·oapact ty tor art and sOience, psychology and philosophy', religion

the

and

morali t;rI operates • • • without awareness of the ditterences between these
d.epartmenta and without any sharp distinction between them and underlying

impulse. or needs. MSi This lack ot di.tinotiqns leada to a spontaneous
integration of a pre-ci'rilized conwuni t.Y which is not
ordering

mob a conscious

ot distinct things u it 18 a tel t participation in things not clearly

distinguished from one another.
If

80

Redfield

aq8

that the ooncept ot .elf is the

axis of world view. It And in every world view, there will be .ome degree ot

distinction between the self and the non-self; the nOD-self will be distinguished into

huJun and

non-humans and the non-human aspect of the non-selt will

be further distinguished into nature and God.

But in the world vi..,

or

primitive man, the selt which confronts the non-self i8 not sharp17 distinguiened from it.

"Tne triangle of man, nature, God is originally no triangle

at all; the distinctness

or ita side.

49Ibid., pp. 120-121.

-

50Ibid., p. 125.

-

and the sharpne.s of the angles are a

230

later development, a product ot civilization."
OU8.

Hence, integration is spontane.

Man does not oonfront nature, but rather "does his part within

it."

i>!an t s attitude towards what is not-man i8 one ot "partioipant maintenance," in
a world in which man, nature, and God are not entirely separable and act in a
personal way towards one another.

"It almost follows that the relations among

the entities-man, nature, and God however distingui8hed or merged-are not
personal but also, as personal relationships alwq8 tend to be, Moru. Il

9.

Transtorm.a.tion.2! primitive world!!!!.

From

8.

'2

0

world view nin which

man was part of nature and god and acted out his sense ot participation," man
gradually ttoomes to stand a8ide and look tirs1( at Ood-Nature, then, in the case

ot the Hebrews, God-without-Nature, and then, beginning with the Ionian
philosophers • • • at nature without God. 1t Subsequently I the exploitation of
nature by the use of technology becomes the predominant attitude.

"1'b.e

aontempora.ry Western world, now imitated by the Orient, tends to regard the
relation of man to nature as a relation of man to plV'sical matter in whioh the
application ot piV'sioal SCience to man's material comfort is mants paramount
assignment on earth."

5.3

Now it is obvious that scae such transformation was

necessary if aul. tural life wu to develop; failure to distingui8h between
SCience, art, philosophy, religion. morality, and biological impulses does not
help any of these.

But Bidney points out that specialization of oultural life

has made modern :nan feel the need "for some principle of unifioation whereby' to

52Red.tiel.d, "The Primi ti ve ',;orld View, It ProoeedilJ s of the Amerioan
Philosophical Society, XCVI (Februa.r;r, 19$2), jo-:JS.
--

53The Primitive World!!!!.!l! 'fransformations, pp. 109-110.
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comprehend our culture as a whole and to provide a common meaning and objective

for the multitude or diverse interests and values.

Practically, the Second

World T.<:ar, even more than al\Y theoretical argument, has led thin.1<ing men to

realize that genuine, enduring peace requires a harmon;y of world cultures whioh
may enable all the peoples of the world to live together in peace, assured or

their common rights and opportunities for progressive development. n

,4

!ldney

here formulates 8 very powerf'ul 8!piration or 'TlOdern man, the desire for unity.
Integration 1s thus oonceived as a value.

10.

Differentiation

~

development.

The differentiation of man, nature,

and God, and the differentiation of the varioqs areas ot cultural life, are
necessary tor oultural. development.

Lonergan say's that differentiation is

characteristic ot &f\Y course of developmentr
Thus, initial single cells of different organisms admit material
dirterenees, for example. in the number or chrOOlOSO!llea, but
their tunctionlng does not exhibit dltferenoes that are comparable
to the later dlfterenoe. in f\mctioning. Again, men or widely
different temperament and character began, as intants, from instanou of senai tive oonsciousness that not only were remarkab17
ailnUar but also raarkably und1.f'f'erentiateciJ there were
.ensationa but percept!veness wu undeveloped, there was nothing
to remember and pCMers of imagination Wf're latent, afrects were
global af'fairs of elementary types J and skills were 11m1ted to
walling_ Finally, intellectual development has its roots in the
detached and disinterested desire to know, but the mere desire
is not knowledge of anything; it will lead to highly' differentiated
structures that are masteries of logiC, mathematiCS, natural science,
common eense, philosophy, and human science; but these intelligible
differentiations are yet to co_, am they' come on.lJr in and through
the process of development."

,4Bidney, p. 367.

,St,onergan,

p.

4,3.

&

232
Soroldn s.,.. that human intellectual

devel~nt

is impossible without

social development. Without interaction mental development does not Of'4ur,
there is no tran8ll1.s.ion ot cultural achievements or inYelltiotUl, there is no
language developed, there i8 no ponibilit)" ot developing distimtions between
true, false, right, wrong, normal, and abnormal.

The basic categories

ot

human thought-identity, difterence, causality, space, tlM--need a framework:

ot interaction. "Their emergence

has occurred only' wi til the de".lopment

interaction, ot social difterentiation, stratIfication, and integration.

ot
More

speclt1call.)", the appearance ot the anal.y'tlcal &billty ot the human lIIind 18 a

concomitant ot the d....lopment ot 80cial difrfPrentiatlon.

And the growth

ot

the synthesizing faC'.llV ot man bu accompanied the proces8 or integration or

aocial groups and oultural syatems ••S6
11.

Swamw.

Chan Icn is an instance ot a community torming conscious

aspirations and. striving to direct its own development to achieve these
upiratione.

The process ot the emergence of the desired goal is de8cribed. by'

Sorokin as consisting ot !nental integration, empir10al objectilicati on, and
socialization.

'ormation of aspirations and the development ot polioie8 to

achieve them is characteristio of the transformation of tolk
throughout the world tocla\r.

CClIRMUni ties

Also characteristic ot the development ot a

cc:mtmUni t,. is increasing explanatory ditterentiation.

On a cul rural level there

is a growing awareness ot distinctions between man and nature and God, and. ot
the ditterent aspecte ot man' 8 cuI tural 11te.

On the 80cial level there is the

emergence ot social ditferentiation and stratitication.

56Sooietl, Culture,

.!!!!!

Peraonalltr, p. 344.

Speoialisation, howey

23)
makes integration a problem tor human intelligence, tor 11fe is no longer
spontaneously integrated by an undifferentlated order of all things in whioh
man partioipates.

He has a oonsoiousness

ot control over material nature as

well as aver his own development.
D.

EMERGENCE OF THE EXPLANATORY
VIPMP~NT

1.

l!!! p2;"incipat

notion

2!

objectiv1t"y1

<a> Judgment.

The most baslc

distinction that must be made in order to arrive at an explanatory viewpoint is
that between the self and the nOll-self, which. Redtield 811i1S ill not sharply made

in the primitive world view..
Lonergan terms the

ft

selt-af'firma tion of the kno;.et", It which is necessary for the

notion ot ObjectiviV.
eubetantiated.

For this distlnotJ-on 18 necessary tar what

This Hlt-att1rm&tion, 11ke tItf¥ atfirmation, lIlUst be

Lonergan sa.y. that the process of verifioation leads to "a

grasp ot the unconditioned. ft
wishes to verity.

The oondi tioned is the i1n>othetlcal statement one

The conditions are usually oast in the form ot "1t" clausesa

A is true it B,e,D, and E are true.

The araap ot the unconditioned oonsists in

what Lonergan calls a reno: insight, an answer to the question

"Is it true."

tor refieotion,

-

By this refiex insight, one grasps what conditions must be

fulfilled, and whether or not they are fulfilled.

Only by' this grasp, can one

discover a link between the coOO1 tioned (the hypothesi.) and its conditions, to

grasp the bypothesis as unconditioned.

57 It is failure to recognize the need

tor this refiex insight, it seems, that Polmy!. criticizes philosophers who, in
analyzing the process ot ·terU"ication, "invariably choose &s specimens such

570f• Lonergan, pp. 2n-3l5 far a

full discussion of judgment.
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laws as are not in doubt," thus overlooking the tact that

11 aI\V

crt tioal

verification of' a f'cientific statement requires the same powers for recognizing

rationali~

in naturo as does the process of scientific discovery. use

It is

through such a renex insight the.t theyalue judgments ot scientuts enter into

their acceptance or rejection of scientif1c hypotheses, since, as Furt.., s.,.,
it is very ran that the conditions take the form, "If,
X 1s

true, x,,.,
2.

notion

.2!

h3'Pothes1s

_

and z will follow. 1I59

!b! 2rincipal

.!!l!!.2!!1I !!,

(b) self-affirmation.
........................................ In eolt-

objectivityt

affirft'lI:,tion, "the relevant conditioned is the statement, I am a knower.

The

link between the conditioned and its conditton!, m.ay be cast in the proposition,

I am a knower, if I am a concrete and intelllgible unity-identity-whole g..e.,
a thin.s;""1, characterized

by

acts ot sensing, perceiving, imagining, inquiring,

understand:irg J formulating, renecting, grasping the unconditioned, and

judging.

The fulfilment ot: the conditions is given in consciousness."

). !!l! principle

notion

2!

60

(o)! pattern 2!. juggment.s.

obJectivi'!Qrl

Lonergan sqs that "there is objectivity if there are distinct beings, some of
which

bo~~

know themselves and know others as others." And this notion

objectivity demands a definite pattern of ju-lgments.

or

The notion is reached it

to the affirmation, ttl am a knower," is added the judgment, "This is a

tJpewri'ter," and the further judgment, "I

&i1'l

not this ty'pewr1ter."

the self and the typewriter are known as objects.

sepola.nyi, Personal Knowledre, pp. 13-14.
'59Furfey, ftThe Problem of Values," p. Sll-4.

60x,0nergan, p. 319.

Now both

tlAn indefinite number of

23S
further objects may be added by makil1g the additional appropriate positive and
negative judgments.

'inal.ly', in so tar as one can intelligently grasp and

reasonably att1l"1l the existenoe of other knowers besides oneself, one can add
to the 118t the objeots that are also subjects ...61 'rhus, Sorokin's subjects of
interaction" are objects as well, for an object is a thing which 18 not oneself
and a subject is an object that 1s "characterized by acts ot sensing, percein
imagining, inquiring, understanding, formulating, refiecting, grasping the

uncondi tiona, and judg1.rc."

Lt.. ............
Levels
of ..............
consciousness.
The principle notion of objectivitY' is not
__
iooiiiioMo....................
reached in the dramatio, aesthetio, or

b1ol~cal

but only in the intellectual pattern.

'or biological consciousness i8 directed

pattern of oonsciousness,

towards the tult1l.lJaent of biological needa, ..sthetic consoiousness is free

both from biological pul'poaivenen and the demand tor the unconditioned, and

dramatic consciousness is conoerned not with determining the correlat.ions in

things

&8 they'

effect!vel.y.

cst, but in letting insights into how to get thing. done

Intellectual consciowmess, on the other hand, is dominated by

the demand tor the uncondl tloned, for verification.
different levels

.2£. ...c...on8;;,; ; ; .;c;, ; ;l...ou.-&n8;; ,; .; ,.; , ; ;...
s s Wi thin

There are, however,

the intellectual pattern, becau.e

consciousness i. "an awareness il'lll1&ll8nt. in cognit.ional acta," and intellectual
ooneciowm... i8 characterilled by acta of experience, understanding, and

judgment.

-

61zbid., pp. 376-377.

,

2)6
There is an empirical consciousness characteristic of sensing,
perceiving, imagining. As the content of these acts is merely'
presented or represented, so t.he awareness :1lmaanent in the acts
is the mere giv8IHJSS of the acts. But there 1s an intelligent
conSCiousness charaoteristic ot inquiry, insight, and formulation.
On this level. cognitional process not merely strives tor and
reaches the intell.igible, but in doing so it exhibits 1ts intelligence; 1t operates intelligently. The awareness is present but
it is the awareness ot intelligence, of what strives to understand,
ot what is saUstied by understanding, of what formulates the
understood, not as a schoolboT repeating by rote a definition, but
as one that defines because he grasps why that detinitJ.on hits
things ott. Finally, on the third level ot renection, grasp ot
the unconditioned, and judgment, th"re is rational consCiousness.
It is the emergence and the errective operation of a single l_
ot utmost generality', the law ot sufficient reuon, where the
sutfiCient reason is the unconditioned. It emerge. aa a demand
tor the uncondi tioned &I¥l a refusal to assent unreservedly on any
leaaer ground. It advance. to grasp of t;he unconditioned. It
terminate. in the rational cqmpulsion by 'Which grasp ot the unconditioned caMlanda uaent.62
).

Normative objectiviV.

Rational consciousness does not pttrtain to the

emergel¥'J8 of an empirical 8ociooultural 878tem directlT, tor it is not
identified. with mental integration, with empirical objectification, or with
socialization.

It is concerned indireetl.;r with socializa.tion in the cue ot

speculative insights, for a coununiV ot scientists is unlikely to be pereuaded

to be the "recipients, users, and bearers" of a
are somehow veritted.

system of meanings unless thq

Rational. conaciousMs8 pertaina directly to the

correctness of the trrpe ot mental integration had in a speculative insight, and
thus constitutes the ground or normative objectivitz. which is "objectivity
opposed to the eubjeotiv1ty of wishful thinking, of rash or e.xce••ivelJ'
cautiou. judgments, or allowing jo;r or sadness, hope or tear, love or

62Ibid.,

-

p. )22.

ILl
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detestation, to interfere with the proper march of cognitional process. 1t
ground lios in

desire to

"th.

kno~,"

unfolding

63

Ita

ot the unrestricted, detached, disinterested

thus putting it in oppOSition to obscurantisM, interference or

inhibition b.r other human desires, and making cognitional process subordinate

to the satisfaction or other desires.
senae ot the

t~rm,

To be objective, "in the normative

i8 to give tree rein to the pure deSire, to ita questions

tor intelligence, and to its questions tor refiection.

Fu.rther, it is to dis-

tinguish between questlons tor intelligence that admit prOXimate solutions and
other questions ot the same type that, at present, cannot be solved.
S1m1larly, it is to distinguish between sound :queations, and on the other hand,

queatiordl that are meaningless or incoherent or Ulegitblate." And upon this
norma:Uve objectivitq rests tM validit.Y of all logic and methods, tor these
"are intelligent a.nd rational; their grounds are not belief nor propaganda nor

the pragmatic utility of atom-bombs and lltYlon stockingsJ their erounds are the
inner ex1.gence ot the pure desire to know.

they succeed in tormulating that
insotar as they tail.'"

6. Absolute
context

or

(~rnam1c

They are to be accepted insofar as

ex:igenceJ and. they are to be revised

64

obJectivi~.

Absolute objectivity c:)ncerns, not a patterned

judgments as does the principal notion, nor the dynamic exigence

that constitutes normative objectivity, but the 5inel. judgments one reaches by'
accepting that norm.

64
-

Absolute objeotivity removes the content ot judgment tl"om

63Ibid., pp. .380-)81.
Ib1d.

2J8
relati'ri.ty' to the judging ind1Y1dual, and the time and place at which he utters

the judgment.

lIeUSar'l!I

crossing ot the Rubicon was a contingent event

occu.rring at a particular place and time.

But a true aftirmation

is an eternal, immutable, definiti..... validity.

or

that event

For it it is true 'that he did

cross, then no one W'hate"er at any place or time can truly deny that he d1d.,,6S
It is by absolute objectivity that knowledge acquires its publicit.r, tor sinee
the unconditioned. is withdrawn trca relativity to the one who utters the
judgment, it also
1981'S

becOtMS

ace_sible to other knowers.

Absolute objectivity

nothing about an absolute space or time, and doe. not necessarily involve

saying that a thing, to' be real, must be in

t~,

or in space.

"Absolute

objectivity is simply' a property ot the unconditioned, and the unconditioned,

as such, says nothing about space or time.

It one's imagination makes the use

ot the preposition 'within' imperative, then one may s8':1 that ""'8l'7 judgment is
within a context ot other judgments, and that every-unconditioned i8 within a

66

universe ot being.1I

7. ¥!!e!l"1ential objectivitz. Experiential objectivity "is the given as
The field ot materials which 1s questioned, it is in itselt

given. tt

unquestionable and indubitable, tor it is not constituted by annering
questione, it

COMS

prior to questioning.

The given 18 residual and dUtuse,

for it is what remains alter insight and fonwlation have selected and

6SIbid., pp. 378-379.

66
-

Ibid •

239
indicated clearly and precisel,. difterent elements in the given.

67 The given

would constitute the "randaa backgroundl ! spoken of b.1 Polan;'fi in describing the
law ot consistenq in the use of language, in

identifyi~

different si tuat.ions

in respect to some particular feature, one must first Itdecide what variations
of our experience are irrelevant to the identification of this recurrent
teature, as forming no part. of it, i.e. we must disoriminate against ita randca
68
baokgrc.lund. "
Sorokin sqs that the given is a Iteomplioated and inexhaustible
chaos of

int1n1te~

numerous and diverse fragments,U and that only by' methods

such as the oausal-funotional and logioo-mean1ng:fUl. methods of integration can

one order el_ents of tQis chaos into

cODq)reh~nsible

,.,.stem.

69

Lonergan s."s

that the given as given is equall.y' valid in all of its parts, but difterentl7

significant; the imaginations, dreams, and personal equations that must be ,2!!regarded by the plVsicist lIIUSt be e!l?lained by the psychologist.

Lonergan's

acoount of the given is e.xtrinsicl
It involves no desoription of the stream of sensitive consciou8ness. It involves no theol"'.1 of that stream. It discusses neither
the contribution of the empirioal.ly conscious subject nor the
contribution of other 'outside' agents. It sUtp~ notes that
refieotion and judgment presuppose understanding, that inquiry
and understanding presuppose .. terials tor inqui1"1 and something
to be understood. Such presupposed materials will be unquestionable and indubitable, tor they are not constituted b.r answering
questions. They will be residual and diffuse, for they' are what
is left over once the f'rui ta of inquiry and renection are subtracted trom cogni tiona! contents. 70

68personal

67Ibid., pp. 381-382.
Knowledse, pp. 79-80.

69Br9!!1cs, I, 22.

-

1OxbicL., pp. 362-383.
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8. 1h! desire

1:.2~.

The explanatory viewpoint rests upon the correct

unfolding of the deSire to know in the intellectual pattern of experience.

But

there are other human desires and needs to which human understanding can be
subordinated in the biological, aesthetic, and drama.tic patterns of conscious

experience. And primitive man doea not distinguish between the different
patterns of experience, between desires and needs.

Even more, he tails to

distinguish clearly between himaelt as an empirically, intelligently, and

rationally conscious knower, and what is not himself.

Thus he cannot formulate

the principal notion of ob.ject1v1 ty, nor the other partial aspects

objectivity, related as they are to the desire. to know.
knows them through experience, insight, and judgments.
conceptual tools to

beCCllll8

He knows things, and
But he lacks the

critically aware of the structure ot his knowing,

and of the wqs that desires other than the pure desire

with correct knowing.

ot

to know oan interfere

And most important, he does not know that he

self-knowledge ot hi. knowing processes.

71

lacks this

The critical awareness necessar,y

for science. eapeoial17 for a scientific study of man, is a result of a long
process of development.

And even the cultural relativist is aware of this

development towards greater objectivity.

Anthropologists recognise a trend in

history which haa resulted in a standard of truth and

or good

that i. inherentl

better than that pos• •sed b7 the primitives.

What the anthropologist s.-;rs about the magic practiced in a prim! tiv.
society' is to the anthropologist really truer, in some sens., than
what the native saye about it. Dr .. Lads sug,ests that the
'l'epoztecans would be better otf with le.s magiC and more applied
science. I do not think that he r ••ls he is expressing mere~ an

enculturated judgment no more valid than what a preliterate native
would say on the subject. • •• Anthropologists, like other people
around them recognize a double standard ot excellence in t1.nding the
truth. The primitive man is not expected to reach the kind of
truth we oall scientific with the same success with whioh civilized
:nan is expected to reach it. There has been a transformation ot
judgment 88 to truth.
But I say alao that there haa been a transformation as to
judgment as to the good. 'fhe moral order has been provided with
measures of excellence unknown ani! unknowable in preciviUllecl
SOCiety. The anthropologist, insofar as his describing 1nvolves,
as I think it does, some valuing. makes un ot the. . new measures,
and does not expect his subject matter, the preUterate people. to
make use ot them in valuing him. 72

These transformations or judgment have come about through the gradual recognition ot the d.1.tterences between difterent kind,l ot cultural aotivi ty.. and
especially of the reoogni tion of the dallinanoe of the desire to know with it.
demand for the unconditioned.

9.

Self-knowledge!:!!! soientific development.

Without knowledge ot selt

as distinct from. other things, it is impossible to attain the principal notion
of objectivity, which consiats in a patterned oontext ot judgments att1rm1ng
the existence of ditterent objects, some

ot which are also knowers, or subjects

And without knowledge of such distinct ooncrete un! tie8 in data, there can be
no continult,y of acientifio development.

For sCientifio development occurs

through sequences of d1!terent eXplanatory aystema.

Systems, however, have to

be discovered and verified in data; 11they cannot be discovered in &n.V' data

whatever, neither can they be discovered and veritied in the data which the;r
thfJllaelvea select, tor then a numb$!' of incompatible 8Ystem.s would be equally'
veri.tiable tor each would satiety equally well the data it selected.

Accord-

ingl.y, scientific thought needs, not only explanatory systems, but also
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descriptions that determine the data whioh explanations must satist.v."
"soientific thought needs the notion of the thing, wnich has

88

Thus,

its properties

both experiential ard explanatory conjugates Lierms expressing properties as

described and as explaineg7', which remains identical whether it is described

01"

explained, which by ita identity demands a coherent explanation or set of

explanations that is veritiable in the easily ascertainable data at the thing
&8

described ... 13

discussed..

Tn. danger of letting the system select the data has al.r~

It is to use what are mereljr hypotheses as dogmatic preSCriptions

for the denial at data that do not agree with these hypotheses.

Although it ia

true, u Polan1i sqa, that one's language itIrp?-1es a set of aaaumptiona or
antiCipations of what the univer.. is 11ke, nevertheless, 1t the theor.r of the
universe implied in onets language includes the notion at the thing, one will
have a tirm basis for the critici_ of competing explanatory qstellls.
thing can be described.

The

Then the question can be raiaed, "Which qst_ best

satisfies the data, not that it selects itselt, but that a deSCription ot the
thing in question brings to light?"

In the sciences that atudy man, it is onl7

through the developl1l6nt ot philosophy, the\)logy, ethiCS, mathematiCS, art, and
science over a long period ot time that the self-knowledge neceSS817 tor an
adequate description ot man as a thing has emerged.

The student ot SOCiology,

psychology, or anthropology seea too much dogmatic selection

ot data

by

cOl1lpeting explanatory syatems in theae tields to doubt tor very long whether or
not there is &a yet an adequate SCientific !!,planation at Man that satisfies
all the data nov a-vailable.

24.3
Scientific controver!y.

10.

not remove scientific controversy.

Any a'no'mt of develo'lment of m(~thods will

As Lonert;'an says,

not succeed in toae :ng old dogs new t.ricks.

II

scientific method does

As ;1ro: Planck testified, a new

scientific position rains ;:eneral acceptance, not by making opponents change

holding its own '!Util old a~:e has retired tbem for their
1I74
professional Chairs.
This confiMs Fur'fayls contention that value
their :'linds, hut

[yJ

judgments play a rreat role in detormining scientists' acceptance of hypotheses
It also dashes the hope of aQ1

~ethodolo~ists

who look for criteria of

objectivity that does away with the need for critical ronection and the refiex
insight that

~:·ra.sps

the unconditioned.

ItI regard the automatic solution as a mere ':JYth that

Lonergan t s judgment:

springs

rro~

The wr1:ter hF'artily agrees with

a non-rational hankerinp atter a non-rational security, tor every

solution is to be discovered by intelligence and is to be accepted by

reasonableness, and neither the exercise of intelligence nor the exercise of
reasonableness is automatic. '1

ll.

~utomatic

7$

knowledge.

Palmy! gives a sharp critioism of this

rational hankering after a non-rational security."

I· non-

He says that "the> ideal ot

strictly objeotive knowledge, paradigmatlcally formulated by Laplace, continues
to sustain a uui'Tersal tendency to enhance the observational accuracy and

systematiC preciSion ot sCienoe, at the expense of its bearing on its subject

-

74Ibid., p.

526.
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matter."

!h1s reeul ts in a "menaoe to all cultural values, including those

science, try an acceptance at a oonception

»f

')f

man derived from a Laplacean ideal

of knowledge and by the conduot of human affairs in the light of such a
conception."

It leads to the view that

Hp'~litical

action is neoessarilT shaped

by force, motivated b;( greed and fear, with ",:orality used as a soreen to delude

the victims. 1t

He claims that the "establishment in our time of the scientific

method as th8 supreme interpreter ot hu.man affairs" has created a. tension in
our culture "similar to that generated at an earlier time by the rebellion of

reason agalnst religion, but even more comprehensive in its scope."

For the

Lapla.cean view of scienoe leads to the ocnvic\ion that the supreme good
consists in "material welfare and the establi.shment of an unlimited power for
imposing the conditions ot matnrial weltare."

This view then can add a

supposed scientU'ic objectivity t,) intense moral aspiratiOns, and will demand
that all cultural activities serve the state in aChieving the end ot welfare.

Thus,

"8

philOSOphic mOTement guided b.1 aspirations of scientific severltr has

come to threaten

~~e

position of science itaelf.

This selt-contradiction stems

tram a misguided intellectual passion--a passion tor aohieving absolutelY

impersonal knowledge which, being WlAble to rec()gniH any pers-:ms, nresents us
~.,i t"

a nicture of the universe in which we ourselves are absent.

In such a

universe there is no one canable of creating and upholding scientific values,

hence there is no scienoe."
world view that regards

76

This is in direct contrast to the primitive

eve~i¥

in the universe as personal, but only a

refusal to ad"l2it allot tho data concerning man can lead to the position that
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nothinc in the universe is 'Oer8onal.

The p&8sion for impersonal

knowle<4~e

is a

flight from intelligenoe and reasonableness, a desire tor automatic security.
12.

Theolgs,y, phU08OPhz,

differentiation.

!!!!!

soience.

Development has been through

It was only in the twelfth century of the Christian era that

the distinction between faith and reason vas made.

This distinction

W88

within

theoloQ', pertaining to the theologian' 8 deliadnation of hi. field and to his
own m.eth(;dGlogy.

But it had an blportant implication outside ot theology, "tor

once reason is acknowledged to be distinct trom faith, there is issued an
invitation to reason to

gl"OV

in consoiousness ot its native power, to olaim its

proper field ot inqu1l7, to work out ita

d~ents

ot investigation, to

determine its own methods, to operate on the buis ot ita own principles and
77
precepta."
Descartes vOrked out the problem ot an independent philosophioal
method care.tully, but "he was oompletely innocent ot the notion that science
could be pursued with a simUar independenoe ot philo.op.. • ••
eleventh-oentury brillianoe

ot an

As the

Anselm had bean mistaken in oftering nec8s8

reasons tor the JIO"ster1es ot tat th, 80 the seventeenth-centuI7 b:r1.llianoe ot
Deacartea

V&8

mechanics."

.mistaken in of'tering philosophic reasons tor a theory ot
Thus phUoaopbT vas challenged by soiencel

As there is a poet-Carteaian aftirmat10n of' philosoptv that rules
theology out ot court, so there is a p08t-Kantian affirmation ot
science that tos... overboard even Kant's modest olaims tor
philoaophy, and there i8 a still later totalitarian violence that
with equal impartiality brushes aside theology and philosophy am
soienoe. But at that empty' conclusion to the sequenoe ot ever les.
cc.,prehens1f t syntheses, man still exists and man stUl is called
upon to decide. Arohaists urge him to imagine that he lives in an age

11Lonergan, p. 527.
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ot liberalism, or rationalise, or fal th. Futurists paint tor him a
utopia that cannot disguise its own m;ythieal features. But the plain
tact is that the world lin in pieces before bim and pleads to be put
together again, to be put together not as it stood before on the
carele.a toundation ot assumptions that happened to be unquestioned
but on the strong ground of the possibUity or questioning and with
lull awareness or the range ot possible answera.78

13. Saientism.!!!! utoQia. Of the futurists who paint tor man a utopia
that cannot disguise its own mythical features, the ones that have the most
infiuence tOOq, perhaps, are those who believe in what Wll1iamWhyts. Jr. call
It.aienti_ • • • the promi•• that with the 8ee technique. that have worked in
the physical solences we oan eventually create an exact sOience of man."

79

Although this ideal hu had a "long and dismal: record of achlevement, tt faith in
scientiSl'll has not been shaken, "for it is essentially a utopian rather than a
technioal idea."

The argument generally rune.

it i8 almost too late.

"We are in a terrible fix and

We have applied sCionce to things, and onlJr now have we

begun applying it to man htuaU'.

Already' we haft learned some useful social

techniques; we can measure personality, cm spot the obstacles to good group
c:t,auaa1cs, and predict coarmunicat10n response.

But these are merely the

beginning, it only we provide the time and money, before long we can unwrap the
whole enigma with a unified science ot:uan.,,80 Sclentism betr. . its
rrt)"'thological features in it' ideal ot a good sooiety to be attained by the

application ot the same technique. that have worked in the

78~., p. 528.

p~ical

sciences.

20.7
As Red.tield has said, modern rqths look toward the future.

Scientil!ft is to be

distingulshed fl"om science in that it ls not dominated by' the pure desire to

know; lt ls not regulated by normative objectivity, tor practical desires
control activi t.r, so that concern tor reasonable ftr1tleation is not dominant,

10 Much as concern with the manipulation ot people in order to achieve the
ideals ot scientism.

81

14. Scientism ~ ObJectivism.
on three fallaciesl
means the atte~t

"objectivism, collectivism, and historiciam.

By this he

to dispense with subJective knowledge; to treat abstract

W'holes--sucb as 'societTt-as detinite

t.~e

F. A.. Hay-ele sqs that scientism is bued

object~vesJ

like biological organisms.

atte;npt to make histoS"T a science, and the only' one, of' social. prumomenaJ2

The oharacteristic ot "objectivism'· shows the arlini ty ot scientiam tor the

pasaion tor strictly" objective, impersonal knavledge criticized by' Polattr1,
or tor the "automatic" security of mechanical verit1cation which Lonergan said
was a l17tb.

'!his ideal ot ob,jectivity regards the objective as what ls "out

there'· to be looked at-a

15.

'Bodies.

.2!St.

Bodies can be known in the biological pattern ot experienoe,

a k1 tten can recognize a saucer ot milk.
"already out there now real."

It is a bodT, what Lonergan calls an

He explains:

'Already" refers to the orientation and d1namic anticipation ot
biologioal conaciouanessJ such consciousness does not oreate but
finds ita environment; it tinda it as already constituted, already

-

81n,ld., p. 33.
82Tbe Counter..Revolution of Seience: Studies on the abuse of Reason
(Glencoe, Ifiinol., 1952),
to s:y. t~'hiG, P.2o,footnotel.

retmea
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offering opportunities, already' isntng ohallenges. •Out' refers
to the extroversion of a consoiousness that is aware, not or its
own ground, but of objects distinct trOll itself. 'There' and 'now'
indicate the spatial and temporal determinations of extroverted
oonsoiousness. 'Real,' tlnal.l.y, 1s a subdivision within the field
ot the 'aJ.read1' out there now't part of that is mere appearance,
but part is real. and its reality oonsists in its relevance to
biologioal suCCess or failure, pleasure or pain. 8)
It was stated

earli(~r

that Galileo inaugurated modern soience b.r going beyond

talk about natures in terms of the relationa of things to man's aenses, to

seek to discover the correlations that give knowledge of natures in terms of
the relations

or things

to one another. But instead ot spea.ld.Dg of the

relations of things to one' a senses and the relations of things to one another,
,

Galileo distinguishes between merely' apparent,' secondary qualities, and the
real and objecti.,. primar;r qualities.

84

"'w'hen GalUeo pronounced secondary

qualities to be m.erel;r subjective, he meant that they were not 'already out
there nov real.'

When the decadent Aristotelians and, generall,y, people that

rely on good cOll'llllOn sen•• , insist that secondary qualities obviously' are
objective, they' mean that the;r are 'already out there now real. ttl

16.

D1tficul~.!!:!

reach1gs explanatozz d!Wpoint.

8S

Thi. position ot

Oalileo's involves a world view which stUl 1s not tully' explanator;r.

For it

fails to distinguish between what i8 imagined and. what i8 grasped by insight)
it baae, objectivity, not on reaching the unconditioned through a process ot
verification, but on animal extroversion.

Thus, it is only rea.sonable not to

expect primitive man to reach the kind of truth we call scientific.

8ltonergan, p. 251.

-

84Ibid., p. 132.

8SjW., p. 252.

Indeed,
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"one might sq tllat it has taken modern science tOW" centuries to make the discoyal")" that the objects ot ita inquil")" need not be imaginable entities moving
through imaginable processes in an imaginable space.time. • ••

Even before

Einstein and Heisenberg it was clear enough that the world desoribed by
scientists

W8.8

strangely difterent froIa the world depicted by' artists and

inhabited by men of common sense.

But it was lert to twentietb-centur,y

physicists to enVisage the poaaibUity that t.ite objects ot their science were
to be reached only by severing the umbilical cord

maternal. imagination of man."

86

that tied them to the

And Sorokin sqs that although the ph1'siciste

have made such a tranSition, sociologists o~n have ootl

"WhUe the pb,ysical

sciencee have already' abandoned the atom. as the elementary unit, and have found
that an ever-increasing IlU!Ilber of the el_entary particles are of a lell and
le.s 'material' nature, our 'hCllUtlaade phy'sicists' are still

pl~

with atalic

marble., still looking for locial atoms as the simplest. and smallest units of
psychosocial phenomena. .. 87

17.

Ideal observer

2!

social i,henomena.

Sjoberg t s statement that

contemporary SOCiologists hesitate to ackllOW'ledge the eftect of the sociocultural 8,1sta upon themselves and their research, that. thq tend to regard
therA.elve. as it functioning in a

86Ibid., pp. xx-xxi.

-

87rada, p. 221.

88Sjoberg, p. 610.

Vactmll.

88

i8

related to the tendenq to

2,0
objectiYiam (ae opposed to objectivity), which regards the real as something
11

alread;y out there now."

Tald.1'lI the explanator.r viewpoint in the stuq- of man

Itdrops trom oonsideration the knower as a spectator of the real and makes hilIl

an inconspicuous item in the real.
man;r objects that are

al80

t..~at

18 aft1rmed. 1I89 '!'he knower is one ot

subjects-interacting subjects.

The viewpoint that

some social scientists are tempted to take, that they are detached. spectators
looking at what is going on "out there, U reinforoes a.rr:! acientistio tendencies
they may have.

For this viewpoint turns the attention away from the ta.ak of

using scientific method to reach reasonable affirmations of bypoth.MS stating
the relationships between things as the,r are,: allowing one to equate scientU'1c
method with one' 8 techniques tor achieving a utopian ideal society'.

18. Anthro20l'1Whic projection.
position is not

80

One who is oaught in a scientistic

much interested in the relations that hold between the

elements in society

and culture

to himself and to his dream.

88

he is in society and culture as th~ relate

He is not in the intellectual pattern of

experience. but in the dramatic pattern.

And as such, he is interested in

insiehta, but not the grasp of "a By'stem of terms defined by their intelligible

relations to one another, but the grasp of intellig1b111V in the ooncrete
presentations of his own experience." This is not in itselt bad, but can lead
to

oontusion.
• • • I would. note that all the explaining is done by the insight
and that, unle.s one distinguishes between the insight and the

89Lonergan, p. $39.

presentations, then one is open to the blunder ot attributing an
explanatory power to the presentations and eYen to associated
feelings and emotions. OM can know exactly the conU"lbut1on made
by the irudght by having recourse to concepta, to abstract
formulations, to the utterance of tel"!!lS and relations with the
terms tixing the relations and the relations ilIIplicitl7 detininc
the terms. But if' one employs this procedure, one is involved in
the explanatory viewpoint, one is without &qy' detence against th.
tendency to regard. as explanatory what merely is an i t . to be
axplained.90
It one is unwilling to torsake the desCriptive viewpolnt, if be "insiate that
going be,yond concrete insights i.8 a desertion ot reality J It then.

one canno't ris. above one'" personal, spatio-temporal traM of
reterence and one cannot distinguish between the intelligibility'
immanent in that fr.. and mere eenaitive tamiliar! ty with directions and with the lapse ot time. iUthout such a distinction,
objective space and time are cred1 ted not only with the int.lligibUi ty of the frame but also with our leelings. As we feel
the gravitational field to be directed tr""" above to below, so a
man at the antiposed would have to mov-e about like a tly waJ.lc1Dg
on the ceiling ot a roam. As we make decisions and then produce
results, 80 causes are be.tore etfacts, am. a .first cause necessarily am CllXclusivalJ' is first in time. Causality cannot be
merely an intelligible relation ot dependenoe; it has to be
explained and the explanation is reached by an appeal to the
sensation ot MUso'llar eftort and to the 1mage ot transmiSSion of
effort through contact. So universal causality is a pervasive tate,
linking all things at once, keeping the wandering stars to their
strange cours•• and, by the s_e stroke, settling tor astrologers the
destinies ot iMtn. 91

19. Subjective projection. Anthropomorphic projection reSlllted from the
addition 'Jt feelings to the contents ot insights, but subjective projection
involves thinking that others ... things just as one does oneself,

-

9Orbid., n. ,93.

91Ibid., pp. 539-,40.

-
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subject!ve projection reaul ts when we interpret the words and deeds
of other men by reconstruct1ng 1n ourselves their expertenoe and
uncritically adding our intellectual viewpoints 1Ihich they do not
share. • •• The stranger turns out to be strange when we find that
hi8 mentality is not the same 88 our own. A visit to the next
village, to the bordering country, to a different oontinent, leads
first to MUseunt at the oddity ot the 1nhabitants and ulti.mately
to despair OYer their incomprehensibility. But we cannot travel
into the past. So fathers are misunderstood by their sons and each
century by the succeeding century. As the data assembled by
historical research acOUJlllllate, insights are revised continuously
in accord w1th the concrete process of learning. But besides the
revisions torced qy further data, there also are the revisions due
to the advent of new investigators, tor history is rewritten not
only by each new culture but also by each stag. ot progres8 and
deoline in each culture. Nor 1s there art:! escape trail such
relativism as long as men cling to the descriptive viewpoint. 92

20.

Suaaarr.

'l'be _ergence of the expl8J)&tory viewpoint i8 necessary

tor .. critioal hu1un acienoe. Without its relativi8ll, anthropGlllOl"Phic
projection, and soientism are real dange:ra.

'l'.he explanatory viewpoint regards

the objeotive as that which is verified, not as that lftIJ.ch is imaginable, which
i8

·alr~

out there now real. It

The principal notion of objectiVity requires

affirmation of oneself as a knowing SUbject, affirmation of other thing., and.
denial th.at these other things are oneselt.

given.

Experiential. objectivity is the

Normative objectivity is the demand for the unconditioned grounded in

the pure desire to know operating in the intellectual pattern of coneeiousnes8.
Absolute objectivity regards the veri.ricat1on of single propOSitions, taJd.ng

them out of an euential relationship to the one who utters the propOSition,
and making the contenw of that proposition public knowledge.

Xnowledge of

selt, and ot one's cognitional. processes has COJICt slowly, 80 that it il
generally recognised that those who ha1fe not had the benefit of the process ot

92Ibid., pp. 540-541.

-
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cultural development cannot be expected to reach scientU'lc knowledge with
oonsistent sucoess.

There is another notion of objectlv1tr, which identities

the objective with the "already' out there now real."

This notion stems from. a

misguided intallectual passion for impersonal. knowledge, tor automatio
solutions to problems, which tree one of the burden of being intelligent aDd
reasonable.

Seientisro seems to be oharacterised by this notion of objectivity,

preclse17 because scientis!I1 has utopian aspirations wbich oannot be verified
reasonably.
E.

1.

Desires.

rnm

SEIJ'-CotiSCI:::USNESS

Self-affirmation of the knover occurs in the intellectual

pattern of experience, and is a result ot a eelt-appropriation ot rational
cOlUlcioueMs8.

This rational consciousnen is the gr0'1nd of normative

objectivity, for it 18 not satisfied with bright ideas but wants verification;
it will not give tull as.ent without a grasp of the unconditioned.

Rational

consciousness reaul ta from allowing the detaohed and disinterested desire to
know operate un1mpeded by other desires.

which oorrespond to real needs.

But man does have other desires,

The object ot desire is perceived by man as

good, as "pleasant, enjoyable, satisfying."

The good of desire ls, however,

coupled on the experiential level with its oppOSite, which is the object of
aversion or the bad. 9)

2. Levels

E! lh!

l0od.

'lbe detached, diSinterested, unrestricted desire

to knOW', however, differs from the other desires of ·'len in that it i8 not
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content with satisfactionJ f'it heads beyond one's own JOT in one's own insight
to the

.further question whether ons' 8 own insight is oorrect.

It is a desire

to know and its immanent criterion is the attainment of an unconditioned that,
by the tact that it is unconditi.oned, i8 independent of the individualts likes

and dislikes, of his wishful and his anxious

think1~."

94 Because

of the

knowledge generated by the desire to know, there is, besides the simple good ot
desire, tne good ot order.

1'h1s "stands to single desires as system. to

systematised, as universal condition to particulars that are conditioned, as
scheme ot recurrence that supervenes upon the materials of desires and the
ettorts to meet them and, at the price ot

lim~ted

restrictions, through the

tertui ty ot inte1l1gent control, secures an otherwise unattainable abundance

ot satistactions. 1195
The good of order is <trnanic, tor it orders the dynamio unfolding of
desires and aversions, and is itself a system. "on the l'I1ove lt posseSSing a
normative line ot development, ttinaamuch as el.enta of the idea ot order are
grasped b1' insight into concrete Situations, are formulated in proposals, are
aocepted by explicit or tacit. agreements, and are put into execution onl.y" to
change the situation and. give rise to still further inSights. tt

or

Unlike the good

desire, which is on an experiential level prior to questions and insights,

the good of order "e...ntiall.y is a formal intelligibility that 1s to be
discovered onl.y' by raising questions, grasped only' through accumulating

-

94Ib1d.
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ineip;hts, formulated only in concentions. 1t

96

Besides the notion of good on the levels of experience ard insight, there
is also a notion of eood on the level of reflection and jUdgments.
intellectual

~rasp

For the

of possible orders only issues in realization of one of

these as the result of a value jUdgment and a decision to nut one of these
orders into effect. 97

-

And a decisi on is a will act.

3. The notion of

-~rill.
-

In the three phases of the emergence of a socio-

cultural system, tr:e phases of mental inteeration and empirical objectification
pertain prttflarily to the person or nersons who originally grasped the idea
t..~e

behind

S".!stem, but the phase of s oclalizati:on pertains primarll:,! to other

subjects of interaction.

These other men "lust be persuaded to accept the order

grasped by 'the originators.
willingness to acceptl

Their acceptance vrl11 be relative to their

"besides the bare capacity that is will, there is the

habitual inclination, specialized in particular directions, that constitutes
the willingness and unwillingness with which individuals antecedentl.7 are
disposed to making decisions and choices of determinate kinds."
will
the

an~

willingness, there is also the act of willing, the decision.

event~

and

80

it alone is revealed directly'.

Moral. -selt-consciousness.
............

-

96rbid., pp.

596-597.

-

97Ibld., pp. 597-598.

-

98Ibid.,

p.

598.

!lIt is

To know willingness, one :1'lUSt

study the changes in suoh frequencies over a litetime. t'

4.

And besides

98

The normative exigence of the desire to
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know goes beyond speculative cognitional activities to knowledge of practical
possibUlties, which include the field ot deliberate human acta.

And thus the

empirioally', intelligently, and rationally conscious knower becomes also a
morally self-conscious doer, who recognizes an exigence for selt-consbtency

between his knowing and his doing.

A man can seek to dodge this exi.CetlCY, by

ignoring the precept "Know thyself. 1I

It is possible for a man to avoid a

responsible moral analYsis ot his words and deeds b.Y a feverish persual ot

"worthwhile activity. It
knowing and

doing.

Or be c an rational ize the inconsistency' bet.ween his

i8 doing by

revisi~

his knowing to make it harmonize with hi.

Finally, he can simplJ' run from moral responsibility, joining a

speculative recognition ot the aspiration to make living oorrespond with
reason to a total refusal to put this aspiration into practice.

This anal.1'.1.

does not militate against what. is valid in cultural relativiSlru

"In different

strata of SOCiety, in different epochs, in different cultures and civilizations
one 11Geta with different moral codes.

But the content of the moral code is one

thing, end the dynamio function that demands its observance i8 another.

Our

consideration has centered on that dynamic tumtion, on the operati-ve exigence

ot selt-eonsistency in self-ooneciocisoess and, since contrut. i8 luminous, on
the threefold e.cape ot neeing self-consciousness, ot mitigating the moral

code by rationalization, and of giVing up hope in the struggle. 1f99

5.

~

good of value.

"Now it is in rational, moral self-consci<Nsnna

that the good as value Com.e8 to light, tor the value i8 the good as the

possible object ot rational Choice.

Just as the Objects of desire tall under
!I,I
I'

I

1,1'1
,I I"
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schemes of recurrence to Rive rise tl) the good of order grasped by intelligence I
so also the good of order with its concrete contents is a possible object of
ra.tional choice and so a value. tflOO

I,f alues

differ 1n different places because

different processes of enculturation have resulted in

d~"fferent

experience,

desires, insights, and judgments, but more important, because this different
enculturation has resulted in different patterns of antecedent willingness, the
habitual inclinations to make decisions and choices of determinate kinds.

6.

Eoistedc integration.

by' taking

At this point, a further advance can be made

up, once aga.in, the ou.tside viewpoint.

For the values which the

members of a community consciously proclaim as :theirs :nay, as a matter of fact,
not be as relevant to their behavior as they would like to believe.

There ma.;r

be a distinct lack of integration between their ideological culture and their

behavioral cu! turs.

The investigator can discover this simply by' studying the

frequencies with which objects or orders relative to the value in question are
chosen.

From a stuqy of such frequenoies, he oan determine habitual willing-

ness, and then canpare this willingness with the willingness that is demanded
by the val ues explicitly embraoed.

A study of this kind can lead baok into an

analysis of latent function. for it may well reveal needs and goals at which the
subjeots themselves are not conscious.

Obviously, the distinction between

latent and manif'est function cannot be applied too rigidly', because in

any'

culture there ma;v be some individuals who oonsciously and deliberately work for
ends of which the maj ori ty of the people are not aware.

What is a manitest

goal. for the propagandist can be latent tor the propagandized. What is a

-

lOOIb1d., p. 601.

2,8
manitest goal tor tho teacher can be unrecognized. by the student until he has
learned.

1. Metaaociological value judgments.
method fall under the good of order.

Variou8 coooeptions of sCientU'ic

An intelligible pattern ot means to reach

the goal of scientific knowledge can be refiecte<i upon crt tically, and judged
to be valuable.

But, just as in any cultural system, in science there mq be

a lack ot epi8temic integration between explicitly acknowledged values and the
actual practice of SCientists, a lack

behavioral culture.

ot integration between ideological and

;'ledfield accused the proponents of radical cultural

relativism of such a lack of integrationJ

~

aocused the praotitioners of

scientilll1l who claimed to rule out all value judgments of such a lacK

integration.

ot

But Polanyl noted that the integration of values and scientU'ic

research rendered sociology suapect, for the values the scientist holds are
those he acquired in a process of eneul turation wi thin the very sooiety he
attempts to study'.

It tollows that sociology' wst be ori tical..

gist must himself become a morally' selt-conscious subject.
the pure desire

to know as the ground ot objectivity.

The sociolo-

He must recognize

He lI1Uat distinguish

between the epist.emic integration that :involves maldng one's doing correspond

t.o one's knowing, and the epiat-.ic integration that involves ra.tionaliza.tion-making one's knowing conform. to one's doing.

But this is difficult,

~or

it

requires a courageous analysis ot one' 8 worda and deeds to discover whether one
is interfering with the proper unfolding of the pure desire to know by
introduoing such goals as social acceptabill t:r, scientilic prestige, or the
establishment or scientistic utopia into his research, allowing these to
diotate the norms ot scientific method.

Difficult a.a the task mq be, it i8

2$9
vi tally necesaary.

For t.he cn tica ot the social sciences note with soorn,

social. scientists not with excuses, and. those students ot the social scienoes
lIho are unwilling to take all on fal th note with anger or dismq, that very
frequently the sociological research oarried on by the confiioting schools of
sociology is not the detached, disinterested search tor truth that is so highly
praised by all, but rather a partisan defense of the metasociological value
judgments that difterent interacting human beings have acquired b,y a process of
enaulturation in different groups.
F.

1.

Generalised. biogr!l?N:.

SUMl1ARY

Every individual. is

"wired"

to many different

social and cultural. systems, which results in what Sorokin calls a plurali_ of
"egos. It

desires.

These different egos can correspond to biological or social needs and
In general, it would be sat. to identity the difterent social

am

cultural systems Soroldn speaks of to Lonergan's "good of order," since these
social and oultural systems are the l"dults of organising intelligence
operating upon human desires and activities.

And the good of order corresponds

closel¥ to Redfield' a concept of the i\mctionaJ. model in which the oanmunity is
concei. .d as a eystem of means and ends.

Human development starts on a

biological level, but includes aesthetiC, dramatiC, and intellectual patterns
experience.

0

Af'tinll&tion of oneself as a knower occurs in the intelleotual

pattern ot experience.

Domination of intelligence over dramatic action resul t8

from moral self-oonsciou8ne...

2.

Abnormal development.

The deviation trom oorrect development is

Significant for the study' ot the integration of the little conwunity because of
it. connection with symboli_.

For just as dreams oan provide an outlet tor
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repressed attects in the indiri.dual.. so also the dramatiC enactDlent of dream.
or artistically created symbols can provide a therapeutio release of tanalOl'l
for a community.

The process of association of a1'fects with 1ncongruws objec

is also presented as an eXplanation of taboos.

3. Connunal. deYelopmeut.

Development can take place when a c01!llUUity

deliberately conceives a plan tor progress and elaborates a polley to reali••
this aspiration.

This" however J already presupposes a development

&war !rca

the more primitive outlook of participant. maintenance of the Ul'Ji verse, which

regards everything as personal and moral.

Differentiation of self and non-selt

ot persons trom what is impersonal is made slP1lly.

4.

~lanatorz

vi!wp<!!nt.

Suoh differentiation is neces8&l"7 for attain!

to the prinoipal notion of objeotiv1V, whioh is had if it is recogni.ed that
there are distinct beings, some of which both know theMelvea and know others

as other.

This notion ot objectiv1ty drops the "ideal observer" approach to

social phenomena, recognizing that the knower is not a spectator of the real
but one element in the real that i8 affirmed.

The objective is not what is

"already out there now real" but what is verified.

Making the object of one's

science the rtalread;y out there now real." results in a clinging to a descriptive
viewpoint that oannot transcend the relativism immanent in anthropomorphio and
subjective projection.

5. Moral !!!£-..c...on_8C;.;;;,;;;;i...ou,;;.s;;;,;n8;.;;;;;,;;s.....s. Recognition ot an exigency for malcing one's
action conform with ona's lmow1ng leads to moral self-consciousness.
in such consciousness that the notion of value comes to light.
a good that is the possible object of choice.

And

it is

For a value is

It is relative to the habitual

willingness ot individuals or groups to lUke choices of a. determinate kind.

But
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it is common to all lrdividua1s and groups to have values.
the s1mple good

ot desire in that a value is grasped

Values differ tl"Oll

by insight and affirmed

to be good in a value judgment, whereas a simple object of desire i l prior to
oonception and affirmat1on; it is on the experiential. level, whereas the good

of value 18 on the level of reneotion.

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
The unknown was named lithe integration ot the little community" first ot
all, then, under the influence of Sorokints sociological theory, it was named
the Itintegration

ot society, culture,

and personality in the little community."

This .econd method ot neming the unknown, hovever, depended upon using
Sorokin's generic phenoaenon tor sociological research, "meaningful interaction
1
~
as a or1 terton ot relevanoe.
The tact that Furfey sqs that relevance
criteria are, to a oertain extent at least, arbitrary, raised doubts about the
objective

validi~

Sorok1n'a theor,y.

of working out the properties of the unknown in terms of
For relevance criteria are relative to the basic interpre-

tative .framework ,me has acquired in the process of enculturation.

And the

encu1 turation process experienced by' many social scientists has led them to

aftirm that it i8 impossible to say that one such interpretative .framework 1s

better than another. 2 The question of relativism thus b~came a major theme
throughout the thesis.
It one of the wqs ot working out the properties of the unknown 1n order
to guide research 1s through a speCification of the wa;y that the unknown 18 to

become known, then specification ot the interpretative framework in '4h1ch one

lSee above,

2~.,

w. lal-46.

w. 41-46,

110-114, 134.
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will work becomes an important aspect of the process of working out a
heuristic structure.

This is eapeciall.y' true in working with the little

community, tor as Redfield points out, tne investigator must take the inside

-view

This tension between the
inside and the outside views, sqs Redfield, "is the central probl_ in studies
without losing his grip on an outside view.

of oul ture or ot personalit,.. ,,3 And it is a tension between two ditterent
interpretative frameworks.
In addition to a specification ot one's interpretative tra.mework, however,

there IlU8t also be a specitication ot the antioipated tqpes of interrelationships one expects to discover in the little

o~munitT

which, taken all

together, consti tut. the "integration" ot that cOJllllUni\7.

As W'&8 seen from the

discussion ot criteria ot relevance in relatioll8hip to Soroldn's "l'I'l8anlngtul.
interaction," the types of interrelationships among the elements in the little
OOl'llllunity, u wall as the specification

ot the elements to

be interrelated,

depend upon the criteria of relevance one choo.e., which again, i. a result of

a particular interpretative framework.
1.

~-_af_t_i_rm.;;;.;;;&t_i_o_n.

A basic atep in clarification of one' a interpret&-

tift frlllMWOrk 1s selt-aft1rmation

()t

the knowing atXt ohoo81ng subject.

Redt1eld sqs that in every world view there is some distinction between the
s.lf and the non-self. 4 Tbe self that wishes to undertake a soientific stuctr

ot man must make this distinction more explicit. He must. distinguish the

3The Little Communitl' p. 82; see above, pp. Uo-120.
hsee above .. p. 229.
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conscious subject the further level of moral. se1t-eonsciousne8S; to affirmation
of oneself as not only a knower but also a responsible actor.
2.

Interpretative framework.

8

Self-aftirmation involves an explicit

recogni tion ot the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know and ot
the e:agency ot JlU)ral. consciousness tor consistency between knoving and doing.
These two principles are important for the study of integration.

For the dest

to know termInates in a demand tor the uncondit1oned; this dllllW'ld i. pa.rtl¥ a
demand tor consistency in one's ideological. culture, for it a proposition

which one is testing appears to contradict other propositiona which one holds
to be

tru.,

further questions lJIUSt be asked l::)ef'ore one can att1rm that

proposition as unconditioned.

One of the conditions that rational conscious-

nes. sets up, in other words, is that the oom.itioned propOSition mst not
contradict a context of judgmenta, 9 a syste.'Tl ot superior know1edge. lO And it
is this same demard tor consistency in one' 8 ideological. culture that enables
the discoveJ'Y'

ot one mistaken beliet to start a process ot correction ot other

mistaken belief••

ll

The second principle, that of' the exigency tor consistency between knowing

and doing, 1s a demand, not tor integration

at ideological culture, but tor

lOpolanyi, Personal Knowledge, pp. 375-376, see above, pp.

llLonergan, pp. 7l4...n5J s •• above, 1'1'. 17Q..ln.

104...106.

1ntegration of behavioral. au! ture with ideological oul ture.

Upon these two

principles rests an interpretative .trs."!lf!tWork which can give vhat is valid to
the principle ot oultural relatiVism, even though it remains invariant itaelt.
lSperience varies from oulture to culture, and from individual to
individual.

There is no eY1denee, however, that a culture exists composed ot

people who have no conscious experience.
Insight is into onets own

experi·~nee.

Therefore, just as the oontents of

experiences differs so alao the contents ot ditterent insights are not
identical.

ret whenever the use ot language has nourished,

insi~rhts

into the

wq words are to be used have occurred.
Desire or aversion oan be to what 1s presented to
variations of desire .trom oulture to culture does not

on~'s

ch~e

experience, but
the reality ot

desire as an element in human experience.
Order 1s put into the objects ot desire and the means ot getting them by
human intelllf!ence.

This is a recurrent tact, desDi te the differences in the

good of order in different times and places.

Judeent is had whenever people accept same statements and reject others.

-

-

','hat statements are accepted or rejected is relative to enculturation; that
atfirmations and denials occur is not relative to encul turation.
Choice occurs whenever there is a selection of one of two or more

alternatives, the qu.est10n of freedom need. not be discussed here, altllough the
writer does affirm the capacity of man tor free choice in the right conditi01l8.

Value, is a good of desire or of order considered as an object ot rational
choice.

Men with different backgrounds have different values, but they all

regaJ"d it as reasonable to choose scm. course of action, to choos~ some order of
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doing th.ings.

3.

0bjectivitZ.

The

~)rincipal

notio!'"! of objectivity 1s a patterned

context ot judgments, and hence an interpretative fra.>nework, or a part ot one.
The first necessary judg-:nent is affirmation of oneself as a knower; the second
is affirmation of some other thing, such as a typewriters the third nee.sear"
judgment is a negation of identity between oneselt and the other thing_ItI am
not

~~is

typewriter."

Other objects are added, including other objects that
l2
are also knm-18rs, and hence other Subjects.
The ground of normative objectivity is the pure desire to know; this
partial notion ot objectivit.y is a refusal

to~al1ow

other desires to interfere

with oognitional process, and a refusal to judge logics and methods on

anr

other grounds than that ot whether or n'Jt the". satisty the demands ot the

pure desire to know tor the unconditioned. l3
Absolute objeotivity is signiticant tor relatiVism, for it removes the
content of the attirma tion from rel at! vi ty to the one af'tlrm1ng 1 t.
single judgments as unoondi tioned.

14

It regards

It a man affirms "! am a knower," the

content. of that affirmation is not relative to who it is that atf'irms it; his

-

friend changes the words, however, to make the S8me aff1rmation--"You are a
knower."

F.xperiential. object.irlty regards t.he given as given.

It states that sinoe

what can be judged to be true or talae is the answer to a question, and. since

12Lonergan, pp. 376-377J see above, p. 234.
13rb1d., pp. 360-381.
14~., pp. 378-379; ••• above, p. 238.
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the given is prior to all questions-the .ma.terial to be questioned, the given
is indubitable. 1S

4.

Meaniggtul interaction.

Meanin~tul

interaction as the generic

phenomenon ot sociology i8 logically consistent with Lonergan's prinCipal notior
of objectivity.

For the prinCipal notion of ob,jeetlv1ty is the affirmation of

ot.t.ler objects which are not oneself, and some of which are, like oneselt,
knowing subjects.

The knowing subjects are the subjects of interaction, other

objects are vehicles, what is known by the subjects is the meaningM aspect

ot interaction.

Add

to these notions the further affirmations or oneaelf as a

doer, witil ita recognition ot the exigenc;y

tor~

integration of one' a action with

one's knowledge, and the reasonable attirmation that others operate on the same
prinoiple, and it follows that one's own action and the actions ot others are
going to be meaningful.
The selection of meaningful interaction

a8

the generic phe1'l<Jlenon to be

studied qy sociology, along with the criteria of relevance that this invo11"ea,
is not arbitrar.r.

It 1s a choice, based on a value judgment.

The content ot

that value judgment i8 that it 1.s better for sociological re••arch to be
dClldnated b.r the pure desire to know than by other deSires, such as the utopian

aepirat10ns of scientism.

16 Acceptance ot thi.,value judgment 1s an acceptance

ot Lonergan's det1nition of nonut.1ve objectiv1ty. '1'0 follOW' this norm is to
place oneselt in the intellectual pattern of experience, to be a knover.
value judgment, however, i8 not arbitrary,

ev-8n

though rejection at it would be

lStonergllll, p. )81-383J see above, pp. 239-240.

~, p. 26, aee above, pp. 245-21,.6.

'n1e
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arbitrary, tor to del\Y the pure desire to know is. ulti.mately, to -put oneselt
outside the realM of scientitic discourse.

5.
is an

~alectic.

aegre~"ate

Lonergan says that there will be a dialectic "it (1) there

ot events ot a determinate oharacter, (2) the events may be

traced to either or both of two ,rinciples, (3) the principles are opposed yet
bound together, and (4) they are ;l'1Od1fied by the changes that 8ucoessive17
resul t from t':'lem."

17

An::! interaction, 1 t would seem. satisfies these condi tioru I-

The opposition between the two partie. need not be a clash

ot ideas; it need

be no more than minor differenoes of opinion or viewpoint or understanding that

result !"rom the tact that each experiences tne interaction ditterentlJ"-tbe
Itseltt' ot the one i8 tfanothertt tor the second.

And every interaction process

1s an aggregate of events. 18 Tn1s 1s 1n oontrast to Soroldn's characterilation

ot an interaction process as a oausa1.-tunctional unitT_
The investigator of a little COlmlUn1ty interacts with the members

cornmu.ni ty.

ot that

Redfield speaks ot the tension between the iMide and the outside

viewpoints that he must maintain.

This tension is between two interpretative

tl"&<"!JI1forks whioh act a8 the opposed principles in a dialectical relationship.

The insights the investigator gets. and the formulations he makes and aeek. to
verii)' will be acts which torm a concrete aggregate of events that are traced

to e1 ther the inside

vi_,

the outside view, or both.

The correetion ot a mistaken belief laads to the oorreotion of other
mistakea, due to the demand tor oonsistency imposed by rational oonsciousness.

11I,onergan, p. 211.

lasee abov.. p. 20.
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The process of correction is dialectical, for there are two princlnles
:lnvol'led:

th.'Z! set of beliefs and values buUt around and supporting the mis.

taken belief, as opposed to the insight and judgment that pronounoed the
beliet to be mistaken. 1,,'hat had been 1'crrwrly a !'lore 'r less well tntep:rated
system now is broken down, and a new integrated patwrn forms as new and
rela.ted inSights and judgments are added.
dialectical process

~

A change in viewpoint through such a

be through a saries

ot events that are all private--one

But it is more 111<011' that m8l'\Y'

man-nedi tating in. his room.

occur in a dialogue, in reading, or in

t.~e

b&t~.f8en

events will

meaning 01' another's action; it will

itself take place as part or an interaction

6. L2gie. Interaction

or the

P~OC&S8

or processes.

ahthropologist Evans-Pritchard and the

Asande illustrate a dialectical tension between viewpoints which did not ohange
the beliar of the Azande in besse.

The Azande reaisted &rrJ' change in their

viewpoint by the utilization of defense mechanisms, such as circularity,

automatic expansion
concepts.

19

or the

cirole, and suppressed nucleation ot contrar,r

A viewpoint such as this is not reallY integrated logically, a.s a

treatise in logic is integrated.

For it is expressed, not in precisely defined

terms, rules of operations, with axioms and derived theorems, but in ordin.ary
language.

And an outJ.ook of a comnmni ty', as interpretative frarnework, a lforld

viw, cannot be translated into a logical s,ystemJ it is consistent, and this 18
what 1s often meant by being logioal, but the consistency is something that is
only grasped by understarlding the coherence of a set ot rela ted

insi~ht8

19Polaqri, Personal Knowle~e, pp. 288-291, see above,

166-169.

?p.

that
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are lett vague and unformulated nrecisely because of the need tor emnla,ying not
only defense

mechani&~s,

situations.

iWen a system of mathematics cannot be oompletely formalized, much

but also supplementary insights into concrete

less a EUstem of culture. 20

7.

I,snguse.

Since the investigator 9roceeds with his investigation ot

the little community only by communicating with the :aemb9l"S of that COIYlllUnity,
language is going to be a major entrance into the inside view of that community
There is a theory of the universe, a world view, implicit in the language of
the COl1'l!l1uni ty.

The integration of that wrld view is not going to be aocording

to precise definition of terms and striot relationships, but through its overalJ
oonsistency. Language, according to Sorokin, is one of the main systems of
2l
culture.
And although an understanding of the grammar and vocabulary of a
language does not give a logically integrated whole, it still will be consistent
to a rather high degree.
quality.

But floonsistency" refers to a somewhat unspeclfiable

Polanyi says that it is had o.nly through a aeries of personal

judgments, through an act of generalization similar to the one made when om
uses one word to refer to several objects that are similar, but not exaotlJ'
aJ..ike, or to several similar situations or relationships as well.

22

',;ihen is a

man no longer of "average height," but Ittall?1t
8.

Primitive terms.

The above disoussion is in reference to ordinary

language in whiob the terms are nominally defined as a result of insight into

20r,onergan, 573-576, see above, pp. 183-189; 200-201..

21Brnamics , IV, 110-111; see above, 118-179.
22personal ~nowledge, pp. 79-~O; see above pp. 177-178.
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the way they are used.
the oonsistenoy

The oonsistency spoken of, however, can be compared to

ot the set

of terms and relations needed to express any' basic

insight into the things to wilioh language refers.

ItIf one grasps the noosss

and sufficient condi tiona for the perfect roundness of the imagined plane
curve, then one grasps not only the

~irole

but also the point, the line, the

cirownferenoe. the radii, the plane, and equality'.

All the O()ncepts tumble

out together, because all are needed to express adequately a single insight.
All are ooherent, tor coherence basically' means that all hang together from a

Single insight.,·23

Such pr1m.1tive terms are pure conjugates,: defined. impl1citl.7 by the set
of terms and relations which lixes the meaning of each term.

:Experience,

question, insight, formulation, reflection, and judgment are suoh terms, for
they are tixed prec1se13' by an insight into their interrela.tions.

however, abstract, insofar

&8 they'

24

They are,

prescind trom particular contents o£ what

is e.xperienced, understood, affirmed.. 1rfuen one takes possession of the
structure of his own knowing processes in self-affirmation, he is grasping a
concre~

and

~ic

structure, personal to himself. When he generalizes trom

this to a oognitional the"ry anplicable to any hwun knowing, he abstracts not

only trom the particular contents experienced here and now, but also trOOl the
ooncrete end nartloular nature of his own intelligenoe.

acts

In antiCipating the

by which he wUl come to know an unknown, he is working with a heuristic

23Lonergan, pp. 11-12; see above, p. 27.

2U1bid., PP. 333-3)6) see above, pp. l53-1~4.
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struoture that deals with his own concrete knowing processes.

i<lhen human

oognition entera into the object of his study, as it does in SOCiology or

anthropoloo, he is dealing with concepts that abstract not onlJr' trom
particular contents but also from particular knowing sub.1ects.
9.

Classical laws.

ot man 1$ not in their

The signiticanoe of classical laws tar the SCiences

.'Mth • .atical nature in physics and chemistry, but in

their abstractness. 25 The basic acts of knowing--experience, question,

insight, judgrnent, and the basic a.t£ective acts-such as desiring, and choosi
along wi th tha intellectual ordering of desires and value judgnlents-are
concrete when viewed personally as the dynamic structures behind one's knowing
and doing, but abstract when they fom basic tems in one's sociological
theory.

The correlations bettieen insight and experiences and desires and

judgments and choices can be verified in concrete ill8tances ot men in d1tferen
cultures grasping intelligibility in their experiences and attirrning their
understandings as correct, by men ordering their practical action to sattsby' needs and desires through insights grasping possible orders, by men

selecting from S'Ilong these orders through ju1ging their value.

But the

correlations between the terms abstract from the concrete contents.

Such

correlations stand to the sciences of man as classical laws do to physics and

chemistry.

:)ne is able to go back t.o the concrete schemes of recurrence in

this or that culture only tu employing experiential conjugates, b.Y which the
acts are joined to specific contents.
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10.

Causal ,'nOdels.

concretelY.

Sorokin and ,tedtield interpret

systems

Thus, they are speaking, not of abstract correl&tions of

correlativds, but of concrete schemes of recurrence.
rAt({

CS,11Sal

c,~nsti tute

26 A scheme

a systematic or a non-systematic process.

qster.w.tic process, all the events

C tltl.

If t.he scheme is a

be deduced l.""rom a knowledge ot the

relevant abstract laws and a knowledge ot a basic s1 tuation.
lawa will be systematically related.

or recurrence

And the relevant

Their relationships can be gra8';ed b.1 a

single insight or set of related insights.

Ibt i f the events consti tuts a

non-S"fstematic process, such a conerete inference trom a sirlgle set of

classiCal. laws is impossible.

27

If SoCiocultural interaction, with all the avents, cognitive, affective,

ph;ysical, neurological, etc., that cunstitute an interaction process, is a
systema.tic process, then explanat.i.on can be on the basis of classical l3ws
alone.

If, however, events can sometimes be traced to e1 t.'ler or both ot two

or more opposed principles so as to constitute a dialectiC, then explanation

cannot be on the buis of classical laws alone.

And interaction would not

necessarUy be a causal...tunc tional system, a.t least if such a syste."Il is
interpreted as a s,ystematic process.

ll.

Statistics.

Events in non-sys te.1latic process do not occur

neceS8~,

once the process is initiated, but occur with a greater cr lesser

probability.

menta still are defined ill terms of classical laws, or at least

26see above, pp. 66-9h.

27LOnerga.~, pp. 46-50, see abov., pp. 68-72.
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in conjugates that abstract trom the concrete occurrence in a particular time
and place, but whether a determinate event will take place 1s known through a

statistical. law determining probability.

28 This is a concept of statistical

method that makes it refer to a t,-pe of intelligibility distinctly different
from a position that would reduce statistics to a wq of getting "looser"

correlations of essentially classical

~.

Statistical probabilities cOlIlbine with classical laws, for they reter to
the cc,ncrete events which classical laws or abstract conjugates define.
Statistical probability joins hands with dialectical analysiS, for
dialectic analyzes the way- events can proceed: from opposed principles and how
the occurrence of the events modifies the principles.

deal with how frequent1,. such events occur.
integration .2! ideo1olical
s ta.tistical 2robab1l1tz.

.!!:2

But dialectic does not

-

And in this connection, the

behaVioral. cuIture

.!! .2!! ~

baais

.2!.

For behavior consists of events which are likely' to

contom or not to confOrM to one' 8 moving on the basis of one t s habitual
willingness. 29 Such integration will be higher insofar as the culture otters
tewer alternatives to the 'behavior demanded by its norms.
Statistical. probability is also intimately connected with de'felopaent,
and in this connection is relevant to integration.
12.

D~91!!!nt.

BasiC in the notion of development i8 the concept of
30
emergence ot an integration of an othennse Coincidental. man1f'o1d.
!his

29Lonergan, p. 598, see above, p. 2".

3Ozbid.,

p.

4SlJ •••

ahoYe, p. 191.
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emergence is an event, and ita occurrence can be judged to be more or len
probable.

An insight is such an event; it is the Ifl'l'lental integration" that

Sorokin s~ is the first step in the emergence ot a sociocultural system. 3l
Such an integration can dominate the underlying manif'old w1 th complete
suooesa, resulting in a static system.

it can allow suoh changes in the
underlyIng mmI,told so as to require a new higher integra.tion. 32 The
Or

frequency and number ot such changes in the underlying manifold are meuured
statistIcally.

The Azande, for example, possessed an integrated viewpoint

which had an explanation for the action ot benge upon fowl.
was

E.vans-Pritchard

not able to provide a sufficient number of experiences that would enable

the inSight that would give the Azande the concept of natural causalIty to
occur.

The defense mechanism of suppressed nucleation worked to prevent the

gr!)uping ot such experiences.
13.

Difterentia.tion.

Development 1s also characterized by increasing

differentiation)3 Cultural development, and personal development within a
culture, are prerequiSites tor the clear distinction between selt and nonselt, between objects that are subjects and those that are not subjects,
between the desire to know and other desires, between moral judgment and moral
feeling, and between different areas ot cultural lite. 34 Thus there is
possible, in a verr undeveloped community, an integration hued primaril:r upon
the feeling ot inter-subjeotivity and or a pervasive moral or religious

31DfnamiC8, IV, 62-6); see above, p. 227.
32Ibid., pp. 78-79; Lonergan, pp. 452-453; see above, pp. 187-193.
33Ibid., pp. 616-617; Lonergan, pp. h,2-543J see above, p. 19h.
~above, pp. 22a.:.231.
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significanoe to all aspects of life.

Such a community would be a multibonded

group, but the different bonds would not be distinguished by' the members of
the group.

Differentiation brings the dialectical processes of opposed but

linked principles out into the open.

14. 1:!!......no...rm
........
s. Inoreased ditferentiation brings a need for explicit
prinoiples of integration; this need is likely to be met by the explioi t
formulation ot law-norma.

Thus, communal development brings about an increase

in the number of offioial law-norms 1n

~roportion

to

t.~e

unotficial law-norms.

There mq be laok of comprehension ot official law-norms on the part of man:r
of the people,
culture.

~lich

would result in a lack of integration of ideological

There ma1 also be a dialectical opposition between offiCial and un-

official law-norms within the oommunity.35
It is through self-affirmation that the investigator arrives at an
interpretative

fra~work

based upon the d,ynamic structure of human oognition

and hu.!llan deSire, value, and. choice.

This same interpretative framework is

operative in the investigator and in the subjects whom he is stu.dying,

althollgh it is likely that the subjects have not reached a tully explicit
knowledge of the distinotion and relationships ot the different aots. Within
this basic tra1lltnlork, the investigator t.hen can formulate possible
which thin.78, conjugates, and events can be related.

w&y'8

in

The heuristic ant1c1pa-

t10na ot abstract relationships between terms. ot concrete events occurring
wi th vary1ng trequenoies, of dialectical and genetic processes,

)$SOOie]l, Culture,

~

ot concrete

Persona11![, p. 79) see above, pp. 32-33.
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oausal. systems, of aesthetio and symbolic unities al.l oan aot as clues in the
formulation of hypotheses when one is oonfronted with a question of how this
or that particular communi t(r is integrated.
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